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Izvod:  
IZ  
Kada je profesor renesansne 
književnosti na UCLA dr Majkl Alen krajem 
prošlog i početkom ovog veka počeo da 
objavljuje svoje prevode dela Marsilija Fičina 
sa latinskog na engleski jezik, moglo bi se reći 
da je započeo novo poglavlje u šekspirologiji. 
Neuporedivo veća dostupnost ovih, 
svojevremeno izuzetno uticajnih, a u 
međuvremenu gotovo zaboravljenih tekstova 
dovela je do obnove interesovanja književno-
kritičkih krugova za fenomen poznat kao 
renesansni neoplatonizam, praćene povećanom 
svešću o tome koliko je sveobuhvatan i 
sveprožimajući uticaj koji je ovaj neobični i 
eklektički sistem misli ostvario na Šekspirova 
dela, kao i dela mnogih njegovih savremenika.  
Renesansni neoplatonizam, iako ni 
ranije nije bio nepoznat šekspirolozima, dugo je 
 bio zanemarivan pri tumačenjima Šekspirovih 
dela – posebno onih „ozbiljnijih“ – kao suviše 
marginalan ili, u najboljem slučaju, suviše 
optimističan skup ideja o harmoniji kosmičkih 
sfera. Detaljnije čitanje Fičinovih tekstova, kao 
i dela drugih neoplatoničara i njihovih drevnih 
izvora, pruža neprocenjiv uvid u „mračnu“ 
stranu neoplatonizma, ali i „mračnu“ stranu 
Šekspirovih „mračnijih“ drama. 
Ovaj uvid nije zanimljiv samo sa 
aspekta tumačenja književnosti. Šekspirovo 
doba, koje se sada najčešće naziva ranim 
modernim periodom upravo iz tog razloga, doba 
je u kome su utemeljeni mnogi kulturni obrasci 
koji su i dalje u opticaju. Upravo su Šekspirova 
dela u velikoj meri poslužila kao provodnik za 
veliki broj tih obrazaca zbog široke i dugotrajne 
recepcije koju su uživala.  
Polazeći od pretpostavke da se bazični 
metafizički koncepti mogu lako prenositi i 
ugrađivati u temelje raznih ideologija u 
najširem smislu te reči i da su stoga njihovo 
iznošenje na površinu i analiziranje posebno 
zanimljivi i korisni, ova disertacija za svoj 
fokus uzima jedan metafizički koncept koji čini 
osnovu renesansnog (a i svakog drugog) 
neoplatonizma. Taj metafizički koncept jeste 
hijerarhijska i gotovo uvek rodno determinisana 
dihotomija duh/materija, čije se „mračnije“ 
manifestacije u renesansnom neoplatonizmu 
često zanemaruju ili pogrešno pripisuju 
 hrišćanskim uticajima.  
Cilj ove disertacije je da se identifikuju 
oni aspekti Šekspirovih dela – pre svega 
tragedija i takozvanih „problemskih drama“ – 
koji su u saglasju sa dualističkom metafizikom 
renesansnog neoplatonizma, zatim da se 
značenja tih aspekata analiziraju u okviru te 
metafizike, te da se time iznađu dalje 
implikacije ne samo za tumačenja Šekspirovih 
dela, već i za bliže razumevanje čitave naše 
civilizacije, koja bi se, pre no posthrišćanskom, 
moga slobodno nazvati postneoplatoničarskom. 
Kao hipoteza se postavlja očekivanje da 
će dualistički koncepti koji potiču iz 
renesansnog neoplatonizma biti pronađeni na 
nekolikim nivoima Šekspirovih odabranih 
tekstova, od zvučnog, preko metaforičkog, do 
alegorijskog. Daleko od toga da ponudi 
nekakvo konačno tumačenje Šekspirovih dela, 
ova analiza će, nadamo se, prosto povećati broj 
njihovih mogućih interpretacija. 
Metodi koji će biti korišćeni su 
eklektični. Najčešće će se koristiti klasična 
komparativna analiza – s jedne strane, 
metafizičkih sistema dostupnih Šekspiru putem 
renesansnog neoplatonizma i, s druge strane, 
Šekspirovih dela (pre svega tragedija i 
takozvanih „problemskih drama“). Stavovi 
autorki i autora koji pripadaju feminizmu, 
novom istorizmu, dekonstrukciji i psihoanalizi 
biće citirani, a neke tehnike u okviru ovih škola 
 tumačenja korišćene pri daljoj analizi. U 
znatnom delu disertacije koristiće se 
feminističko čitanje metafizike, jer je 
utvrđivanje rodno zasnovanih hijerarhija i 
stereotipa jedna od implikacija metafizičkog 
dualizma duha i materije. 
Prva tri poglavlja ove disertacije su 
uvodna, od čega drugo i treće pružaju kratki 
osvrt na razvoj dualizma duh/materija i samog 
koncepta materije kroz istoriju evropske 
filozofije i religije. Koncept feminino 
determinisane, haotične i mračne materije, 
suprotstavljen konceptu maskulino 
determinisanog, racionalnog i svetlog duha, 
prati se u drugom poglavlju od svojih začetaka 
u orfizmu, dionizijskim i eleuzinskim 
misterijama i pitagorejskom pokretu, preko 
svog najuticajnijeg proponenta Platona i 
njegovih sledbenika, sa posebnim osvrtom na 
neoplatoničare, do mnogobrojnih dualističkih 
pokreta koji su pod njihovim direktnim ili 
indirektnim uticajem nicali diljem antičkog i 
srednjovekovnog sveta. Radikalni ili 
emanativni, prokosmički ili antikosmički, 
dualizam duha i materije – prenošen kroz spise i 
usmena učenja hermetičara, gnostika, 
manihejaca, bogumila i katara, pa katkad i kroz 
samo hrišćanstvo, koje mu je zvanično 
suprotstavljeno – pokazuje se kao neprekinuta 
nit u istoriji evropske civilizacije. 
Treće poglavlje bavi se dualizmom duha 
 i materije u renesansnom neoplatonizmu. 
Eklektičan, kompleksan i imanentno 
paradoksalan fenomen poznat kao renesansni 
neoplatonizam nastaje kao rezultat snažnog 
istovremenog upliva više tipova dualizma u 
judeohrišćansku misao – Platonovi rukopisi 
stižu u zapadnu Evropu zajedno sa rukopisima 
neoplatoničara i hermetičara, ali i pravim, živim 
kabalistima – koji sa oduševljenjem prihvataju, 
prisvajaju i prerađuju tzv. „hrišćanski“ 
neoplatoničari na čelu sa Marsiliom Fičinom. U 
okviru renesansnog neoplatonizma može se 
izdvojiti nekoliko sasvim različitih i međusobno 
nekompatibilnih struja: „čist“ neoplatonizam, 
magija, alhemija, gnosticizam, kabala i 
hermetizam. Sve one, bile prokosmičke ili 
antikosmičke, imaju u svojoj osnovi rodno 
determinisan hijerarhijski dualizam duha i 
materije i, u najmanju ruku, ambivalentan odnos 
prema telu i kosmosu, a u odnosu na samu 
materiju – odnosno, šta se sa njom može ili 
mora činiti – mogu se uočiti tri široke kategorije 
koje se mogu ilustrovati kroz primer 
dualističkih alegorijskih tumačenja mita o 
Narcisu. 
Plotinovo viđenje Narcisa kao prikaz 
duha prevarenog sopstvenim odrazom u kaljuzi 
materije poredi se sa gotovo identičnim, ali 
drugačije percipiranim događajem opisanim u 
hermetičkom spisu Pimander, gde je pad duha u 
materiju u kojoj se ogleda opisan kao kreativni 
 čin ljubavi iz koga nastaje kosmos. Tako 
antikosmički nastrojeni Plotin moli čitaoca da 
se vine ka pravom duhovnom izvoru svog lepog 
lika, jer je druga opcija pad u kal materije. 
Treća opcija, koju nudi prokosmički 
hermetizam, jeste ljubavni spoj duha i materije 
u kom superiorni ali benevolentni maskulini 
duh svojevoljno svojim odrazom formira 
inferiornu ali prijemčivu femininu materiju.  
Ove tri opcije se ogledaju u Šekspirovim 
delima u centralnom delu disertacije (poglavlja 
4-9), koji se sastoji od komparativne analize 
pristupa materijalnom i telesnom u, s jedne 
strane, različitim strujama renesansnog 
neoplatonizma i, s druge strane, Šekspirovim 
delima, najpre tragedijama i problemskim 
dramama. 
Pojedinačna poglavlja središnjeg dela 
disertacije bave se mogućim pristupima 
materiji, ali takođe i mogućim koracima na 
jednom neoplatoničarskom putu kroz 
materijalni svet. 
Taj put počinje u „Tamnici“, kojom se 
bavi četvrto poglavlje. Istraživanje 
antikosmičkih stavova prema materijalnom i 
telesnom u Šekspirovim tragedijama i 
problemskim dramama dovodi do zaključka da 
su oni u skladu sa antikosmičkim učenjima 
gnostika, manihejaca, bogumila, katara, i 
pesimista među neoplatoničarima. Junaci 
Šekspirovih tragedija i problemskih drama 
 (Hamlet, Romeo, Kleopatra, Lir, Gloster, Tit 
Andronik) svet i telo eksplicitno doživljavaju 
kao tamnicu duše, a često se takva osećanja i 
poređenja javljaju u doslovnim tamnicama (kao 
što na svojoj koži iskuse Ričard II, Lir, 
Malvolio, Klaudio i Barnardin). Mora se 
primetiti da su antikosmički stavovi kod 
Šekspirovih junaka najčešće posledica 
nekakvog šoka ili razočarenja.  
Mikrokosmosi drama kao što su Hamlet, 
Magbet, Kralj Lir i Mera za meru mogu se čitati 
kao alegorijski prikazi neoplatoničarskog pakla 
u kome vlada haos mračne materije, a njihovi 
vladari-uzurpatori kao zločesti demijurzi. 
Primećuje se dvojaka subverzivnost – u 
religijskom i političkom smislu – korišćenja 
figure kralja kao demijurga, kao i činjenice da 
pomoć utamničenima u njegovom mračnom 
domenu uvek dolazi spolja, obično u figuri 
doketskog Hrista, koji dolazi da probudi 
uspavane iskre (Vojvoda u Meri za meru, duh 
Hamletovog oca, Kordelija u Kralju Liru). 
Kada se svet posmatra kao tamnica čiji 
je glavni tamničar lažljivi uzurpator, sama 
akcija postaje problematizovana i lako se nailazi 
na stav da je kontemplacija bezbednija i čistija 
opcija. Tako se Hamletov čuveni solilokvij 
može čitati i kao suprotstavljanje opcije „biti“ u 
fiksnom, nepromenljivom duhu opciji „ne biti“ 
u fluidnom i iluzornom svetu stalnog nastajanja 
i nestajanja materije. Mnogi Šekspirovi junaci 
 izbegavaju da uprljaju ruke i odriču se svega, 
između ostalog i ljubavi, zarad viših ciljeva 
(Hamlet; Vojvoda, Izabela i Anđelo u Meri za 
meru). 
Ovo se u sledećem poglavlju, 
„Uznošenje“, pokazuje, opet u 
neoplatoničarskom diskursu, kao potencijalno 
pogrešan korak. U neoplatonizmom inspirisanoj 
renesansnoj teoriji ljubavi, čiji su najuticajniji 
propagatori Fičino i Bruno, upravo se kroz 
erotsko dostiže božansko, ali uz bitno 
upozorenje da erotski poticaj mora dolaziti od 
nebeske, a ne zemaljske Venere, i da ne sme 
imati za cilj brak ili, još gore, blud. Narcis koji 
se ogleda u baruštini materije mora znati da je 
zaljubljen u sopstveni lepi odraz, a ne u tu baru, 
i mora se vinuti naviše, ka čisto duhovnom 
božanstvu kome je suštinski istovetan. 
Analizom Šekspirovih dela se utvrđuje da se 
primeri uspešnog erotskog uzdizanja od 
materijalnog i telesnog mogu naći uglavnom u 
komedijama, dok je u mračnijim dramama 
figura nebeske Venere uvek bar donekle 
problematizovana, kao što je to Dezdemona u 
Otelu. Takođe se dolazi do zaključka da je eros 
dualizma po definiciji narcisoidan, jer je uvek 
težnja istog za istim – duha za duhom, 
razdvojenim samim od sebe Drugim materije – i 
da je ovakva idealizovana ljubav, bilo se 
manifestovala homoerotski ili heteroerotski (a 
obe manifestacije se mogu naći kod Šekspira) 
 neumitno neprijateljski nastrojena prema svakoj 
stvarnoj ženskoj osobi pojedinačno i ženskom 
telu uopšte. 
Poglavlje „Enoza“ bavi se stanjem koje 
predstavlja krajnji cilj dualističke erotske 
žudnje, a to je mistično potpuno utapanje svake 
iskre u svoje božansko izvorište. Svrha 
narcisoidnog erosa dualizma se ispunjava tako 
što se maskulini duh sjedinjuje sam sa sobom. 
Iako je nijedna pravoverna monoteistička 
religija ne priznaje kao legitimni cilj vernika, 
enoza je eksplicitno postavljena kao ishodište 
svake duše u Fičinovom sistemu „hrišćanskog“ 
neoplatonizma, bilo kao ishod čiste 
kontemplacije ili vatrene žudnje. Kod Šekspira 
se figura enoze javlja uglavnom u ovom 
drugom obliku, i to nikada bez poveće doze 
ambivalencije prema erotskom. Antonijev 
dijalog sa Erosom ilustruje nekoliko aspekata 
erotske enoze: brisanje granica između 
ljubavnika i voljenog, onostranu prirodu 
„istinske“ ljubavi, povezanost seksualnosti i 
smrti, konačno nepostojanje identiteta i 
ništavilo smrti kao krajnji cilj i ishod svake 
žudnje. Ovi aspekti se dalje istražuju i ilustruju 
kroz svoje manifestacije u Šekspirovim 
tragedijama i problemskim dramama (Hamlet, 
Romeo i Julija, Otelo, Troil i Kresida, Mera za 
meru, Julije Cezar, Timon Atinjanin). Zaključak 
je da Šekspir uvek zadržava ambivalenciju 
prema erotskom i da se svaka erotska smrt može 
 tumačiti i kao enoza i kao pad. 
Sedmo poglavlje, „Silazak“, bavi se 
onim što se zbiva kada Narcis, zaveden 
odrazom svog duha u njima, zakorači u vode 
materije. Fičino i Bruno su u svojim teorijama 
ljubavi jasni: ukoliko ljubavnik napravi kobnu 
grešku i posegne za telom osobe za koju mu se 
učini da ga erotski privlači, umesto da se, 
inspirisan njenom lepom formom, vine ka 
čistoti duha odakle ta forma potiče, upašće u 
pakao materijalnog. Zemaljska Venera može 
pod maskom nebeske zavesti naivnog i nevinog 
ljubavnika i odvući ga u dubine materijalnog 
sveta, naizgled nudeći mu mogućnost uzleta ka 
nebeskim visinama. Za to je dovoljna jedna noć 
provedena sa njom. Ovaj zaplet se može naći, u 
različitim varijacijama, u mnogim Šekspirovim 
delima: Sve je dobro što se dobro svrši, Troil i 
Kresida, Mera za meru, Romeo i Julija i Otelo. 
U svima je dovoljna jedna noć provedena sa 
njom da se nebeska Venera volšebno 
transformiše u zemaljsku – čista Dijana u 
bludnu Jelenu, devica u kurvu – i utamniči 
zlosrećnog ljubavnika u telesnost braka ili 
bluda, ili, još gore, na samo dno pakla ženske 
seksualnosti, u haotično ništavilo pramaterije. 
Osmo poglavlje, „Ništavilo“, bavi se 
upravo onime što se nalazi na dnu 
neoplatoničarskog kosmosa – ništavilom koje se 
istodobno otkriva kao neoplatoničarska prima 
materia. Ona je uvek feminino determinisana – 
 u neoplatonizmu je Hekata identifikovana sa 
materijom, a figura Hekate se i u 
mikrokosmosima Šekspirovih mračnijih 
komada pokazuje kao prava vladarka paklenog 
domena zločestog uzurpatora (Ledi Magbet, 
Tamora, pa čak i Gertruda). Feminina 
determinisanost pramaterije ogleda se kod 
Šekspira i u višeznačnom i često ponavljanom 
glasu, ili slovu, ili cifri – „O“ ili „0“ – koje 
može biti matematički izraženo ništavilo 
pramaterije, ali i oznaka za vaginalni otvor. 
Ovom višeznačju doprinosi i činjenica da se reč 
„nothing“ („ništa“), uvek zlokobno značajna reč 
kod Šekspira, mogla u jeziku Šekspirove 
Engleske koristiti u oba smisla. „O“ je i oznaka 
za matericu u kojoj se ljudsko biće, po 
tadašnjim teorijama, zdušno prihvaćenim od 
strane neoplatoničara, materijalizuje od očevog 
duha i majčine materije, i time materinstvo 
dobija izrazito negativan prizvuk. Majka je ta 
koja doprinosi materiju u procesu reprodukcije, 
čineći nas time smrtnim i pravdajući čestu 
povezanost figura materice i grobnice 
(„womb/tomb“), kao i očajnički pokušaj nekih 
junaka – primerice, Koriolana – da se od 
materinskog tela radikalno odvoje, što često 
dovodi do nasilnog i krvavog vraćanja u njega. 
Neoplatoničarska majka, pokazuje se, često 
proždire sopstvenu decu.  
U mnogim tragedijama se junak suočava 
sa pramaterijom koja se pojavljuje doslovno 
 uobličena u „O“: primeri za ovu figuru su 
paklena jama u šumi višestruko povezana sa 
Tamorom i vaginalno determinisana u Titu 
Androniku, grobnica Kapuleta u Romeu i Juliji, 
veštičiji kotao u Magbetu, kao i vaginalni pakao 
kroz koji prolaze Lir i Timon u svojoj mašti. 
Hamlet se spušta u tri gradirana ponora 
pramaterije u svojoj istrazi o tome odakle dolazi 
trulež u Danskoj: Ofelijina, zatim Gertrudina 
odaja, i na kraju otvoreni grob u koji uskače. 
Suočavanje sa materijalnom osnovom kosmosa, 
premda u tragedijama uglavnom najviše služi 
tome da ilustruje paklene dubine do kojih se 
junak i/ili njegov svet srozao, može dovesti 
junaka i do neke vrste regeneracije i ponovnog 
rođenja, kao što je slučaj sa Lirom. 
Suočavanje sa neformiranom materijom 
može dovesti neoplatoničarskog junaka i do 
prokosmičkih tendencija: može poželeti da u taj 
mračni haos unese red i lepotu forme iz viših 
kosmičkih sfera. Time se bavi poslednje 
poglavlje centralnog dela disertacije, nazvano 
„Teurgija“. Narativ iz Pimandera o 
primordijalnom duhovnom Čoveku koji 
ogledanjem u njenim tamnim vodama 
svojevoljno daje formu voljenoj materijalnoj 
Prirodi je, u kombinaciji sa Jamblihovom 
teorijom teurgije, dao podsticaj Fičinu da 
osmisli sopstvenu, i pored svog stalno 
ambivalentnog stava prema bilo kakvoj 
interakciji maskulinog duha sa femininom 
 materijom. Teurgija – koja može obuhvatati 
rituale, praktičnu magiju i alhemiju, ali i druga 
neimenovana delanja – nalazi se na 
prokosmičkom ekstremu neoplatonizma, kao 
aktivan napor svakog pojedinca da uvede red u 
kosmos i, kao demijurg, i sam formira materiju 
koja mu je na raspolaganju. 
Kod Šekspira se primeri uspešne 
teurgije uglavnom mogu naći u kasnijim 
komadima (takozvanim „romansama“), dok 
tragedije i problemske drame obično prikazuju 
obrnut proces, u kome se kosmos svodi na haos 
pramaterije. Ubijanje ili uklanjanje uspešnih 
teurga, koji održavaju red na svim nivoima – 
pojedinac, država, kosmos – dovodi do pada 
čitavog domena u haos, kao što se može videti u 
Meri za meru, Hamletu i Magbetu. Figura 
uspešnog teurga ili maga oslikava se kao 
neoplatoničarsko sunce koje oplođava i formira 
mrtvu materiju, dajući joj život, kao što je slučaj 
sa solarnim kraljem Dankanom. Uspešan teurg 
je dobar kralj, otac, oličenje božanstva, što se 
istražuje kroz metaforu kovanja novca, koje, 
kao davanje svog lika i forme bezobličnom 
metalu, kao pravo pripada upravo ovim 
figurama. Lirova izjava da sme da kuje novac 
pošto je on kralj se, međutim, može čitati i kao 
izjava bilo kog teurgijski nastrojenog pojedinca, 
jer po metafizici prokosmičkih struja u 
neoplatonizmu svaka iskra duha ima pravo i 
obavezu da formira materiju po svom 
 uzvišenom liku i uvodi poredak u nju. 
Prokosmički dualizam se time pokazuje kao 
potencijalno politički i religijski čak 
subverzivniji od antikosmičkog. 
Teurgija kao koncept je, dalje se 
primećuje, ugrađena u nekolike diskriminatorne 
ideologije: mag može figurirati kao kolonizator 
koji civilizuje inferiornije, telesnije, 
materijalnije „varvare“ ili kao krotitelj, opet, 
inferiornijih, telesnijih, materijalnijih žena. U 
Buri se, recimo, jasno vide oba procesa, kao i 
paradoks po kome je muškarac koji menja i 
kontroliše prirodu (Prospero) moćni mag, dok je 
žena koja čini to isto (Sikoraks) zlokobna 
veštica.  
Ženske figure se u slikama vezanim za 
teurgiju javljaju u dve najčešće varijante. U 
prvoj su predstavnice feminine materije, koja u 
prokosmizmu može biti „dobra“ ukoliko je 
dovoljno poslušna i prijemčiva kontroli i 
formiranju od strane maskulinog duha, koji time 
postaje direktno odgovoran za nju, što dovodi 
do pojačane anksioznosti. Neposlušna materija 
je kod Šekspira često predstavljena kroz figure 
neposlušnih žena. Analiziraju se zanimljive 
slike u kojima se pobuna kćerki (Šajlokove i 
Lirovih) opisuje kao pobuna materijalnog i 
telesnog protiv duha koji daje život. 
Potencijalno neposlušna žena, doživljena kao 
previše materijalna i telesna jer aktivnim 
iskazivanjem ljubavi pre braka (Dezdemona, 
 Julija, Kordelija) daje signal ocu i/ili mužu da 
joj je požuda preča od dužnosti, može biti 
odbačena, i tu se oslikava druga varijanta 
ženske figure – kao spone kosmosa.  
Naime, Šekspirovi junaci, koji usled 
imanentne paradoksalnosti neoplatonizma 
nikada ne mogu znati kako se odnositi prema 
ženskim figurama, često prave i grešku upravo 
suprotnu, ali isto tako fatalnu, kao što je pad 
pred požudom zemaljske Venere, a to je 
odbacivanje ženske ljubavi iz straha da je u 
pitanju puka požuda. Ispostavlja se da je ta 
ljubav, kao što je slučaj u Kralju Liru i Otelu, 
ali i Zimskoj bajci, bila neoplatoničarski zlatni 
lanac ljubavi, spona kosmosa, koja ga je držala 
u harmoniji, a da bez nje haos pramaterije 
ponovo dolazi. Šekspir ovime dekonstruiše 
dihotomiju ljubav/dužnost, i to koristeći 
neoplatoničarsku metafiziku, u kojoj su oba 
pojma sinonimi za harmoniju kosmosa koju 
održava uzvišena božanska ljubav. Kodelijin 
odgovor Liru da ga voli „according to my bond“ 
(dužnost i spona su samo neka od mogućih 
značenja ove reči) time dobija dodatne moguće 
interpretacije.  
Još jedna dihotomija koju Šekspir 
dekonstruiše upravo putem neoplatoničarske 
metafizike jeste, u njegovo doba popularna, 
umetnost/priroda. Umetnost se – u smislu svega 
umetnog i artificijelnog i svakog umeća, veštine 
i delanja koje uređuje i menja datost – često 
 suprotstavljala „Bogom danoj“ prirodi u 
pokatkad žestokim debatama, od kojih su neke 
umele da potkače i pozorište. Ono po čemu se 
neoplatonizam razlikuje od pravovernih 
monoteizama jeste, između ostalog, dvojakost 
shvatanja prirode i neinsistiranje na njenoj 
normativnosti. Dve prirode u neoplatonizmu, 
viša i niža, duhovna i materijalna, aktivna i 
pasivna, korespondiraju sa Venerom i Hekatom, 
a ova podvojenost prirode se najizrazitije 
ispoljava u Kralju Liru, ali se njene 
manifestacije mogu naći i u Hamletu i Magbetu. 
Viša priroda koja kultiviše nižu kao što vrtlar 
kultiviše vrt – što je česta figura, kako kod 
renesansnih neoplatoničara, tako i kod Šekspira 
– poistovećuje se sa umetnošću.  
Pozorišna umetnost kao ogledalo prirode 
u Hamletovoj izjavi može se u 
neoplatoničarskom ključu čitati i kao teurgijsko 
upodobljavanje niže prirode višoj, a ne samo 
kao puki mimetski prikaz čulne stvarnosti. 
Dramaturg se tako pokazuje kao teurg koji 
onom materijom koja mu je na raspolaganju 
manipuliše e da bi i nju (svoje glumce, 
scenografiju i pozorište) i publiku transformisao 
i preuredio po liku više prirode koja je njemu, 
po platoničarskim teorijama božanske poetske 
inspiracije, dostupnija. Dok u tragedijama 
teurgijske umetničke tendencije ostaju 
neispoljene, a njihovi nesuđeni agenti (kao što 
su Lavinija u Titu Androniku i Kasio i 
 Dezdemona u Otelu) obogaljeni i/ili ubijeni, 
usled čega kosmos ponovo postaje haos, u 
romansama se pojavljuju i uspešni umetnici-
teurzi. Paulina u Zimskoj bajci i Prospero u Buri 
su možda najbolji primeri, koji svojim 
„nadilaženjem“ prirode i ukazivanjem na višu 
istinu putem pozorišne iluzije pokazuju da je 
dramaturg verodostojniji stvaralac od 
demijurga. 
Posle kratke rekapitulacije 
paradoksalnih i često međusobno 
nekompatibilnih tumačenja Šekspirovih dela na 
osnovu aspekata metafizičkog dualizma 
preuzetog iz renesansnog neoplatonizma, u 
zaključku ove disertacije predlaže se detaljnije i 
dublje izučavanje uticaja neoplatoničarskog 
koncepta materije, kao i dihotomije 
duh/materija, na dalju književnost i kulturu. 
Ovo bi moglo da ima implikacije za studije 
književnosti, ali i studije kulture, rodne i kvir 
studije. 
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Abstract:  
AB  
We have in the past two decades, owing 
to the recently appearing translations of Ficino’s 
works into English, witnessed a revival of 
interest in the phenomenon known as 
Renaissance Neoplatonism. Although not 
unknown to Shakespearologists, Renaissance 
Neoplatonism has long been neglected in 
interpretations of Shakespeare’s works – 
especially the “darker” ones – as an overly 
marginal, eccentric, or optimistic concoction of 
notions on the harmony of the spheres. A deeper 
reading of Ficino’s texts, as well as those of 
other Renaissance Neoplatonists and their 
ancient sources, offers an invaluable insight into 
the “dark” sides of both Neoplatonism and 
Shakespeare’s “darker” plays. 
This insight is also intriguing for areas 
of research other than literary criticism. It was 
 in Shakespeare’s age – now usually referred to 
as the early modern period precisely for this 
reason – that many of our own current cultural 
patterns were shaped, and Shakespeare’s works 
certainly served as one conduit. Using as its 
starting point the assumption that basic 
metaphysical concepts can with great ease be 
transferred over time and space and built into 
the foundations of differing ideologies in the 
broadest sense of the word, and that unearthing 
and analyzing them is therefore an especially 
rewarding and useful endeavor, this dissertation 
chooses to focus on a metaphysical concept 
which lies at the very basis of (Renaissance) 
Neoplatonism. The metaphysical concept in 
question is the nearly invariably gendered and 
hierarchized spirit/matter dichotomy, whose 
more sinister and “darker” manifestations in 
Renaissance Neoplatonism have frequently been 
neglected or misattributed to Christian 
influences.  
The aim of this dissertation is to identify 
those facets of Shakespeare’s darker plays – 
primarily his tragedies and “problem plays” – 
that resonate well with the dualistic traditions 
extant in Renaissance Neoplatonism, analyze 
their possible meanings within the contexts 
offered by these religious and philosophical 
systems, and hopefully discover their further 
implications for understanding both 
Shakespeare and certain aspects of so-called 
 Western cultures. The hypothesis is that the 
dualistic concepts derived from Renaissance 
Neoplatonism will resonate well with parts of 
Shakespeare’s work, revealing in their 
originative context further notions illuminating 
further meanings attributable to Shakespeare’s 
text and our cultural atmosphere, many of which 
will be paradoxical and contradictory – much 
like Renaissance Neoplatonism itself.  
The central portion of this thesis consists 
of a comparative analysis of approaches to the 
material and the carnal existing in, on the one 
hand, various branches of Renaissance 
Neoplatonism, and, on the other, Shakespeare’s 
work, primarily his tragedies and so-called 
“problem” plays. The individual chapters deal 
with possible approaches to matter and also 
possible steps along a Neoplatonic journey 
through the material world. This journey begins 
in “The Prison,” where the hero experiences 
those Neoplatonic sentiments that are on the 
anti-cosmic end of the spectrum. This, many 
Neoplatonists would hope, can induce him to 
attempt an “Ascent” towards the purely spiritual 
spheres. This ascent is often also inspired by 
female figures stripped of all carnality. The 
ultimate goal of Neoplatonic ascent is 
“Henosis,” in which the hero becomes one with 
the One. If the hero is not careful, allowing 
himself to be lured downward by carnal female 
figures, or if he is very adventurous indeed, he 
 can instead begin a kenotic “Descent” into the 
depths of matter. This descent will allow him to 
face the “Nothing” of formless prime matter 
which is at the basis of the cosmos and his own 
mortal body. Faced with it, he will, some 
Neoplatonists would hope, realize that it is this 
nothing that everything comes from, and will 
strive to help the spiritual forces in the universe, 
of which he ultimately is one, form it lovingly. 
This is known as “Theurgy.” 
As predicted, the analysis shows that the 
dualistic concepts originating from Renaissance 
Neoplatonism can indeed be found on several 
levels of Shakespeare’s “darker” plays. Far 
from providing definitive answers to questions 
raised by Shakespeare’s work, the proffered 
analysis, as expected, merely increases the 
number of its possible interpretations.  
It is concluded that the Neoplatonic 
concept of matter and its spirit/matter 
dichotomy exerted a formative influence not 
only on Shakespeare and his age, but the ages 
that followed as well, our own included. This 
insight offers implications for further research 
not only in literary criticism, but also cultural, 
gender and queer studies. 
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FIGURE MATERIJALNOG I TELESNOG 
U ŠEKSPIROVIM TRAGEDIJAMA I PROBLEMSKIM DRAMAMA 
 
APSTRAKT 
 
Kada je profesor renesansne književnosti na UCLA dr Majkl Alen krajem prošlog 
i početkom ovog veka počeo da objavljuje svoje prevode dela Marsilija Fičina sa 
latinskog na engleski jezik, moglo bi se reći da je započeo novo poglavlje u 
šekspirologiji. Neuporedivo veća dostupnost ovih, svojevremeno izuzetno uticajnih, a u 
međuvremenu gotovo zaboravljenih tekstova dovela je do obnove interesovanja 
književno-kritičkih krugova za fenomen poznat kao renesansni neoplatonizam, praćene 
povećanom svešću o tome koliko je sveobuhvatan i sveprožimajući uticaj koji je ovaj 
neobični i eklektički sistem misli ostvario na Šekspirova dela, kao i dela mnogih njegovih 
savremenika.  
Renesansni neoplatonizam, iako ni ranije nije bio nepoznat šekspirolozima, dugo 
je bio zanemarivan pri tumačenjima Šekspirovih dela – posebno onih „ozbiljnijih“ – kao 
suviše marginalan ili, u najboljem slučaju, suviše optimističan skup ideja o harmoniji 
kosmičkih sfera. Detaljnije čitanje Fičinovih tekstova, kao i dela drugih neoplatoničara i 
njihovih drevnih izvora, pruža neprocenjiv uvid u „mračnu“ stranu neoplatonizma, ali i 
„mračnu“ stranu Šekspirovih „mračnijih“ drama. 
Ovaj uvid nije zanimljiv samo sa aspekta tumačenja književnosti. Šekspirovo 
doba, koje se sada najčešće naziva ranim modernim periodom upravo iz tog razloga, doba 
je u kome su utemeljeni mnogi kulturni obrasci koji su i dalje u opticaju. Upravo su 
 Šekspirova dela u velikoj meri poslužila kao provodnik za veliki broj tih obrazaca zbog 
široke i dugotrajne recepcije koju su uživala.  
Polazeći od pretpostavke da se bazični metafizički koncepti mogu lako prenositi i 
ugrađivati u temelje raznih ideologija u najširem smislu te reči i da su stoga njihovo 
iznošenje na površinu i analiziranje posebno zanimljivi i korisni, ova disertacija za svoj 
fokus uzima jedan metafizički koncept koji čini osnovu renesansnog (a i svakog drugog) 
neoplatonizma. Taj metafizički koncept jeste hijerarhijska i gotovo uvek rodno 
determinisana dihotomija duh/materija, čije se „mračnije“ manifestacije u renesansnom 
neoplatonizmu često zanemaruju ili pogrešno pripisuju hrišćanskim uticajima.  
Cilj ove disertacije je da se identifikuju oni aspekti Šekspirovih dela – pre svega 
tragedija i takozvanih „problemskih drama“ – koji su u saglasju sa dualističkom 
metafizikom renesansnog neoplatonizma, zatim da se značenja tih aspekata analiziraju u 
okviru te metafizike, te da se time iznađu dalje implikacije ne samo za tumačenja 
Šekspirovih dela, već i za bliže razumevanje čitave naše civilizacije, koja bi se, pre no 
posthrišćanskom, moga slobodno nazvati postneoplatoničarskom. 
Kao hipoteza se postavlja očekivanje da će dualistički koncepti koji potiču iz 
renesansnog neoplatonizma biti pronađeni na nekolikim nivoima Šekspirovih odabranih 
tekstova, od zvučnog, preko metaforičkog, do alegorijskog. Daleko od toga da ponudi 
nekakvo konačno tumačenje Šekspirovih dela, ova analiza će, nadamo se, prosto povećati 
broj njihovih mogućih interpretacija. 
Metodi koji će biti korišćeni su eklektični. Najčešće će se koristiti klasična 
komparativna analiza – s jedne strane, metafizičkih sistema dostupnih Šekspiru putem 
renesansnog neoplatonizma i, s druge strane, Šekspirovih dela (pre svega tragedija i 
takozvanih „problemskih drama“). Stavovi autorki i autora koji pripadaju feminizmu, 
novom istorizmu, dekonstrukciji i psihoanalizi biće citirani, a neke tehnike u okviru ovih 
škola tumačenja korišćene pri daljoj analizi. U znatnom delu disertacije koristiće se 
feminističko čitanje metafizike, jer je utvrđivanje rodno zasnovanih hijerarhija i 
stereotipa jedna od implikacija metafizičkog dualizma duha i materije. 
Prva tri poglavlja ove disertacije su uvodna, od čega drugo i treće pružaju kratki 
osvrt na razvoj dualizma duh/materija i samog koncepta materije kroz istoriju evropske 
filozofije i religije. Koncept feminino determinisane, haotične i mračne materije, 
 suprotstavljen konceptu maskulino determinisanog, racionalnog i svetlog duha, prati se u 
drugom poglavlju od svojih začetaka u orfizmu, dionizijskim i eleuzinskim misterijama i 
pitagorejskom pokretu, preko svog najuticajnijeg proponenta Platona i njegovih 
sledbenika, sa posebnim osvrtom na neoplatoničare, do mnogobrojnih dualističkih 
pokreta koji su pod njihovim direktnim ili indirektnim uticajem nicali diljem antičkog i 
srednjovekovnog sveta. Radikalni ili emanativni, prokosmički ili antikosmički, dualizam 
duha i materije – prenošen kroz spise i usmena učenja hermetičara, gnostika, manihejaca, 
bogumila i katara, pa katkad i kroz samo hrišćanstvo, koje mu je zvanično 
suprotstavljeno – pokazuje se kao neprekinuta nit u istoriji evropske civilizacije. 
Treće poglavlje bavi se dualizmom duha i materije u renesansnom neoplatonizmu. 
Eklektičan, kompleksan i imanentno paradoksalan fenomen poznat kao renesansni 
neoplatonizam nastaje kao rezultat snažnog istovremenog upliva više tipova dualizma u 
judeohrišćansku misao – Platonovi rukopisi stižu u zapadnu Evropu zajedno sa 
rukopisima neoplatoničara i hermetičara, ali i pravim, živim kabalistima – koji sa 
oduševljenjem prihvataju, prisvajaju i prerađuju tzv. „hrišćanski“ neoplatoničari na čelu 
sa Marsiliom Fičinom. U okviru renesansnog neoplatonizma može se izdvojiti nekoliko 
sasvim različitih i međusobno nekompatibilnih struja: „čist“ neoplatonizam, magija, 
alhemija, gnosticizam, kabala i hermetizam. Sve one, bile prokosmičke ili antikosmičke, 
imaju u svojoj osnovi rodno determinisan hijerarhijski dualizam duha i materije i, u 
najmanju ruku, ambivalentan odnos prema telu i kosmosu, a u odnosu na samu materiju – 
odnosno, šta se sa njom može ili mora činiti – mogu se uočiti tri široke kategorije koje se 
mogu ilustrovati kroz primer dualističkih alegorijskih tumačenja mita o Narcisu. 
Plotinovo viđenje Narcisa kao prikaz duha prevarenog sopstvenim odrazom u 
kaljuzi materije poredi se sa gotovo identičnim, ali drugačije percipiranim događajem 
opisanim u hermetičkom spisu Pimander, gde je pad duha u materiju u kojoj se ogleda 
opisan kao kreativni čin ljubavi iz koga nastaje kosmos. Tako antikosmički nastrojeni 
Plotin moli čitaoca da se vine ka pravom duhovnom izvoru svog lepog lika, jer je druga 
opcija pad u kal materije. Treća opcija, koju nudi prokosmički hermetizam, jeste ljubavni 
spoj duha i materije u kom superiorni ali benevolentni maskulini duh svojevoljno svojim 
odrazom formira inferiornu ali prijemčivu femininu materiju.  
 Ove tri opcije se ogledaju u Šekspirovim delima u centralnom delu disertacije 
(poglavlja 4-9), koji se sastoji od komparativne analize pristupa materijalnom i telesnom 
u, s jedne strane, različitim strujama renesansnog neoplatonizma i, s druge strane, 
Šekspirovim delima, najpre tragedijama i problemskim dramama. 
Pojedinačna poglavlja središnjeg dela disertacije bave se mogućim pristupima 
materiji, ali takođe i mogućim koracima na jednom neoplatoničarskom putu kroz 
materijalni svet. 
Taj put počinje u „Tamnici“, kojom se bavi četvrto poglavlje. Istraživanje 
antikosmičkih stavova prema materijalnom i telesnom u Šekspirovim tragedijama i 
problemskim dramama dovodi do zaključka da su oni u skladu sa antikosmičkim 
učenjima gnostika, manihejaca, bogumila, katara, i pesimista među neoplatoničarima. 
Junaci Šekspirovih tragedija i problemskih drama (Hamlet, Romeo, Kleopatra, Lir, 
Gloster, Tit Andronik) svet i telo eksplicitno doživljavaju kao tamnicu duše, a često se 
takva osećanja i poređenja javljaju u doslovnim tamnicama (kao što na svojoj koži iskuse 
Ričard II, Lir, Malvolio, Klaudio i Barnardin). Mora se primetiti da su antikosmički 
stavovi kod Šekspirovih junaka najčešće posledica nekakvog šoka ili razočarenja.  
Mikrokosmosi drama kao što su Hamlet, Magbet, Kralj Lir i Mera za meru mogu 
se čitati kao alegorijski prikazi neoplatoničarskog pakla u kome vlada haos mračne 
materije, a njihovi vladari-uzurpatori kao zločesti demijurzi. Primećuje se dvojaka 
subverzivnost – u religijskom i političkom smislu – korišćenja figure kralja kao 
demijurga, kao i činjenice da pomoć utamničenima u njegovom mračnom domenu uvek 
dolazi spolja, obično u figuri doketskog Hrista, koji dolazi da probudi uspavane iskre 
(Vojvoda u Meri za meru, duh Hamletovog oca, Kordelija u Kralju Liru). 
Kada se svet posmatra kao tamnica čiji je glavni tamničar lažljivi uzurpator, sama 
akcija postaje problematizovana i lako se nailazi na stav da je kontemplacija bezbednija i 
čistija opcija. Tako se Hamletov čuveni solilokvij može čitati i kao suprotstavljanje 
opcije „biti“ u fiksnom, nepromenljivom duhu opciji „ne biti“ u fluidnom i iluzornom 
svetu stalnog nastajanja i nestajanja materije. Mnogi Šekspirovi junaci izbegavaju da 
uprljaju ruke i odriču se svega, između ostalog i ljubavi, zarad viših ciljeva (Hamlet; 
Vojvoda, Izabela i Anđelo u Meri za meru). 
 Ovo se u sledećem poglavlju, „Uznošenje“, pokazuje, opet u neoplatoničarskom 
diskursu, kao potencijalno pogrešan korak. U neoplatonizmom inspirisanoj renesansnoj 
teoriji ljubavi, čiji su najuticajniji propagatori Fičino i Bruno, upravo se kroz erotsko 
dostiže božansko, ali uz bitno upozorenje da erotski poticaj mora dolaziti od nebeske, a 
ne zemaljske Venere, i da ne sme imati za cilj brak ili, još gore, blud. Narcis koji se 
ogleda u baruštini materije mora znati da je zaljubljen u sopstveni lepi odraz, a ne u tu 
baru, i mora se vinuti naviše, ka čisto duhovnom božanstvu kome je suštinski istovetan. 
Analizom Šekspirovih dela se utvrđuje da se primeri uspešnog erotskog uzdizanja od 
materijalnog i telesnog mogu naći uglavnom u komedijama, dok je u mračnijim dramama 
figura nebeske Venere uvek bar donekle problematizovana, kao što je to Dezdemona u 
Otelu. Takođe se dolazi do zaključka da je eros dualizma po definiciji narcisoidan, jer je 
uvek težnja istog za istim – duha za duhom, razdvojenim samim od sebe Drugim materije 
– i da je ovakva idealizovana ljubav, bilo se manifestovala homoerotski ili heteroerotski 
(a obe manifestacije se mogu naći kod Šekspira) neumitno neprijateljski nastrojena prema 
svakoj stvarnoj ženskoj osobi pojedinačno i ženskom telu uopšte. 
Poglavlje „Enoza“ bavi se stanjem koje predstavlja krajnji cilj dualističke erotske 
žudnje, a to je mistično potpuno utapanje svake iskre u svoje božansko izvorište. Svrha 
narcisoidnog erosa dualizma se ispunjava tako što se maskulini duh sjedinjuje sam sa 
sobom. Iako je nijedna pravoverna monoteistička religija ne priznaje kao legitimni cilj 
vernika, enoza je eksplicitno postavljena kao ishodište svake duše u Fičinovom sistemu 
„hrišćanskog“ neoplatonizma, bilo kao ishod čiste kontemplacije ili vatrene žudnje. Kod 
Šekspira se figura enoze javlja uglavnom u ovom drugom obliku, i to nikada bez poveće 
doze ambivalencije prema erotskom. Antonijev dijalog sa Erosom ilustruje nekoliko 
aspekata erotske enoze: brisanje granica između ljubavnika i voljenog, onostranu prirodu 
„istinske“ ljubavi, povezanost seksualnosti i smrti, konačno nepostojanje identiteta i 
ništavilo smrti kao krajnji cilj i ishod svake žudnje. Ovi aspekti se dalje istražuju i 
ilustruju kroz svoje manifestacije u Šekspirovim tragedijama i problemskim dramama 
(Hamlet, Romeo i Julija, Otelo, Troil i Kresida, Mera za meru, Julije Cezar, Timon 
Atinjanin). Zaključak je da Šekspir uvek zadržava ambivalenciju prema erotskom i da se 
svaka erotska smrt može tumačiti i kao enoza i kao pad. 
 Sedmo poglavlje, „Silazak“, bavi se onim što se zbiva kada Narcis, zaveden 
odrazom svog duha u njima, zakorači u vode materije. Fičino i Bruno su u svojim 
teorijama ljubavi jasni: ukoliko ljubavnik napravi kobnu grešku i posegne za telom osobe 
za koju mu se učini da ga erotski privlači, umesto da se, inspirisan njenom lepom 
formom, vine ka čistoti duha odakle ta forma potiče, upašće u pakao materijalnog. 
Zemaljska Venera može pod maskom nebeske zavesti naivnog i nevinog ljubavnika i 
odvući ga u dubine materijalnog sveta, naizgled nudeći mu mogućnost uzleta ka 
nebeskim visinama. Za to je dovoljna jedna noć provedena sa njom. Ovaj zaplet se može 
naći, u različitim varijacijama, u mnogim Šekspirovim delima: Sve je dobro što se dobro 
svrši, Troil i Kresida, Mera za meru, Romeo i Julija i Otelo. U svima je dovoljna jedna 
noć provedena sa njom da se nebeska Venera volšebno transformiše u zemaljsku – čista 
Dijana u bludnu Jelenu, devica u kurvu – i utamniči zlosrećnog ljubavnika u telesnost 
braka ili bluda, ili, još gore, na samo dno pakla ženske seksualnosti, u haotično ništavilo 
pramaterije. 
Osmo poglavlje, „Ništavilo“, bavi se upravo onime što se nalazi na dnu 
neoplatoničarskog kosmosa – ništavilom koje se istodobno otkriva kao neoplatoničarska 
prima materia. Ona je uvek feminino determinisana – u neoplatonizmu je Hekata 
identifikovana sa materijom, a figura Hekate se i u mikrokosmosima Šekspirovih 
mračnijih komada pokazuje kao prava vladarka paklenog domena zločestog uzurpatora 
(Ledi Magbet, Tamora, pa čak i Gertruda). Feminina determinisanost pramaterije ogleda 
se kod Šekspira i u višeznačnom i često ponavljanom glasu, ili slovu, ili cifri – „O“ ili 
„0“ – koje može biti matematički izraženo ništavilo pramaterije, ali i oznaka za vaginalni 
otvor. Ovom višeznačju doprinosi i činjenica da se reč „nothing“ („ništa“), uvek 
zlokobno značajna reč kod Šekspira, mogla u jeziku Šekspirove Engleske koristiti u oba 
smisla. „O“ je i oznaka za matericu u kojoj se ljudsko biće, po tadašnjim teorijama, 
zdušno prihvaćenim od strane neoplatoničara, materijalizuje od očevog duha i majčine 
materije, i time materinstvo dobija izrazito negativan prizvuk. Majka je ta koja doprinosi 
materiju u procesu reprodukcije, čineći nas time smrtnim i pravdajući čestu povezanost 
figura materice i grobnice („womb/tomb“), kao i očajnički pokušaj nekih junaka – 
primerice, Koriolana – da se od materinskog tela radikalno odvoje, što često dovodi do 
 nasilnog i krvavog vraćanja u njega. Neoplatoničarska majka, pokazuje se, često proždire 
sopstvenu decu.  
U mnogim tragedijama se junak suočava sa pramaterijom koja se pojavljuje 
doslovno uobličena u „O“: primeri za ovu figuru su paklena jama u šumi višestruko 
povezana sa Tamorom i vaginalno determinisana u Titu Androniku, grobnica Kapuleta u 
Romeu i Juliji, veštičiji kotao u Magbetu, kao i vaginalni pakao kroz koji prolaze Lir i 
Timon u svojoj mašti. Hamlet se spušta u tri gradirana ponora pramaterije u svojoj istrazi 
o tome odakle dolazi trulež u Danskoj: Ofelijina, zatim Gertrudina odaja, i na kraju 
otvoreni grob u koji uskače. Suočavanje sa materijalnom osnovom kosmosa, premda u 
tragedijama uglavnom najviše služi tome da ilustruje paklene dubine do kojih se junak 
i/ili njegov svet srozao, može dovesti junaka i do neke vrste regeneracije i ponovnog 
rođenja, kao što je slučaj sa Lirom. 
Suočavanje sa neformiranom materijom može dovesti neoplatoničarskog junaka i 
do prokosmičkih tendencija: može poželeti da u taj mračni haos unese red i lepotu forme 
iz viših kosmičkih sfera. Time se bavi poslednje poglavlje centralnog dela disertacije, 
nazvano „Teurgija“. Narativ iz Pimandera o primordijalnom duhovnom Čoveku koji 
ogledanjem u njenim tamnim vodama svojevoljno daje formu voljenoj materijalnoj 
Prirodi je, u kombinaciji sa Jamblihovom teorijom teurgije, dao podsticaj Fičinu da 
osmisli sopstvenu, i pored svog stalno ambivalentnog stava prema bilo kakvoj interakciji 
maskulinog duha sa femininom materijom. Teurgija – koja može obuhvatati rituale, 
praktičnu magiju i alhemiju, ali i druga neimenovana delanja – nalazi se na 
prokosmičkom ekstremu neoplatonizma, kao aktivan napor svakog pojedinca da uvede 
red u kosmos i, kao demijurg, i sam formira materiju koja mu je na raspolaganju. 
Kod Šekspira se primeri uspešne teurgije uglavnom mogu naći u kasnijim 
komadima (takozvanim „romansama“), dok tragedije i problemske drame obično 
prikazuju obrnut proces, u kome se kosmos svodi na haos pramaterije. Ubijanje ili 
uklanjanje uspešnih teurga, koji održavaju red na svim nivoima – pojedinac, država, 
kosmos – dovodi do pada čitavog domena u haos, kao što se može videti u Meri za meru, 
Hamletu i Magbetu. Figura uspešnog teurga ili maga oslikava se kao neoplatoničarsko 
sunce koje oplođava i formira mrtvu materiju, dajući joj život, kao što je slučaj sa 
solarnim kraljem Dankanom. Uspešan teurg je dobar kralj, otac, oličenje božanstva, što 
 se istražuje kroz metaforu kovanja novca, koje, kao davanje svog lika i forme 
bezobličnom metalu, kao pravo pripada upravo ovim figurama. Lirova izjava da sme da 
kuje novac pošto je on kralj se, međutim, može čitati i kao izjava bilo kog teurgijski 
nastrojenog pojedinca, jer po metafizici prokosmičkih struja u neoplatonizmu svaka iskra 
duha ima pravo i obavezu da formira materiju po svom uzvišenom liku i uvodi poredak u 
nju. Prokosmički dualizam se time pokazuje kao potencijalno politički i religijski čak 
subverzivniji od antikosmičkog. 
Teurgija kao koncept je, dalje se primećuje, ugrađena u nekolike diskriminatorne 
ideologije: mag može figurirati kao kolonizator koji civilizuje inferiornije, telesnije, 
materijalnije „varvare“ ili kao krotitelj, opet, inferiornijih, telesnijih, materijalnijih žena. 
U Buri se, recimo, jasno vide oba procesa, kao i paradoks po kome je muškarac koji 
menja i kontroliše prirodu (Prospero) moćni mag, dok je žena koja čini to isto (Sikoraks) 
zlokobna veštica.  
Ženske figure se u slikama vezanim za teurgiju javljaju u dve najčešće varijante. 
U prvoj su predstavnice feminine materije, koja u prokosmizmu može biti „dobra“ 
ukoliko je dovoljno poslušna i prijemčiva kontroli i formiranju od strane maskulinog 
duha, koji time postaje direktno odgovoran za nju, što dovodi do pojačane anksioznosti. 
Neposlušna materija je kod Šekspira često predstavljena kroz figure neposlušnih žena. 
Analiziraju se zanimljive slike u kojima se pobuna kćerki (Šajlokove i Lirovih) opisuje 
kao pobuna materijalnog i telesnog protiv duha koji daje život. Potencijalno neposlušna 
žena, doživljena kao previše materijalna i telesna jer aktivnim iskazivanjem ljubavi pre 
braka (Dezdemona, Julija, Kordelija) daje signal ocu i/ili mužu da joj je požuda preča od 
dužnosti, može biti odbačena, i tu se oslikava druga varijanta ženske figure – kao spone 
kosmosa.  
Naime, Šekspirovi junaci, koji usled imanentne paradoksalnosti neoplatonizma 
nikada ne mogu znati kako se odnositi prema ženskim figurama, često prave i grešku 
upravo suprotnu, ali isto tako fatalnu, kao što je pad pred požudom zemaljske Venere, a 
to je odbacivanje ženske ljubavi iz straha da je u pitanju puka požuda. Ispostavlja se da je 
ta ljubav, kao što je slučaj u Kralju Liru i Otelu, ali i Zimskoj bajci, bila neoplatoničarski 
zlatni lanac ljubavi, spona kosmosa, koja ga je držala u harmoniji, a da bez nje haos 
pramaterije ponovo dolazi. Šekspir ovime dekonstruiše dihotomiju ljubav/dužnost, i to 
 koristeći neoplatoničarsku metafiziku, u kojoj su oba pojma sinonimi za harmoniju 
kosmosa koju održava uzvišena božanska ljubav. Kodelijin odgovor Liru da ga voli 
„according to my bond“ (dužnost i spona su samo neka od mogućih značenja ove reči) 
time dobija dodatne moguće interpretacije.  
Još jedna dihotomija koju Šekspir dekonstruiše upravo putem neoplatoničarske 
metafizike jeste, u njegovo doba popularna, umetnost/priroda. Umetnost se – u smislu 
svega umetnog i artificijelnog i svakog umeća, veštine i delanja koje uređuje i menja 
datost – često suprotstavljala „Bogom danoj“ prirodi u pokatkad žestokim debatama, od 
kojih su neke umele da potkače i pozorište. Ono po čemu se neoplatonizam razlikuje od 
pravovernih monoteizama jeste, između ostalog, dvojakost shvatanja prirode i 
neinsistiranje na njenoj normativnosti. Dve prirode u neoplatonizmu, viša i niža, duhovna 
i materijalna, aktivna i pasivna, korespondiraju sa Venerom i Hekatom, a ova 
podvojenost prirode se najizrazitije ispoljava u Kralju Liru, ali se njene manifestacije 
mogu naći i u Hamletu i Magbetu. Viša priroda koja kultiviše nižu kao što vrtlar kultiviše 
vrt – što je česta figura, kako kod renesansnih neoplatoničara, tako i kod Šekspira – 
poistovećuje se sa umetnošću.  
Pozorišna umetnost kao ogledalo prirode u Hamletovoj izjavi može se u 
neoplatoničarskom ključu čitati i kao teurgijsko upodobljavanje niže prirode višoj, a ne 
samo kao puki mimetski prikaz čulne stvarnosti. Dramaturg se tako pokazuje kao teurg 
koji onom materijom koja mu je na raspolaganju manipuliše e da bi i nju (svoje glumce, 
scenografiju i pozorište) i publiku transformisao i preuredio po liku više prirode koja je 
njemu, po platoničarskim teorijama božanske poetske inspiracije, dostupnija. Dok u 
tragedijama teurgijske umetničke tendencije ostaju neispoljene, a njihovi nesuđeni agenti 
(kao što su Lavinija u Titu Androniku i Kasio i Dezdemona u Otelu) obogaljeni i/ili 
ubijeni, usled čega kosmos ponovo postaje haos, u romansama se pojavljuju i uspešni 
umetnici-teurzi. Paulina u Zimskoj bajci i Prospero u Buri su možda najbolji primeri, koji 
svojim „nadilaženjem“ prirode i ukazivanjem na višu istinu putem pozorišne iluzije 
pokazuju da je dramaturg verodostojniji stvaralac od demijurga. 
Posle kratke rekapitulacije paradoksalnih i često međusobno nekompatibilnih 
tumačenja Šekspirovih dela na osnovu aspekata metafizičkog dualizma preuzetog iz 
renesansnog neoplatonizma, u zaključku ove disertacije predlaže se detaljnije i dublje 
 izučavanje uticaja neoplatoničarskog koncepta materije, kao i dihotomije duh/materija, na 
dalju književnost i kulturu. Ovo bi moglo da ima implikacije za studije književnosti, ali i 
studije kulture, rodne i kvir studije. 
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FIGURES OF THE MATERIAL AND THE CARNAL 
IN SHAKESPEARE’S TRAGEDIES AND PROBLEM PLAYS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We have in the past two decades, owing to the recently appearing translations of 
Ficino’s works into English, witnessed a revival of interest in the phenomenon known as 
Renaissance Neoplatonism. Although not unknown to Shakespearologists, Renaissance 
Neoplatonism has long been neglected in interpretations of Shakespeare’s works – 
especially the “darker” ones – as an overly marginal, eccentric, or optimistic concoction 
of notions on the harmony of the spheres. A deeper reading of Ficino’s texts, as well as 
those of other Renaissance Neoplatonists and their ancient sources, offers an invaluable 
insight into the “dark” sides of both Neoplatonism and Shakespeare’s “darker” plays. 
This insight is also intriguing for areas of research other than literary criticism. It 
was in Shakespeare’s age – now usually referred to as the early modern period precisely 
for this reason – that many of our own current cultural patterns were shaped, and 
Shakespeare’s works certainly served as one conduit. Using as its starting point the 
assumption that basic metaphysical concepts can with great ease be transferred over time 
and space and built into the foundations of differing ideologies in the broadest sense of 
the word, and that unearthing and analyzing them is therefore an especially rewarding 
and useful endeavor, this dissertation chooses to focus on a metaphysical concept which 
lies at the very basis of (Renaissance) Neoplatonism. The metaphysical concept in 
question is the nearly invariably gendered and hierarchized spirit/matter dichotomy, 
 whose more sinister and “darker” manifestations in Renaissance Neoplatonism have 
frequently been neglected or misattributed to Christian influences.  
The aim of this dissertation is to identify those facets of Shakespeare’s darker 
plays – primarily his tragedies and “problem plays” – that resonate well with the dualistic 
traditions extant in Renaissance Neoplatonism, analyze their possible meanings within 
the contexts offered by these religious and philosophical systems, and hopefully discover 
their further implications for understanding both Shakespeare and certain aspects of so-
called Western cultures. The hypothesis is that the dualistic concepts derived from 
Renaissance Neoplatonism will resonate well with parts of Shakespeare’s work, revealing 
in their originative context further notions illuminating further meanings attributable to 
Shakespeare’s text and our cultural atmosphere, many of which will be paradoxical and 
contradictory – much like Renaissance Neoplatonism itself.  
The central portion of this thesis consists of a comparative analysis of approaches 
to the material and the carnal existing in, on the one hand, various branches of 
Renaissance Neoplatonism, and, on the other, Shakespeare’s work, primarily his 
tragedies and so-called “problem” plays. The individual chapters deal with possible 
approaches to matter and also possible steps along a Neoplatonic journey through the 
material world. This journey begins in “The Prison,” where the hero experiences those 
Neoplatonic sentiments that are on the anti-cosmic end of the spectrum. This, many 
Neoplatonists would hope, can induce him to attempt an “Ascent” towards the purely 
spiritual spheres. This ascent is often also inspired by female figures stripped of all 
carnality. The ultimate goal of Neoplatonic ascent is “Henosis,” in which the hero 
becomes one with the One. If the hero is not careful, allowing himself to be lured 
downward by carnal female figures, or if he is very adventurous indeed, he can instead 
begin a kenotic “Descent” into the depths of matter. This descent will allow him to face 
the “Nothing” of formless prime matter which is at the basis of the cosmos and his own 
mortal body. Faced with it, he will, some Neoplatonists would hope, realize that it is this 
nothing that everything comes from, and will strive to help the spiritual forces in the 
universe, of which he ultimately is one, form it lovingly. This is known as “Theurgy.” 
As predicted, the analysis shows that the dualistic concepts originating from 
Renaissance Neoplatonism can indeed be found on several levels of Shakespeare’s 
 “darker” plays. Far from providing definitive answers to questions raised by 
Shakespeare’s work, the proffered analysis, as expected, merely increases the number of 
its possible interpretations.  
It is concluded that the Neoplatonic concept of matter and its spirit/matter 
dichotomy exerted a formative influence not only on Shakespeare and his age, but the 
ages that followed as well, our own included. This insight offers implications for further 
research not only in literary criticism, but also cultural, gender and queer studies. 
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Shakespeare is the happy hunting ground  
of all minds that have lost their balance.  
(Joyce, Ulysses) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.0. INTRODUCTION 
 
It has become a commonplace to assert that it was in Shakespeare’s age – now 
usually referred to as the early modern period precisely for this reason – that many of our 
current thought patterns, judgments, and hang-ups were shaped, for better or worse, 
which makes it a crucial era to mine for answers to the question of why we think and act 
the way we do now. (Grady 2002: 7) 
Shakespeare’s work, in particular, has served as a powerful conduit for concepts 
extant in the early modern period. It is not difficult to understand why. Firstly, there is 
hardly a thought that was thinkable in Shakespeare’s time that remained unexpressed by 
one of Shakespeare’s characters. Secondly, ideas tend to travel better through artistic 
expression than by any other means of transportation, spreading like airborne viruses 
where dry philosophies remain quarantined in various ivory towers. Neoplatonism in 
Renaissance England, as one very significant example, has been shown to have been a 
poetic rather than a philosophical phenomenon, (Jayne 1952: 238) and it was conceivably 
owing to this fact that it was so ubiquitous. Thirdly, Shakespeare’s works were 
subsequently read by such disparate but influential figures as Coleridge, Freud, Jung, T. 
S. Eliot, and Joyce, who then further disseminated, in their own writings, the concepts 
they had absorbed from them. 
Even if no other reasons existed – and they certainly do – the enduring impact of 
Shakespeare’s works alone would suffice to justify undertaking a close analysis of those 
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concepts in them that would go on to build themselves into many of our own subsequent 
ideologies, some of which we continue to hold even to this day. 
When the term “ideology” is used here, it will not be in its limited, derisive 
meanings delineated by Raymond Williams as “a system of beliefs characteristic of a 
particular class or group” or “a system of illusory beliefs – false ideas or false 
consciousness – which can be contrasted with true or scientific knowledge.” It will 
instead be used in Williams’ third meaning, “the general process of the production of 
meanings and ideas,” (Williams 1977: 55) to which Dollimore offers his own 
corresponding definition. Ideology, in his view, is “not a set of false beliefs capable of 
correction by perceiving properly, but the very terms in which we perceive the world.” 
(Dollimore 2004: 9) An ideology can thus be defined here as any system of beliefs that 
facilitates perceiving patterns and categorizing phenomena in our surroundings, 
accelerates our decisions – whether universal value judgments or practical, personal 
choices – and to which no one is immune. Ideologies can range from ambitious religious, 
philosophical, or political systems of thought to those idiosyncratic concoctions of views 
individuals may hold, but all have at their foundations certain basic metaphysical 
building blocks – the inherited responses to those fundamental questions unanswerable 
by empirical evidence – which are often concealed from view and unconscious. 
Those metaphysical building blocks present in Shakespeare’s work that will be 
paid special attention here will be those that have unjustly been neglected for long – and 
those are unorthodox dualistic concepts belonging to the complex contemporary system 
of ideas known as Renaissance Neoplatonism. As Ted Hughes poignantly points out, the 
sudden disappearance of the tradition of Renaissance Neoplatonism from cultural 
awareness right after Shakespeare’s prime resulted in the tragic fact that “Shakespeare 
became in some essential aspects incomprehensible. The metaphysical system behind his 
drama” in time “became invisible.” (Hughes 2007: 171) Jill Line similarly laments the 
fact that the relationship of Platonic concepts “to Shakespeare and his plays is not so well 
known.” (Line 2004: xi) Even authors belonging to the schools of cultural materialism 
and new historicism now accede that it is not only permissible, but even necessary to deal 
with issues pertaining to spirituality and religion, for, as Fernie notes in his Introduction 
to Spiritual Shakespeares, the tendency of some critics to miss references to spirituality 
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“has resulted in serious neglect” of “important metaphysical dimensions of Shakespeare’s 
text.” (Fernie 2005: 8) 
The aim of this thesis is to identify those facets of Shakespeare’s work that 
resonate well with the dualistic traditions extant in Renaissance Neoplatonism, analyze 
their possible meanings within the contexts offered by these religious and philosophical 
systems, and hopefully discover their further implications for understanding both 
Shakespeare and certain aspects of so-called Western cultures. I expect, as a loosely 
defined hypothesis, that the dualistic concepts derived from Renaissance Neoplatonism 
will resonate well with parts of Shakespeare’s work, revealing in their originative context 
further notions illuminating further meanings attributable to Shakespeare’s text and our 
cultural atmosphere, many of which will be paradoxical and contradictory – much like 
Renaissance Neoplatonism itself. Far from providing definitive answers to questions 
raised by Shakespeare’s work, I expect the following analysis to merely increase the 
number of its possible meanings and further confound any prospective spectator or 
reader. 
Methods employed here will be eclectic, but will mostly be reducible to a 
classical comparative analysis of, on the one hand, those metaphysical systems available 
to Shakespeare primarily through Renaissance Neoplatonism and, on the other, those 
Shakespeare’s works – primarily tragedies and so-called problem plays – that, arguably, 
contain darker and thus more useful world-weary-and-wary sentiments. Some methods 
might resemble new historicism or deconstruction, although I do not subscribe to these 
schools of criticism, and I will also not shy away from sources belonging to 
psychoanalysis, whether Freudian or Lacanian, although I do not subscribe to it either. 
Parts of the thesis will employ what can be termed a feminist reading of metaphysics, as 
gender issues are perhaps the most intriguing implication of dualism, though certainly not 
the only one. 
Several other tools are now officially permitted in literary criticism and will not 
be avoided here. Dealing with “spiritual” or “metaphysical” issues is, as has been noted, 
apparently enjoying a vogue even among those least likely to be invested in it, and 
discovering allegorical scaffoldings for literary works is once again permitted, though 
generally now, thankfully, practiced with much more caution, and without any 
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impression that a work of literature is ever reducible to allegory. (Bloom 2004: 511) Use 
of biographical data to illuminate an author’s interest in a topic or even his “intended” 
meaning is not anathema any longer, (Kozuka/Mulryne 2006: 54) and Shakespeare is 
now, at “the start of the twenty-first century,” finally allowed to have been quite aware of 
the intellectual currents of his time. (Batson 2006: 27) 
These intellectual currents, as I hope to show, have at the core an unorthodox 
spirit/matter dualism which posits matter as the perennial dark other.  
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The stone which the builders refused 
is become the head stone of the corner. 
(Psalm 118: 22, KJV) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
2.0. WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH MATTER? 
 
Basic metaphysical concepts are, arguably, absorbed more easily and permanently 
than wholesale ideological and religious systems. These fundamental concepts could be 
seen as metaphysical building blocks which lie at the foundations of the buildings of 
belief systems and ideologies. The foundations are concealed from view, but nevertheless 
shape the remainder of the building.  
Who are we, humans? Are we our bodies or something else? Are our bodies good, 
bad, or inconsequential? Is the world fundamentally good or bad? Are we allowed to 
change it to make it more suitable for us? Are we perhaps even required to? Answers to 
those and other basic questions constitute the metaphysical building blocks that lie at the 
foundations of all belief systems and ideologies. For instance, an ideology of 
technological progress would have a hard time taking roots in a culture with a basic belief 
in a fundamentally good and holy nature that is not to be interfered with. We are more 
likely to accept an ideology if its metaphysical building blocks resonate with those we 
have already absorbed.   
In the Psalm cited above – The stone which the builders refused is become the 
head stone of the corner (Psalm 118: 22, KJV) – the stone that the builders reject 
becomes the cornerstone of the house, which is usually interpreted in Christianity as 
referring to Jesus Christ, cast off at first but ultimately becoming the founder of a new 
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major religion. I would like to make an attempt at demonstrating that the fate of a 
particular metaphysical building block has been very similar. 
This new cornerstone, officially rejected by the builders of orthodoxies, is 
something I would like to term the “dark otherness” of matter. It has never found its way 
into the official doctrines of any mainstream religious system. It has never been given the 
stamp of orthodoxy by any major monotheism. It has in fact been explicitly rejected as 
heretical by many an authority within the established orthodoxies. And yet, spirit/matter 
dualism has been an unremitting undercurrent throughout the history of what could 
loosely be termed the “Western” civilization, shaping far more than merely its religious 
and philosophical discourses.  
The metaphysical spirit/matter split has profoundly influenced our outlook on 
such phenomena as art, science, technology and progress, to name but a few. It has 
helped fashion our ideologies, from the “highest,” purportedly universal ones, right down 
to the personal idiosyncratic ones we employ when making practical decisions about our 
lives. Most enduringly, perhaps, it has shaped the way we perceive and discuss our 
gender dichotomies. The building block of dualism discarded by the builders of 
orthodoxies has become the cornerstone of our civilization. 
 
2.1. A SHORT HISTORY OF MATTER: THE DARK OTHER OF 
CIVILIZATION 
 
“Matter” today conjures in our modern minds images of science labs, particle 
accelerators, and ever-changing models of the atom. A Google search of the word yields 
mostly results related to physics. This is, however, a relatively recent development. For 
over two millennia in the history of human thought, matter frequently represented 
something far more sinister, perilous and treacherous. It occupied the place of 
civilization’s Dark Other. 
When this first came to be can never be known for certain. Our own scientifically 
enlightened conceptions of matter actually largely coincide with those of Pre-Socratic 
philosophers. Not that they actually used that word. Ionian “physicists” asked themselves 
what subsisted at the basis of all nature, and came up with different notions of the arche 
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(not that they used that word either). Thales saw water at the foundation of all existing 
things, Anaximander termed his elusive basis of nature the apeiron, and Anaximenes 
believed air could become rarefied or solidified and thus transform itself into the other 
elements. Empedocles thought there were four discrete elements forming the world, and 
Leucippus postulated that the world consisted of small indivisible particles he referred to 
as atoms.  
They all believed that nature was wholly living and in a state of constant flux, 
which prompted later historians of philosophy to categorize them under the misnomer 
“hylozoists,” which implies that they saw all matter as animated and suffused with life. 
The early “physicists,” however, did not even distinguish matter from life. Nature was for 
them inherently living and ultimately one. Even when the word for “matter” made its 
appearance in Greek as hyle, its etymological meaning of “wood” simply denoted it as 
“that which things are made of.” This was mirrored in the Latin counterpart materia, but 
with the added bonus – or twist, if you will – of suggesting a link with the word for 
“mother” – mater. (Pavlović 1997: 17) 
It seems that the distaste for matter and its relegation to the status of Other arose 
from the appearance of concepts opposed and superior to it. While “life,” “soul” and 
“spirit” existed as notions before the advent of dualistic metaphysical explanations of the 
world, they were seen as phenomena inherently immanent to “matter,” and not as 
separate, superior, immortal entities graciously deigning to animate it, if only for a short 
while. (Collingwood 1945: 6-7) The soul was perceived to be independent and separable 
from the body to the extent that the flame is independent and separable from, say, a 
candle. Once spirit began to be touted as the fixed and eternal part of the universe, matter 
itself changed as a concept to conform itself to being its perpetual Other. This is the point 
in the history of ideas at which beginning to use the term “dualism” becomes justified.  
As an often misunderstood and misused label, and one that will be employed 
throughout this thesis as one of its keywords, dualism needs to be precisely defined in all 
its common varieties here. The most widespread error perpetrated by those encountering 
Neoplatonism of any sort in their study is the insistence that all Platonic thought is 
“monistic” and therefore fully compatible with monotheistic religions. This seems to be 
derived from the never explicitly articulated notion of dualism as restricted to those 
  53 
metaphysical systems which condemn the entire cosmos and the body as wholly evil or 
those which see the dark other of matter as co-eternal and fully equal with spirit. As soon 
as a single seriously conducted categorization of dualisms is pitted against it, this notion 
begins to collapse. One such systematization of dualistic thought is given by A. H. 
Armstrong in his “Dualism: Platonic, Gnostic, and Christian.” Dualisms, Armstrong 
explains, have but one constant tenet in common – that of the existence of two distinct 
principles whose interaction in some way forms the world as we know it. The 
relationship between them and the state of the resulting cosmos can, however, be very 
different: 
 
1. The two principles may be thought of as both unoriginated, independent and 
everlastingly operative in the nature of things. They may be perceived as (a) intrinsically 
opposed and in perpetual conflict (or conflict as long as this world lasts). This gives a 
conflict-dualism of what may be called the Iranian pattern. In this case one principle must 
be qualified as “good” and the other as “evil,” and one is expected to take the good’s 
side. Or (b) they may be conceived as equally independent, but working together in 
harmony. This seems to be prevalent in Chinese thought, and is certainly very well 
expressed by the Yang-Yin symbol. Its most radical and fiercely original expression in 
the Greek world is in the thought of Heraclitus: here it takes a very dynamic form, and 
the conflict and tension, which any doctrine of cosmic harmony which is sufficiently 
attentive to experience must recognize, is powerfully emphasized. 
2. Or the second principle may be thought of as derived from and dependent on 
the first. […] This derived and dependent “dark other” may be thought of as either (a) in 
revolt against, or at least opposed to, the first principle or (b) working in accord and co-
operation, at least passive, with it. (Wallis/Bregman 1992: 34)  
 
This is almost fully in accordance with the systematization offered in Brandt’s 
seminal work on the sources of evil in dualistic religious systems, (Brandt 1989) which is 
based on two fundamental divisions of dualisms: on the one hand, into radical and 
emanative, and, on the other, into anti-cosmic and pro-cosmic. Radical dualisms 
(coinciding with Armstrong’s “1”) are those in which the two principles are both 
unoriginated and co-eternal, whereas emanative dualisms (“2”) are those in which one of 
the principles – usually the dark, evil, or inferior one – is derived from the other. Anti-
cosmic dualisms (largely coinciding with Armstrong’s “a”) see the “bad” principle as 
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irreconcilable with the “good” one and any combination of the two as irredeemably evil 
and thus rightly doomed to failure. Pro-cosmic dualisms (largely coinciding with 
Armstrong’s “b”), conversely, even when they see the “dark other” as somewhat 
rebellious and recalcitrant, still consider the (relatively harmonious) cosmos to be a 
praiseworthy and heroic endeavor. 
Dualism is thus extant in a religion, philosophy, or any other system of thought as 
soon as a second cosmic principle is first introduced into it. This may be conjectured to 
have first occurred in the history of what can be termed the “Western civilization” around 
six centuries BCE in Orphism, whose obsession with the afterlife centered on an eternal 
and preexistent divine soul. (Stoyanov 2003: 28) This pure soul was seen as fallen, 
imprisoned, and entombed in the material body, and in need of rescuing from it via 
ascetic and cathartic practices. Similar tendencies were shortly afterwards adopted by the 
Dionysian and Eleusinian mysteries, as well as the Pythagorean movement. (Savić-Rebac 
1957: 24)  
Pythagoras also saw the spiritual as fixed and eternal, and the material as a 
constantly fluctuating encumbrance to it. The spirit/matter dichotomy was explicitly 
gendered: in the Pythagorean Table of Opposites, the light, male, limiting, ordering, 
numerical, musical principle is plainly qualified as “good,” and the dark, female, 
indefinite principle as “evil.” This was the “principle of formlessness, disorder and 
irrationality, and so opposed to the good principle of light and musical order”; however, 
the cosmos would not exist without it, and the existence of the cosmos was to Pythagoras 
an inherent good. (Wallis/Bregman 1992: 35) Pythagoras’ ideas on metempsychosis and 
the eternal soul were taken over by Plato, as well as his relatively consistent pro-
cosmism. 
 
2.2. PLATO AND HIS WAKE 
 
2.2.1. PLATO 
 
Plato (424/423-348/347 BCE) is by far the most eloquent, coherent, and 
influential proponent of such theretofore revolutionary ideas as the immortality of the 
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soul, its opposition to (or at least uneasy relationship with) the body, and the division of 
reality into the intelligible and the sensible parts – the eternal Ideas and the constant flux 
of the perceptible world attempting to conform to them.  
In the Meno, Phaedo, and Phaedrus, Plato expounds his doctrine of the immortal 
soul, pure and unchangeable, as opposed to the corruptible body. In the Phaedo, the 
presumed existence of non-empiric knowledge is taken as evidence of the preexistence of 
souls, their heavenly origin, and their prenatal knowledge of Ideas, which they swiftly 
forget upon their unfortunate embodiment. 
In the Symposium, Pausanus opposes the masculine Aphrodite Ourania, the 
motherless daughter of Uranus, inspiring love of wisdom and leading away from the 
body, to Aphrodite Pandemos, the feminine daughter of Zeus and Dione, who can only 
inspire love of the body, leading to reproduction as merely a lower form of love for 
immortality. Socrates seems to concur with this division, quoting Diotima’s dictum that 
true love strives for immortality. Those who wish to give birth in their bodies desire 
women and strive for immortality through their bodies, while those pregnant in their 
souls will only look at beautiful bodies in order to transcend bodies themselves and 
ascend towards pure, spiritual beauty. (Plato 1970)  
The Republic contains the famous parable of the cave, whose influence on the 
cosmologies and cosmogonies of different philosophical and religious systems can hardly 
be overestimated. In Book 7 of the dialog, Socrates invites his interlocutor to imagine a 
group of people fettered in a dark cave from childhood, only able to see the shadows of 
real objects reflected on the wall, and mistaking these reflections for reality, even if they 
were somehow at some point to be granted freedom. “When one was freed and suddenly 
compelled to stand up, turn his neck around, walk, and look up toward the light,” 
Socrates explains, “he would be pained by doing all these things and be unable to see the 
things whose shadows he had seen before, because of the flashing lights.”  
But the only road towards truth is this painfully dazzling escape from the 
shadows. The cave, an image of this world, is likened to a prison and to Hades itself. Its 
illusions must be fled if a soul wishes to be truly free and alive. As Socrates explicitly 
concedes, “if you think of the upward journey and the seeing of things above as the 
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upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you won’t mistake my intention.” 
(Plato 2004: 208-214) 
Plato certainly has his moments of world-weary ennui, but it would be difficult to 
ascribe a persistent anti-cosmic sentiment to him. In the Timaeus, he explicitly lauds the 
actions of his cosmos-creating Demiurge, who shaped the preexistent chaos in imitation, 
albeit imperfect, of the divine Ideas: “the god took over all that is visible – not at rest, but 
in discordant and unordered motion – and brought it from disorder into order, since he 
judged that order was in every way the better.” (Plato 1997: 33) 
The Demiurge received this chaotic, fluctuating “all that is visible” (which has 
often been, not without reason, likened to primeval matter – though Plato never uses the 
word “matter”) from a distinctly female-gendered “Receptacle.” (Plato 1997: 156) Plato 
refers to the Receptacle as “the nurse” of “all Becoming,” (Plato 1997: 177) and assures 
us that “we may fittingly compare the Recipient to a mother, the model to a father, and 
the nature that arises between them to their offspring.” (Plato 1997: 185) This is in 
keeping with the contemporary view of the part played by the mother in procreation – 
maintained, significantly for this thesis, until the seventeenth century, when the existence 
of the ovum was established – according to which the father provided the active, forming 
principle, and the mother merely the material to be formed. This is yet another reflection 
of what appears to be a constant facet of spirit/matter dualism – harking back, as we have 
seen, at least to Pythagoras – and that is the association of spirit with male figures, and 
matter with female.  
As Plato’s souls are all purely spiritual and thus male, he needs to use some 
serious mental gymnastics in order to explain the existence of two distinct sexes in 
humankind. In the Timaeus, therefore, he insists that the first incarnation of humans was 
composed entirely of males, who then, if they succumbed to low bodily passions, were 
then reincarnated as females – or, worse yet, beasts. (Plato 1997: 143-144) 
Aristotle saw no reason to discard the gendered spirit/matter dichotomy he 
inherited from his teacher. “The male principle in nature,” he argued in his Physics, “is 
associated with active, formative and perfected characteristics, while the female is 
passive, material and deprived, desiring the male in order to become complete.” Few 
thinkers following Plato did. (Wiesner 2005: 25)  
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2.2.2. PLATO’S WAKE: MIDDLE PLATONISM AND NEOPLATONISM 
 
As the known world slowly moved away from the bright period of classical 
antiquity and into what many would see as the decadence and degeneration brought about 
by the stability and prosperity of the Hellenistic period and the early Roman Empire, so 
thinkers following in Plato’s footsteps appeared to be increasingly world-weary and 
decreasingly fond of matter in so-called Middle Platonism, extant between the second 
century BCE and the third century CE. The preeminent thinker of the period was Plutarch 
of Chaeronea, whose tract On Isis and Osiris characteristically describes how God, 
creating the world, managed to transform primeval matter into the world soul, but it still 
somehow continued to function as the source of all evil in the cosmos. Though it did not 
produce many original or noteworthy works, Middle Platonism demonstrates well the 
slow but steady progression of Platonic thought towards the intensifying anti-cosmic 
sentiments of the far more influential Neoplatonists proper.  
Appearing in the same period and difficult to categorize, but maintaining a 
distinctly Platonic spirit/matter dichotomy along with the less-than-distinctly-Platonic 
insistence on the highly troublesome nature of matter, are the Chaldaean Oracles, the 
Hermetic writings, and the works of Philo of Alexandria. All these, Kristeller argues, 
prepared the ground both among pagans and monotheists for a revival of philosophical 
Platonism in the third century CE in Alexandria by Ammonius Saccas and his disciple 
Plotinus. (Kristeller 1961: 51) If the stability of the early Roman Empire brought ennui 
and satiety, then its crisis in the third century CE caused even more pressing anxiety 
about the perceptible world. This is the setting in which Neoplatonism proper emerged. 
(Wallis/Bregman 1992: 1-2) 
Following Plato, Plotinus systematized the universe into the hypostases of One, 
Intellect, Soul and Matter. The human soul is celestial, pure, and eternal, but has 
unfortunately fallen into the prison of matter, from which it must fully escape and return 
to the world of the divine Forms from which it hails. Otherwise, it will remain forever 
mired in the “mud of Hades,” as Plotinus terms this apparently independent and 
ungenerated matter, (Turner/Majercik 2000: 39) explaining that it is simply “evil itself.” 
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Numenius and Porphyry also locate the source of all evil in unoriginated prime matter, 
the latter explaining in his Sententiae that, matter in fact being absolute nonbeing, and 
thus an active principle of evil, the soul’s salvation can only be attained via its final 
escape from the cosmos and into the realm of pure spirit, where it is “never again to find 
itself held and polluted by the contagion of the world.” (Turner/Majercik 2000: 76)  
In the later history of Neoplatonism, Plotinus’ view that matter can only help 
create an irredeemably chaotic cosmos that is merely to be fled is abandoned, 
(Turner/Majercik 2000: 29) and the “dark other” accorded a somewhat more positive 
evaluation. (Turner/Majercik 2000: 36) Rejecting Plotinus’ doctrine of the undescended 
soul, according to which the divine human soul never fully leaves its heavenly abode to 
wallow in the filth of the world, Iamblichus boldly asserts that, when the human soul 
enters a body, it descends entirely and does not leave its “head in heaven.” 
(Turner/Majercik 2000: 68)  
This allows Iamblichus to suggest a more positive and active role for the soul 
while it is in this cosmos, including participation in theurgic rituals that was so abhorrent 
to Plotinus because it involved dealings with tangible objects in the sensible world. As 
Gregory Shaw explains in Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus, 
theurgy (theion ergon – a “work of the gods” or “working the divine”) became an 
“integral part of the Platonic vocabulary” owing mostly to Iamblichus’ writings in 
defense of it. (Shaw 1995: 5) Just as the Demiurge uses matter to create a relatively 
beautiful and harmonious cosmos out of it, so a theurgist can use matter in his rites and 
achieve divine status through them. (Shaw 1995: 26) 
Iamblichus’ cosmos is as good as a dualistic cosmos can be, but all the evil in it is 
still squarely blamed on matter. In his De mysteriis he deplores “the absence of beauty 
which is characteristic of matter” (Iamblichus 2003: 49) and explains that those souls 
“that are pure reveal themselves as wholly removed from matter, but those of opposite 
nature show themselves encompassed by it.” (Iamblichus 2003: 99) The ultimate goal of 
each soul is still to escape the material world, and it is in this context that the (seemingly) 
revolutionarily pro-cosmic and pro-material practice of theurgy must ultimately be 
understood.  
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2.3. DUALISMS MEET MONOTHEISMS 
 
When Alexander the Great colonized his newly founded city of Alexandria with 
Greeks, it had already been home to an indigenous Egyptian population, but also, 
significantly, to the largest Jewish community in the contemporary world. This 
extraordinary mixture brewing there during the Hellenistic period – the ancient Egyptian 
religion, Hellenized Judaism, Greek philosophy with its emerging Neoplatonism, and 
early Christianity subjected to all these influences – is what made Alexandria the 
Jerusalem of those dualisms which were to impact the Western world for millennia to 
come, and which arguably continue to do so. Two distinct phenomena occurring in early 
CE Alexandria will be mentioned here, as their role in connecting these disparate 
traditions is such that the history of ideas would look very different without them.  
The first of these are the works of Philo Judaeus of Alexandria. A philosophically 
Hellenized, but ritually practicing Jew, he is usually taken to be representative of Middle 
Platonism. His allegorical interpretations of the Torah are, however, also sometimes 
categorized as a continuation of an ancient “form of Jewish Gnosticism” and a precursor 
of the Jewish Kabbalah which was in actuality a development of “the Gnostic material 
which Philo refashioned in the light of Platonism for the Hellenized community of 
Alexandria.” (Bentwich 1910: 160) 
Philo’s Jehovah closely resembles the impassible and ineluctable supreme being 
of the Platonists, creating the world of ideas, but not directly involved in creating the 
material world, an act instead delegated to the hierarchically inferior Logos or Spirit of 
God. Significantly, the act of creation also presupposes the preexistence of a primeval 
matter, “destitute of arrangement, of quality, of animation, of distinctive character, and 
full of all disorder and confusion,” which is then formed and “invested with order, 
quality, animation, resemblance, identity, arrangement, harmony, and everything which 
belongs to the more excellent idea.” (Philo 1995: 19) Though the created world is as good 
and as harmonious as can be, its dwellers are still but prisoners of matter, whereas the 
high and mighty of the world are merely “the keepers of the prison.” (Philo 1995: 230) 
The Platonic gendering of the spirit/matter dichotomy makes its way into Philo’s 
allegorical interpretation of the Mosaic account of the creation of man. According to it, 
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Adam is pure mind, whereas Eve should be taken to mean external sense, created while 
the mind is asleep, and susceptible to the temptations of carnal pleasures, as symbolized 
by the serpent. (Philo 1995: 66) In another interpretation of the same chapters of Genesis, 
Philo insists that Adam’s creation from a lump of clay into which God breathed life 
should be read as the primordial matter that was to be his body being infused with divine 
spirit and thus formed and animated. 
Without these thoroughly dualistic interpretations of the Torah offered by Philo 
and distinctly different from traditional monotheistic Judaism, it would be impossible to 
imagine much that was soon to follow, including Gnosticism, the Kabbalah, the Christian 
Neoplatonism of both medieval times and the Renaissance, and, before all, the wildly 
influential Hermetica.  
The most important compendia of Hermetic writing include the Corpus 
Hermeticum, The Emerald Tablets of Hermes Trismegistus, and the Asclepius (Ebeling 
2007: 10-11) which were written by various unknown authors belonging to a circle of 
pagan philosophers flourishing in Alexandria in the second and third centuries CE. The 
Hermetica – their traditional themes including, according to Ebeling, “the soul’s 
imprisonment in the body, its rule over the body, its release from the body, and its return 
to its creator” (Ebeling 2007: 24) – are a bewildering a mixture of Platonism and 
Stoicism, alchemy and magic, combined with Persian and Jewish influences. (Yates 
1864: 3) These Jewish influences are strong enough to distinguish Hermetic thought from 
fully “pagan” Middle Platonism, where it is sometimes classified, along with Philo. 
Many, Yates notes, have been struck by the resemblances between the book of Genesis 
and the “Genesis” of Hermetics, the opening chapter of the Corpus Hermeticum. (Yates 
1964: 23-25) 
In it, Trismegistus receives a vision from Pimander, the “Nous of God,” of the 
creation of the world, which involved two intermediaries, “the demiurgic spirit as the 
model for the world, and the incorporeal proto-human as the model for man.” (Ebeling 
2007: 13) The perceptible world having been formed in an erotically charged encounter 
between feminine Nature and masculine divine Man, the world and man are both 
composed of “two polar principles: one is matter, the world of darkness and chaos, 
“damp nature,” and the other is light, the ordering principle, God or the divine spirit.” 
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(Ebeling 2007: 12) Man rightly belongs in the highest, most spiritual realm, but he can 
descend into the lowest, if he relinquishes order and control over his passions. (Ebeling 
2007: 16)  
Trismegistus, thanking Pimander for these invaluable revelations, wishes also to 
know how he can ascend towards the purely spiritual. Pimander explains that the mortal 
body dissolves upon death, but that the spiritual man rises through the cosmic spheres, 
shedding at each step along the way the corresponding portion of his nature that is still 
stained with the evil of the material. Recognizing, at last, his purely spiritual essence and 
origin, man can finally fully merge with God. (Ebeling 2007: 15) 
 
2.3.1. DUALISMS REJECTED BY ORTHODOX MONOTHEISMS 
 
Constant in the Hermetica, Ebeling notes, is “a polarity in the world order, an 
opposition of divine spirit and dark matter.” (Ebeling 2007: 15) Though the world and the 
body are beautifully formed, the divine spirit in man yearns to be released from the bonds 
of matter and return into God. A profound ambivalence towards the world thus becomes 
a persistent feature of Hermetic texts, prompting some scholars to divide them into two 
discrete categories: one “monistic and optimistic, the other dualistic and pessimistic,” the 
second category distinctly resembling Gnostic teaching in its strong anti-cosmic 
sentiments. (Ebeling 2007: 32) The problem with such categorizations is that, firstly, one 
cannot label a metaphysical system with a spirit/matter dichotomy at its core “monistic” 
simply for displaying a slightly more pro-cosmic worldview; and secondly, as Ebeling 
concedes, gnosis itself is frequently divided into “pessimist gnosis” and “optimist 
gnosis.” For the “optimist gnostic,” Ebeling explains, “matter is impregnated with the 
divine.” (Ebeling 2007: 22)1 
Being somehow “more dualistic” or “more pessimistic” is, thus, not necessarily a 
useful differentia specifica to be employed for distinguishing Gnosticism from 
Hermeticism – a task perhaps rendered moot by the fact that the “Gnostic” Nag Hammadi 
library itself contains five Hermetica. (Ebeling 2007: 10-11) 
                                               
1 The 1966 congress of Messina established the convention of distinguishing “gnosis” from “Gnosticism,” 
but this is a distinction Ebeling and many others do not seem to heed, perhaps for good reason. It will thus 
not be observed here either. 
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Gnosticism first appeared on the periphery of the Jewish world – Samaria, 
Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and, of course, flourished in Alexandria. Its name is an 
afterthought of historians of religion, and is based on the tenet that gnosis – direct 
knowledge of the divine – was necessary for salvation, and ignorance the worst sin. Its 
probable influences include Plato, early apocalyptic Judaism, Philo, and other allegorical 
“purely spiritual” interpretations of the Torah by Hellenized Jews who, especially after 
the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE became increasingly prone to see the world as 
unjust and cruel. (Vukomanović 2003: 163-169)  
“Anti-cosmism,” Michael Allen Williams notes in his paradigm-shifting book 
Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category, is the 
feature most frequently chosen as the identifying mark of “gnostic dualism.” (Williams 
1996: 96) However, he warns, many of the  
 
sources usually classified as “gnostic” tended to renounce the body’s substance while at 
the same time finding a certain reassurance in the image traced by its form. Its substance, 
crude matter, subject to mutilation, disease, inevitable decay, shared in the instability of 
all matter, all bodies. Its substance was doomed. Yet its form was a mirror of the divine. 
(Williams 1996: 130)  
 
As we can see, the only certain facet of dualistic thought is its consistent relegation of 
unformed matter to the status of dark other. Within each of its broad categories, widely 
ranging sentiments towards the cosmos created from this matter can be found. Having 
been somewhat oblivious to these shades of gray when constructing our histories of ideas, 
William notices, we have consequently arrived at a rather peculiar situation where 
 
we have the “gnostics” labeled “anticosmic” and Plotinus as “procosmic.” The problem 
with such formulations is not that they are entirely wrong, but that they are abstractions 
which at best tell us very little and at worst can be seriously misleading. (Williams 1996: 
133) 
 
What could well be the sole definite distinctive feature of Gnosticism is its both 
religiously and politically subversive act of portraying the figure of the Demiurge who 
creates and then rules the cosmos as evil – or at least blind and blundering – and then 
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equating this figure with that of the Creator in the Torah. Marcion was particularly 
disposed to see the Jehovah of the Old Testament as an evil, judgmental tyrant. (Stoyanov 
2003: 84) The Gnostic Demiurge, often going under such pseudonyms as Ialdabaoth, 
Samael, or Saklas, bears some resemblance to Plato’s, as he fashions chaotic matter into a 
more harmonious universe, but is a much more sinister figure. His domain is invariably a 
dark prison doomed to collapse as soon as the sparks of divine light trapped in it are able 
to flee. This is most probably the reason why many ideas of Plato, the Neoplatonists, and 
Hermetics were “smuggled” into orthodoxies with relative ease, whereas Gnosticism has 
been consistently rejected by them. 
Its metaphysical spirit/matter dualism itself is certainly and demonstrably not the 
reason. The dualism of Gnosticism is, actually, interestingly enough – unlike that of the 
Hermetics and some Neoplatonists – emanative, and not radical. Chaos is, in direct 
opposition to Greek philosophy, derived, and not preexistent in Gnostic myths, a 
difference made explicit in the tract On the Origin of the World. (Turner/Majercik 2000: 
3) It concerns itself with the exploits of Sophia, the Divine Wisdom, who falls from the 
unity and immaculate light of the Pleroma – the fullness of spirit immanent in the first 
purely spiritual emanations derived from the heavenly One – when she desires to create a 
universe of her own. Her hubris compels the world of light to separate itself by a curtain 
which casts a shadow on Sophia’s cosmos, thus creating the first darkness, otherwise 
known as matter. Sophia’s reflection in the dark waters of primordial matter causes the 
serpentine Ialdabaoth to be spawned from it. Unaware of the heavenly world of light and 
thus convinced that he is the supreme being, he fashions the surrounding watery darkness 
into a cosmos. (Wallis/Bregman 1992: 6) 
The Apocryphon of John describes the subsequent creation of man, turning the 
Genesis narrative on its head. Unable to give life to his Adam which he made out of 
matter, Ialdabaoth is tricked into allowing the divine spark of spirit to be breathed into 
him, animating him, but also making him superior to his creator and captor. Sophia, 
having already repented of her grievous error, attempts to mitigate it by planting in 
Paradise two trees that could liberate Adam’s spirit and by creating Eve who would help 
him decide to taste of them. Having eaten from the Tree of Knowledge, the first humans 
realize they are divine sparks trapped in filthy material bodies and strive to escape from 
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their prisons. Enraged, Ialdabaoth throws them out of his Paradise and onto the earth, the 
bottom of the created world, where he keeps them intoxicated by carnal pleasures. 
Procreation, Ialdabaoth’s infernal invention, makes sure there will always be divine 
sparks trapped in his realm, even if some enlightened human souls manage to leave it. 
(Williams 1996: 12) 
In order to help them do so, a series of spiritual beings arrives to awaken the 
slumbering sparks to their true identity and origin, and most notable among these is the 
appearance of the eon known as Jesus, who even assumed the semblance of a human 
body to better approach them. This notion of Jesus only appearing to have taken on a 
human body in which to be born, crucified, and resurrected, is known as docetism and is 
pervasive in all anti-cosmic dualisms in which the body is merely a burden and a 
defilement. Only the elect elite termed the “pneumatics” were capable of understanding 
that Jesus’ resurrection was merely a spiritual allegory for what happens to the soul when 
it is made aware of its heavenly paternity. The dimwitted “psychics” had to be humored 
with fairy tales of Jesus’ incarnation and resurrection, whereas the “somatics,” being 
entirely bodily, were incapable of receiving any message at all. (Pagels 1975: 5-7)  
It is the Gnostic view of the body as an insignificant burden which may have 
made possible the apparent sexual equality that, as a general rule, prevailed among the 
Gnostics. (Morris 2008: 60) This equality of the sexes prompted Elaine Pagels to label 
Gnosticism as “protofeminist.” This is, however, an overly enthusiastic qualification. In 
the Gospel of Thomas, Jesus promises that Mary Magdalene will be purged of her filthy 
femininity, and thus made worthy of discipleship, and Zostrianos clearly genders the 
darkness of matter as feminine, and the message of the treatise can neatly be summed up 
in its exhortation to “Flee from the madness and the bondage of femininity and choose 
for yourself the salvation of masculinity.” (Armstrong 2007: 43-44) Divine sparks being 
essentially identical, and bodies being but deceptive dungeons, for those who have 
transcended the carnal, there simply are no sexes, as all are spiritual and thus masculine. 
A woman could arguably attain equal status only in a movement in which her female 
body was judged to be irrelevant, and in which procreation – though not necessarily also 
sexual intercourse – was absolutely prohibited. 
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This aspect is even more pronounced in Manichaeism, quite possibly the first 
truly radical anti-cosmic dualistic system of the spirit/matter variety. Its prophet, Mani, 
who taught in the third century CE, believed the cosmos to be a grievous error which is 
the result of an attack perpetrated by the eternally chaotic kingdom of darkness against 
the similarly eternal purely spiritual kingdom of light. His intricate mythology contains, 
among other illustrative gems, graphic images of creation involving the demonic Mother 
of Life fashioning the world out of the corpses of slaughtered demons – the canopy of 
heavens out of their skinned hides, the mountains out of their crushed bones, and the 
fertile earth out of the dung extracted from their bowels. Clearly, this earth is not meant 
to be a pleasant home for humans carrying the divine spark of pure spirit, but demonic 
forces still manage to keep them in deep sleep through pleasures of the flesh. 
This is why Jesus arrives from the Kingdom of Light to awaken Adam to his 
spiritual origin and the light he carries within. (Stoyanov 2003: 103) Mani’s Jesus is 
crucified as a symbolic lesson to humanity that only a radical split from the body will 
bring salvation to the soul.  
Manichees, like Gnostics, divided themselves into the elect, sworn to strict 
asceticism, and followers, allowed to be married and sexually active, provided they 
abstained from demonic procreation which trapped more divine sparks in this vile world. 
(Stoyanov 2003: 105) Manichaeism also accorded its female members an enviable level 
of independence, power, and status.  
Equality between the sexes, the prohibition of marriage, (Obolensky 1948: 201) 
and the division into the elect and followers are also characteristic of Bogomil teaching, 
which appeared in Byzantium, Bulgaria, and Bosnia in the 10th century under different 
names. (Obolensky 1948: 123) Bogomils believed in a docetic, not truly incarnated 
Christ, (Obolensky 137) as the Son of the True God would not take on an evil body in 
this evil world, ruled and created by the Devil. (Obolensky 1948: 180) Obolensky calls 
Bogomils “the missing link between Mani and the Cathars.” (Obolensky 1948: 289) 
The Cathar church, arguably more influential in the Western world than the 
Bogomil heresy, appeared first in Italy in the 11th century (where its adherents were 
named Patarenes), and quickly spread to France, where it flourished. (Runciman 2008: 
117) Its theology included, not entirely surprisingly, a docetic Christology and the belief 
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that the Devil is the creator and ultimate lord of this world – its malevolent Rex Mundi. 
(Obolensky 1948: 288)  
Cathars likewise condemned marriage and placed an emphasis on asceticism, 
though rumors of promiscuous orgies followed in their wake. (Runciman 2008: 120-121) 
These rumors they did not care too much to disperse, as they openly confessed to 
preferring occasional fornication to marriage, which they considered to be 
institutionalized fornication, exacerbating the danger of procreation. (Runciman 2008: 
149) 
Not surprisingly, again, we see women in prominent roles. (Runciman 2008: 130) 
Esclarmande de Foix was one notable example. Considered to be one of the holiest 
among the Catharist elite, she participated in debates with the Catholics. On one such 
occasion, a Catholic monk, obviously scandalized, exclaimed “Go madam, spin at your 
distaff! You know nothing of such matters.”  
Karen Armstrong argues that women enjoyed equality in anti-cosmically dualistic 
movements – which she terms “anti-sex heresies” – because, apparently, “once a woman 
shed her sexuality she was accepted as a perfectly respectable human being.” (Armstrong 
1996: 51) However, as we have seen, most of these heresies were not necessarily anti-sex 
at all, provided that sex did not lead to progeny. What they certainly were was anti-
procreation. It would appear that childbearing is the factor that makes women unequal in 
dualist-leaning cultures, not sex itself. Cathars, for instance, denied their sacrament, the 
consolamentum (a laying on of hands), to pregnant women. (Ozment 1980: 92)  
Women could be equal in anti-cosmic dualisms provided they renounced their 
female bodies. On the other hand, in most contemporary orthodoxies, women’s bodies 
were not evil per se, and their reproductive functions were frequently duly lauded; 
however, these same bodies made women “naturally” different, which translated as 
“inferior and subjected.” One thing is constant and certain: a female body is an 
encumbrance in any religious system. 
De Rougemont cites that Catharism allegedly spread in England in 1145. (De 
Rougemont 1983: 83) Arthurian romances and the poetry of courtly love provided a 
probable conduit for the ideas of the Cathars in medieval England. Eleanor of Aquitaine 
notably took her troubadours with her from the South of France when she married Henry 
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in 1152. (De Rougemont 1983: 123) Several authors have also intriguingly suggested that 
several strains within Protestantism, especially those of the more puritanical variety, 
share certain distinctive features – such as anti-clericalism, anti-ritualism, denial of the 
Real Presence in the Eucharist, and denial of the Incarnation or at least its importance – 
with medieval anti-cosmic heresies and could have been directly or indirectly influenced 
by them. (Stoyanov 2003: 9-16) 
 
2.3.2. DUALISMS WITHIN MONOTHEISMS 
 
Judaism has always placed emphasis on the relation between God and His 
creation and asserted that human history was significant as it prepared the Kingdom of 
God on Earth, which will entail a bodily resurrection of His people (Szulakowska 2006: 
8); however, after the fall of the Temple in 70 CE, emerging apocalyptic tendencies 
combined with the influence of dualisms among Hellenized Alexandrian Jews 
contributed to the development of early Gnosticism and Kabbalah. Christianity adds to 
Judaism’s insistence on the importance of the world and the body with its revolutionary 
doctrines of the Incarnation (Copenhaver/Schmitt 1992: 129) and the Resurrection of 
Christ (Velimirović 1972); however, the writings of Plato and some Neoplatonists were 
widely used by the early fathers of the church, mostly world-weary-and-wary monastics, 
with predictable results. Although the subject of this thesis does not include Islam, a 
relatively similar dynamic is observable in this religion as well. A staunchly monotheistic 
faith, Islam holds clear doctrines of creation as wholly good, of personal identity as 
inseparable from the body, and of a universal resurrection in the flesh; however, a steady 
influence of Plato and Neoplatonism resulted in the deeply mystical Sufi tradition which 
denies the reality of the world and of separate identities for human beings. 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have thus all been heavily influenced by Platonic 
notions at different points throughout their respective histories, and a rudimentary, 
“original,” or “pure” monotheism appears to be impossible to excavate. However, certain 
tenets of “orthodoxy” are undeniable. As Shakespeare lived in a predominantly Christian 
country, the focus in our attempted excavations here will be on those Christian doctrines 
which had crystallized before his time and were – explicitly, clearly, and unambiguously 
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– universally accepted as orthodox by Catholics, Anglicans, and Puritans alike. 
(Cressy/Ferrell 2007) 
Orthodoxy in Christianity is usually defined as conformity to those doctrines that 
the Christian Church held “at the time of, and following, the formal acceptance of the 
Nicene Creed” in 325 CE. (Morris 2008: 6) The Nicene Creed – still used in both 
Catholic and Protestant religious services and prayer manuals – expresses firm beliefs in 
God as the creator and ruler of the entire cosmos, in the second face of the Trinity, Jesus 
Christ, as fully incarnated, crucified, and resurrected, and in a general resurrection 
awaiting all human beings. This has always easily disqualified anti-cosmic dualisms, but 
pro-cosmic emanative dualisms, such as those inspired by Plato, have often found ways 
to masquerade as monisms.  
This is why the distinction between “pagan philosophy” and “Christian teaching” 
made by John of Damascus is also useful to our discussion on what “orthodoxy” might 
entail – though this might not have been as easily perceived and accepted by all who 
identified as adherents of Christianity throughout its history. In the words of John 
Damascene, unlike the pagans, who divide reality into the intelligible and the sensible, 
Christians only truly distinguish between the created and the uncreated. God is uncreated, 
and everything else is created. Consequently, God is “wholly other” (Morris 2008: 50) 
and the nature of humans radically different from divinity. For orthodoxy, as Morris 
plainly puts it, “there is no divine spark.” (Morris 2008: 20) Christian mystics – like, for 
that matter, Jewish and Muslim ones as well – have therefore always cautiously avoided 
identifying themselves with God. (Pagels 1998: 33) Creation in monotheisms is humbled, 
separated from its creator by an insurmountable gulf and utterly dependent on him, but 
fundamentally whole and good. Crucially, “matter” as something dark, formless, and 
separable from “spirit” is not really a terribly useful concept in true monism. (Basil 2001) 
Like it has no “divine spark” of spirit, so orthodoxy has no “dark other” of matter. The 
cosmos and the human body are by definition wholly good (Kolakovski 1992: 40) and the 
origin of evil lies elsewhere – not in the dark, formless, and irrational nature of matter. 
Usually explained as the absence of good, evil is primarily located in demonic powers – 
significantly conceived of as incorporeal.  
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For Christian doctrine, man was created in God’s image both in body and in soul, 
(Athanasius 2003: 26) if it is even possible to divide humans in this way. (Elkaisy-
Friemuth/Dillon 2009: 91) A human being is created whole at the moment of conception, 
as opposed to Plato’s description of an eternal, preexistent soul undergoing temporary 
embodiment. Though the idea of an immortal soul, also taken from Plato, appears to have 
become almost universally accepted by Christian theologians, a disembodied soul after 
death does not in Christianity possess the fullness of the identity held by the original 
earthly individual. (Szulakowska 2006: 13) This is, again, only provided that this 
separation ever truly occurs at death, even temporarily – a notion such theologians as 
Maximus the Confessor and Eriugena argue against. (Tunberg 2008: 139) Maximus 
follows Athanasius in being only able to imagine theosis in the body, commencing after 
universal resurrection has taken place. (Jevtić 1984: 58) 
However, the subject of the body in Christianity, as the eminent Roman Catholic 
theologian von Balthasar concedes, “has always been, and still is, surrounded by forms of 
Platonism and spiritualism, which disparage the body and everything material in favor of 
a pure spirituality.” He asserts this can only be done “in crass opposition to the doctrine 
of the Incarnation of God in Christ: everything spiritual in God should become incarnate 
– and remain so even to the resurrection of the body.” He adds that the “concept of 
transcending the bodily sphere is unknown in the New Testament.” (Balthasar 1989: 80) 
The New Testament was, however, read and interpreted by celibate men educated 
primarily in Greek philosophy. They saw in Paul’s epistles the Greek word for “flesh” 
(sarx) – which in Greek could mean “our physical body, the self, our flesh, or humanity 
as a whole,” (Obach 2009: 13) while the corresponding Jewish concept referred to “man 
(soul and body together) in all his physical and moral frailty” (Armstrong 1996: 20) – and 
interpreted it to mean simply “the body as opposed to the soul.” Another, even more 
unfortunate twist was the subsequent use of the word “flesh” to denote sexuality. (Obach 
2009: 10-13) Obach laments this development: 
 
Ironically, even though Paul had expressly permitted men and women to marry 
on the basis of strong sexual desire (1 Cor. 7:9), the churchmen who came after him 
concluded that it was sinful for spouses to engage in marital relations for the sake of 
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satisfying their sexual desires! Thus the words of Paul provided future leaders with a 
rationale that enabled them to divide Christians into two classes. (Obach 2009: 12)  
 
The Christian Church, built on the foundations of Judaism, which has yet to place any 
value on the unmarried state, thus became divided into lofty ascetic monastics and lowly 
married laymen – much resembling the elect and hearers of anti-cosmic heresies. 
Some Fathers of the Church were notoriously inimical to the human body and its 
attendant sexuality to such a degree that the views they expressed are in direct opposition 
to the Church’s official doctrines. Origen saw bodies as punishments doled out to 
previously purely spiritual beings for their sins, and his views were later officially 
declared anathema. Gregory of Nyssa, following Origen, declared that man was given his 
animalistic body with its disgusting sexual urges only after the Fall, and that the pre-
lapsarian body was in contrast not subject to passions. His contemporary, but much more 
influential namesake Gregory of Nazianzus in contrast held that the only way in which 
human bodies were changed by the Fall was in their now acquired inertia. (Srbulj 2003: 
36) 
Tertullian, a member of the dualistic Montanists before his stint with Christianity, 
and founding the even more extreme Tertullianists after it, notoriously claimed that 
female beauty was dangerously seductive even to the incorporeal angels, and that the lust 
women were guilty of producing in men was the very gate to Hell. Ambrose, who 
believed that the body was but a dirty robe discarded upon death, wrote in his On 
virginity that man never acts as an irrational animal more than during coitus. Ambrose 
was followed in his views by the even more extreme Jerome. 
In his Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians, Jerome expresses the type of 
misogyny usually only observable in fully dualistic systems: “As long as woman is for 
birth and children, she is different from man as body is from soul. But when she wishes 
to serve Christ more than the world, then she will cease to be a woman and will be called 
man.” (Armstrong 1996: 129) This is, of course, in crass opposition to Paul’s differently 
misogynistic dictum that a woman will be saved through childbirth. (1 Tim. 2: 15) 
Jerome’s Adversus Jovinianum is a tract that has entered the annals of notoriety. 
Jovinian had taught that all baptized persons, whether virgins, married, or widowed, had 
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equal spiritual merit. In his vitriolic attack on Jovinian’s position, Jerome exalts virginity 
and decries the “dirt of marriage” which the blood of the martyrs can barely wash clean. 
His shocked friends in Rome tried to withdraw it from circulation, Jerome agreed to write 
a retraction, and Augustine actually wrote The Good of Marriage in response to this 
extremism. (Obach 2009: 37)  
Augustine’s is a peculiar case. A fervent Manichee throughout his youth, during 
which time he cohabited with a woman, he was baptized into the Christian Church at the 
Easter Vigil in 387, whereupon he decided to become a monk, and not marry her. (Obach 
2009: 30) Apparently unable to truly shed the Manichean mistrust of the body, he simply 
turned their teachings on sexuality on their head instead. Manichaeism allowed its 
followers the pleasures of sexual intercourse, as long as it did not result in procreation; 
Augustine, conversely, claimed that procreation was the only acceptable excuse for 
indulging in marital relations. (Obach 2009: 33) His additional complex strictures on how 
to make certain one is not engaging in them in a sinful manner notoriously made life 
difficult for those married couples who attempted to follow them. 
To be fair to the Christian Church, those Fathers who expressed dualistic views 
invariably belonged to monastic orders not fully under its control, or came as converts to 
Christianity from dualistic heresies, or started their own. Some of their teachings were 
condemned after their death, when the doctrines they clashed with were officially 
declared, while some caused shocked reactions even during their lifetimes. There are, 
then, certain limits to the influence that dualistic thought has been able to exert on 
orthodox Christianity, pervasive and constant though it may have been. 
Where Neoplatonism was most influential was in providing later theologians, 
especially in the East, with their philosophical terms and concepts. Most notable is the 
case of pseudo-Dionysius, a 6th century Neoplatonic mystic whose writings had been 
ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, a disciple of Christ mentioned in the Acts and thus 
a figure of unquestionable authority. The confusion was only cleared in the 15th century, 
by which time his dualistic notions had already become ubiquitous in Christian mystical 
thought. Further influxes of dualistic thought into Christianity came with Michael 
Psellus, who mixed Neoplatonic concepts with those drawn from the Chaldean Oracles 
and the Corpus Hermeticum in the 11th century, and then with Gemistus Pletho and 
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Nicholas of Cusa, who revived Platonism in the 14th and 15th centuries. (Kristeller 1961: 
52-53)  
An ancient dualistic tradition in the history of Judeo-Christian thought thus begins 
to emerge before our eyes. Never truly broken – suppressed by the Church in anti-cosmic 
heresies, but smuggled through the Neoplatonic currents within that very same Church – 
this undercurrent of dualism was alive and well when Plato was resurrected to once more 
exert a direct influence on the history of ideas. The ground was thus well prepared for the 
consequent explosive revival of dualistic ideas in the phenomenon that would become 
known as Renaissance Neoplatonism.  
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The one imperfect, mortall, foeminine: 
Th’ other immortall, perfect, masculine 
(Spenser, The Faerie Queene, Book II, ix, 22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0. MATTER IN RENAISSANCE NEOPLATONISM 
 
There have been several major infusions of the (post-)Platonic brand of dualism 
into the mainstream currents of the history of monotheistic Judeo-Christian thought. The 
first significant influx of dualistic ideas into orthodoxy occurred, as we have seen, in 
Alexandria. The second, without a doubt, took place in the Renaissance.  
The fall of Constantinople in 1453 was, according to many, a starting point for the 
Renaissance, as it was the Greek refugees from Byzantium who spread the knowledge of 
Greek in Europe. It was also from Byzantium that the Greek manuscripts of Plato, the 
Neoplatonists, and the Hermetica reached the Western world and helped form the 
phenomenon that has since become most widely known as Renaissance Neoplatonism, 
(Copenhaver/Smitt 1992: 15) though Frances Yates usually refers to it as Occult 
Neoplatonism and Ted Hughes feels it necessary to expand the term into Hermetic Occult 
Neoplatonism. The disagreements concerning its name illustrate the complex and 
composite nature of the phenomenon itself. If it was difficult to differentiate among the 
various strains of post-Platonic dualistic thought when they first appeared, this becomes a 
well-nigh impossible task in this eclectic and chaotic movement. 
Any discussion of Renaissance Neoplatonism must begin with, center on, and end 
with the fascinating figure of Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), who was directly responsible 
both for resurrecting each of the movement’s various and sometimes disparate strains and 
for somehow managing to merge them into a relatively harmonious-seeming whole. He 
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was also, remarkably, able to widely publicize and disseminate this amazing amalgam 
that bordered on heresy – exerting a formative influence on his own and two subsequent 
centuries – as a Roman Catholic priest, and a scrupulous one at that. Ficino tries very 
hard not to contradict any accepted doctrines of the Church in his writings, which is why 
he sometimes resorts to conspicuously neglecting those that do not resonate well with 
dualistic ideas. For instance, he only mentions the Incarnation of Christ in passing, and 
almost completely omits the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. (Allen 2002: 58) He is 
thus able to consider himself a Christian Platonist and avoid noticing the inherent 
contradictions of such a designation. 
 
3.1. FICINO’S (NEO)PLATONISM 
  
Ficino’s contribution to the revival of Platonic thought in the Renaissance could 
hardly be overestimated. Perhaps most significantly, he translated the entire Plato into 
Latin. This monumental translation was published in 1484 and included his prefaces for 
each dialogue. He also separately published a long commentary on the Symposium 
entitled De amore, which would become the seminal text of Renaissance love theory. Not 
stopping at that, he rendered the entire Enneads of Plotinus into Latin, and spent the last 
few years of his life publishing translations of other Neoplatonic authors, including 
Iamblichus, Porphyry, Proclus, Synesius and Michael Psellus. 
Ficino’s cosmology closely echoes that of the Neoplatonists. He divides the 
cosmos into the hierarchically ordered hypostases of the One, Mind (or Angel), Soul, and 
Matter (or Body), each mirrored in the lower sphere. The fundamental split existing at the 
basis of the universe, however, is that between spirit and matter, a dichotomy that is 
clearly gendered in his system. The spirit is male, ordering, and rational, whereas matter 
is female, chaotic, and irrational. The spirit/matter dichotomy is also, as it were, 
numbered, as the purely spiritual and masculine number 1 is likened to the maker of the 
world, imposing form on number 2, a fall from its perfect unity and thus given the role of 
indeterminate matter. (Allen 1994: 64) 
Ficino is by no means clear on the position of matter in his cosmos, or the cosmos 
itself, which, as Sergius Kodera notes, is fully in keeping with his sources. In the 
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Timaeus, Plato’s vision of the world is essentially optimistic, whereas the Phaedo stresses 
its perils to the soul. Among the Neoplatonists, Plotinus notoriously deplores the soul’s 
contact with the corporeal world, while, on the other side of the Neoplatonic spectrum, 
we have Iamblichus, who sees it as a wondrous opportunity. Both approaches towards the 
material world are present in Ficino’s own philosophy. On the one hand, matter is a 
defiling encumbrance to the soul from which it must ascend towards full liberation; on 
the other hand, the cosmos is filled with beautiful forms, of which the human body 
notably is one, and the divine spirit of man has both the right and the responsibility to 
propagate these forms and imprint them onto lower matter. (Allen 2002: 286-287) 
The union of the soul and the body is, however, invariably uneasy, unpleasant, 
and almost tragic. The soul is constantly on the borderline between the immortal and 
mortal parts of the cosmos, and powerfully drawn towards both. The divine spirit, from 
which it has originated, beckons it back with reminders of its beauty as it is reflected in 
the forms of this world. The soul can, however, also succumb to the lures of matter, 
instead of striving towards the purity of spirit, and this is what Ficino calls “sin.” (Allen 
2002: 52) 
By the sixteenth century, under the widespread influence of Ficino’s writings and 
his Florentine Academy, modeled on Plato’s, Platonism had become an extremely 
important aspect of popular culture and had an “almost ubiquitous presence” throughout 
Europe. (Kristeller 1961: 61) This, significantly, included England – especially its poets. 
Many of Ficino’s theories, Jayne declares, “were in the intellectual atmosphere and could 
have reached England in a number of indirect ways,” but there are also those English 
poets who were demonstrably directly impacted by Ficino’s writings. There are, for 
instance, in Spenser’s verses “verbatim quotations and sequences of ideas unquestionably 
taken directly from Ficino,” (Jayne 1952: 217) and other poets who can be shown to have 
actually read Ficino include Raleigh, Burton, and Chapman. (Jayne 1952: 238) Other 
poets and thinkers have received Ficino’s ideas via other sources, mostly poetic, resulting 
in a profusion of thought closely reflecting his own, and justifying his reputation as the 
“fountainhead” of Platonism in the English Renaissance. (Jayne 1952: 222) 
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3.2. THE RENAISSANCE MAGUS AS NEOPLATONIST, HERMETIC, 
ALCHEMIST, GNOSTIC… 
 
Neo(Platonic) thought in the narrow sense of the designation is quite difficult to 
distinguish from other strains of Renaissance Neoplatonism partly because Ficino and his 
colleagues attempted to do no such thing. Though Renaissance Neoplatonists highly 
praised Plato, they saw him as merely one prophet in a long, never broken tradition of 
occult knowledge, later termed prisca theologia. According to Ficino’s final list (he had 
several), this pre-Mosaic occult tradition encompassed Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, 
Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, and Plato. This perennial wisdom was thus 
ultimately derived from Hermes Trismegistus, thought at the time to have been an ancient 
sage who had preceded and prophesied both Moses and Plato. The true age of Hermetic 
writings was only revealed in 1614, when Swiss philologist Isaac Casaubon dated them to 
the 2nd and 3rd centuries CE. This explains the seemingly paradoxical decision Ficino 
made when the Hermetica reached him: he stopped his work on the complete works of 
Plato and translated Hermes first. Ficino’s Latin translation appeared under the title 
Pimander and was relatively quickly available in the vernacular as well, causing quite a 
stir among a relatively wide circle. (Yates 1964: 13)  
Hermeticism, with its gendered spirit/matter dichotomy and its ambivalence 
towards the created world, was quite easy to assimilate into the newly founded 
Neoplatonism, and its other aspects simply followed suit. The Hermetica, namely, also 
contained alchemical texts. Much like had been indicated in Iamblichus’ theory of 
theurgy, it seemed possible to do the divine work of ordering and reordering matter 
through practical magic – only with juicier examples and some actual instructions. 
Alchemy was in Hermetic texts an investigation into matter and its transmutation into 
something more durable through applying the mysteries of birth, death, and resurrection. 
The transmutation of lead into gold served as a symbol for the transfiguration of the 
alchemist himself – his dark and dull prima materia turned into bright and solid spirit. 
Alchemy had not, of course, been unknown to the West before the discovery of the 
Hermetica, but it could now be taken seriously and practiced even by such otherwise 
sober “actual” scientists as Paracelsus. Almost all branches of practical magic, as long as 
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it was “white” – directed by and leading towards the spiritual – now seemed justified and 
sanctioned by divine Hermes who, after all, influenced Moses himself. 
Renaissance Magia was another strain of Renaissance Neoplatonism that Ficino 
personally started. His popular three-volume treatise De vita which dealt, among other 
things, with statues, talismans, astrology, and daemonology, was suspicious to such a 
degree that Ficino was threatened with a Curial investigation.  
Ficino’s pupil and colleague in the Florentine Academy, Pico della Mirandola, 
continued in the traditions his teacher had started. His thought contains Platonic, 
Neoplatonic, Hermetic, and Cabalistic elements, with a touch of Magia. His seminal 
Oration on the Dignity of Man (De hominis dignitate) written in 1486 has often been 
touted as the manifesto of humanism, partly because it accords man a great deal of 
operative power and free will. The operative power is based on the dualistic notion that 
man, being a spark of the divine, has the right to do divine work on the lower matter of 
this world. The free will is based on the Neoplatonic notion of the chain of being on 
which man, being divided into the spiritual and material parts, can freely ascend towards 
the purely incorporeal angels or descend to the fully carnal beasts.  
The German magician, occult writer, and alchemist Cornelius Agrippa goes 
beyond both Ficino and Pico in his magic pursuits. His De occulta philosophia, whose 
three volumes were printed in early 1530s, and widely, albeit somewhat clandestinely 
disseminated, openly describes and advocates a powerful brand of operative magic based 
on a metaphysical dualism. It contains several treatments of harmony in the cosmos, in 
the soul of man, and the beneficial effects of music on the soul if it is composed in 
accordance with cosmic harmonies. These are followed by long discussions of the use of 
number and image in celestial magic, complete with the printed pictures of daemons to be 
employed by young aspiring Magi. (Yates 1964: 135) Agrippa exerted a powerful 
influence on two such figures: Giordano Bruno and John Dee. 
Bruno’s philosophy, which he claimed was a prisca magia, (Yates 1964: 235) was 
a vertiginous concoction of Neoplatonism, Hermeticism, Magic, the Cabala, astrology, 
and astronomy. Having spent time in Prague at the court of Emperor Rudolf II 
(notoriously obsessed with all things occult), apparently attempting to aid his pursuit of 
the philosopher’s stone, Bruno came on a mission of enlightenment to England in his 
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self-proclaimed role as “the waker of sleeping souls, tamer of presumptuous and 
recalcitrant ignorance, proclaimer of a general philanthropy.” (Yates 1999: 264) As 
Hughes surmises, surely “Bruno’s impact on England must have been the supreme 
experience of these years, a sensation closely associated with the leaders of the English 
Renaissance,” with whom Bruno was evidently in close contact. He dedicated his sonnets 
to Sir Philip Sidney, whose tutor had been John Dee. Shakespeare’s patron Southampton, 
in turn, was the best friend of the Earl of Essex, who married Sidney’s widow and 
inherited Sidney’s social circle along with her. Shakespeare was, Hughes concludes, 
therefore more than likely familiar with the ideas of both Bruno and Dee. (Hughes 2007: 
169) 
John Dee, the first and only widely known fully fledged genuine English 
Renaissance Magus, was also an eminent mathematician and a welcome guest in 
Elizabeth’s court. He was apparently sent on a mission to Europe and spent several years 
in Prague, staying with a noble family whose members were interested in alchemy and 
other occult sciences, and counseling Emperor Rudolf II. (Yates 2003: 102) When he 
returned, the times had apparently changed, and Dee suddenly fell into disfavor and 
finally died in penury. His end was better at least than Bruno’s, who was burned at the 
stake in 1600. The dreary fates of Dee and Bruno – as opposed to Ficino and Pico, who 
suffered few repercussions in their time – illustrate well the change of climate in which 
this still fledgling dualistic tradition was abruptly forced to go fully underground, which 
may be why we knew so little about it until relatively recently. 
Another interesting dualistic strain of thought within Renaissance Neoplatonism, 
closely associated with its tradition of operative magic (but understandably never 
explicitly mentioned, as the term used for it has only ever been employed by outsiders, 
not adherents) was Gnosticism. Elements of Gnosticism, demonstrably present in the 
Hermetica and in the great magicians of the Renaissance, in Nuttall’s words, “show the 
tradition in living form.” (Nuttall 2007: 1) Both Nuttall and Mitchell have persuasively 
argued that Gnostic thought has endured in England for centuries – and that, for instance, 
its resurgence in Blake should not come as a surprise to anyone. Gnostic ideas were, in 
their view, disseminated throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance via such 
conduits as persistent Faustian themes in literature. (Nuttall 2007; Mitchell 2006) 
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Another possible conduit for Gnostic ideas was another significant strain of 
Renaissance Neoplatonism that should be mentioned here. Sixteenth century Jewish 
mysticism, first resurrected in Italy, contains, according to Yates, “gnostic elements 
which the Renaissance scholar could assimilate to the Hermetic type of Gnosticism,” 
(Yates 2003: 19-20) and Daphne Freedman concurs that its “proven Gnostic elements” 
disseminated via Italian Renaissance writers expounding it “provide a possible conduit 
for gnostic themes” into Renaissance Neoplatonism in England. (Freedman 2006: 75)  
 
3.3. … AND (CHRISTIAN) CABALIST 
 
As Yates notes, apart from the fall of Constantinople in 1453, there is another date 
which has not been so much stressed by historians of the Renaissance, but which is at 
least equally important. This is 1492, the date of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain. 
Many of these exiles fled to Italy, inciting there a fascination with the Hebrew language 
and an enthusiasm for the Jewish mystical tradition. (Yates 2003: 18) The name used for 
this tradition here will be the “Cabala,” as this is the spelling usually employed for 
differentiating its Christianized form widely accepted in Western Europe from the strictly 
Jewish Kabbalah and the Hermetic Qabalah – although the teachings of the movements 
themselves are difficult to distinguish. All are based on the notion of En Sof as the 
ineluctable source of the ten Sephirot emanating from it and forming the Tree of Life, the 
spiritual basis of the visible universe. Most Cabalists of all stripes have frequently 
concerned themselves with allegorical, spiritualized readings of the Torah which 
accentuate the significance of letters and numbers – as each letter of the Hebrew alphabet 
has both numerical value and symbolic meaning assigned to it – and see reflected in them 
a divine harmony imprinted into the cosmos and the microcosm that is man. 
First incorporated into Christianity by Ramond Llull in medieval times, the 
Cabala was a subject that Ficino also took a great interest in and was tutored in by a 
rabbi. It is, however, Ficino’s student Pico who is widely considered to be the founder of 
Christian Cabala. The Cabala evidently appeared to the mystically-minded Christians in 
the Renaissance as a new insight into the meaning of Christianity and a novel way to 
attempt to convert Jews. (Yates 2003: 18) Significant expositions of Christian Cabala 
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published after the expulsion of the Jews include Reuchlin’s De arte Cabalistica (1517) 
and Francesco Giorgi’s De harmonia mundi (1525). Both authors were also demonstrably 
influenced by Neoplatonism and Hermeticism. 
Jewish intellectuals in Italy were themselves actively involved in this syncretic 
mystical revival of their tradition and easily accepted the Neoplatonic additions to it, as 
“Jewish philosophy itself was suffused with Neoplatonism.” (Frank/Leaman 1997: 455) 
An important Jewish Cabalist with a strong Neoplatonic bent was Leone Ebreo, 
whose Dialoghi d’amore between the lovers named Philo and Sophia possibly earned 
him the name “Philo Ebreo,” which he was also known under. His Dialoghi, influenced 
by Ficino and Pico, were themselves highly influential among both philosophers and 
poets. Combining Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Cabalistic elements, Ebreo expresses the 
love of the beautiful in gendered symbolism: the beloved spiritual, active, male principle 
“impregnates” its material, passive, receptive female lover by imparting the form of 
beauty onto it. (Frank/Leaman 1997: 456-457) 
Now considered to be the most significant Cabalistic text, the Zohar became 
authoritative and venerated among Italian Cabalists, Jewish and Christian alike, around 
the middle of the sixteenth century. Paradoxically, while the Talmud was being burned 
and other Jewish works subjected to severe censorship, the Zohar was, not without 
controversy, but without any repercussions, printed by two Christian publishing houses. 
(Frank/Leaman 1997: 460) 
Another important development in the sixteenth century was the appearance of a 
new type of Cabala and its platonization and further dissemination in Italy. 
(Frank/Leaman 1997: 462) The kind of Cabala which had influenced Pico was Cabala as 
it had developed in Spain before the expulsion of the Jews. After the expulsion, a new 
kind of Cabala emerged and quickly spread like wildfire. (Yates 2003: 25) This was 
Lurianic Cabala, named after its founder, Isaac Luria Ashkenazi (1534-1572), the most 
important and influential Cabalistic mystic after the expulsion.  
It is in the Cabala of Isaac Luria that Jewish mysticism – quite possibly owing to 
yet another exile of God’s chosen people – takes a distinctly anti-cosmic turn. As 
Freedman notices, the myths of Lurianic Cabala, Gnosticism and Manichaeism are very 
similar, which does not necessarily mean, she warns, that the “origin of these views in the 
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lurianic cabala is necessarily gnostic,” as “they may equally reflect a parallel 
development of themes from Jewish exegesis or Jewish influence on gnostic texts; but the 
consciousness, if not gnostic, shows gnostic sensibilities.” (Freedman 2006: 75) 
Armstrong agrees, stating that the “Gnostic character of these ideas, which constitute a 
new mythology in Judaism, cannot be doubted.” (Armstrong 2007: 171) 
In what way is the “Gnostic character of these ideas,” or at least, their “gnostic 
sensibilities” reflected? Significantly, the supreme being of the system, the wholly 
transcendental En Sof, had little to do with the actual creation of the cosmos, which is 
only possible because of His absence. Having withdrawn to make space for the cosmos, 
He tried to fill the vacuum with His divine light, but sparks of this primal light fell into 
the abyss, where some remained imprisoned in this dark domain now ruled by the evil 
sephirah Din, much resembling the judgmental Demiurge of the Gnostics and likewise 
expressly identified with Jehovah. The first Adam was purely spiritual and only acquired 
a material nature after his soul was shattered owing to his sin. Like Gnostics and 
Manichees, Luria also preached a transmigration of souls until they are returned into the 
En Sof. (Armstrong 2007: 170-171) 
The Cabala of Isaac Luria spread with astonishing ease and speed throughout 
Europe and demonstrably had adherents in England. Lurianic ideas were disseminated in 
Renaissance England through different conduits. As Richard H. Popkin notices in “A 
Jewish Merchant of Venice,” there was an actual Jewish merchant from Venice in 
England from 1596 to 1600, a hostage from the Earl of Essex’s raid on Cadiz by the 
name of one Alonso Nufiez de Herrera (Abraham Cohen de Herrera). He had studied 
Florentine Neoplatonism and Lurianic Cabala and “became the most important 
philosophical expositor of the Lurianic Cabbala.” In December 1596, he wrote to Essex 
that he was not Spanish and should not be kept with the Spanish hostages, but instead be 
allowed to move to London where he had friends. His request was apparently granted. 
(Popkin 1989: 330) 
Additionally, English scholars studied in Renaissance Italy – where they came 
into contact with Pico della Mirandola – and the books of Johann Reuchlin appeared in 
England in the 16th century. Sir Philip Sidney, Robert Fludd, Sir Francis Bacon, and John 
Milton were demonstrably all familiar with Cabalistic ideas, enabling Shultz to declare 
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that in “sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, Kabbalah was in the air.” (Shultz 
1981: 228) 
 
3.4. THE NEOPLATONIC NARCISSUS 
 
Renaissance Neoplatonism, as we have seen, incorporated Platonic, Neoplatonic, 
Hermetic, Gnostic, and Cabalistic elements. All of these different strains of the tradition 
had a gendered spirit/matter dichotomy at the core and were ambivalent towards the 
material world, making possible both pro-cosmic and anti-cosmic sentiments. On the one 
hand, ascending towards the purity of spirit was the ideal, as matter was an encumbrance 
to the soul; on the other hand, the harmony of the cosmos and the microcosm was 
undeniable, and the Magus was invited to introduce this harmony into the dark other of 
matter by way of theurgy, alchemy, and/or Magia. Matter in the dualisms offered within 
Renaissance Neoplatonism was, then, particularly ambiguous. Simultaneously optimistic 
and pessimistic, enthusiastically pro-cosmic and world-weary, transcendental and 
“proactive,” the Neoplatonism which the air that Shakespeare breathed was saturated 
with could not quite make up its mind on what the proper attitude towards matter was. 
Three broad categories of approaches to matter, with different implications for 
views on kingship, art, love and gender, can nevertheless be identified. All three can be 
related to a particular Neoplatonic reinterpretation of the myth of Narcissus. 
 
 
             Narcissus (1594-96) by Caravaggio 
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The ancient myth of Narcissus has arguably experienced its most widely 
disseminated version in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. According to Ovid, Narcissus, a 
beautiful Greek youth, incurs the wrath of Eros by spurning the advances of the nymph 
Echo. His fundamental sin lies in his refusal to share his love – and his body – with the 
men and women who desire him. His punishment is symbolically appropriate: he is 
doomed to fall desperately in love with his own image reflected in water and drown 
attempting to become united with it. Poor misguided Narcissus obliviously continues to 
worship his reflection even in Hades. The moral of the story is clear: avoid solipsistic 
self-obsession and lovingly notice other human beings around you. In other words, don’t 
be narcissistic. 
Interestingly enough, Neoplatonists manage to interpret the myth in exactly the 
opposite way. Only three centuries after Ovid, Plotinus takes this story to refer 
allegorically to the soul’s fall into the illusory but alluring world of lower matter. In 
Plotinus’ interpretation, Narcissus represents the soul of the Neoplatonic Everyman, who 
is called upon to contemplate the beautiful forms imprinted upon the matter of this world 
only to be inspired by them to ascend into the purely spiritual realms of Ideas:  
 
When he sees the beauty in bodies he must not run after them; we must know 
that they are images, traces, shadows, and hurry away to that which they image. For if a 
man runs to the image and wants to seize it as if it was the reality (like a beautiful 
reflection playing on the water, which some story somewhere, I think, said riddlingly a 
man wanted to catch and sank down into the stream and disappeared) then this man who 
clings to beautiful bodies and will not let them go, will, like the man in the story, but in 
soul, not in body, sink down into the dark depths where intellect has no delight, and stay 
blind in Hades, consorting with shadows there and here. (Allen 2002: 289-290) 
 
This interpretation remained highly popular throughout antiquity and the Middle 
Ages and made its way into Renaissance Neoplatonism unscathed. Ficino interprets the 
myth of Narcissus his De amore in terms very reminiscent of those used by Plotinus:  
 
Narcissus, who is obviously young, that is, the soul of rash and inexperienced 
man. Does not look at his own face, that is, does not notice its own substance and 
character at all. But admires the reflection of it in the water and tries to embrace that, that 
  84 
is, the soul admires in the body, which is unstable and in flux, like water, a beauty which 
is the shadow of the soul itself. He abandons his own beauty, but he never reaches the 
reflection. That is, the soul, in pursuing the body, neglects itself but finds no gratification 
in its use of the body. For it does not really desire the body itself; rather, seduced, like 
Narcissus, by corporeal beauty, which is an image of its own beauty, it desires its own 
beauty. And since it never notices the fact that, while it is desiring one thing, it is 
pursuing another, it never satisfies its desire. For this reason, melted into tears, he is 
destroyed; that is, when soul is located outside itself, in this way, and has sunken into the 
body, it is racked by terrible passions and, stained by the filths of the body, it dies, as it 
were, since it now seems to be a body rather than a soul. (Allen 2002: 289) 
 
This interpretation is one of those Neoplatonic concepts that have demonstrably 
reached England, as a version of the Narcissus story from Ovid appeared in English in 
1560. Its anonymous author cites Plato and Ficino as authorities for part of his work and 
proceeds to moralize about the treachery of watery matter in a similarly dualistic fashion. 
(Jayne 1952: 219)  
The positive reception of this Neoplatonic interpretation of the Narcissus story in 
the Renaissance was conceivably facilitated by the concurrent rediscovery, translation, 
and propagation of Hermetic texts, in which Ficino played the pivotal role. A similar 
story to that of Narcissus can be found in Pimander, Corpus Hermeticum V. It is also 
distinctively dualistic in its metaphysics, but its dualism is slightly different in its 
approach. It regales us with the adventures of the newly emanated, purely spiritual Man:  
 
Man […] leant across the armature of the spheres, having broken through their 
envelopes, and showed to the Nature below the beautiful form of God. […] Nature smiled 
with love, for she had seen the features of that marvelously beautiful form of Man 
reflected in the water and his shadow on the earth. And he, having seen this form like to 
himself in Nature, reflected in the water, he loved her and wished to dwell with her. The 
moment he wished this he accomplished it and came to inhabit the irrational form. Then 
Nature having received her loved one, embraced him, and they were united, for they 
burned with love. (Yates 1964: 23-25) 
 
The parallels with the Neoplatonic interpretation of the story of Narcissus are 
striking. Both Narcissus and Man lean over the dark, formless waters of feminine matter, 
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and see their forms reflected in them. Both are commended for loving the reflection of 
their own spiritual form in the Other, rather than loving the Other herself. But Narcissus’ 
water is merely deceptive and deadly, while the Hermetic Nature, though infinitely 
inferior to Man and unlovable for her own self, shows herself to be malleable and pliable, 
eagerly reflecting his image, and thus making Man’s plunge into her waters a positive, 
creative act.  
Ficino bases on the Hermetic story of Man’s leap into Nature a captivating, if 
highly unorthodox, exegesis of the opening verses of the book of Genesis and offers it in 
his commentary on this treatise: “Here Mercurius is seen to be treating of the Mosaic 
mysteries,” Ficino asserts, noting the similarity with the image of the Spirit of God 
brooding over the material waters “in the beginning,” and thus creating the world by 
casting his reflection onto them lovingly. (Yates 1964: 23-25) 
The interpretations of this basic allegorical narrative of the spiritual male figure 
who falls in love with his own image reflected in the dark feminine waters of matter and 
consequently plunges into them, either drowning or lovingly creating the universe, carry 
with them nearly all of the possible approaches to matter that were thinkable in 
Renaissance Neoplatonism, and were sometimes – as was shown was the case with 
Ficino – also actually thought by the same person. This is why the narrative of Narcissus 
and his three options will be very useful in delineating the structure of this thesis.  
The first option available to Narcissus, standing on the brink of the waters and 
admiring his reflection, is the one advocated by Plotinus and Ficino in their moralizing 
accounts of the myth: Narcissus should realize that what he is looking at is the mere 
shadow of a spiritual reality – his soul, identical to that of the One – reflected onto the 
dark formless nothingness of matter. This beauty he has fallen in love with should inspire 
him to ascend far away from the shadowy illusions that this world offers and, rising far 
above matter, ultimately become one with the real deity, essentially identical to his own 
spirit. It is as anti-cosmic as Neoplatonism can get.  
The second option is what, tragically, happens to Narcissus in the myth, as he 
does not seem to heed Plotinus’ and Ficino’s advice: Narcissus descends deep into the 
dark waters of matter, becoming indistinguishable from the material body.  
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The third option is the one suggested by the Hermetic story of the descent of Man, 
and also, paradoxically, espoused by Ficino in his interpretation of it, in which he was 
possibly inspired by Iamblichus’ Neoplatonic system: Narcissus’ reflection can form the 
watery matter lovingly and thus (help) create the universe. It is as pro-cosmic as 
Neoplatonism gets. 
All three can be found in Shakespeare’s work. 
The central portion of this thesis will consist of a comparative analysis of 
approaches to the material and the carnal existing in, on the one hand, various branches 
of Renaissance Neoplatonism, and, on the other, Shakespeare’s work, primarily his 
tragedies and so-called “problem” plays. The chapters will deal with possible approaches 
to matter and also possible steps along a Neoplatonic journey through the material world. 
This journey begins in “The Prison,” where the hero experiences those 
Neoplatonic sentiments that are on the anti-cosmic end of the spectrum.  
This, many Neoplatonists would hope, can induce him to attempt an “Ascent” 
towards the purely spiritual spheres. This ascent is often also inspired by female figures 
stripped of all carnality. 
The ultimate goal of Neoplatonic ascent is “Henosis,” in which the hero becomes 
one with the One. 
If the hero is not careful, allowing himself to be lured downward by carnal female 
figures, or if he is very adventurous indeed, he can instead begin a kenotic “Descent” into 
the depths of matter. 
This descent will allow him to face the “Nothing” of formless prime matter which 
is at the basis of the cosmos and his own mortal body. 
Faced with it, he will, some Neoplatonists would hope, realize that it is this 
nothing that everything comes from, and will strive to help the spiritual forces in the 
universe, of which he ultimately is one, form it lovingly. This is known as “Theurgy.” 
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I have been studying how I may compare 
This prison where I live unto the world 
(Richard II, V. v. 1-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.0. THE PRISON 
 
Narcissus, gazing at his beautiful reflection in the murky waters of matter, has 
three options: ascend far away from the shadowy illusions that this world offers, descend 
deep into the dark waters of matter, or form the watery matter lovingly. 
In their moralizing interpretations of the myth, Plotinus and Ficino advocate the 
first option: Narcissus should realize that his gaze is meeting nothing more than the 
shadow of true spiritual reality reflected onto the dark formless nothingness of matter. 
The world that surrounds him is a mere imprisoning illusion that is ideally to be escaped 
from. Ficino explicitly maintains in his interpretation that the myth of Narcissus is an 
allegory for the soul which falls prey to the deceiving powers of the corporeal world. The 
world thus acquires a firmly negative undertone. (Allen 2002: 289) 
This is as anti-cosmic as Neoplatonism can get without becoming something else. 
 
4.1.1. THIS LOATHSOME WORLD: ANTI-COSMIC SENTIMENTS 
 
Anti-cosmic attitudes, as we have seen, have a long-standing tradition in the 
history of religious concepts. Manichees and Gnostics, Bogomils and Cathars, to name 
but a few, frankly and openly admitted to entertaining a desire to break free from the 
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filthy and evil material world that imprisoned them and return to the pristine purity of 
spirit which they believed was their true legacy. 
Neoplatonism proper, in contrast, approached the created world with mixed 
feelings. The ontology of Neoplatonism is usually categorized as a “pro-cosmic dualism” 
in histories of religious and philosophical thought – which sometimes does little more 
than make one wonder to what extent a dualistic ontology truly can be pro-cosmic, as it is 
quite difficult to find Neoplatonic thinkers who did not at one point express grave 
misgivings about the cosmos. Plotinus, who famously argued – against both Gnostics and 
Christians – that the created world is eternal, also expressed notoriously extreme anti-
cosmic sentiments in his Enneads. Iamblichus, reputedly the least squeamish of 
Neoplatonists, who was not averse to theurgical rites involving “filthy” matter, still 
believed their ultimate goal was to liberate each fallen spark of spirit from the prison of 
this world. Both were intensively read and extensively quoted by Ficino, who inherited 
their ambiguity towards the material world. (Allen 2002: 286)   
Shakespeare’s tragedies and dark comedies are densely inhabited by characters – 
usually male, often previously idealistic and naïve, quite frequently young – who at one 
point express strong anti-cosmic sentiments. These are nearly always, one immediately 
notices, the result of shock or disappointment. Hamlet’s melancholy and ascetic anti-
cosmism following his father’s death (and, more importantly, his mother’s “o’erhasty 
marriage”) is probably the best example of this.  
By persisting in mourning his deceased father in his black garb, Hamlet, perhaps 
unwittingly, courts the lofty Saturnian influences sought by Neoplatonic philosophers. In 
Renaissance Neoplatonic astrology, melancholics such as Hamlet traditionally belong 
under the auspices of Saturn. In Ficino’s own astrological system, Saturn occupies the 
most elevated position, as he comprehensively explains in his De vita, and his influence 
can be courted “by sorrow,” which Hamlet thoroughly does. (Ficino 1998: 295)  
If there is any question as to why anyone would willingly choose mourning, 
isolation, and melancholy, Ficino explains that Saturn “helps one contemplate the more 
secret and the higher subjects,” (Ficino 1998: 295) as he “has taken over the things which 
transcend the physical.” (Ficino 1998: 365) Being under the influence of Saturn helps one 
ascend away from matter and, “via Saturnian Capricorn, the sign of contemplation, into 
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the world, not just of the stars, but of light itself, whence originally we descended into the 
ever darkening, sublunar realms of generation and the elements.” (Hutton/Hedley 2008: 
44) 
Hamlet’s melancholy, for better or worse, impels him to see the world with new, 
different eyes:  
 
this goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory; this most excellent 
canopy, the air, look you, this brave o’erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted 
with golden fire, why, it appeareth nothing to me but a foul and pestilent congregation of 
vapors. (Hamlet, II. ii. 298-303) 
 
Contrasted here are two possible perceptions of the created world in Renaissance 
Neoplatonism: on the pro-cosmic end of the spectrum, the cosmos is indeed “most 
excellent” and “majestical,” as a reflection of heavenly spheres in the waters of matter; 
on the anti-cosmic end, being created from filthy matter, however beautifully formed, the 
universe truly is little more than “a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors” and is best 
renounced and escaped. Under the influence of his Saturnian melancholy, the latter 
appears to be Hamlet’s choice, at least initially.   
Other heroes in Shakespeare’s tragedies also renounce and strive to escape the 
world as a result of disappointment or sorrow. Romeo, upon hearing of Juliet’s alleged 
death, decides to likewise abandon “this loathsome world” and, giving money to the 
apothecary in return for the vial of poison, warns him that  
 
I sell thee poison, thou hast sold me none.  
Farewell! Buy food, and get thyself in flesh.  
(Romeo and Juliet, V. i. 81-84)  
 
His implication, of course, is that money – which can be used for sustaining repugnant 
bodily existence in this world – is the real poison, while the actual toxic substance is a 
blessed means to his delivery.  
Cleopatra has a similar reaction to news of Antony’s death. The world becomes 
disgusting and dreary to her, and her proposed solution to this conundrum is also suicide: 
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Shall I abide  
In this dull world, which in thy absence is 
No better than a sty? 
(Antony and Cleopatra, IV. xv. 60-62) 
 
Horatio likewise believes it is futile to continue living without his beloved 
Hamlet, but Hamlet pleads with him to refrain from drinking from the poisoned cup:  
 
in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain  
To tell my story.  
(Hamlet, V. ii. 348-349)  
 
It is not an appealing prospect. Stoic Horatio may choose to continue to endure being 
crucified on the wheel of fire that is worldly existence, but less stalwart heroes such as 
Lear will understandably prefer to escape into death, as Kent says to those attempting to 
resuscitate the late king: 
 
O, let him pass, he hates him 
That would upon the rack of this tough world 
Stretch him out longer. 
(King Lear, V. iii. 314-316) 
 
Before his own attempted suicide, betrayed and blinded, Gloucester proclaims: 
“This world I do renounce, and […] Shake patiently my great affliction off.” (King Lear, 
IV. vi. 34-35) When Edgar first sees his father in this condition, he exclaims 
 
World, world, O world! 
But that thy strange mutations make us hate thee, 
Life would not yield to age. 
(King Lear, IV. i. 10-12) 
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Edgar makes an important point here: death in the universes of Shakespeare’s 
plays is often a voluntary means of escape from the strange mutations of the material 
world. Shakespeare consistently connects anti-cosmic sentiments with shock and 
disappointment, rarely putting them in the mouths of his wisest and most seasoned 
heroes. Gloucester’s proposition to “patiently” shake his affliction off via suicide can 
easily be read as ironic, and he is eventually taught by his own disguised son that his life 
is a “miracle.”  
Nevertheless, anti-cosmic attitudes form part of an ancient and venerable 
Neoplatonic tradition, harking back at least to Plato’s own numerous depictions of 
embodiment as imprisonment.  
 
4.1.2. THIS HOLLOW PRISON OF MY FLESH: THE BODY AS A 
PRISON 
 
Plato frequently made use of the fact that the words for “body” (soma) and 
“tomb” (sema) form a minimal pair in Greek, which conveniently allowed him to pun on 
the “body-as-tomb” (soma-sema). In the Timaeus, he described his vision of the descent 
and constraining embodiment of eternal souls, and in the Phaedrus, he explained that the 
body kept the soul imprisoned in it “by sense experience.” (Shaw 1995: 26)  
Although Plato arguably did not explicitly express many strong anti-cosmic 
notions, Plotinus and the ensuing Neoplatonists were only too rearing to read them back 
into his writings – and it was Plotinus that Ficino saw as Plato’s best student who 
interpreted his wise teachings according to the uninterrupted prisca theologia of even 
more ancient wise men such as Hermes and Orpheus. Ficino explains how the body is to 
be seen both as a prison and a tomb, quoting Orpheus as claiming that “the body is the 
prison and tomb of the soul, so that, insofar as the soul is in the body, it is deemed to be 
dead.” (Ficino 2005: 102) In a letter to Pellegrino degli Agli, Ficino reasserts that Plato 
laments the soul’s fall into “the prison of the body.” (Allen 2002: 127).  
Shakespeare rarely passes up an opportunity to refer to the Neoplatonic notion of 
the body as a tomb and a prison to the soul in his use of metaphorical and allegorical 
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figures. One of the first instances occurs as early as The Rape of Lucrece, in the 
description of the heroine’s suicide: 
  
Even here she sheathed in her harmless breast 
A harmful knife, that hence her soul unsheathed; 
That blow did bail it from the deep unrest 
Of that polluted prison where it breathed. 
(The Rape of Lucrece, 1723-1726) 
 
Titus Andronicus, written around the same time, contains very similar imagery. 
Shakespeare has Titus denounce “this hollow prison of my flesh” (Titus Andronicus, III. 
ii. 10) in his moment of misery.  
Constance’s body is referred to by King Philip in King John as both a tomb and a 
prison to her soul:  
 
Look who comes here! a grave unto her soul, 
Holding th’ eternal spirit, against her will, 
In the vild prison of afflicted breath. 
(King John, III. iv. 17-19) 
 
It should be noted that these exclamations occur after the “souls” inhabiting these 
“imprisoning” bodies have received significant shocks. Constance’s son has been taken 
from her, Titus’ sons murdered and his daughter raped and mutilated, and Lucrece’s body 
apparently becomes a “polluted prison” only because it has likewise been raped. As has 
been noted, it is often grief that causes world-weariness and anti-cosmic dualism in the 
worlds of Shakespeare’s plays, causing heroes to see the world through the black lenses 
of melancholy Saturn. 
The imprisoning bodies then begin to seem overly stalwart and resilient, 
prompting heroes to rage against them. Lear feels compelled to cry out  
 
O sides, you are too tough!  
  93 
Will you yet hold?  
(King Lear, II. iv. 197-198)  
 
and Gloucester to avow  
 
If I could bear it longer […] 
My snuff and loathed part of nature should 
Burn itself out. 
(King Lear, IV. vi. 34-41) 
 
His “snuff and loathed part of nature” is, of course, his body. Gloucester imagines it burnt 
away through his suffering in this world. 
Similarly, Hamlet’s flesh becomes “too too solid” when his father dies and his 
mother promptly remarries, but his image of how it should be destroyed is somewhat 
different:  
 
O that this too too solid flesh would melt,  
Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew!  
(Hamlet, I. ii. 129-159)2 
 
As a Christian (Neoplatonist), Hamlet knows that the prison of the body is not 
lawfully escaped via suicide, as the “Everlasting” has indeed “fix’d His canon ‘gainst 
self-slaughter.” The Roman Cassius in Julius Caesar has no such qualms; he knows that  
 
life, being weary of these worldly bars,  
Never lacks power to dismiss itself.  
(Julius Caesar, I. iii. 96-97)  
 
                                               
2 It is worth noting that “solid” sounded both like “sullied” and “sallied” in Elizabethan pronunciation, 
(Burgess 1970: 183) which makes Hamlet’s exclamation even more interesting. Hamlet’s flesh is “sullied” 
because his mother, in whom it originated, has made it dirty, and “sallied” because it is attacked from both 
without and within. 
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Though nominally Christian, the overthrown and imprisoned king Richard II entertains 
similar notions: 
 
Thoughts tending to ambition, they do plot 
Unlikely wonders: how these vain weak nails 
May tear a passage through the flinty ribs 
Of this hard world, my ragged prison walls. 
(Richard II, V. v. 63-66) 
 
The imprisoning body is here illuminatingly elided with the entire world. The 
king, incarcerated in a literal prison, begins this soliloquy by explicitly and deliberately 
allegorizing:  
 
I have been studying how I may compare  
This prison where I live unto the world.  
(Richard II, V. v. 1-2)  
 
Thus the body as a prison is metaphorically identified with the world as a prison, while 
the speaker is locked in a genuine cell. Other heroes – Lear, Malvolio, Claudio, 
Barnardine – appear to be at least invited to attempt “studying” the very same thing when 
they find themselves trapped in actual prisons, more often than not because they have 
previously become slaves to the passions, which, according to contemporary Neoplatonic 
theories, stem from their bodies. 
That the body was widely seen in the Renaissance as the microcosm, reflecting on 
a smaller scale the entire order (or disorder) of the universe, is one of the most often 
repeated commonplaces in the cultural histories of the period. (Kostić 1978: 36) What is 
not as frequently mentioned is that this does not only apply in the positive, pro-cosmic 
frame of reference, but in the negative, anti-cosmic one as well. 
The body-as-prison is thus also the world-as-prison, and both are frequently 
elided with “earth.” Romeo calls his body “dull earth” and Sonnet 146 laments the poetic 
subject’s “Poor soul, the centre of my sinful earth.” Gnostic Mother Earth, interestingly, 
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also traps divine sparks in her “matrix of chaos,” imprisoning them in earthly bodies. 
(Stoyanov 2003: 88) 
The maternal body is, of course, the very first prison of the newly trapped soul. 
When the Roman emperor Saturninus’ wife Tamora is delivered of a black child, her sons 
declare that the newborn must die. The baby’s father Aaron says to them: 
 
He is your brother, lords, sensibly fed 
Of that self blood that first gave life to you, 
And from your womb where you imprisoned were  
He is enfranchised and come to light. 
(Titus Andronicus, IV. ii. 122-125) 
 
Pregnant Hermione calls her daughter “My poor prisoner” (The Winter’s Tale, II. 
ii. 26) and the midwife Paulina subsequently explains to the jailer: 
 
This child was prisoner to the womb, and is 
By law and process of great Nature thence 
Freed and enfrenchis’d. 
(The Winter’s Tale, II. ii. 57-59) 
 
This liberation from the mother’s womb is only relative, as it inevitably leads to 
the soul’s further imprisonment in this world. As Lear observes,  
 
we came crying hither. 
Thou know’st, the first time that we smell the air 
We wawl and cry. […] 
When we are born, we cry that we are come  
To this great stage of fools. 
(King Lear, IV. vi. 178-183) 
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Lear is here echoing Ficino, who notes that “not all who are dying lament, but that 
all who are being born do lament,” for “they enter upon this earthly journey as an exile, 
unwillingly it would seem from their tears.” (Ficino 2005: 313) 
All these figures are masterfully connected in the scene from Richard III in which 
murderers come into Clarence’s cell to kill him, as instructed by the tyrannical usurper. 
Clarence cries in disbelief that Richard  
 
swore with sobs  
That he would labor my delivery. 
(Richard III, I. iv. 244-245)3  
 
One of the murderers laconically replies:  
 
Why, so he doth, when he delivers you  
From this earth’s thralldom to the joys of heaven.  
(Richard III, I. iv. 246-247)  
 
The imagery is brilliantly economical and eerily apt. It is the womb of Mother Earth that 
truly imprisons one’s soul. To “labor” one’s “delivery” is to effect a kind of a birth 
freeing one from it. To be delivered from it is to die. 
 
 4.1.3. THE AFFLICTED SPIRITS HERE IN THE PRISON: THE WORLD 
AS A PRISON 
 
Hamlet notoriously asserts that the world is a prison in his conversation with 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern:  
 
Hamlet: What have you, my good friends, deserv’d at the hands of Fortune, that 
she sends you to prison hither? 
Guildenstern: Prison, my lord? 
Hamlet: Denmark’s a prison. 
                                               
3 Emphases mine. 
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Rosencrantz: Then is the world one. 
Hamlet: A goodly one, in which there are many confines, wards, and dungeons, 
Denmark being one o’ th’ worst. […] To me it is a prison. (Hamlet, II. ii. 239-251) 
 
This is, of course, no mere figure of speech. “Prison” is the favorite term used by all the 
relevant strains of Renaissance Neoplatonism – Gnostics, Hermeticists, Lurianic 
Cabalists, and Neoplatonists proper alike – to describe the created universe. Gnostics may 
be said to have held more distinctly anti-cosmic views than the Hermeticists, Cabalists 
and Neoplatonists – insisting, unlike them, that the very act of creation was a grievous 
error which must and eventually will be rectified – but all would agree that divine sparks 
are indeed imprisoned in this oppressive material world and long to escape it. 
(Wallis/Bregman 1992: 121). 
 Hamlet’s universe truly is unrelentingly oppressive. Claustrophobically restricted 
to Elsinore and its surroundings, apparently constantly dark and “bitter cold,” eerily 
quiet, the world of the play is, like the Gnostic Demiurge’s domain, plagued by doubts 
and uncertainties, and hastily preparing for an attack from abroad. The world in which 
Hamlet finds himself at the beginning of his tragedy resembles a Gnostic universe 
presided over by an evil Demiurge much more than a Christian one, created and ruled by 
a benevolent deity. The persistent imagery of sickness, disease, ulcers and tumors 
(Spurgeon 1971: 316) should give those inhabiting it a clue that something is rotten in the 
state of Denmark, but the pleasant illusions created by the “most seeming virtuous” ruler 
keep his subjects complacently imprisoned. (Igrutinović 2007: 86) 
Macbeth’s domain is similarly troubled. Veiled in constant darkness, filled with 
fears and terrors, and steeped in disorder and injustice, it is ruled by an evil, spiritually 
blind tyrant. There is little wonder that Gnostic-leaning Harold Bloom has felt the urge to 
refer to Macbeth as a “full-scale venture into a Gnostic cosmos.” (Bloom 1991: 71) He 
goes on to elaborate:  
 
Macbeth, my personal favorite among Shakespeare’s dramas, always has 
seemed to me to be set in a Gnostic cosmos, though certainly Shakespeare’s own vision is 
by no means Gnostic in spirit. Gnosticism [maintains] that one’s ambition to be 
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everything in oneself is only an imitation of the Demiurge, the maker of this ruined 
world. (Bloom 1991: 71) 
 
Bloom, naturally, sees Macbeth as the Demiurge of his dark and chaotic world, 
and notes that Macbeth is one of those Shakespearean plays where one feels that “the 
cosmos, and not just the kingdom, is an apocalyptic stage,” and where one is clearly an 
allegory for the other. He sees this in King Lear as well. (Bloom Macbeth 2008: 340).  
The kingdom – and the cosmos – ruled over by Goneril and Regan in King Lear is 
also a dark, chaotic, unjust realm. Its erring heroes, Gloucester and Lear, are both 
incarcerated in literal prisons by the evil tyrannical usurpers. The image of loyal Kent, 
who serves the one true King, suffering in the stocks, is the perfect figure of this 
universe.  
Most of the action in Measure for Measure takes place in a literal prison, and 
most of the characters find themselves in it for different reasons. This dark abode is 
presided over by the “demigod” Angelo, who is the reason most of his subjects are 
trapped in it. The Everyman of this microcosm, Barnardine, is a “Bohemian born; but 
here nurs’d up and bred.” (Measure for Measure, IV. ii. 130-131) His true home is 
elsewhere – tellingly, in Bohemia, the contemporary center of “secret studies” (Yates 
1964: 313)4 – but, having been incarcerated in Angelo’s prison for so long, he has 
forgotten where he harks from. He spends his days in a drunker stupor, not even 
attempting to flee, although he might, if he wanted to:  
 
A man that apprehends death no more dreadfully but as a drunken sleep, 
careless, reakless, and fearless of what's past, present, or to come; insensible of mortality, 
and desperately mortal. […] He hath evermore had the liberty of the prison; give him 
leave to escape hence, he would not. Drunk many times a day, if not many days entirely 
drunk. We have very oft awak’d him, as if  to carry him to execution, and show’d him a 
seeming warrant for it; it hath not mov’d him at all. (Measure for Measure, IV. ii. 142-
152) 
 
                                               
4 According to Frances Yates, the Bohemian Emperor Rudolph II held his court in Prague and gathered 
there astrologers and alchemists from all over Europe “to assist in his melancholy search for the 
philosopher’s stone.” Giordano Bruno joined them in 1588, before his tour in England. (Yates 1964: 313) 
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Blind and oblivious to the true reality of the external world, though bound only by 
his own ignorance and intoxication with the world of matter, he rages and swears at those 
coming to awaken him and remind him of his mortality. (Igrutinović 2009: 112) In 
Greeenblatt’s words,  
 
penned up, drunken, filthy, and rustling in the straw, the convicted criminal Barnardine is 
the embodiment of everything that is mortal, bodily, and earth-bound. (Greenblatt 2010: 
13)  
 
Malvolio’s imprisonment in the “hideous darkness” of the “dark house” 
somewhat resembles Barnardine’s incarceration in Angelo’s prison. Malvolio, unlike 
Barnardine, is sufficiently enlightened to complain about the imprisoning darkness, but 
insufficiently enlightened to be freed of it. Feste explains to him, in strikingly Gnostic 
terms: “I say there is no darkness but ignorance.” (Twelfth Night, IV. ii. 28-47) Just like 
Barnardine, Malvolio finds himself imprisoned in the darkness of this world because of 
his blind ignorance.  
 
5.1.4. T’ACCOUNT THIS WORLD BUT HELL: THE WORLD AS HELL 
 
Malvolio’s entire metaphysical conversation with Feste is illuminating: 
 
Malvolio: never was man thus wrong’d [...] they have laid me here in hideous darkness. 
Clown: Say’st thou that house is dark? 
Malvolio: As hell. […] 
Clown: Madman, thou errest. I say there is no darkness but ignorance, in which thou art more 
puzzled than the Egyptians in their fog. 
Malvolio: I say this house is as dark as ignorance, though ignorance were as dark as hell; and I say 
there was never man thus abus’d. (Twelfth Night, IV. ii. 28-47) 
 
Malvolio may be dim and ignorant, but he is aware enough to realize he has found 
himself in hell. The porter of Macbeth’s castle realizes as much when Macduff knocks in 
the night: 
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Here’s a knocking indeed! If a man were porter of Hell Gate, he should have old 
turning the key. […] Who’s there, I’ th’ name of Beelzebub? [...] But this place is too 
cold for hell. I'll devil-porter it no further. (Macbeth, II. iii. 1-21) 
 
It has often been pointed out that the porter closely resembles the keepers of 
Hell’s gates in miracle plays depicting Christ knocking on them prior to His harrowing of 
Hell. (Kostić 1994: 217) Murray explains in his “Why was Duncan’s Blood Golden?” 
that Shakespeare “will identify Macbeth’s castle with hell in the porter scene, which is 
based on the duality of this world and hell.” (Wain 1968: 284) The answer to J. Dover 
Wilson’s question “Where does Macbeth open, on earth or in hell?” (Wilson 1933: 32) is 
thus “both.” 
Murray cites Paracelsus for the notion of this earth simultaneously playing the 
part of hell. Other thinkers belonging to the Neoplatonic tradition also express such ideas. 
Xenocrates believed that it is this sublunar realm that is actually the Hades and Numenius 
attributed to Pythagoras the doctrine that Hades is the whole area between the earth and 
the moon. (Elkaisy-Friemuth/Dillon 2009: 23) Philo refers to ordinary mortals as 
“skulking in the caverns of Hades” and as “partaking in things earthly and nurtured on 
the things in Hades.” Such a view was very much in line with contemporary and later 
Platonism, though starkly opposed to that of later Christianity. (Elkaisy-Friemuth/Dillon 
24) Cathars likewise did not believe in Hell of Purgatory, as they taught that the devil’s 
abode is the world that we live in. (Runciman 2008: 147) In a nutshell, this is as bad as it 
gets. 
In the more anti-cosmic strands of Renaissance Neoplatonism, thus, there is no 
hell – only this material world. This is the hell Macbeth in set in. It would arguably be 
ridiculous overkill to see Macbeth hauled off to hell like Faustus is at the end of 
Marlowe’s play. It should be noted, however, that in Dr. Faustus the unhappy magus asks 
the summoned demon: “How comes it then that thou art out of hell?” and Mephistopheles 
replies laconically: “Why, this is hell, nor am I out of it.” (Dr. Faustus, I. iii. 77–78) He 
later further elaborates this notion: 
 
Hell hath no limits, nor is circumscribed 
In one self place, for where we are is hell.  
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(Dr. Faustus, II. i. 124-125) 
 
It should again be noted that such strong anti-cosmic views that would identify 
this world with hell can often, when held by Shakespeare’s characters, be merely the 
result of disappointment. It is, for instance, only because “love forswore” him in his 
“mother’s womb” and left him disproportioned “like to a chaos” that Richard proposes 
“t’account this world but hell” as long as he lives. (Richard III, III. ii. 153-171) 
Sometimes, however, we are not allowed to simply disregard such complaints. 
Just like Macduff knocks on Hell’s gate in the night to harrow it and awaken its 
sleeping inhabitants, so Feste and the Duke arrive in the dark domain under the guise of 
priests to visit and teach the ignorant souls trapped in the prison of this world. The 
Duke’s  
 
I come to visit the afflicted spirits  
Here in the prison  
(Measure for Measure, II. iii. 4-5)  
 
has both a Gnostic and a Lurianic ring to it. The afflicted spirits are the sparks of spirit 
fallen into the loathsome prison of the material cosmos and trapped in it by its evil ruler. 
These images of divine sparks trapped in the dark prison of this cosmos which is a 
kind of a hell and ruled over by an unjust and blind tyrant who is a kind of a devil can be 
found in such belief systems as Gnosticism and Lurianic Cabala. They have never had a 
place in mainstream orthodoxies.  
 
4.1.5. THE PRINCE OF DARKNESS IS A GENTLEMAN: THE DEVIL AS 
“THE PRINCE OF THE WORLD” 
 
The Ghost of Old Hamlet appears to his son in order to expose this world as a 
dark prison ruled by a usurper. The usurper is no mere political figure: 
 
‘Tis given out that, sleeping in my orchard, 
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A serpent stung me, so the whole ear of Denmark 
Is by a forged process of my death 
Rankly abus’d; but know, thou noble youth, 
The serpent that did sting thy father’s life 
Now wears his crown. 
(Hamlet, I. v. 35-40) 
 
Maynard Mack says in “The World of Hamlet” that the play has an “almost 
mythic status […] as a paradigm of the life of man,” (Jump 1968: 87) as truly great plays, 
in his words, “present us with something that can be called a world, a microcosm.” (Jump 
1968: 86) In this microcosm, Hamlet – as a kind of an Everyman – is faced with the fact 
that there is “something godlike about his father” and that “Denmark was a garden then, 
when his father ruled.” But “a serpent was in the garden” and now the serpent wears his 
crown. (Jump 1968: 101) 
This is a shocking image for anyone who has had their expectations formed by 
mainstream versions of Biblical Christianity in which a story about a seditious serpent in 
a garden must end very differently, with both the serpent and his rebellious followers 
punished by God. There is nothing orthodox about the idea of the devil taking over the 
world from its rightful ruler. There is certainly nothing orthodox about the figure of the 
serpent wearing the crown. 
The serpent who wears the crown can easily be found in Gnostic writings, though. 
Ialdabaoth, the blind Demiurge of Gnosticism, and the tyrannical ruler of this fallen 
universe, is actually described as serpentine in the tenth section of the Apocryphon of 
John. (Nuttall 2007: 13)  
According to Hamlet’s ghostly father, Claudius 
 
won to his shameful lust 
The will of my most seeming virtuous queen. 
O Hamlet, what [a] falling-off was there 
From me, whose love was of that dignity 
That it went hand in hand even with the vow 
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I made to her in marriage, and to decline 
Upon a wretch whose natural gifts were poor 
To those of mine! 
But virtue, as it never will be moved, 
Though lewdness court it in the shape of heaven, 
So [lust], though to a radiant angel link’d, 
Will [sate] itself in a celestian bed 
And prey on garbage. 
(Hamlet, I. v. 41-57) 
 
Catherine Belsey notes that the Garden of Eden was, in Shakespeare’s time, the 
locus of the archetypal seduction, where the serpent seduced Eve and Eve seduced Adam. 
This seduction scene contained definite sexual overtones:  
 
Conventional representations of the Fall make evident the sexual component of the whole 
episode in the nudity of the central figures, and sometimes in their gestures as well. The 
serpent, meanwhile, sustains the erotic reference: sometimes the snake is overtly phallic; 
alternatively, it often has the face of a woman, to show how sexual desire endangers men. 
(Hawkes 2005: 56) 
 
Interestingly enough, while none of the mainstream Christian theologians saw the 
Fall in terms of sexual seduction, except Justin Martyr – and his notion has been 
discarded by the Church, which doctrinally considers demons to be purely spiritual and 
thus incapable of coitus – the story of Eve’s very explicitly physical “seduction by the 
Devil or the Demiurge” was one of the most famous Gnostic teachings concerning the 
Fall. Cain was supposedly the fruit of that union. (Stoyanov 2003: 84)   
Just as the devilish and serpentine usurper Claudius sexually seduces Gertrude, so 
the demonic deputy Angelo attempts to seduce Isabel. He notoriously demands that she 
yield to him in return for her brother Claudio’s life. Isabel explains to her brother what 
the price would be for the remittal of his death sentence: 
 
There is a devilish mercy in the judge, 
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If you’ll implore it, that will free your life, 
But fetter you till death. 
(Measure for Measure, III. i. 54-56) 
 
The devil who rules this world appears to be offering earthly life in exchange for 
carnal sin, which in turn keeps his victims even more firmly imprisoned in his dark 
abode. This is a notion most commonly encountered in anti-cosmic dualistic systems 
such as Gnosticism and Catharism. In All’s Well That Ends Well, the Clown presents a 
similar doctrinal conviction in his conversation with the Countess:  
 
Clown: I think I shall never have the blessing of God till I have issue a’ my 
body. [...] 
Countess: Tell me thy reason why thou wilt marry. 
Clown: My poor body, madam, requires it. I am driven on by the flesh, and he 
must needs go that the devil drives. (All’s Well That Ends Well, I. iii. 24-30) 
 
It is ultimately unclear whether it is God or the devil that rules and requires 
progeny and procreation, which in Shakespeare appear to be consistently and 
unapologetically ambiguous, often with humorous effects. The situation encountered in 
Measure for Measure is undeniably the far less humorous of the two, although both 
doctrinally belong to the realm of anti-cosmic dualisms, where it is the evil ruler of this 
world, opposed to the One True God, who presides over matter, sexuality, and 
procreation. 
This has not always been readily noticed in religious interpretations of Measure 
for Measure, which relatively straightforwardly see it as a Christian play. Knight, for 
instance, asserts in his “Measure for Measure and the Gospels” that the “religious 
coloring” of the “allegory or symbolism” towards which the play tends is “orthodox.” 
(Stead/Dyson 1971: 91-92) Most allegorical interpretations firmly identify the Duke with 
the Christian God, and, somewhat less assuredly, associate Isabella with Man’s Soul or 
the Church, and Lucio with Satan. Establishing the God-Duke parallel in his “Comic 
Form in Measure for Measure,” Nevill Coghill, as one example, points out that Duke 
Vincentio  
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had long since ordained laws the breach of which he has never himself punished […]; he 
has withdrawn himself into invisibility from the world of which he is the lord, but 
remains as it were omnipresent and omniscient, in the guise of a priest, seeking to draw 
good out of evil; he reappears […] in righteousness, majesty and judgment in the last 
scene. (Coghill 1955: 21)  
 
This is not meant to be taken as an assertion that the identification of the Duke 
with God as seen in Christian orthodoxy has been uniformly seen as unproblematic. The 
Duke has been seen as unfit for the role of the Almighty for “violating law and religious 
observance” (Cole 1965: 428) by hearing confessions in the guise of a priest, for his 
“seemingly motiveless malingering,” (Lawrence 1969: 25) and for hurting people and 
treating them “as if they were inhuman cogs to be manipulated.” (Gelb 1971: 29) C. K. 
Stead offers a litany of accusatory questions: 
 
Why does this prophet of mercy tell Juliet that her contracted husband, the father 
of the child in her womb, is to die “tomorrow,” when in fact he has no intention of 
allowing the execution to occur? Why does he load more pain on the already suffering 
Isabella by letting her believe Claudio has been executed? Why does he sententiously 
urge Juliet to repent of her “mutual entertainment” with Claudio, and then urge Mariana 
into Angelo’s bed (assuring her “it is no sin”) – when the contract of neither pair has been 
blessed by the church? Why does he labor to convince the suffering Claudio that there is 
no escape from death? Why does he manipulate events to bring about the marriage of the 
virtuous Mariana to a man who has attempted (in effect) both rape and murder? 
(Stead/Dyson 1971: 16-17) 
 
Stressing the Duke’s arbitrariness, Stead goes on to argue that serious problems 
arise “if we are to look to the Duke, as to Jesus, for a consistent ethic.” (Stead/Dyson 
1971: 17) The basic premise, however, that Measure for Measure offers an orthodox 
cosmos in which the Duke, were he but a little nicer, could easily play the role of the 
Christian God, has gone virtually unchallenged.  
Few critics expounding the allegorical interpretation of the play have, for 
instance, ventured to explain why the Duke-God leaves his realm to another’s rule – as 
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God leaving the world to another’s rule is certainly not in line with any orthodox 
Christian teaching – and who it is exactly that he leaves it to.  
The role of the evil usurper of the One True God’s authority fits well with the 
figure of the Gnostic demiurge, who rules this lowly dark domain and traps divine sparks 
in it using both carnal pleasure and legalistic scriptures. The cosmogonies of various 
Gnosticisms were extremely heterogeneous, but they agreed on two points, according to 
Stoyanov: their anti-cosmic dualism (which has at times been contested), and their 
identification of the Gnostic Demiurge of the material world with the Old Testament 
Creator and legalistic ruler of the world (which has not). (Stoyanov 2003: 84) Marcion in 
particular insisted that the Old and New Testament had different Gods appearing in them. 
The New Testament God was good and merciful; the Jehovah of the Old Testament was 
evil and strictly legalistic. (Vukomanović 2003: 204) Angelo can thus certainly figure as 
a Marcionite Jehovah, who snatches the lowly abode of the material world away from the 
good and merciful Duke.  
John Donne observed in his sermon on the Gnostics preached on Easter Monday 
1622 – proving, among other things, that Jacobeans certainly knew and thought about 
Gnostic doctrines – that Gnostics generally ascribed mercy to the One True God, who is 
far away, and legalistic justice to the evil Jehovah of the Old Testament: 
 
All their errors were upon this ground, this root. They could not comprehend 
that the same God should be the God of Justice, and the God of Mercy too […] Hence 
they came to call the God of the New Testament, a good God, because there was Copiosa 
Redemptio, plentiful Redemption in the Gospel: and the God of the Old Testament, 
Malum Deum, an ill God, because they thought all penalties of the Law, evil. (John 
Donne’s sermon on the Gnostics, preached on Easter Monday, 1622) (Nuttall 2007: 2)  
 
Angelo undeniably resembles a Gnostic Demiurge, but he also resembles the evil 
sephirah Din in the Cabala of Isaac Luria, which represents justice divorced from mercy, 
and which rules over this fallen material world as part of the Old Testament Jehovah.  
In Lurianic Cabala, the One True God, En Sof, withdrew at one point to vacate 
room for the cosmos, attempted to fill it with divine light, but the vessels conducting it 
had broken, so sparks of this light fell into the abyss that was the absence of God. 
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(Armstrong 2007: 170) Thus the Duke withdraws, attempting to inspire his realm to rise 
(as indicated by the name “Escalus” – the first word uttered by him in the play), but the 
world instead comes crashing down.  
According to Luria, some of the sparks of divine light managed to return to the 
divine world, while others remained trapped in the Godless realm dominated by the evil 
Din (“Judgment”), a lower sephirah no longer held in check by the other sephirot 
(Mercy, Compassion, Patience, Majesty and Stability, all of which were originally in 
perfect balance) after the breaking of the vessels. Dominated by Din, Armstrong notes, 
“they together become “The Impatient One,” the deity revealed in the post-lapsarian 
Torah,” or the God of most of what is usually referred to by Christians as the Old 
Testament. (Armstrong 2007: 171) This certainly resembles the world of Measure for 
Measure, where the legalistic judge Angelo rules over his dark realm, where he imprisons 
the real ruler’s subjects.   
It can be said, in reply to all this metaphysical allegorizing, that Angelo simply 
represents humanity. As the “demigod authority,” Angelo certainly can and does stand 
for mankind and secular authority, as opposed to God’s justice. However, Isabel’s tirade 
on  
 
man, proud man  
Dress’d in a little brief authority  
(Measure for Measure, II. Ii. 117-118)  
 
also closely echoes patristic readings of the Old Testament to find explanations for the 
existence of evil.  
In order to prove that the fall of angels was caused by their pride, Tertullian 
quotes Ezekiel: “Because thine heart is lifted up, and thou hast said, I am a God, I sit in 
the seat of God, in the midst of the seas; yet thou art a man, and not God.” (Ezekiel 28: 2) 
Augustine draws the same conclusion, only quoting Isaiah:  
 
How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! How art thou 
cut down to the ground, which didst weaken the nations! For thou hast said in thine heart, 
I will ascend to heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God! (Isaiah 14: 12-13)  
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The quotes in question also clearly mention men, not angels, but are taken to symbolize 
angels who fell from Heaven. Similarly, Angelo in his proud authority can be taken to 
signify both man and angel, towards which his name would additionally seem to point, 
though also denoting his seemingly immaterial human nature. The rumor that “this 
Angelo was not made by man and woman after this downright way of creation” (Measure 
for Measure, III. ii. 104-105) is another possible indication of this. (Igrutinović 2009: 
112)   
Angelo thus represents, among other figures, a fallen angel ruling the world as 
God’s deputy. The notion of the devil ruling the world in God’s stead can be found in the 
doctrine of the Bogomils and the Cathars, who both had the figure of the devil as the 
creator and ruler of the world. The Bogomils taught this notion through the New 
Testament parable of “the bad servant” (Luke 16: 1-9) and the parable of the prodigal 
son. (Luke 15: 11-32) (Stoyanov 2003: 134) The Cathars saw the devil as the evil Rex 
Mundi, the king of this world. Bogomils and Cathars are mutually connected, though it is 
the latter group that has exerted a more lasting influence on Western ethics and esthetics, 
primarily through the poetry of courtly love and Arthurian romances. (De Rougemont 
1983) 
Angelo, cast in the role of the real deity’s deputy, whether he be demigod or 
demiurge, the Gnostic temporary lord of the temporary prison world, or the Marcionite 
evil god upholding the cruel letter of the old law, the Cabalistic sephirah of Din or the 
Bogomil “bad servant,” has a demonic, not angelic, part to play. Explicit identifications 
between Angelo and the devil in the text – “Let’s write “good angel” on the devil’s horn” 
(Measure for Measure, II. ii. 15) and “This outward-sainted deputy […] is yet a devil” 
(Measure for Measure, III. i. 88-91) – confirm Angelo’s demonic status and thus the 
clearly unorthodox “coloring” of the play’s imagery. (Igrutinović 2009: 112)  
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4.1.5.1. THOUGH HE BE AS GOOD A GENTLEMAN AS THE DEVIL IS: 
SOME POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ANTI-COSMISMS 
 
Angelo is in one way actually a rarity among the demonic usurpers of divine 
authority in Shakespeare, as he is not represented as a king. The majority of 
Shakespeare’s evil rulers of the world are figured as anointed kings, thus subverting the 
doctrine of the divine right of kings – which harks back to Constantine (Vukomanović 
2003: 245-246) and was quite vigorously upheld by James (Burgess 1970: 204) – from 
both ends: the political as well as theological. If an anointed king can be an evil 
tyrannical usurper, then kings do not have unquestioned supernatural license and support, 
but also, conversely, God Himself is not the omnipotent creator and ruler of the world, as 
he is depicted in all Christian orthodoxies. The already mentioned Claudius is certainly a 
devilish king, as is Macbeth: 
 
Not in the legions  
Of horrid hell can come a devil more damn’d 
In evils to top Macbeth. 
(Macbeth, IV. iii. 55-57) 
 
Bogomils and Cathars believed that, as the world was governed by the devil, all 
its rulers – kings, queens, the nobility, and all others holding political power – had in fact 
been given this power by the demonic king of this world, as it was only the devil that 
could confer such favors to his adherents. The Clown in All’s Well That Ends Well is 
perhaps the most explicit in expounding this very doctrine:  
 
But sure he is the prince of the world; let his nobility remain in’s court. I am for 
the house with the narrow gate, which I take to be too little for pomp to enter. Some that 
humble themselves may, but the many will be too chill and tender, and they'll be for the 
flow’ry way that leads to the broad gate and the great fire. (All’s Well That Ends Well, IV. 
v. 49-55) 
 
  110 
Edgar allows himself similar license under the clownish guise of Poor Tom: “The 
prince of darkness is a gentleman. Modo he’s call’d, and Mahu.” (King Lear, III. iv. 143-
144) Very similarly, in Henry V Fluellen begins his tirade with: “Though he be as good a 
gentleman as the devil is, as Lucifer and Beelzebub himself.” (Henry V, IV. vii. 137-138) 
The message is very clear: the devil is the first among the esteemed and powerful 
gentlemen of this world. 
Shakespeare, of course, did not exactly invent the phrase “the prince of the 
world”: the devil is mentioned in the New Testament as “the ruler of this world” (John 
12: 31; 14: 31; 16: 11), “the prince of the power of the air” (Ephesians 2: 2), and “the god 
of this world” (2 Corinthians 4: 4). He allegedly promises the world to those who will 
obey him (Matthew 4: 8-9), and his domain is a sinful world under an evil power. (1 John 
5: 19) However, it is also clear that Satan does not really have power over anything, 
including the sublunar world (1 John 4: 4), only the souls of those who accept him, and 
that if Satan can be said to rule the world in any way, it is merely the corrupted part of 
humanity manipulated through deception and sin, and not the tangible created world. 
(Revelation, 12: 9)  
Augustine takes great pains to explain the Biblical references to the prince of the 
world in orthodox terms: 
 
The devil is not called the prince of this world, in the sense of being Lord over 
heaven and earth; God forbid. The world here stands for the wicked dispersed over all 
over the world. In this sense the devil is the prince of the world, i.e. of all the wicked men 
who live in the world. The world also sometimes stands for the good dispersed 
throughout the world: God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself (2 Corinthians 
5: 19). These are they from whose hearts the prince of this world shall be cast out. Our 
Lord foresaw that, after His passion and glorifying, great nations all over the world would 
be converted, in whom the devil was then, but from whose hearts, on their truly 
renouncing him, he would be cast out. But was he not cast out of the hearts of re 
righteous men of old? Why is it, Now shall be cast out? Because that which once took 
place in a very few persons, was now to take place in whole nations. What then, does the 
devil not tempt at all the minds of believers? Yea, he never ceases to tempt them. But it is 
one thing to reign within, another to lay siege from without. (Augustine of Hippo, cited in 
Thomas Aquinas’ Catena Aurea, exegesis on John 12: 27-33) 
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Since the figure first appeared in the history of mainstream Christianity, Satan has 
consistently been taken to be the ruler of this world in the sense of ruling those who are 
legalistic, unjust and hypocritical, and this was notoriously first applied to the Jews of the 
Sanhedrin. (Pagels 1996: 102-107)  
Even Auden feels the need to explain: 
 
When the New Testament speaks of the ‘Prince of this world,’ it certainly does 
not mean the Prince of Cosmos nor assert that, so long as they are on earth, human souls 
have no option but to obey the orders of the Devil. By this world is meant, I should guess, 
Leviathan, the Social Beast. (From the review of Dodd’s Pagan and Christian in the Age 
of Anxiety) (Kirsch 2005: 126-127)  
 
The proponents of the doctrine of the divine right of kings similarly took great 
pains to prove that the monarch’s right to rule is directly conferred by God, who is 
Himself the king of the cosmos, starting with Constantine’s leading “ideologue” Eusebius 
of Caesarea, (Vukomanović 2003: 246) and culminating, in Shakespeare’s time, with 
James’ treatise on rule, Basilikon Doron, which, among other things, claimed that 
 
God giues not Kings the stile of Gods in vaine, 
For on his Throne his Scepter doe they swey.  
(Kastan 2005: 129)  
 
The King is a kind of a God and the God is the ultimate King, conferring the 
authority to rule the world to His chosen and anointed earthly kings. But if, as is the case 
in anti-cosmisms, the world is a prison ruled by a devilish usurper, the true God is 
unknown and unknowable and very far away, and every human being is in fact a trapped 
spark of the one true divinity – thus decentering the right to rule – then the whole 
construct of the divine right of kings comes crashing down, and we potentially have on 
our hands a very subversive ideology indeed. 
The convergence of religious and political figures seems to come naturally to 
humans. As one very pertinent example, some thought currents in otherwise very 
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monotheistic Judaism took a distinctly anti-cosmically dualistic turn after the fall of the 
Temple and the Jews’ expulsion from Jerusalem in year 70, which may have been one of 
the chief contributing factors to the emergence of Gnosticism proper. (Stoyanov 2003: 
78; Bentwich 1910: 160) Nuttall explains the persistence of Gnostic ideas apparently 
throughout the history of humankind in plainly political terms: 
 
It may be that there is a fundamental impulse in many cultures to say 
simultaneously “We live under a tyrant” and “The true king is good but lives far away.” 
If a secular equivalent is sought, the seemingly subversive, democratic legend of Robin 
Hood gives us indeed bad King John, oppressing the people, but also, at the same time, 
good King Richard Coeur de Lion, far away in the Holy Land. [It has been observed that] 
in medieval England the peasantry believed unshakably in the justice of the king but 
considered his officers corrupt. (Nuttall 2007: 270) 
 
Shakespeare, as we have seen, appears to be at times subversively toying with 
anti-cosmically dualistic interpretations of Biblical verses. Using royal figures for that 
purpose, in allegory, does not weaken the political subversion, but instead only reinforces 
it, adding to it a theological dimension – and vice versa. 
To appreciate how close to the verge of explicit anti-cosmism Shakespeare can 
veer, we can contrast his “prince of darkness” scene in King Lear with the source that he 
used for it. Dr Samuel Harsnett narrates a scene of an alleged exorcism in his Declaration 
of Egregious Popishe Impostures: a devil who describes himself as “Monarch of the 
World” appears, accompanied by “two men and an vrchin boy”; Harsnett scoffs at this 
and notes that he is “skuruily attended” for such a lofty title. (Muir 1956: 153) This is not 
surprising, as no orthodox author would take either a demon’s or pretend demon’s claim 
to be the ruler of the world seriously. Harsnett obviously does not.  
Lear is similarly attended, and Gloucester similarly asks “What, hath your Grace 
no better company?” Edgar replies that “The prince of darkness is a gentleman.” (King 
Lear, III. iv. 142-144) This yields no comic response. We are left to attempt to make 
sense of this on our own. Is Lear a comic fake devil without the comic relief that even 
Harsnett provided to his readers? Or, more plausibly, is he, the true king of the realm, 
virtually alone in the wilderness because this world is ruled by the devil? Anti-cosmic 
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dualists had no qualms about interpreting the “prince of the world” verses liberally and 
literally, and, apparently, neither did Shakespeare. He at times seems to seriously 
entertain the idea of the devil as the real ruler of the world, which is both dualistically 
heretical and politically subversive. 
Greenblatt famously argues in his “Shakespeare and the exorcists” that Edgar’s 
unenviable situation bears a resemblance to the contemporary situation of the Jesuits in 
England, although he cautions that the  
 
resemblance does not necessarily resolve itself into an allegory in which Catholicism is 
revealed to be the persecuted, legitimate elder brother forced to defend himself by means 
of theatrical illusions against the cold persecution of his skeptical bastard brother 
Protestantism. (Parker/Hartman 1985: 178)  
 
Even if it is not a neat allegorical representation of Catholic priests attempting to operate 
under an oppressive illegitimate usurper, King Lear can be and has in fact at least once 
actually been interpreted to support the case for “recusancy.” Greenblatt notes that a 
company of traveling players in Yorkshire included King Lear in a repertoire that also 
incorporated a “St. Christopher Play.” The plays were performed in the manor house of a 
recusant couple, and the players themselves and their organizer were in trouble for 
recusancy and were investigated by the Star Chamber in 1610. (Parker/Hartman 1985: 
178) 
It is very interesting to note that the areas where Catholicism was still stubbornly 
strong were commonly condemned by the reformers as the “dark corners of the land.” 
(Cressy/Ferrell 2007: 5) This expression certainly makes the “Duke of dark corners,” as 
he is referred to in Measure for Measure, (IV. iii. 157) very interesting as a figure, 
especially since he furtively revisits his realm in the garb of a Catholic priest. The absent 
Duke, just like the absconding king Lear, and the persecuted Gloucester and his older, 
legitimate son Edgar, can all appear to be Catholics, oppressed but righteous adherents of 
the old religion. 
Traditional Roman Catholicism in the first half of the sixteenth century in 
England, most historians now agree, was quite “lively, popular and robust” 
(Cressy/Ferrell 2007: 2) and there were “numerous pockets of recusancy” where the 
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rituals were retained. (Doran 2001: 51) About 1570, Catholics still outnumbered the 
Protestants and most of them had remained loyal to Elizabeth. After 1574, however, 
when the Pope began to send Jesuits into the country, the position of domestic Catholics 
became more complex and religious freedoms were suppressed. (Hussey 1971: 35) As 
the Catholics considered Elizabeth to be an illegitimate child of Henry VIII and thus an 
illegitimate queen, (Gottschalk 1974: 66) she is probably the muse who inspired the many 
treatises written in her lifetime by Catholics on the right to depose heretical, usurping 
rulers. (Hadfield 2004: 2)  
The Catholics in late Elizabethan England thus felt – much like the Gnostics and 
Lurianic Cabalists – oppressed under an ungodly usurper, while their true spiritual home 
lay elsewhere. (Prior 2005: 256) Just like being a Jew living in exile demonstrably did, it 
is conceivable that being a Catholic under an increasingly hostile Anglican rule could 
also have inspired both politically seditious and religiously subversive notions and 
sentiments. If he came from an at least nominally Catholic family, as is increasingly and 
ever more persuasively being argued, (Batson 2006: 17) this is the religious and political 
atmosphere in which Shakespeare would have grown up. 
Others have, perhaps less convincingly, argued that Shakespeare had, at least at 
one point in his life, Puritan leanings. (Dusinberre 1975) Puritans, interestingly enough, 
lay on the other extreme point on the doctrinal spectrum on which Elizabeth attempted to 
find a precarious balance, but at times felt similarly oppressed by the Anglicans. One of 
the possible reasons why Shakespeare has sometimes been taken for a Puritan is that, 
after about 1597, he demonstrably used the Geneva Bible for his citations, the same Bible 
that the Puritans used. (Brake 2008: 149)  
The Geneva Bible notoriously came packed with controversial marginal 
explanatory notes. Many of them were explicitly anti-royalist. The word “tyrant,” for 
instance, which cannot even be found in the King James Bible, occurs over 400 times in 
the Geneva translation. King James was understandably not pleased, and Barlow, one of 
the chroniclers of the making of the King James Version, wrote down that the king had 
found most of the notes “very partial, untrue, seditious, and savoring too much of 
dangerous and traitorous conceits.” (Nicolson 2003: 58) 
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Whether Catholic or Puritan or neither, Shakespeare appears to have had definite 
sympathy and understanding for oppressed religious minorities who felt they were living 
under a usurping tyrant, while their true spiritual home remained abroad.    
 
4.1.6. THERE COMES A POWER INTO THIS SCATTERED KINGDOM: 
HELP FROM BEYOND  
 
One thing that Catholics and Puritans in England at the turn of the century had in 
common was that both these oppressed religious groups might have supported the 
intervention of a foreign power. Jean R. Brink argues in “What does Shakespeare leave 
out of King Lear?” that the Anglican establishment was “by no means secure” and that it 
was potentially endangered both by Puritans and by Catholics and both from without and 
from within. Brink notes that Catholic Father Robert Parsons argued in his A Conference 
about the Next Succession to the Crowne of England, published in 1594, that the Spanish 
Infanta had a strong claim to the throne, and dedicated the treatise to Robert Devereux, 
Earl of Essex.  
The figure of Essex, who was becoming progressively more popular, seems to 
have served as the focal point of all the hopes the disenfranchised religious groups might 
have held. Essex certainly appealed both to Puritans and to Catholics. On the one hand, 
he inherited his Puritan leadership position from his stepfather Robert Dudley, Earl of 
Leicester. On the other hand, he opposed religious persecution of any sort and thus 
seemed to promise freedom of worship to the increasingly oppressed recusants. The 
Catholic underground, at least, obviously considered him to be a potential savior and a 
potential collaborator with the potentially intervening Infanta. (Kahan 2008: 220) His 
beheading in 1601 must have dealt a devastating blow to all who had hoped that this 
fallen world under the reign of an evil usurper could be saved by an intervention from 
beyond aided by a domestic hero. 
Salvation of a realm by means of a foreign intervention is a common motif in 
Shakespeare’s work, occurring with noteworthy frequency in the histories, and making an 
appearance in each of the great tragedies. After Othello’s fall into irrational jealousy and 
his realm’s consequent fall into disarray and chaos, Venetians promptly appear to 
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reinstate peace and order in Cyprus. After all the nobility in Denmark slaughter 
themselves or each other, Fortinbras marches in with his troop of Norwegian soldiers and 
receives Hamlet’s “dying voice.” 
The figures of saving foreign intervention in Shakespeare’s work are not couched 
merely in political terms. They are commonly invested with spiritual significance as well. 
One pertinent example of this is Macbeth, in which the eponymous ruling devil has 
transformed his realm into hell. The tormented Scots have one hope: 
 
Some holy angel 
Fly to the court of England, and unfold 
His message ere he come, that a swift blessing 
May soon return to this our suffering country 
Under a hand accurs’d! 
(Macbeth, III. vi. 45-49) 
 
Macduff consequently goes to Edward the Confessor 
 
to pray the holy king, upon his aid 
To wake Northumberland and warlike Siward, 
That by the help of these (with Him above 
To ratify the work) we may again 
Give to our tables meat, sleep to our nights. 
(Macbeth, III. vi. 29-34) 
 
Kastan rightly notes that “the English invasion is not merely English but is 
endowed with a unique spiritual authority, evident in Edward’s “most pious” kingship,” 
and remarks that this divine kingship is so spiritually elevated that it paradoxically “keeps 
itself discretely aloof from the military action necessary to activate its moral charge.” 
(Kastan 2005: 163) 
All this is, interestingly enough, completely in keeping with such anti-cosmic 
doctrines as those preached by Gnostics, Manichees, Cathars, and Bogomils. In all these 
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anti-cosmisms, the higher spiritual plane stages an intervention from beyond to aid the 
trapped sparks of spirit in their rebellion against the tyrannical ruler of the sublunar 
realm. This intervention, however, is never effected by the highest, apathetic, unperturbed 
spiritual realms, but only by lower emissaries of light. 
The devoted and loyal Kent suffering in the dark world of King Lear is heartened 
when he learns from Cordelia’s letter that  
 
from France there comes a power 
Into this scattered kingdom, who already 
Wise in our negligence, have secret feet 
In some of our best ports, and are at point  
To show their open banner. 
(King Lear, III. i. 30-34) 
 
Cordelia furtively infiltrates her sisters’ domain while her husband, the King of 
France, the one who sends liberating troops into this dark realm, remains away. She 
promises in her letter to Kent that the King  
 
shall find time 
From this enormous state – seeking to give 
Losses their remedies. 
(King Lear, II. ii. 168-170) 
 
Her choice of phrase invests her spouse with spiritual significance. Lofty but 
aloof, caring but distant, the divine King will send help, but remain unreachable.  
Cordelia’s letter serves as what is usually referred to in anti-cosmic dualisms as 
“the call from beyond.” An emissary of light descends into the dark realm to inform the 
trapped sparks of light that this world has imprisoned them, but that there is also a higher 
realm that is their true home. Help will come from this higher plane, but they must first 
wake up to be able to assist this foreign power in removing the evil tyrannical ruler of 
this world. 
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4.2. REMEMBER ME: THE CALL FROM BEYOND 
 
Gnostics, Manichees, Cathars, and Hermeticists all had as prominent part of their 
doctrines the figure of a heavenly guide awakening the soul to its true spiritual origin and 
its imprisonment in the world of matter. It was almost always conflated with the figure of 
Christ.   
Gnostics saw Jesus as an emanation of light, and frequently identified him with 
the original, purely spiritual, Adam. This spiritual, non-incarnated Christ came to earth to 
awaken souls to gnosis – the knowledge of the divine origin of each spark trapped in the 
material world. Mani similarly taught his followers that Jesus was a spiritual savior 
descending from the Kingdom of Light to awaken Adam from his slumber and remind 
him of his true origin and of the spark of divine light within himself. (Stoyanov 2003: 
103)  
Cathars saw this spiritual guide as the soul’s “light self” – the heavenly 
counterpart leading each trapped divine spark back into the realm of pure light. In a 
prominent Cathar text, Liber supra Stella, a spirit which is the higher self arrives from 
above and addresses the soul, which immediately recognizes it and thus remembers 
heaven. (Savić-Rebac 1957: 29-30) The Hermetic texts translated by Ficino likewise 
contained the notion of a heavenly guide awakening sleeping humanity and making souls 
aware of their unenviable situation. This is the role Pimander plays in relation to Hermes, 
who is grateful at having received “this vision from a Self that is not himself.” (Mitchell 
2006: 22-26)  
It is possible to trace this idea of the necessity of awakening the soul to its true 
divine origin back to at least Plato. Ficino certainly does this. He finds in Plato’s 
Phaedrus and Republic the notion that sleep fully encompasses our earthly lives and is 
only interrupted by brief visionary moments when the soul recollects its true spiritual 
origin and inherent immortality. (Allen 2002: 165)  
This is reminiscent of the enchanted island of The Tempest, where the exiled 
rightful ruler and his innocent young daughter find their new home. Prospero asks 
Miranda, attempting to remind her of her noble origin:  
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Canst thou remember 
A time before we came unto this cell?  
(The Tempest, I. ii. 38-39)  
 
Miranda only has a vague memory of it, “rather like a dream” – much like the Platonic 
soul. 
When Malvolio is trapped in the “dark house,” Feste visits him under the guise of 
a Catholic priest, but in fact preaches Gnosticism to him when he pronounces, echoing 
the tone of the sermons spoken by Jesus: “I say there is no darkness but ignorance.” 
Pagels notes that the “living Jesus” of Gnostic texts speaks of “illusion and 
enlightenment, not of sin and repentance,” as the Jesus of the Christian New Testament 
does. Instead of coming to save humanity from sin, the Gnostic Christ “comes as a guide 
who opens access to spiritual understanding.” (Pagels 1989: xx) 
The Duke of Measure for Measure is likewise a Gnostic Christ, coming into the 
prison in the garb of a priest as an emissary of light to enlighten and awaken, not suffer 
and redeem. His otherworldly origin is emphasized when he replies to Escalus’ question: 
“Of whence are you?” with 
 
Not of this country, though my chance is now 
To use it for my time. I am a brother 
Of gracious order, late come from the [See], 
In special business from his Holiness. 
(Measure for Measure, III. ii. 216-220) 
 
The Duke preaches a Gnostic Gospel to Claudio: 
 
Reason thus with life: 
If I do lose thee, I do lose a thing 
That none but fools would keep. A breath thou art, 
Servile to all the skyey influences, 
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That dost this habitation where thou keep’st 
Hourly afflict [...] Thou art not thyself, 
For thou exists on many a thousand grains 
That issue out of dust [...] Thou hast nor youth nor age, 
But as it were an after-dinner’s sleep, 
Dreaming on both. 
(Measure for Measure, III. i. 5-43) 
 
Claudio should welcome death, as life in this sublunar realm is not life at all, and 
existing in his earthly body he is not himself at all. The Duke’s reasoning echoes Ficino’s 
dualistic injunction to any aspiring philosopher:  
 
Since all the study of a philosopher is nothing but detachment from the body, 
and since he is brought closer to perfection every day by this detachment, he should 
certainly not fear the detachment from the body which occurs at death but should look 
forward to it with supreme hope and joy. (Ficino 2005: 131)  
 
Not surprisingly, the Duke’s “comfort” has perplexed almost all of the critics 
approaching Measure for Measure as a Christian play. W. W. Robson, as only one 
example, notices in his “Shakespeare and his Modern Editors” that Isabella reminds 
Angelo of the Atonement, so it is a given that this Christian doctrine is present and 
thinkable in the world of the play.  
 
Yet the friar, supposedly preparing Claudio for his reconciliation with God, 
makes no reference to Christ’s atoning sacrifice. Is not this quite as surprising whether or 
not Measure for Measure is ‘Catholic’, as Coghill thinks, or ‘Protestant’, as Dr Lever 
thinks? (Stead 1971: 86)  
 
Indeed, this is not surprising only if Measure for Measure is docetic, as I would venture 
to think. Let us recall the words in which Isabella purportedly mentions the Atonement: 
 
Why, all the souls that were were forfeit once, 
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And He that might the vantage best have took 
Found out the remedy. 
(Measure for Measure, II. ii. 73-75) 
 
“Found out the remedy” is quite sanitized compared to the usual descriptions of the 
orthodox doctrine of substitutionary atonement, which state that Christ “was slaughtered 
like a sacrificial lamb” in our stead or “was crucified for our sins.” The souls that were 
“forfeit” sound more like lost sparks of divine light which need liberating gnosis than 
sinning Christian souls in need of a redeeming Savior.  
The Christian Savior, let us remember, is a fully incarnated deity who suffers and 
dies in the world and is then resurrected in the flesh. The Christ of dualisms, conversely, 
is almost always docetic, only appearing to be an embodied human being. He is instead a 
purely spiritual entity who comes to enlighten and teach the lost sparks that they need to 
break free from the shackles of the material world, as the Duke teaches Claudio. Being 
immaterial, the docetic Christ never suffers and certainly cannot die. The Duke, 
universally accepted as a Christ figure by the allegorically prone critics, never suffers in 
the play nor is he ever even remotely in mortal danger. In fact, just like in the usual 
docetic explanations for the apparent resurrection of Christ, which state that another dead 
body was planted in Christ’s stead, so in Measure for Measure no one needs to be killed, 
as all the Christ figure has to do is “satisfy the deputy” with a head – any head. Claudio’s 
head is substituted by Barnardine’s, which is then substituted by that of Ragozine, the 
unfortunate pirate, pre-killed for the Duke’s convenience. This is substitutionary 
atonement of the docetic kind, paralleled in the other subplot by Mariana also being able 
to “satisfy the deputy” by substituting for Isabella in his bed. 
Portia and Paulina also descend, like the Duke does, as figures of inviolable 
authority, into the lower, confining realm to bring freedom to its prisoners. They are 
never perceived to be in any real danger, their words are heeded and obeyed, and what 
they bring is illuminating knowledge, not redeeming sacrificial aid. If they are Christ 
figures, the Christ they figure is also docetic. Cordelia might well be the only Christ 
figure that truly suffers and dies in the world she comes to save, “going about” her 
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father’s “business” (King Lear, IV. iv. 23-24) and saving nature from “the general curse” 
which “twain have brought her to.” (King Lear, IV. vi. 205-207)  
Perhaps the most intriguing figure of a “spiritual” guide arriving to awaken the 
hero to the truth is that of the Ghost in Hamlet. Many critics have observed that Hamlet’s 
ghostly father, Old Hamlet, carries a compelling spiritual significance. Spurgeon has 
perceived that the pervasive atmosphere of diseases, ulcers, and overall murkiness in the 
play is starkly contrasted with images of the father. (Spurgeon 1971: 319) Bradley notes 
that the Ghost is not a mere dead king, but is invested with a majestical, solemn quality, 
which transforms him into a “messenger of divine justice” and “a reminder or a symbol 
of the connection of the limited world of ordinary experience with the vaster life.” 
(Bradley 1956: 166) Few critics have, in fact, failed to notice that the Ghost is 
representative of some kind of a higher spiritual reality. (Bristol/McLuskie 2001: 72)  
The spirit finds in Hamlet an apt student, rearing to hear his otherworldly 
message:  
 
Haste me to know’t, that I with wings as swift  
As meditation, or the thoughts of love,  
May sweep to my revenge.  
(Hamlet, I. v. 29-31)  
 
Belsey notices that “meditation” is an unexpected word to be used in conjunction 
with promises of revenge. It can simply mean “thought” (OED, 1, b) and thus reinforce 
the “breathless speed of the image.” It can, however, also evoke the meaning of “a 
religious experience” (OED, 2) in which case, as Belsey explains, it “conveys a visionary 
intensity in Hamlet’s response.” (Belsey 2008: 150-151) The melancholy Saturnian 
student greets the messenger from beyond with a keen visionary intensity, as his own 
“prophetic soul” has long told him that this most seeming virtuous world and its ruler are 
evil and depraved. If “meditation” and “the thoughts of love” indeed sound strange in the 
context of filial revenge, this is because Shakespeare is grafting onto a revenge tragedy a 
dualistic spiritual quest of ascent, to which the two possible traditional pathways in 
Renaissance Neoplatonism are precisely meditation and love.   
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This spiritual emissary arrives with a clear message: the kingdom is ruled by an 
evil usurper. Thou, noble youth, must remember that this was not always so, and that, 
though the ruler of this world may lay claim upon you, I am your one true father. 
“Remember me,” repeated ad nauseam, means simply this: remember where your true 
spiritual paternity lies.  
Hamlet duly obliges and honors his ghostly father. Gnostics would see Hamlet as 
a successful disciple, awakening to gnosis and recognizing, as depicted in the Gnostic 
Gospel of Truth, that he is “in the Father” and is thus able to ascend from the world of 
darkness and ignorance back to the Father. (Wallis/Bregman 1992: 286) Cathars and 
Hermeticists would also probably see Old Hamlet as Hamlet’s spiritual counterpart and 
his higher self, which could be indicated by their shared name, introduced by 
Shakespeare. Cathars would especially also find Hamlet’s reaction laudable, as he 
renounces the imposed paternity of the lascivious, carnal and imprisoning Rex Mundi, 
and proves to be a true son to the true divine king. 
In the fallen world of Cymbeline, we similarly find the true king’s sons exiled, 
hiding, and living in a Platonic-sounding cave. Though far away from the royal throne 
and their father, they are lovely and virtuous, unsullied by the rotten realm they belong to. 
Their keeper is amazed:  
 
How hard it is to hide the sparks of nature!  
These boys know little they are sons to th’ King.  
(Cymbeline, III. iii. 79-80)  
 
Like in so many sparks of divine light exiled in this dark cosmos, their father’s divine 
nature is apparent in them and cannot be concealed by the bodily garb they happen to find 
themselves in, nor can it be stamped out by their ignorance of their noble origin.  
The father’s divine spirit cannot be suppressed in young Orlando, either, who 
finds, much like Hamlet, that “the spirit of my father, which I think is within me, begins 
to mutiny against this servitude.” (As You Like It, I. i. 22-24). 
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4.2.1. TO ACT, TO DO, TO PERFORM 
 
Once the hero discovers his true spiritual paternity that impels him to mutiny 
against the servitude of this material world and its tyrannical ruler, he is faced with an 
even trickier question: What exactly is to be done about it? 
One of the most consistently popular questions that the critics who have tackled 
Hamlet have long attempted to answer is “Why does Hamlet delay his revenge?” or, 
simply, “Why doesn’t Hamlet act?” The questions that need to be asked first are “How 
does one act in a deceptive, oppressive, and erratic world?” and “What does it even mean 
to act in a play where “act” itself is an extremely ambiguous key word?” A clue may be 
given in the sexton’s statement that “an act hath three branches – it is to act, to do, to 
perform.” (Hamlet, V. i. 11-12)5 These are the three meanings of the word “act” as used 
in Hamlet, which correspond with the three basic meanings of another key word – “play.” 
(Igrutinović 2007: 89) 
One way to attempt to deal with this world is “to act” – to put on an act in order to 
deceive others and disguise one’s true inner reality. It is immediately linked with one of 
the meanings of the word “play,” mentioned for the first time in Hamlet’s renunciation of 
all outward appearances of grief as “actions that a man might play.” (Hamlet, I. i. 83)6 
All the pertinent characters in the play resort to pretence at some point. “To do” is to take 
concrete and decisive action in this world, for which Hamlet – no clumsy weakling – 
consistently uses his sword throughout the play, culminating in his fencing match with 
Laertes (which is conveniently referred to as “playing”). “To perform” is the kind of 
acting that actors, or “players” do. Theatrical performance, paradoxically, transpires to be 
the only deceptive illusion (“to act”) that can approximate truth, and the only concrete 
action (“to do”) in the course of the play that achieves something positive and does not 
directly result in a catastrophe. 
 
                                               
5 Philip Edwards suggests in the 1985 Cambridge edition of Hamlet that the sexton has in mind the three 
parts of an act – the Imagination, the Resolution, and the Perfection, as stated in the legal arguments of 
1561-2 on the suicide of Sir James Hales, and cites Plowden’s Commentaries in support of this. (1761: 259) 
While I agree that this is what the sexton is trying to say, he obviously fails, as he does when attempting to 
use other learned expressions such as ergo and se defendendo. The very phrase in which he gets it wrong 
provides an invaluable insight. 
6 Emphases mine. 
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4.2.1.1. “TO ACT”: I KNOW NOT “SEEMS” 
 
Matter is, according to Ficino and other Neoplatonists, the real source of all 
illusions that this world offers, as it traps higher reality in it and then only reflects it in a 
deceptive and shadowy way. This contrast between reality and illusion took on a great 
significance in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, according to 
Katharine Maus, and was based experientially on a sense of discrepancy between “inward 
disposition” and “outward appearance” that is fundamentally impossible without 
perceiving the material body as an illusory disguise. The modern idea of interiority, Maus 
argues, depends on “the body as the essential other of this new self.” This dualistic 
othering of the material body is thus essential for the newly formed dichotomy of the 
“spiritual” inner as opposed to the “corporeal” outer, or the “self” as opposed to the 
“body.” (Reynolds/West 2005: 163) Or, in Hamlet’s terms, “is” as opposed to “seems.” 
Hamlet assuredly asserts “I know not “seems”” (Hamlet, I. ii. 76) and goes on to 
denounce 
 
all forms, moods, [shapes] of grief... These indeed seem, 
For they are actions that a man might play, 
But I have that within which passes show. 
(Hamlet, I. ii. 82-85) 
 
Contrasted to this is Claudius’ conscious deception: 
 
The harlot’s cheek, beautied with plast’ring art, 
Is not more ugly to the thing that helps it 
Than is my deed to my most painted word. 
(Hamlet, III. i. 50-52) 
 
Claudius figures several commonplaces of the Renaissance referring to illusion-
mongering. His lies are the “witchcraft of his wits,” and witches were imagined to 
practice the art of illusion, as reflected in “fair is foul, and foul is fair” uttered by the 
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witches in Macbeth. Witches were, in turn, commonly equated with those whorish 
women who dared deceive men by practicing the art of “face-painting.” This is who 
Claudius compares himself to, managing to sound almost as if he were exaggerating. It 
may have, after all, been a bit harsh to compare concealing the murder of his brother with 
a woman using some make-up.   
Iago likewise consciously chooses seeming over being:  
 
Heaven is my judge, not I for love and duty,   
But seeming so, for my peculiar end.  
(Othello, I. i. 59-60)  
 
His “I am not what I am” (Othello, I. i. 65) is, interestingly, the direct opposite of 
Jehovah’s self-defining “I am who I am” given to Moses on Mount Tabor. Seeming is, 
once more, the opposite of truly being.  
The deceptive Iago significantly offers Othello “ocular proof,” while lying 
Edmund offers Gloucester “auricular assurance.” In her Feminine endings, Philippa Berry 
attempts to outline the attention paid to sense experience in all the tragedies. While she 
concedes that each tragedy “gives varied attention to most or all of the senses,” she traces 
the figure of sense experience  
 
from the devouring mouths of the ‘star-crossed’ lovers in Romeo and Juliet, through the 
ambivalent attentiveness (to secreted meanings) of Hamlet’s ear; across the monstrously 
dilated eyes of Othello (with their suggestive bodily ambiguity) and the uncannily tactile 
‘hairiness’ of ‘the Scottish play’; to a consideration of the stinking tragic refuse whose 
stench ultimately reaches the nose of King Lear. As each sense—taste or eating, hearing, 
smelling, touching, as well as seeing—is reconfigured with an obscene difference, what 
is implicitly produced is an experiential knowledge of the secrets of matter. (Berry 2002: 
9) 
 
The most disturbing secret of matter is that it creates a shadowy illusion to 
deceive suspicious but earnestly truth-seeking heroes. Iago’s “ocular proof” and 
Edmund’s “auricular assurance” are, ultimately, only evidence that our senses cannot be 
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trusted and that the material world consistently offers illusions to trick us. This is why 
choosing the right casket in The Merchant of Venice is such a difficult task. This is why 
Hamlet does not immediately act. This is, finally, how conscience makes cowards of us 
all.  
The anti-cosmism of Hamlet is, perhaps paradoxically, shaken by the illusory 
nature of the material world itself. The Ghost could himself well be a demon assuming a 
pleasing shape, offering Hamlet nothing but trickery and illusion. The figure is certainly 
not without its metaphysical ambiguities. Stately, half Apollonian, half Jehovan, King 
Hamlet is a figure whose notions of justice are decidedly pre-Christian, and there is an 
eerie echo of “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” in his demand for revenge. He at 
times appears to be as cold and legalistic as the notorious Din of Lurianic Cabala or 
Marcion’s Jehovah. More problematically, his abode is in Purgatory and he tellingly 
descends into the cellarage during his conversation with Hamlet.  
There does not seem to be any love in him for any creature, living or dead: he 
discards his son’s show of affection and pity for him as weakness, and summarizes his 
feelings for his wife with “the vow” he “made to her in marriage.” The first mention of 
the word “usurp” is directed at him (Hamlet, I. i. 46) and Barnardo ominously remarks 
that the late king “was and is the question of these wars.” (Hamlet, I. i. 111) When we 
finally hear exclaimed “The king, the king’s to blame!” (Hamlet, V. ii. 300) we cannot 
but wonder: of the two “kings” mentioned, which one is to blame?  
On the other hand, G. Wilson Knight reminds us in The Wheel of Fire that 
Claudius, “as he appears in the play,” is “a good and gentle king.” (Jump 1968: 40) He 
does not bear any real animosity towards anyone and for Gertrude he seems to feel 
genuine affection. His succession to the throne may even be seen in terms of the 
Marcionite Gnostic system where the stern, angry, revengeful God of the Old Testament 
is superseded by the loving and merciful Father of Christ in the worship of man. There is 
certainly something poetic and Dionysian about the witchcraft of his wits and his 
incessant feasting, drinking, and dancing. 
Both kings claim Hamlet for a son. Old Hamlet constantly seems to be probing 
his filial devotion, while Claudius calls him “son” and officially names him his heir. 
Hamlet’s paternity is thus a question raised in multiple ways throughout the play (Grady 
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2002: 199) and there have even been conjectures of Claudius being his biological father. 
(Bloom 1998: 418-419) In his strong emotions, powers of speech and artistic 
propensities, at least, Hamlet certainly bears a stronger resemblance to Claudius than to 
Old Hamlet. Identifying the two has naturally often presented itself as an attractive 
notion. 
Perhaps most notoriously, Ernest Jones has argued in his relentlessly 
psychoanalytical “Hamlet and Oedipus” that Hamlet procrastinates because he wishes to 
avoid being identified with Claudius through the act of killing his mother’s husband and 
taking his place in her bed. (Jump 1968: 61-62) Hamlet, however, is not only a family 
drama. The act of killing does identify Claudius and Hamlet, but in multiple ways other 
than doing so out of an illegitimate sexual desire for the same woman – some of which 
are perhaps even more disturbing. 
 
4.2.1.2. “TO PERFORM”: THE PLAY’S THE THING 
 
It is in the character of The Mousetrap’s Lucianus that Claudius and Hamlet are 
finally and clearly identified via Hamlet’s projected act of revenge.  
Far from breaking the theatrical illusion, the play within the play disturbingly 
shows that there is no illusion about it. We are shown the King and Queen, as they 
cheerfully await to be amused by the pleasant pastime, brutally faced with the truth of 
their crime. The Mousetrap reveals the facts for the first time, as should, according to 
Hamlet, be the true  
 
purpose of playing, whose end both at the first and now, was and is, to hold as ‘twere the 
mirror up to nature, to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very 
age and body of the time his form and pressure. (Hamlet, III. ii. 17-20) 
 
Just as Shakespeare appears to be using Hamlet to explore the metaphysical 
ambiguities of the cosmos, Hamlet uses The Mousetrap to investigate his own 
microcosm. The “illusion” of the performance (“to perform”) disperses the illusion of 
pretence (“to act”), making the writing for and directing of The Mousetrap the only 
unambiguously positive concrete action (“to do”) that Hamlet takes in the course of the 
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play. The play within the play successfully catches the conscience of the King, but it 
manages to catch more than that. 
“This is one Lucianus, nephew to the king,” (Hamlet, III. ii. 221)7 Hamlet 
ironically states immediately after his self-assuredly venomous “Your Majesty, and we 
that have free souls, it touches us not.” (Hamlet, III. ii. 219-220)8 The Mousetrap, in fact, 
does indeed touch both of them. 
The fact that the murderer of the play is made to be the nephew of the victim may 
well have been Hamlet’s conscious scheme made in order to threaten the King while 
catching his conscience, (Wilson 1960: 138-153) but on another level it indicates that the 
play holds up a mirror to Hamlet as well, in which he can, if he dares, behold none other 
than Claudius. 
The revelation, in the character of Lucianus, of Hamlet’s identification with 
Claudius by means of his projected act of vengeance is clear. To avenge regicide in the 
name of justice, law, and order, is to commit regicide, the very emblem of rebellion 
against justice, law, and order. If Claudius is a rebellious, usurping fratricide, regicide, 
and even deicide, then this is what Hamlet will have to become as well. To kill Claudius 
is to become Claudius in every possible respect. (Igrutinović 2007: 90-91) 
Hamlet is not the only hero who finds that taking action in this material world, 
however scrupulously and righteously, always carries with it a taint. “To do” simply is 
inherently problematic. 
 
4.2.2. TO SUFFER THE SLINGS AND ARROWS OR TO TAKE ARMS 
AGAINST A SEA OF TROUBLES: DUALISM AND ACTION  
 
Not only is it difficult, in the deceptive and oppressive microcosms of 
Shakespeare’s darker plays, to know what the reality is and what, consequently, must be 
the noblest course of action, but action itself can at times appear to be less than 
praiseworthy as an option. “To do” can easily translate as “not to be” in the more anti-
cosmic strands of Renaissance Neoplatonism, where stasis – freedom from action and 
                                               
7 Emphases mine. 
8 Emphases mine. 
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motion – and apathia – freedom from passion and emotion – are seen as lofty ideals 
every philosopher must aspire to. 
 
4.2.2.1. “TO DO”: VITA ACTIVA vs. VITA CONTEMPLATIVA 
 
“To do” is to get one’s hands dirty by being active in the material world. The 
heroes and heroes-turned-villains of Shakespeare’s plays, deceived by the demonic 
illusions surrounding them, often seem to be faced with an insoluble conundrum in which 
the only apparently possible and even necessary course of action is at the same time 
starkly opposed to what conscience would dictate. Thus Antony and Coriolanus, once 
heroes of their homeland, find themselves waging war against their native Rome. Othello 
feels impelled to kill Desdemona, and Macbeth is made to believe that his fate is to usurp 
the throne. Macbeth’s rebellion, regicide, and usurpation seemingly necessitate 
Macduff’s, as Claudius’ necessitate Hamlet’s.  
The apparently necessary course of action frequently entails rebelling against the 
king. This is certainly the case with Hamlet, (Belsey 2008: 141) whose soliloquy in III. i. 
could, according to Hadfield, easily have come from the arguments of treatises discussing 
the right of citizens to assassinate their ungodly rulers. (Hadfield 2005: 198) Whether or 
not it is permissible to rebel against an evil king and by killing him commit regicide and 
thus symbolic parricide and deicide, was a burning issue in Shakespeare’s time, and the 
official answer was in fact a resounding “no.” 
William Sclater, a Protestant clergyman, for instance, asserted that the authority 
of a king was in no way affected by the method of his accession to power or his behavior 
on the throne: 
 
the persons are sometimes intruders, as in the case of vsurpation; sometimes abusers of 
their authoritie, as when they tyrannize: but the powers themselues haue God as their 
author. (Kastan 2005: 161-162) 
 
Similarly, King James argued that a king, once enthroned and anointed, must never be 
opposed, and that even a murdering tyrant had to be patiently suffered, as the king could 
be judged by God alone. He cited it as  
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a sure Axiome in Theologie, that evil should not be done, that good may come of it: The 
wickednesse therefore of the King shall never make them that are ordained to be iudged 
by him, to become his Iudges. (Kastan 2005: 161-162) 
 
Hamlet’s predicament seems increasingly difficult. On the one hand, as the lawful 
heir to the throne and the one chosen by the Ghost to hear the terrible truth, he was 
arguably indeed born to set right the time that is out of joint and would 
  
be damned  
To let this canker of our nature come  
In further evil.  
(Hamlet, V. ii. 68-70) 
 
The noble rebels in Macbeth find themselves in a similar position, but have fewer qualms 
about taking decisive action against the usurper, as does the microcosm of the tragedy 
they inhabit. King Lear presents a similarly less scrupulous microcosm. Even a servant 
can be justified in violently resisting Gloucester’s blinding, as Strier argues is the case in 
King Lear, citing it as the reason Shakespeare decided to have the mutilation take place 
onstage. Everyone would thus have understood how “a pezant” could dare “stand up 
thus,” (Strier 1995: 193) even as we understand the other lowly subjects resisting the 
reign of Goneril and Regan, and as we justify Hamlet’s efforts to set right the time that is 
out of joint or celebrate Macduff’s success at setting the time free.   
On the other hand, this precarious support that can be read into Shakespeare’s 
work for resisting tyrannical rulers is not unproblematic at all. Knight notes in “The Milk 
of Concord: Life-themes in “Macbeth’” that “Macbeth’s crime is a kind of parricide – 
hence the suggestions of parricide in II iv and III vi.” (Wain 1968: 149) The suggestions 
of parricide Knight cites are, however, actually – falsely but poignantly – pointed 
primarily at those that will at one point join the rebels and the triumphant Macduff. He 
will certainly commit this symbolic parricide as well when he commits regicide by 
removing the usurping tyrant Macbeth. As Kastan sharply observes, 
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Macbeth kills both a rebel then a king, exactly as does Macduff […] Macbeth’s acts, of 
course, are clearly differentiated: one is a heroic defense of the nation and its king, the 
other a murderous attack upon them; but Macduff’s single act at once defends and attacks 
sovereignty. It is a liberation and a regicide, one more thing that is “fair and foul” in the 
“hurly-burly” of the play. (Kastan 2005: 160)  
 
This is precisely what Hamlet perceives will be his predicament as well, when his 
conscience, as well as Claudius’,  is caught in The Mousetrap, and what he appears to 
wish to avoid at all cost. 
Kastan further notes that William Segar subversively and skeptically wrote in 
1590 that “Kings, Princes, and other soveraign commanders did (in the beginning) aspire 
unto greatness by puissance and force: of which Cain was the first.” (Kastan 2005: 130) It 
is killing one’s brother – figuratively, as all men are brothers, or literally, in the case of 
Claudius – that really puts one on the throne. This puts Hamlet’s father, whose lawful 
heir Hamlet is, in an unfavorable light: he is problematic as a warrior, and a conqueror, 
and a killer himself. Old Hamlet killed Old Fortinbras on the very day that Hamlet was 
born, and thus is “the cause of these wars.” The first “usurp” in the play is directed at him 
and we can surmise that every king is ultimately a usurper. If Hamlet avenges him, if he 
commits fratricide in his name to avenge fratricide committed against him, then he 
becomes just another in a long line of killers who get the throne by repeating the sin of 
Cain.  
Action itself in this deceptive world, then, however nobly envisaged and 
motivated, frequently transpires to be disturbing and problematic, and appears to be far 
less safe an option than contemplation. 
Action and contemplation are quite frequently juxtaposed in Shakespeare. Young 
Fortinbras, of “unimproved mettle hot and full,” goes to battle for “a straw” and Laertes 
often acts without sparing a single thought on th’ event, while Hamlet paces around the 
castle asking his questions and Horatio the Stoic philosopher endures all life’s calamities, 
patiently suff’ring all. In stark contrast to Timon readily choosing an ascetic, 
misanthropic life of contemplation, as another instance, we see Alcibiades planning to 
conquer Athens the moment he is exiled. Our sympathies in these contrasting scenes are 
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likely to side with the less impetuous heroes of the darker among Shakespeare’s plays – 
at least when we see the usual results of action. 
In the final scene of Hamlet, after a general carnage, Horatio promises to speak 
 
Of carnal, bloody, and unnatural acts, 
Of accidental judgments, casual slaughters, 
Of deaths put on by cunning and [forc’d] cause, 
And in the upshot, purposes mistook 
Fall’n on the inventors’ heads. 
(Hamlet, V. ii. 381-385) 
 
This macabre list neatly enumerates all the actions that have taken place in the 
world of the play. This is one pertinent example of the usual results of action in the 
tragedies. It is little wonder that Hamlet thinks too precisely on th’ event and conscience 
makes cowards of us all. 
Contemplation, after all, is the almost universally accepted higher course among 
the Neoplatonists, especially those whose leanings were slightly more anti-cosmic. 
Plotinus, as only one example, famously claimed that action is but “a shadow of 
contemplation,” (Inge 1900: 331) and Hamlet, Cruttwell notes, as a mature student at a 
time “when the division between university and world, scholar and man of the world, still 
had much of the medieval strictness,” would almost certainly agree. The fact that Hamlet 
was a university student indicates that he was striving for a life of contemplation, not 
activity. (Jump 1968: 188) This is also reflected in his asceticism, disgust at the world, 
and mistrust of sexuality, which are almost reminiscent of a monastic bent. 
Hamlet’s choice of university is quite telling as well. He was not a student at any 
old university, but, significantly, at Wittenberg, the same university where Giordano 
Bruno taught for two years (1586-8) shortly before he started his tour of England. The 
doctors of Wittenberg had accepted him and allowed him to teach his mixture of 
astronomy, astrology, mythology, and poetically inclined occult versions of 
Neoplatonism in their schools. In a dedication to the Wittenberg senate, he gratefully 
recounts that  
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you thought me worthy of the kindliest welcome, enrolled me in the album of your 
academy, and gave me a place in a body of men so noble and learned that I could not fail 
to see in you, neither a private school nor an exclusive conventicle, but, as becomes the 
Athens of Germany, a true university. (Yates 1964: 306) 
 
Bruno took an affectionate farewell of the University in an Oratio valedictoria 
which ends with the idea that “it is here, in Wittenberg, whither come all the nations of 
the world in search of truth, that the truth will be found.” (Yates 1964: 312) It is quite 
conceivable that Bruno praised the University of Wittenberg in similar terms when he 
spoke at English universities as well, and that this would have reached anyone remotely 
interested in poetic and Platonic matters. 
Hamlet would apparently be glad to go to Wittenberg in search of truth via 
contemplative Neoplatonic studies, but is instead trapped in the dark and rotten world of 
Denmark, where he is fed lies and deceit, and, much to his chagrin, still apparently 
unavoidably called upon to set right the time that is out of joint.   
  
4.2.2.2. THE VARYING TIDE: THE FIXED vs. THE FLUID 
 
Action, in the Platonic and Neoplatonic discourses, entails becoming entangled in 
the fluid world of motion and matter, while contemplation enables ascent away from the 
world of matter towards the fixed, purely spiritual spheres. Action, motion, and fluidity 
form a paradigm that is commonly juxtaposed – always to its detriment – to 
contemplation, stasis, and fixity. Motion and fluidity are attributes of lower matter and 
thus best shunned. 
Accordingly, Brabantio praises Desdemona as  
 
A maiden, never bold;  
Of spirit so still and quiet that her motion  
Blush’d at herself.  
(Othello, I. iii. 94-96) 
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The still and quiet spirit is juxtaposed to motion – which is apparently inherently 
blushworthy. The still spirit is opposed to the fluid activity of war in Ulysses’ tirade as 
well: 
 
They tax our policy, and call it cowardice, 
Count wisdom as no member of the war, 
Forestall prescience, and esteem no act 
But that of hand. The still and mental parts 
[...] this hath not a finger’s dignity. 
(Troilus and Cressida, I. iii. 197-204) 
 
The fixed (the still and mental parts) is opposed to the fluid (bodily), but also, in Ulysses’ 
entire speech, the fixed/fluid dichotomy corresponds with the head/lower members, and 
wise rulers/riotous rabble dichotomies. The base, lower, common folk are characterized 
by action and motion, much like Coriolanus’ “mutable, rank-scented meiny.” 
(Coriolanus, III. i. 66-71)  
This characterization is also reflected in Caesar’s reaction to the news that 
Pompey is strong at sea and popular among the crowds, or, in his own words: “The 
people love me, and the sea is mine” (Antony and Cleopatra, II. i. 9):  
 
This common body […]  
Goes to and back, [lackeying] the varying tide,  
To rot itself in motion.  
(Antony and Cleopatra, I. iii. 44-47) 
 
The sea and the people are mentioned in conjunction both times, as fluidity is an attribute 
both of the volatile sea and the inconstant multitude. Motion is firmly associated with 
materiality, which is chaotic and rotten.  
Laertes’ violent riot is likewise depicted in clearly negative terms of voraciously 
destructive chaos, fluidity, and motion:  
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The ocean, overpeering of his list, 
Eats not the flats with more impiteous haste 
Than young Laertes, in a riotous head, 
O’erbears your officers. 
(Hamlet, IV. v. 99-102) 
 
Warlike, soldierly action in the world is in imagery commonly associated with all that is 
lower, “base,” “common,” irrational, bodily, and fluid.  
Daryl W. Palmer argues in his “Motion and Mercutio in Romeo and Juliet” that 
Romeo and Juliet attempts to settle an ancient debate on the nature of motion, a debate 
that he traces back to Plato’s Theaetetus. “Everything flows and nothing abides; 
everything gives way and nothing stays fixed,” Plato laments in the dialog, reflecting on 
the vicissitudes of the material world. Palmer believes it is Plato that inspired an intense 
interest in the study of motion which is a predominant theme of Renaissance fencing 
manuals.  
Fencing is studied as motion in the material flux. Mercutio is, according to 
Palmer, a true “philosopher,” as he is able to “step back and observe” the flux and “has 
the capacity to reflect on the nature of motion” from a position of static contemplation. 
(Bloom 2008 Romeo: 293-294) A kind of a dichotomy is established here between 
fencing and philosophy.  
Active life in the world of matter thus puts one at risk and sullies one. One can 
“act,” chameleon-like, biding one’s time, observing from afar. One can “perform,” in 
artistic creation mirroring nature and ordering matter. Or one can “do,” fencing in this 
warlike world of motion and flux. Hamlet’s actions in the world, some of which are rash 
– such as the stabbing of Polonius and the battle against the pirates – and some of which 
are merely ill-advised – such as the fencing match against Laertes – are all performed 
with a sword. To take arms against a sea of troubles is to step into the flux of fencing. 
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4.2.2.3. TO BE OR NOT TO BE: BEING vs. BECOMING 
 
This is a significant part of the meaning in what has often been referred to as 
Hamlet’s “suicide” soliloquy: 
 
To be or not to be, that is the question: 
Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer 
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, 
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, 
And by opposing, end them.  
(Hamlet, III. i. 55-59) 
 
To suffer the slings and arrows is “to be” – to be at one with the One; to take arms 
is “not to be,” but instead to act, to do, to perform. Being is here opposed to action, 
motion, and the material flux of Becoming. Michel Jeanneret, illuminatingly for this 
particular crux, interprets the Renaissance Neoplatonic attitude towards matter in 
extremely apt and useful French terms as  
 
a philosophy of birthing [naître] which is opposed to that of being [être]: to be born and 
to be born again, is to exist in the precariousness of perpetual oscillation, is not to be 
[n’être]. (Michel Jeanneret, Perpetuum mobile: métamorphoses des corps et des oeuvres 
de Vinci à Montaigne (Paris: Editions Macula, 1997, p. 39.) (Berry 2002: 17)  
 
“To be or not to be?” is not a question pertaining to one’s bodily existence in this 
world. It refers, rather, to the Platonic and Neoplatonic distinction between truly Being 
(“to be”) and merely existing in the flux of Becoming (“not to be”). “To die,” the next 
place Hamlet’s meandering mind takes him to, is not necessarily associated with either 
“to be” or “not to be.” The death of the body could well lead to “to be” through suffering 
the slings and arrows in still and contemplative apathia and finally reaching the stasis of 
pure spirit in the One; taking arms and even possibly winning, on the other hand, could 
lead to “not to be” through fencing in the flux of matter and its perennial becoming, 
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which for Hamlet signifies the vicious cycle of killing in order to live and usurping in 
order to rule. 
Lovejoy has identified “two conflicting major strains” in Plato and in the Platonic 
tradition – which he referred to as “otherworldliness and this-worldliness” – and rightly 
observed that Plato “stood on both sides” of this deep “cleavage.” He defines 
“otherworldliness” in terms of an anti-cosmic mysticism that seeks to ascend away from 
and finally escape the material universe, and “this-worldliness” as an active pro-cosmic 
realism that attempts to engage with the world and improve it. (Lovejoy 2001: 24) If 
Hamlet does not know which to choose – to suffer or to take arms – he is in good 
company, as every major thinker from Plato onwards seems to have been similarly 
confused and indecisive.  
It is certainly nobler, at least for many Neoplatonists and Stoics, to choose stasis 
over motion and apathia over emotion. Horatio has done precisely this and is lauded by 
the sincerely admiring Hamlet as “one in suff’ring all that suffers nothing.” (Hamlet, III. 
ii. 66) This is what it means to suffer the slings and arrows and not take arms: to reach the 
ideal apathia and stasis of the Stoic and Neoplatonic One. (Bloom Tragedies: 2010: 43) 
Hamlet is thus not simply a disgruntled youth suffering under an oppressive social 
system and familial strife, or an Oedipal neurotic struggling to come to terms with the 
desire of his mother – in both meanings of this phrase. He is a Saturnian, melancholy soul 
wondering whether ‘tis nobler to remain still and contemplative in a world in which to do 
anything at all is to get one’s hands dirty.  
He goes to great lengths to avoid becoming tainted by this world, forswearing all 
but his Father’s call, as would any ascetic, dedicated pupil of Renaissance secret studies, 
weary and wary of the world. 
 
 4.2.3. UNMIX’D WITH BASER MATTER: RENOUNCING ALL FOR THE 
CALL 
 
This is not necessarily always the wisest course of action. Ficino explains in his 
De vita that “a person who is stimulated into scrutinizing curiously the depths of secret 
things” is Saturnian, as are “all those who delve as far as possible into any pursuit, 
  139 
especially those who neglect other affairs.” (Ficino 1998: 377) We may remember 
Prospero, who studied “the liberal arts” and left the government to his brother, who 
usurped the power while he was “transported” and “rapt in secret studies,” all dedicated 
to “the closeness and the bettering” of his mind, and understand what the risks of 
abandoning oneself to the Saturnian influences may be.  
Hamlet explicitly renounces his entire previous life after his “initiation” by the 
Ghost and dedicates himself fully to this newly acquired knowledge: 
 
Remember thee! 
Yea, from the table of my memory 
I'll wipe away all trivial fond records, 
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past 
That youth and observation copied there, 
And thy commandment alone shall live 
Within the book and volume of my brain, 
Unmix’d with baser matter. Yes, by heaven! 
(Hamlet, I. v. 98-104) 
 
The entire speech smacks of an intense experience of religious conversion, complete with 
the promise to live for his spiritual father’s “commandment.” Hamlet’s fervor recalls the 
religious fanaticism found in the adherents of certain anti-cosmic heresies who also, after 
their initiation, had to renounce all they might have learned or known before. (Stoyanov 
2003: 144)  
Addressing students who were thought to suffer from melancholy through 
solitariness and concentration on their studies, Ficino, conversely, advises that the 
Saturnian or melancholic man, while continuing to pursue his deep studies, should also 
“take care to temper the Saturnian severity with Jovial and Venereal influences.” (Yates 
2003: 61) Hamlet does not heed this advice: he avoids all but his ghostly Father, 
explicitly denouncing the Jovial pursuits of Claudius’ merry court and renouncing the 
pleasant Venereal influence of Ophelia. 
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It is, significantly, immediately after the revelation received from the Ghost that 
Hamlet seemingly arbitrarily seems to find it necessary to detach himself from Ophelia. 
That this was not necessarily an easy sacrifice to make is apparent from Ophelia’s 
description of her final encounter with “mad” Hamlet in her closet: 
 
At last, a little shaking of mine arm, 
And thrice his head thus waving up and down, 
He rais’d a sigh so piteous and profound 
As it did seem to shatter all his bulk 
And end his being. That done, he lets me go. 
(Hamlet, II. i. 89-93) 
 
Hamlet is, in abandoning Ophelia, fulfilling his monastic-sounding vow to renounce all 
other pursuits, especially erotic ones, in order to ascetically and religiously follow his 
father’s commandment. Ophelia apparently qualifies as the “baser matter” that Hamlet 
must let go of.   
Hamlet is not alone in shunning romantic love for loftier goals among 
Shakespeare’s characters. Measure for Measure is, for instance, densely populated by 
characters who renounce erotic love for higher spiritual pursuits. Its spiritually inclined 
Duke boasts:  
 
Believe not that the dribbling dart of love 
Can pierce a complete bosom.  
(Measure for Measure, I. iii. 2-3)  
 
Similarly, Angelo is, according to Lucio,  
 
a man whose blood 
Is very snow-broth; one who never feels 
The wanton stings and motions of the sense; 
But doth rebate and blunt his natural edge 
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With profits of the mind: study and fast. 
(Measure for Measure, I. iv. 57- 61) 
 
Study and fast is all that the novice Isabel wants as well, even “wishing a more 
strict restraint” than the already strict nunnery she has joined requires. (Measure for 
Measure, I. iv. 4) 
At the beginning of Love’s Labor’s Lost, arguably Shakespeare’s most developed 
treatment of the theme of renouncing erotic love in order to pursue contemplative 
spiritual ascent, the King announces:  
 
Our court shall be a little academe, 
Still and contemplative in living art. 
(Love’s Labor’s Lost, I. i. 40-41) 
 
An “academe,” or academy, would be a popular Renaissance institution modeled 
after Plato’s Academy, (Shewmaker 2008) which usually boiled down to “half learned 
society and half literary club.” The fashion started by Ficino’s Florentine Academy, these 
academies flourished in the sixteenth century, especially in Italy, and, interestingly 
enough, mostly offered lectures on the philosophy of love, based on Platonizing poems 
and commentaries on the Symposium. (Kristeller 1961: 60) 
The irony of the endeavor undertaken by the court in Love’s Labor’s Lost – 
renouncing love in order to study the Platonic philosophy of love – will become painfully 
patent in the course of the play. 
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Love is a spirit all compact of fire, 
Not gross to sink, but light, and will aspire 
(Venus and Adonis, 149-150) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5.0. ASCENT 
 
Let us revisit Narcissus, standing on the edge of the dark waters of matter, gazing 
at his beautiful reflection in them, and remember his three Neoplatonic options: purifying 
ascent towards the true divine origin of the beautiful form, disfiguring descent into the 
depths of formless matter, or actively controlling the waters by lending them his form.  
Ascent towards the purely spiritual realms, advocated by Plotinus and Ficino in 
their moralizing Neoplatonic interpretations of the myth can be, as we have seen, inspired 
by an anti-cosmic sentiment of being imprisoned in a hostile, cruel, and filthy universe. A 
common response of the more idealistic and naïve – or the more squeamish and world-
weary – amongst Shakespeare’s heroes is to consciously renounce actions and passions 
and pursue a life of quiet contemplation. 
Figures such as Horatio, Hamlet, the Duke, Isabel, and Angelo appear to be or at 
least attempt to be free of passions, most conspicuously relinquishing – at least at some 
point – their erotic passion for higher spiritual pursuits.  
This does not always yield the expected results. In what is arguably Shakespeare’s 
most extensive and explicit treatment of the idea of renouncing erotic passion for the sake 
of higher spiritual enlightenment via ascetic contemplation, Love’s Labor’s Lost, 
Berowne wittily complains about being compelled 
  
 […] painfully to pore upon a book 
  143 
To seek the light of truth, while truth the while 
Doth falsely blind the eyesight of his look. 
Light, seeking light, doth light of light beguile; 
So ere you find where light in darkness lies, 
Your light grows dark by losing of your eyes. 
Study me how to please the eye indeed 
By fixing it upon a fairer eye, 
Who dazzling so, that eye shall be his heed, 
And give him light that it was blinded by. 
(Love’s Labor’s Lost, I. i. 74-83) 
 
Berowne makes an important Neoplatonic point here: ascent can indeed be 
inspired by something other than ascetic, world-weary contemplation.  
   
 5.1. A HEAVENLY LOVE: LOVE AS ASCENT 
   
 The ascetically inclined members of the courtly “academe” in Love’s Labor’s 
Lost, originally intent on reaching spiritual heights by forswearing all passions, especially 
erotic ones, eventually discover that love can actually serve as a way up. Longaville 
significantly explains to his beloved his change of heart: 
 
 A woman I forswore, but I will prove, 
Thou being a goddess, I forswore not thee. 
My vow was earthly, thou a heavenly love 
[...] thou, fair sun, which on my earth doth shine. 
(Love’s Labor’s Lost, IV. iii. 62-65; 67) 
 
Discovering that their unrequited feelings for their respective heavenly loves 
inspire them to good deeds and constant self-betterment, Berowne is able to conclude: 
 
From women’s eyes this doctrine I derive: 
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They are the ground, the books, the academes, 
From whence doth spring the true Promethean fire.  
(Love’s Labor’s Lost, IV. iii. 298-230)  
 
This is more in keeping with the other, more pro-cosmic, of the “two conflicting major 
strains in Plato and in the Platonic tradition” that Lovejoy has noticed. (Lovejoy 2001: 
24)  
Horatio, the apathetic Stoic philosopher, for one, chooses to renounce desire and 
can thus be “one in suff’ring all that suffers nothing.” (Hamlet, III. ii. 66) This is certainly 
a valid Neoplatonic option. Another, at least equally valid option, is to acknowledge that 
desire causes suffering, but that is also the very force that urges us to climb upwards on 
the scale of perfection. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 205) The latter option is advocated by 
Renaissance love theorists. 
 
5.1.1. THIS DOCTRINE I DERIVE  
 
5.1.1.1. RENAISSANCE LOVE THEORY 
 
The phrase “Renaissance love theory” loosely refers to the various Platonic and 
Neoplatonic ideas – mainly pertaining to climbing upwards on the scale of perfection via 
pure and purifying desire for an idealized chaste lady – expounded in the numerous 
trattati d’amore whose proliferation was pioneered by the publication, in 1484, of 
Marsilio Ficino’s highly influential De amore. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 175) Ficino’s 
theory is especially significant in any discussion of the English renaissance, as it was 
basically his theory of love and beauty expressed in De amore that passed for 
“Platonism” in English Renaissance poetry. Though Ficino’s influence may be said to 
have been mainly indirect – disseminated through verses of poetry rather than copies of 
his treatise – the overwhelming importance of that influence must not be underestimated. 
As Jayne points out, “Ficino certainly was the fountainhead of Renaissance love 
Platonism.” (Jayne 1952: 238)  
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Ficino’s De amore is a lengthy commentary on Plato’s Symposium, and Ficino’s 
love theory represents a reinterpreted revival of Plato’s own love theory, as expounded in 
the Symposium and the Phaedrus. Plato sees Eros as a divine magnetism pulsing through 
the cosmos and irresistibly drawing the soul towards reuniting itself with the divine 
source from which it has descended. Sexual desire which results in procreation is seen as 
merely the very lowest expression of this divine striving towards immortality, as Plato 
has Diotima explain to Socrates in the Symposium. At a higher level, where soldiers, 
poets, and statesmen are situated, Eros manifests itself as a desire for fame after death, 
and at the highest level, that of the philosophers, it impels the soul to regain the 
immaculate purity of its true divine nature and reconnect with its celestial source in 
eternity.  
Plato regards the highest form of erotic desire as essential and originative, and the 
lower forms as derivative and existing only when the soul finds itself imprisoned in a 
mortal body. This doctrine is briefly repeated in the Timaeus before human reproductive 
organs are explained. Plato makes their existence as human body parts sound like an 
afterthought of the demiurge. The male seed, as part of the marrow, is continuous with 
the brain, which is the seat of the immortal and divine part. Reproduction is thus even in 
the hierarchy of the body firmly placed at the bottom, as the lowest rung of the ladder 
leading an individual towards immortality – and, we can surmise, a rung best skipped. 
(Plato 1997: 292-293) 
This hierarchical distinction between the separate levels of erotic desire is also 
reflected in the second speech of the Symposium, in which Pausanias distinguishes 
between the two Aphrodites – Aphrodite Urania and Aphrodite Pandemos – continuing 
an ancient Greek folk tradition separating the two aspects of the goddess of love. By the 
fourth century B.C., Greek mythology had already split Aphrodite into the discrete forms 
of Aphrodite Urania, personifying the loftier celestial facets of love, and the more down-
to-earth Aphrodite Pandemos, dealing with the mundane tasks of aiding marriage, 
childbirth, and celebrating sexual pleasure, by – including, but not limited to – serving as 
the patroness of prostitutes. (Brundage 1987: 12) Plato has Pausanias widen the gap 
between the two Aphrodites by suggesting that those who worship the first, masculine, 
spiritual one, rise towards immortality, whereas those who follow the second, vulgar, 
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feminine one, remain tethered to this ephemeral and fleeting material world. (Plato 1970: 
40-41) 
 
 
Venus Urania (1878) by Griepenkerl 
 
Ficino gleefully adopts this Platonic notion of the “two Aphrodites,” or Venuses, 
and adds his own, distinctly Neoplatonic, layers of interpretation to it, which he offers in 
his De amore. The first or “heavenly Venus” has her abode in the Angelic Mind and is an 
utter stranger to matter, having been born without a mother. The second or “vulgar 
Venus” resides in the World Soul, where she presides over procreation. In accordance 
with their respective locations, the heavenly Venus “is entranced by an innate love for 
understanding the Beauty of God,” whereas the vulgar Venus “is entranced by her love 
for procreating that same beauty in bodies”; the heavenly Venus “embraces the splendor 
of divinity in herself,” whereas the vulgar Venus “transfers sparks of that splendor into 
the Matter of the world.” The heavenly Venus liberates the divine sparks from the prison 
of the material world, and the vulgar Venus, conversely, traps them in it. 
(Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 180) 
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Venus Pandemos (1852-3) by Gleyre 
 
These sparks of beauty trapped in the material world serve to remind the eternal 
human soul of its own true divine origin. Ficino explains in a letter to Pellegrino degli 
Agli that seeing “the reflection of divine beauty with our eyes” enables us to “remember 
what we knew before, when we existed outside the prison of the body.” He continues to 
elucidate that when we happen to “see form and grace in anyone” we ought to “rejoice, as 
at the reflection of divine beauty,” but that we must be careful to remember that it is 
indeed only a reflection that we see.  
The beautiful human forms we are erotically attracted to only exist so that “by a 
burning desire for this beauty” we should feel “drawn to the heavens.” (Allen 2002: 127) 
We must not be tempted to attempt any sort of carnal relationship with them; inspired by 
their beauty, we are instead supposed to climb the Platonic scale of perfection, step by 
step: from the love of beautiful bodies to the love of beautiful souls, and from there to the 
final unification with the divine. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 181) 
Very little change in this doctrine is noticeable a full century later, in Giordano 
Bruno’s 1585 love treatise De gli eroici furori, which, according to Hanegraaff, 
represents a specific culmination of the tradition of trattati d’amore. Bruno wonders 
 
if a shadowy, cloudy, elusive beauty painted upon the surface of corporeal matter pleases 
me so much and so incites my affection […] so captivates me and so sweetly binds me 
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and draws me to it, that I find my senses offer nothing so agreeable to me, what would be 
the effect upon me of that which is the substantial, original, and primal beauty? […] 
Therefore, the contemplation of this vestige of light must lead me by the purgation of my 
soul to an imitation, a conformity, and participation in that most worthy and most lofty 
light into which I am transformed and with which I am united. For I am sure that nature, 
having put this [corporeal] beauty before my eyes […] wishes that from here below I 
become elevated. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 203) 
 
Both Ficino and Bruno legitimize the feelings of erotic desire for the beautiful 
human form, but neither would dream of suggesting that the next step in a lover’s journey 
would be to establish a functional relationship with the actual human being whose form it 
is or – perish the thought – marry her. The beautiful human form is merely a reflection of 
the divine in the material waters of this world, from which Narcissus must avert his gaze 
if he wants to find life instead of death. Both Ficino and Bruno attribute the real agency 
and beauty that operates in erotic desire to another figure – female, ideal, and, most 
importantly, supernatural. 
 
5.1.1.2. VENUS IS BUT DIANA TO ME: THE ANAGOGIC FEMALE 
 
Philippa Berry attempts in her book Of Chastity and Power: Elizabethan 
Literature and the Unmarried Queen to trace back in history the philosophical, 
theological, and poetic origins of the idealized female figure, and it is of particular 
interest here to note that, at every step along the way, solid connections with dualistic 
concepts and belief systems can be found.  
Berry starts with medieval courtly love, celebrating the lover’s desperate worship 
of an immeasurably distant and elevated lady. It is no secret that the emergence of the 
cult of courtly love coincided – in both time and place – with the anti-cosmic dualistic 
heresy of Catharism. This notoriously prompted Denis de Rougemont to go as far as to 
assert that the poetry of courtly love is in fact little more than a compendium of coded 
secret doctrines of the Cathars. (De Rougemont 1983: 74-89)  
The next step is Dante’s adoration of his conveniently deceased – and thus 
disembodied – beloved Beatrice leading him upwards towards the highest spheres of 
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Heaven and Petrarch’s slightly more physical devotion to the equally unattainable Laura, 
combined with utter disgust at the carnality of actual women, especially when this 
carnality involved childbirth and childcare. Both Dante and Petrarch – and both the 
Dantean stilnovisti and the Petrarchan sonneteers that followed in their wake – were 
greatly indebted to the Neoplatonic tradition, and their adoration of their chosen idealized 
ladies served the purpose of inspiring their ascent to the heavenly.  
Finally, Berry arrives to Ficino’s Florentine Neoplatonism with its concurrent 
dualistic obsession with virginity and rising above carnality through the aid of an 
idealized beloved.  
She remarks that attempts have often been made to connect this tradition of the 
idealized female beloved with the cult of the Virgin Mary. Significantly, the flourishing 
of courtly love coincided with the rise in the devotion to the Virgin, the vision of the 
Virgin is the culmination of Dante’s journey of ascent led by his love of Beatrice, and the 
unrelenting emphasis upon chastity in both Petrarchism and Florentine Neoplatonism 
could point to certain parallels between Mary and the beloved in these systems. (Berry 
2003: 9) 
Berry observes that the cult of Mary, however, “did not define her worship in 
terms of desire.” (Berry 2003: 10) It should similarly be noted that other crucial 
differences exist between the mainly orthodox and monistic cult of Mary and the mainly 
Platonic and dualistic cult of the idealized beloved: Mary is never seen as cruel or 
unattainable; quite contrary to that, she is usually depicted as maternally gentle and fully 
approachable. Though virginal, Mary is always distinctly bodily, and even death does not 
deprive her of her body in most Christian orthodoxies – her version of Christ’s 
Resurrection and bodily Ascension is still celebrated as her Dormition or Assumption in 
the majority of today’s Christendom worldwide. Her maternal body is consistently 
celebrated and never seen as even remotely threatening. (Warner 1978) Berry decides 
that the spiritual figure informing the cult of the idealized beloved is not Mary: 
  
These aspects of the idealized female beloved accord more closely with another 
concept, pre-Christian in origin but assimilated by Christian theology, whose genealogy 
was closely associated with those Platonic and Neoplatonic world views to which 
Petrarch as well as the Florentine Neoplatonists were indebted […] the idea of Sapientia 
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or Sophia, the Wisdom of God, who was described in Old Testament and Apocryphal 
texts as a female figure, and who often appeared in medieval texts as Lady Philosophy or 
Lady Reason. [I]n the Renaissance […] her links with an unfallen natural world, and her 
position as an object of desire, were paralleled […] by Diana. (Berry 2003: 10) 
 
Dian is thus finally discovered as the mythical figure closest to the concept 
represented by the idealized female beloved in the Renaissance.  
It might sound peculiar, to say the least, that in Renaissance Neoplatonism Dian, 
the goddess of chastity, the Moon, and the hunt, should become so closely involved in 
erotic dealings traditionally reserved for other deities, but this is precisely what happened. 
It might sound slightly less peculiar if we remember that Dian, unlike other goddesses 
whose virginity denotes their autonomy rather than their renunciation of sexual liaisons, 
truly is stubbornly celibate and utterly unattainable. This is much more in keeping with 
the dualistic erotic tradition of Renaissance Neoplatonism than worshipping an ultimately 
available goddess. 
In the entire tradition of the idealized female beloved, as we have seen, if a lover 
is to ascend above the material, his desire must never be gratified. Accordingly, it might 
be wise to acknowledge that the eternally desirable but eternally unattainable female 
figure in the truly dualistic manifestations of this tradition is not merely “idealized” – 
depicted with the finest blond curls or the deepest blue eyes or the sweetest breath – she 
is ultimately disembodied and disembodying. The often misandric and cruel Dian, who 
brutally has Actaeon torn to shreds for his sexual interest in her, who forbids her female 
devotees from marrying men and punishes those who renege with death in childbirth, 
seems increasingly like an apt choice as a figure of worship.   
Ficino explicitly connects Venus and Dian in his De vita, when he smugly asserts 
that, as he is a celibate priest, “Venus herself is but Diana” to him. (Ficino 1998: 383) 
Dian and heavenly Venus are linked in Bruno’s love theory as well. De gli eroici furori 
celebrates the “cruel and beautiful” goddess Dian, responsible for the eternal “sweet 
pain” of the lover: “although the soul does not attain the end desired and is consumed by 
so much zeal, it is enough that it burns in so noble a fire.” This noble suffering is what, in 
Bruno’s apt elision – based on Ficino’s association of “hero” with “Eros” – makes the 
erotic lover simultaneously heroic. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 200) 
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In his dedication of the eroici furori to Sidney, Bruno reproaches him for writing 
sonnets to mere women, objects unworthy of intellectual contemplation, but 
simultaneously makes an exception for English women, whom he refers to as 
“goddesses,” concluding the dedication with an adulatory sonnet to the ladies of England 
and their “unique Diana,” the virginal and exalted Queen Elizabeth. (Pellegrini 1943: 13) 
Only Dian herself can be a female figure worthy of worship, even if, when it is politically 
expedient, she is embodied in a virgin Queen to whom praise is offered. 
In this function of chastely if cruelly leading a worshipper upwards towards the 
divine, heavenly Venus and Dian thus seem to be firmly identified. In All’s Well That 
Ends Well, Helen pleads with the Countess to help her cause,  
 
if yourself […] Did ever in so true a flame of liking  
Wish chastely, and love dearly, that your Dian  
Was both herself and Love.  
(All’s Well That Ends Well, I. iii. 209-213)  
 
This identification between renunciation of the body and Eros, between pure Dian and 
purified heavenly Venus, constitutes the foundation of Renaissance love theory. 
 
5.1.1.3. WHEN LOVE SPEAKS: DULLING THE SENSES, AWAKENING 
THE SPIRIT 
 
 Shakespeare sometimes seems to be posing the question “Can Dian be both 
herself and Love?” The answer appears to be affirmative in the comedies and romances, 
where harmony – celestial and/or earthly, spiritual and/or interpersonal – is ultimately 
achievable. 
“And when Love speaks, the voice of all the gods / Make heaven drowsy with the 
harmony,” pronounces Berowne in his ecstatic apology of Eros in Love’s Labor’s Lost. 
(IV. iii. 341-42) Frances Yates argues that the character of Berowne, Giordano Bruno’s 
namesake, must be “an echo of Bruno’s visit to England,” and that Berowne’s great 
speech on love is “an echo of the Spaccio della bestia trionfante, in which all the gods 
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speak in praise of love in one of the constellations.” (Yates 1964: 357) Jill Line 
comments that “this harmonious lullaby has a specific function in the ascent of Platonic 
love.” Love awakens the spirit, which now painfully desires to be united with the One, 
simultaneously putting to sleep the senses, the body, and the material world. Love does 
this by making its voice – the harmony uniting the entire cosmos – heard. (Line 2004: 48) 
Ficino envisions separate harmonies ordering separate planes of existence. The 
first one exists in the eternal mind of the One, and the second one, mirroring it, is the 
harmony of the gods and spheres. We heard this second one pre-existentially, before our 
unfortunate embodiment, but once in our bodies, we are no longer able to hear the voice 
of the gods. A third kind of harmony, mirroring the second, can fortunately be found in 
earthly music. In The Merchant of Venice, we witness Lorenzo and Jessica, the newly 
eloped lovers commencing their Platonic ascent of love, striving to hear the harmony of 
the spheres, but realizing that the “muddy vestures of decay” that now imprison them 
make this harmony inaccessible to them. This echoes Ficino’s lament that the soul, “as 
long as it is enclosed in the dark abode of the body,” can sadly “in no way reach that 
music” (Line 2004: 54) but also his belief that earthly music – which is the mirroring of 
the mirroring of divine harmony – can help awaken the spirit to the sounds of the more 
elevated levels of harmony and lead it towards its divine home. Lorenzo accordingly 
orders the musicians:  
 
Come, ho, and wake Diana with a hymn, 
With sweetest touches pierce your mistress’ ear 
And draw her home with music. 
(The Merchant of Venice, V. i. 66-68) 
 
Line observes that Lorenzo here identifies Jessica with Dian and wishes for her to 
be awakened to the harmony of celestial music so that her soul could be drawn to its 
divine home. (Line 2004: 54)  As she further elucidates, when “the soul is awakened the 
body is lulled into drowsiness.” The soul then commences its ascent, having been 
“opened to the world of the angelic mind, and the music of the gods is heard.” (Line 
2004: 58) 
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5.1.2. DIAN WAS BOTH HERSELF AND LOVE: PURE LOVE AS 
ASCENT IN SHAKESPEARE 
 
It is most commonly in the comedies and romances that ascent through pure love 
presents itself as a possibility, whereas in the tragedies and so-called “problem” plays, 
when it does appear as a prospect – which is not frequently the case – it is consistently 
undermined and problematized. 
Not surprisingly, the most complete example of a journey of ascent through love 
can be found in one of the comedies – the one already mentioned above. In The Merchant 
of Venice, through melancholy, renunciation, and sacrifice, ascent towards the heavenly 
sphere of Belmont is effected, facilitated by Portia cast in the role of heavenly Venus. 
The ascent project commences with Antonio’s sorrowful words: “In sooth, I know not 
why I am so sad.” This melancholy opening ushers in the Saturnian motifs which are so 
abundantly present in this play. We may want to remember that Saturn occupies the 
loftiest position in Ficino’s astrology, expounded in his De vita, and its influence can, 
among other activities, be courted “by sorrow,” (Ficino 1998: 295) which Antonio does, 
setting the tone for the entire quest.  
The quest for heavenly Portia necessitates the help of another person – Shylock 
the Jew. It is interesting to note that the Jews were also supposedly Saturnian, much like 
melancholics. (Hutton/Hedley 2008: 41) Antonio and Shylock, a melancholic and a Jew, 
both Saturnian, help lead Bassanio towards heavenly Portia.9 The lead casket leading to 
Portia is also distinctly Saturnian, as Ficino advises that in order to obtain “something 
from Saturn, we use any materials that are somewhat earthy, dusky and leaden.” (Ficino 
1998: 253) The lead casket certainly qualifies. Elsewhere, Ficino reiterates that lead is the 
metal of Saturn, as “the followers of Plato attribute gold to the Sun, silver to the Moon, 
lead to Saturn, electrum to Jupiter, iron and bronze to Mars, yellow copper to Venus, and 
                                               
9 Antonio and Shylock are connected in other ways as well: “As a homosexual man, Antonio is again 
linked with Shylock. In the Divina Commedia Dante placed usurers and sodomites in the same circle of 
hell, on the basis that both sins represented an “unnatural” way of doing a “natural” thing. It is natural to 
create wealth and prosper, but unnatural to make money breed money; it is natural for sexual opposites to 
combine in procreation, but unnatural for members of the same sex to combine in unproductive 
intercourse.” (Holderness 2010: 72) 
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tin to Mercury.” (Ficino 2006: 144) Bassanio decidedly chooses Saturnian influences for 
his quest. 
These Saturnian motifs help establish the Neoplatonic allegorical dimension of 
the quest for Portia. Saturn is, according to Ficino, the sole planetary influence that can 
aid one’s ascent towards the higher spiritual realms, as “spirit is […] always recalled by 
him from the outer to the innermost faculties and subjects and often from the lowest to 
the highest. For this reason he helps one contemplate the more secret and the higher 
subjects.” (Ficino 1998: 295) Ficino further explains Saturn’s influence:  
 
For Saturn has relinquished the ordinary life to Jupiter; but he claims for himself 
a life sequestered and divine. To the minds of those who are truly sequestered as much as 
possible, he is in a way friendly, as to his kinfolk. For Saturn himself is (to speak 
Platonically) in the place of Jupiter to the spirits inhabiting the sublime sphere, just as 
Jupiter is the helping father to people leading ordinary lives. […] Saturn has taken over 
the things which transcend the physical. (Ficino 1998: 365) 
 
Any pursuit undertaken under the auspices of Saturn is, according to Ficino, likely 
to transcend the physical and lead us back away from matter and, “via Saturnian 
Capricorn, the sign of contemplation, into the world, not just of the stars, but of light 
itself, whence originally we descended into the ever darkening, sublunar realms of 
generation and the elements.” (Hutton/Hedley 2008: 44) 
The presence of all these Saturnian motifs clearly indicates that the quest for 
Portia, the exalted virgin, sought by all, residing in heavenly Belmont, is not a mere 
marriage deal pursued solely for the substantial dowry, as was the case in Shakespeare’s 
source for the play.  
The writing in the lead casket reads: “Who chooseth me must give and hazard all 
he hath.” Those who have given and hazarded all they have, as Saturn instructs them to, 
are also rewarded. We may presume that Shylock, the Saturnian Jew, would have been 
amply rewarded as well, had he accepted Portia’s generous offer.  
Bassanio’s labors are rewarded by 
 
This house, these servants, and this same myself 
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Are yours – my lord's! – I give them with this ring 
Which when you part from, lose, or give away, 
Let it presage the ruin of your love. 
(The Merchant of Venice, III. ii. 170-173) 
 
This speech presages that, once again, all will have to be given and hazarded – 
only in the opposite direction – for a good cause. Bassanio parts with the ring as part of 
his efforts to save Antonio: 
 
Antonio, I am married to a wife 
Which is dear to me as life itself, 
But life itself, my wife, and all the world, 
Are not with me esteem’d above thy life. 
I would lose all, ay, sacrifice them all 
Here to this devil, to deliver you. 
(The Merchant of Venice, IV. i. 282-287) 
 
Significantly, although Portia feigns anger at the supposedly treacherous 
exchange, she gives the ring to Antonio to give back to Bassanio, which establishes a sort 
of a triadic marriage among them, reminiscent of the body-soul-spirit triad which is the 
trademark of all Platonic thought, but which has also been widely accepted into the 
orthodoxies. The allegorical interpretation of this triadic bond is in fact more reminiscent 
of orthodox Christian doctrine than of Platonic dualism. The soul sacrifices the body to 
attain to the spiritual, but then endangers the spiritual to save the body, finally binding all 
three together. All has been given and hazarded in both directions and Bassanio now has 
both Antonio and Portia with him in Belmont.  
Portia, the spiritual end of the quest and the heavenly savior figure to whom 
Antonio gratefully acknowledges: “Sweet lady, you have given me life and living,” (The 
Merchant of Venice, V. i. 286) explicitly self-identifies with Dian:  
 
If I live to be as old as Sibylla, 
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I will die as chaste as Diana, 
unless I be obtain’d by the manner of my father’s will.  
(The Merchant of Venice, I. ii. 106-108)  
 
The Neoplatonic moral of the story is clear: Dian must be chastely and 
sacrificially pursued until all the higher powers are satisfied. Bassanio has fulfilled all the 
requirements posed by Portia’s father to the letter. The lover must never be deluded into 
believing that bliss can be found by pursuing the bodily beauty of any actual woman – 
and this world offers ample opportunities for being deluded. When he chooses the right 
casket, Bassanio discovers in it Portia’s portrait – aptly referred to as her “counterfeit” – 
which then leads him to the real Portia. Narcissus gazing at the reflection of a beautiful 
form has here been led to its true source. Only when these conditions are met will the 
lover be allowed to ascend to the higher spiritual spheres. 
 Romances also offer examples of successful ascents aided by spiritually elevated, 
purely virginal female figures. The pure and heavenly Imogen, who has, although 
married, significantly not yet consummated her marriage, saves both her husband 
Posthumus and her father Cymbeline, collecting, along the way, her missing brothers, 
like so many Platonic sparks of light lost in the cave. Miranda is similarly entrusted with 
a double task as a heavenly savior figure in The Tempest. Her father Prospero, on the one 
hand, attributes his salvation to her, describing her in angelic terms:  
 
O, a cherubin 
Thou wast that did preserve me. Thou didst smile,  
Infused with a fortitude from heaven.  
(The Tempest, I. ii. 152-154)  
 
Her devoted admirer Ferdinand, on the other hand, behaves like the textbook courtly 
lover or follower of Renaissance love theory. Inspired by his heavenly unattainable 
mistress, he patiently bears his imprisonment, happily performs menial tasks, and is thus 
purified and perfected in order to be made worthy of her, as per Prospero’s orders. His 
situation, not accidentally, resembles Bassanio’s in The Merchant of Venice, and he 
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similarly gratefully completes all the steps necessitated by his ascent trajectory towards 
his heavenly Venus, all the while singing her praises:  
 
The mistress which I serve quickens what’s dead,  
And makes my labors pleasures.  
(The Tempest, III. i. 6-7)  
 
Pericles’ almost supernaturally pure daughter Marina is explicitly linked with 
Dian via her devotion to the goddess:  
 
One twelve moons more she’ll wear Diana’s livery;  
This by the eye of Cynthia hath she vowed,  
And on her virgin honor will not break it. 
(Pericles, II. v. 10-12)  
 
As the designated heavenly Venus of the play, she remains impervious and untouched in 
the brothel – the nether point of her immaculate descent into the depths of the material 
world, akin to that of a docetic Christ figure – illuminating, instead, the way up to all the 
men she comes into contact with and converting even the most hardened sinners, such as 
Lysimachus. It is said of her that “she’s able to freeze the god Priapus” (Pericles, IV. vi. 
3) and that “she would make a puritan of the devil.” (Pericles, IV. vi. 10) 
These instances of pure Dians and heavenly Venuses, leading the heroes upwards 
along a neatly linear Platonic scale of perfection, yielded by the comedies and the 
romances, can serve to put in relief their counterparts appearing in the tragedies and the 
“problem” plays. In the latter, when such female figures do appear, they are seldom 
unambiguous and unproblematic. Even when they contain female characters which are 
immaculately virginal and conform to the image of Dian/heavenly Venus in every way, 
ascent does not readily present itself as an option in those “darker” plays.  
Despite having the aid of his pure and exalted daughter Cordelia, whom he 
tellingly calls “a soul in bliss” and “a spirit,” Lear fails at what Cymbeline and Prospero 
achieve. He does not unproblematically ascend to a higher spiritual state, having 
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reconciled himself to his world and purified it of evil. If he does undergo a personal 
transformation, which is debatable, it is one that has him traveling in the direction 
opposite to “up,” of which more will be said later.  
It is similarly clear that Othello’s beloved Desdemona is heavenly Venus, and 
Cassio appears to understand it best, describing her as 
  
 a maid 
That paragons description and wild fame; 
One that excels the quirks of blazoning pens, 
And in th’ essential vesture of creation 
Does tire the [ingener]. 
(Othello, II. i. 61-65) 
 
It is also Cassio, apparently the most typical devotee of the goddess in the play, 
who interprets the safe passage of her ship through tempestuous waters as a sign of her 
exalted spiritual status: 
 
Tempests themselves, high seas, and howling winds, 
The gutter’d rocks and congregated sands, 
Traitors ensteep’d to enclog the guiltless keel, 
As having sense of beauty, do omit 
Their mortal natures, letting go safely by 
The divine Desdemona. 
(Othello, II. i. 68-73) 
 
The “divine” Desdemona passes unscathed through the tempestuous waters, much 
like Marina remains untouched in the carnal depths of the brothel. This safe passage 
through the chaotic seas serves a double purpose in according Desdemona her elevated 
role. Philippa Berry rightly notes that the scene of Desdemona’s arrival reminds us of 
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mythical accounts of Venus’ emergence from the sea onto the island and of the Orphic 
notion of Love’s birth from Chaos. For Desdemona’s arrival is seemingly a second birth 
of Venus; the courtly Cassio speaks of ‘the divine Desdemona’, greeting her on his knees, 
and references elsewhere in this scene to Desdemona as ‘Our great captain’s captain’ and 
Othello’s ‘fair warrior’ further remind us of the myth of Venus’ union with Mars, the god 
of war, as a result of which she was sometimes figured with his attributes, as an armed 
Venus. (Berry 2002: 96) 
 
The link between Desdemona and Venus is clear enough. What does not always 
seem as clear, especially in Othello’s Iago-induced increasingly dualistic mode of 
thought, is where to situate her in the heavenly/earthly dichotomy insisted upon in 
Neoplatonism. The arrival scene, at least, should put his mind at ease, as it firmly links 
Desdemona with the loftier and purer aspect of the goddess. It is heavenly Venus who is 
exalted above the material waters and who can never be affected by them.  
It is the Virgin Mary, however, who is traditionally attributed with the ability to 
tame the tempestuous waters of the sea, aiding seafarers in their precarious journeys. 
Portia notably exhibits this capacity when she miraculously retrieves Antonio’s ships, 
purportedly lost at sea. Desdemona similarly shows herself capable of commanding the 
watery element. It is again Cassio who appears to notice the connection, when he 
addresses Desdemona with the salute traditionally reserved for the Virgin Mary: “Hail to 
thee, lady!” (Othello, II. i. 85) We may wish to recall that in Measure for Measure the 
exalted virgin Isabel is greeted similarly by Lucio:  
 
Hail, virgin, if you be, as those cheek-roses  
Proclaim you are no less.  
(Measure for Measure, I. iv. 16-17) 
 
Cleopatra is perhaps the most ambiguous and problematic heroine in 
Shakespeare’s world. One of her aspects, though, quite clearly fulfils the role of heavenly 
Venus, exalting her devotees above the common sphere. In one of her imaginary 
escapades, she fancies herself fishing and conversing with the fish she catches:  
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as I draw them up,  
I’ll think them every one an Antony,  
And say: “Ah, ha! y’ are caught.”  
(Antony and Cleopatra, II. v. 13-15)  
 
If this sounds more than a little eerie, that is certainly no accident, but we must also 
remember Ficino’s image wherein the soul, captivated by the beauty of the beloved, “is 
drawn upward as by a hook.” (Line 2004: 95) One way of interpreting the imaginary 
fishing scene is to see Cleopatra as heavenly Venus who draws Antony’s soul upward “as 
by a hook.” After all, in her dream she exalts Emperor Antony into a divinity and later 
praises him as one whose  
 
delights  
Were dolphin-like, they show’d his back above  
The element they liv’d in.  
(Antony and Cleopatra, V. ii. 82-90)  
 
We must conclude that it is – at least to a degree – she who has drawn him up above the 
watery element. 
Unlike the comedies and romances, Shakespeare’s tragedies and problem plays 
cannot boast many unproblematically chaste Dians and heavenly Venuses. When such 
female figures do appear in these darker plays, they nevertheless fail to effect an 
unambiguous journey of spiritual ascent in their male devotees, which will be discussed 
in greater detail later.  
 
5.2. THE NARCISSISTIC EROS OF DUALISM 
 
Chaste Dians and heavenly Venuses serve to inspire the heroic lover’s ascent to 
the spiritual realm through dualistic erotic love. The smitten lover is expected to patiently 
accept the incessant suffering that his desire for the unattainable Dian brings and through 
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this suffering allow himself to be, in Ficino’s phrase, “drawn upward as by a hook” by 
her. 
Disembodied and disembodying, the anagogic female figure of Renaissance 
Neoplatonism is not merely an idealized version of an object of erotic desire – she is both 
more and less than that. As a purely spiritual representation of divine love drawing the 
lover upwards towards his own true divine self, she is conceivably “more” than a 
depiction of any actual woman, however alluringly idealized. On the other hand, as a 
reflection of the male lover’s own divine essence, she is arguably “less” than any 
representation of anyone or anything that would be truly Other to him.  
Plotinus and Ficino, we might recall here, praised Narcissus for becoming 
enamored of his own divine face and only reproached him for mistakenly seeking it in 
what we can presume is the material body of an actual person. Neoplatonic 
interpretations of the Narcissus myth thus legitimized precisely what is narcissistic in 
Narcissus’ situation: falling for the image of himself reflected in the Other, instead of 
falling for the Other herself – which they simultaneously delegitimized. 
The significance of this cannot be overemphasized. This distinction could well be 
the differentia specifica of Neoplatonic Eros as opposed to Christian Agape, as has 
already been noted by Anders Nygren in his seminal book Agape and Eros. According to 
Nygren, Christian salvation is rooted in Agape – “brotherly” love that created human 
beings can foster for each other and their Creator – whereas dualistic redemption is 
driven by the alluring magnetic Eros of the divine image reflected in the material world. 
(Mitchell 2006: 27) 
In more orthodox versions of Christianity – as well as mainstream Judaism and 
Islam – God always remains Other to His creation, and His creatures similarly always 
remain Other to each other. The Agape that may unite them is always the love of the 
Other as Other. The Eros of dualism, conversely, is love of the same because it is the 
same, as it is the divine essence identical to our own that we seek in natural beauty, other 
beautiful beings, and, finally, God. As Nygren asserts in Agape and Eros: “Ficino’s love 
is fundamentally self-love, of God for Himself, of us for ourselves in the others, and in 
God.” (Devereux 1969: 162) Ficino’s Eros is, quite simply put, narcissistic.  
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This is a logical consequence of the Neoplatonic conception of emanation and 
return that Ficino adopted. The human mind emerges into the human soul from the divine 
mind, which it simultaneously has as its final aim. The soul thus takes part in the circle of 
divine emanation. (Allen 2002: 49). Parallel circular patterns of emanation and return 
exist in the procession of divine love and divine beauty as well. Divine love emanates 
from God and returns to Him, manifesting itself in the soul as a desire for beauty, which 
it first perceives through the bodily senses, but ultimately becomes enchanted with the 
divine origin of all beauty itself. Divine beauty likewise proceeds from God, presents 
itself to embodied souls, and returns to itself as their ignited love. Human love is the 
reaction of the soul to the inspiration of beauty and therefore has both its origin and its 
aim in God. (Allen 2002: 62) 
Desire and love are thus in fact created by the alienation of the soul which is a 
direct result of its embodiment. (Shaw 1995: 80) The desperate tension caused by the 
soul’s separation from its own divine source is what makes love possible. Being 
separated from itself through the existence of material bodies containing it, the divine 
essence can now experience Eros as a desire for itself. (Shaw 1995: 124) The soul’s 
embodiment thus becomes the sine qua non of its ascent, just like, as Plato explains in the 
Symposium, the separation of the lover from the beloved is the sine qua non of their 
attraction and ultimate unification. (Shaw 1995: 125) Love in the Neoplatonic erotic 
discourse can therefore be defined as a desire for the separated sameness, instead of as a 
desire for the beloved otherness. In Lauster’s phrase, “the soul loves its own idea in God 
and God loves in the soul an idea of itself.” (Allen 2002: 66)  
In order to illustrate this circle of emanation and return more lucidly, Ficino also 
uses Platonic metaphors of light, according to which a ray of the divine spirit – the 
human mind – descends into the soul, and from there ascends again back to God, 
reflected, making the soul, in a way, “the mirror of God.” (Allen 2002: 49). 
These figures of the soul as a mirror of God and divinely inspired love as a 
mirroring of the divine, both firmly in keeping with the Neoplatonic interpretations of the 
Narcissus myth, are no accidental occurrences in Ficino’s Neoplatonic system. 
Neoplatonic Eros as a narcissistic love of the same is explicitly expounded in his 
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consistent usage of metaphors of love as a mirroring of the beloved. In a letter to his 
beloved Cavalcanti, Ficino confesses:  
 
“It is well known with what pleasure all men, even little men, admire their own 
image in mirrors. But a friend sees deep in a friend not merely his own image, but his 
very self. For even though I certainly seem beautiful within, in stature I am a little man, 
thin and short. Yet in the human mirror descended from God, whence I have loved, I 
have seen myself these twenty-five years as first manifest: the first among men and not a 
dwarf.” (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 188) 
 
The “human mirror descended from God” is here, as may have been easily 
surmised, the young Cavalcanti himself. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 188) 
The mirrorings that different Neoplatonic heroic lovers may receive from their 
different objects of desire are not necessarily identical. For instance, Ficino’s beautiful 
human forms appear to be those of slender young males, whereas Bruno’s are 
unapologetically those of nubile females, which is in accordance with their respective 
tastes. The calm, almost timid, and “stubborn-chaste” homoerotic mysticism of Ficino is 
greatly dissimilar to the wild heteroerotic “furors” of Giordano Bruno. What is constant is 
their insistence that the anagogic figures that inspire ascent in the lover mirror back to 
him his own divine essence.  
The mechanisms of homoerotic and heteroerotic mystical love theories are not 
identical, but both, as I hope to show, are resolutely misogynist and decidedly inimical to 
actual human women – only in somewhat differing ways. 
 
5.2.1. HOMOEROTIC DUALISTIC LOVE 
 
5.2.1.1. THE HUMAN MIRROR DESCENDED FROM GOD 
 
Homoerotic ideology, arguably, forms the original basis of idealistic erotic love. 
Plato’s Symposium seems to take it for granted that it is a male beloved that will serve as 
a worthy mirror of the divine for a spiritually uplifted and intellectual lover, and heavenly 
Aphrodite is represented in it as decidedly masculine. “Socratic” of “Platonic” love, 
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before its meaning was forever transformed in the Renaissance, could for quite some time 
refer simply to male homosexual relations. 
De Rougemont notes that courtly poets often gave to their Lady the masculine 
title of mi dons or senhor. Sufi mystical poets, who were, apparently, both notoriously 
homosexual and simultaneously more interested in addressing the divine than any mere 
human being, accordingly did the same. De Rougemont consequently argues that 
homosexuality was in these poetic-cum-mystical traditions a “religious symbol as much 
as or more than it was the translation of human relations.” (De Rougemont 1983: 98-99) 
It was the male beloved that could best serve as a mirror of both the divine One and the 
divine spark of the One within the devoted male lover.  
Ficino’s De amore famously has an explicit homoerotic orientation, consistently 
depicting love as a “desire that is excited in the minds of men when they behold the 
beauty of other men.” (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 184) This beauty is, in reality, the 
“divine brilliance which shines in the beauteous man as though in a mirror.” (Line 2004: 
95) Women are, significantly, thus completely absent from the foundational text of 
Renaissance love theory. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 184) This, of course, makes perfect 
sense: women are traditionally associated with the material and the carnal, and it is away 
from those very impurities and towards the pristine male spirit that dualistic Eros 
purports to lead.  
Psychoanalytic treatments of Hamlet have (not surprisingly, as psychoanalysis 
itself is based both on Plato and on Shakespeare) read Hamlet’s love for his father in 
idealistic homoerotic terms. Ernst Jones argued in the original 1910 version of the essay 
later included in his Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis (in which he then limited himself 
to reading Hamlet as only in love with his mother) that Hamlet demonstrates towards his 
father “mirror-love” – an aspect of the psychoanalytic view of homosexuality – which 
would mean that Old Hamlet is Hamlet’s own ideal of himself. (Armstrong P. 2006: 328) 
Old Hamlet apparently personally demands to be Hamlet’s ideal of himself. Linda 
Charnes argues in “The Hamlet formerly known as Prince” that the Ghost’s 
commandment “remember me” reveals a  
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profoundly disturbing fantasy at the heart of patrimonial culture […] a fantasy of keeping 
one’s essence pure, without the contamination of Otherness, a dream of exercising in 
perpetuity one’s undivided will by eradicating the difference that literally conceives and 
constitutes succession. To be a first-born son under primogeniture is one thing; to bear 
the father’s name is a doubly derivative legacy that leaves little room for any kind of 
autonomy. (Grady 2002: 200-201)  
 
She further asserts that, bound by his father to enact his will without actually 
succeeding him on the throne, Hamlet becomes what is known in psychoanalysis as a 
“scissoid replicant – a creature meant to go perpetually from the one to the same.” Thus 
“Remember me” means “remember only me,” while “the maternal body is effaced from 
the replicant relation.” Old Hamlet, spiritual and sublime, will only live “within the book 
and volume” of Hamlet’s brain if the son, in Charnes’ phrase, “agrees to be the father’s 
clone.” (Grady 2002: 201) The material part of Hamlet, received in his mother’s body, is 
to be discarded and forgotten, and only his father’s spirit is to live on in him “unmix’d 
with baser matter.” 
That the father-son relationship can be read in idealistic homoerotic terms is 
substantiated in the words which Hamlet uses to describe his eager desire to hear his 
father’s secret:   
 
Haste me to know’t, that I with wings as swift  
As meditation, or the thoughts of love,  
May sweep to my revenge.  
(Hamlet, I. v. 29-31)  
 
Fulfilling the father’s command is explicitly associated with “the thought of 
love,” leading Belsey to believe that there is a strong suggestion of “heroic passion” – the 
same erotic frenzies or heroic furors that Ficino and Bruno attributed to those lovers 
purely desiring the divine reflected in an ideal(ized) beloved – at work in Hamlet when 
he approaches his ideal(ized) and spiritual(ized) father. (Belsey 2008: 150-151)  
Whether seen through the lens of psychoanalysis or Neoplatonic love theory, 
Hamlet’s passionate love for the spiritually represented father whose name he bears is a 
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mirror-love of the same for same which impels Hamlet to discard the Other of the mother 
– and, subsequently and consequently, the Other of Ophelia as well.  
 
5.2.1.2. THOU NEVER SHOULD’ST LOVE WOMAN LIKE TO ME: 
HOMOEROTIC FIGURES IN SHAKESPEARE  
 
Ficino seems to have been certain that such exalted philosophers as Socrates and 
Plato could not possibly have associated true love and sexual desire in any way. As he 
elucidates in De amore, “the desire for coitus and love are shown to be not only not the 
same motions, but opposite.” Ficino further warns:  
 
No name which is suitable for God is common with sinful things. Therefore 
anyone who is of sound mind ought to be careful lest he heedlessly apply the term love, a 
divine name, to foolish perturbations.” (De amore I, 4, cited in Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 
186) 
 
Hanegraaff nevertheless argues that this does not mean that the homoeroticism of De 
amore can be dismissed as an issue that is irrelevant to what Ficino means by “love.” 
(Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 186) As he notes, Ficino has certainly been claimed for the 
history of homosexuality in most of the recent works belonging to queer theory. 
(Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 184) 
The very sentiment seems to have been much more ideologically acceptable in the 
Renaissance precisely because of its Platonic associations and the notion, agreeable to a 
dualistically imbued culture, that homoerotic stirrings in a male lover, because they are 
not geared towards procreation and because they are directed towards an equally male 
and thus equally spiritual beloved, are consequently of a more exalted and spiritual nature 
than heteroerotic ones.  
This was certainly thinkable and thought in Elizabethan England. For instance, as 
Rackin notes, in Edmund Spenser’s Shepheardes Calender (1579), in a gloss to the 
January eclogue, the writer of the marginal note “E.K.” argues, based on classical 
tradition, that “paederastice is much to be preferred before gynerastice” because, contrary 
to “the love which enflameth men with lust toward woman kind,” male homoerotic love 
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could be purely spiritual. To support his claim, he gives the example of Socrates’ love for 
Alcibiades, whose object was, according to him, not his body, but “hys soule, which is 
Alcybiades owne selfe.” (Rackin 2005: 103-104)  
Sinfield conjectures that a “same-gender coterie” could well have flourished at or 
very near the court of Queen Elizabeth, involving or focused on the Earl of Southampton, 
and around the theaters as well, which the earl who was notoriously reluctant to marry 
frequented, socializing with the Platonically inclined actors and playwrights. (Sinfield 
2006: 28) 
Burgess speculates on this subject in his biography of Shakespeare: 
 
If Southampton would not marry, it might have been not only because he wished 
to enjoy bachelor freedom, but because he had a distaste for women – temporary only, 
perhaps a pose assumed by others of his circle. To have catamites or kiss and clip the 
male friends of one’s own age would be accounted a kind of chic Platonism. […] the 
Southampton set inclined to a mixture of the Bedouin encampment, the well-appointed 
monastery, and the Hellenic agape, during the period of Will’s initiation into the joys of 
aristocratic life. Will would not be shocked by homosexuality: he may have been inclined 
to it himself: he was, after all, a member of the theatrical profession. The sexual 
orientation of Elizabethan actors may have been influenced by the fact of boys taking 
women’s parts and taking them well. Will certainly took well to the laudation of male 
beauty. If it was the pose of the self-seeker, it was a pose not hard to assume and sustain. 
(Burgess 1970: 113-114)  
 
“A kind of chic Platonism” seems like an apt description for the general 
ideological stance towards homoeroticism in Elizabethan England, but Burgess is also 
right in noting that homoerotic sentiments are in Shakespeare’s work expressed with 
particular ease and earnestness. 
Shakespeare changes his sources to accommodate strong homoerotic passions in 
his misogynist heroes. For instance, in Cinthio’s account Iago falls in love with 
Disdemona, (Muir 1956: 124) while in Shakespeare’s version he is a misogynist 
disgusted by all women. A ritual “wedding” takes place between the two men, united in 
their disgust for Desdemona in particular and whorish womanhood in general, wherein 
Othello and Iago vow to revenge together, and Iago promises: “I am your own forever.” 
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(Othello, III. iii. 480) This is strangely reminiscent of Hamlet’s own vow to revenge 
made to his father in a homoerotic furor additionally fueled by his disgust at female 
carnality. 
Similarly, there is nothing in Shakespeare’s sources for Coriolanus that would 
really suggest the effusive homoerotic speech (Muir 1956: 219) that Shakespeare’s 
Aufidius addresses to Coriolanus:  
 
I lov’d the maid I married; never man 
Sigh’d truer breath; but that I see thee here, 
Thou noble thing, more dances my rapt heart 
Than when I first my wedded mistress saw 
Bestride my threshold. 
(Coriolanus, IV. v. 114-118)  
 
As a Volscian soldier notes, “Our general himself makes a mistress of him.” (Coriolanus, 
IV. v. 194-195) The two men are united in their enmity towards the female-gendered 
Rome. 
Sinfield asserts that it is now widely recognized that the Antonio characters in The 
Merchant of Venice and Twelfth Night are in love with Bassanio and Sebastian 
respectively, in scenarios reminiscent of the situation represented in Shakespeare’s 
sonnets. (Sinfield 2006: 14) 
In Twelfth Night, the amorous Duke says to the still cross-dressed Viola:  
 
Boy, thou hast said to me a thousand times 
Thou never should’st love woman like to me. 
[…] Give me thy hand, 
And let me see thee in thy woman’s weeds. 
(Twelfth Night, V. i. 2469-2475) 
 
As Jardine notes, the 
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afterthought of “let me see thee in thy woman’s weeds” reminds the reader (as an 
audience does not need to be reminded) that this social rite of betrothal is performed by 
two “men,” and is thus, as ritual, unseemly and troubling. (Jardine 2005: 72)  
 
It should likewise be noted that an Elizabethan audience had the privilege of witnessing 
this betrothal performed between two actual men – no quotation marks needed – on 
Shakespeare’s stage, as the role of Viola would have been performed by a young male, 
dressed at that point in a young male’s clothes. The question should also be posed as to 
just how unseemly and troubling this ritual would have been to a Platonically inclined 
Elizabethan audience.  
The doubly cross-dressed boy actor, especially when shown as the object of erotic 
love, carried his Platonic symbolic significance, and thus, as Sinfield persuasively argues, 
“became a familiar motif, not in spite of its erotic potential, but because of it.” (Sinfield 
2006: 120) 
 
5.2.1.3. EVEN IN THE LOVELY GARNISH OF A BOY: THE CROSS-
DRESSING HEROINE OR THE DOUBLY CROSS-DRESSED BOY ACTOR 
 
One notable example is that of Lorenzo who, when he sees his beloved Jessica 
cross-dressed, seems positively delighted: “Descend, for you must be my torch-bearer 
[…] Even in the lovely garnish of a boy.” (The Merchant of Venice, II. vi. 40, 45) It is 
also interesting to note that the rest of the imagery in this scene is befitting for a spiritual 
anagogic figure who must “descend” in order to lead her devotee by showing him the 
way with her light as a “torch-bearer.” 
The cross-dressing heroines in Shakespeare seem to serve another important 
function. As Kimbrough notices, of the seven examples of girl-into-boy disguise in 
Shakespeare (Julia, Portia, Nerissa, Jessica, Rosalind, Viola, and Imogen) the last one is 
the most typical of Elizabethan stage-practice: Imogen’s disguise in Cymbeline is used to 
help her flee the increasingly hostile court and to protect her from attack while she is on 
the road. (Kimbrough 1982: 21) Other heroines do not seem to have pressing reasons to 
wear boys’ clothes, but still do so with impunity in an age when there certainly were 
those who would have judged them harshly for it.  
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Not only do they, in Hamlet’s phrase, “escape calumny,” but these heroines are 
arguably the least problematically positive female characters Shakespeare has produced. 
One is hard pressed to find other heroines in Shakespeare’s entire opus that are as 
unambiguously noble, pure, and virtuous as these seven. The only good woman, 
apparently, is a boy dressed as a boy. It might be worth remembering that many critics 
have praised Shakespeare for his depiction of intelligent, witty, resourceful, virtuous 
female figures, but that it is usually these boys dressed as boys that they have in fact 
referred to. In the darker comedies and the tragedies, there is no cross-dressing, and 
hence no unproblematic females.  
Sinfield somewhat caustically observes that “femininity may appear more 
acceptable in the guise of a boy.” (Sinfield 2006: 103) He notes that women, who could 
bear children and thus affect “lineage, alliance and property,” posed great dangers to the 
“social order and the male psyche,” and were therefore not employed as actresses, as they 
were in Spain and Italy. Although boys were indubitably also erotically exciting, “that 
was less threatening than the eroticism of women.” (Sinfield 2006: 61) 
Whether the cross-dressing heroines – in effect boys dressed as boys – in 
Shakespeare’s theater are meant to depict idealized homoerotic passion or passion for 
idealized women deprived of the trappings of their femininity, and thus purely spiritual, 
is not of vital importance. Both options belie a misogynist ideology informing them.    
 
5.2.1.4. FRIENDSHIP vs. LOVE: HOMOSOCIAL FIGURES IN 
SHAKESPEARE 
 
In order to be misogynist and dismissive of women, characters do not have to feel 
a homoerotic passion we would nowadays categorize as homosexual. Even in firmly 
heterosexual settings, the homosocial relationship between men takes precedence over 
any male’s relationship with any woman.  
This is notoriously what happens in the ending of The Two Gentlemen of Verona, 
when Valentine offers his beloved to his friend. The theme is a common one, appearing 
also in Elyot’s tale of Titus and Gisippus, and in James Shirley’s play The Traitor (1631). 
(Sinfield 2006: 96) Wilson reminds that “the friendship that is ready to sacrifice love 
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itself on the altar of its ideal is a commonplace of the Renaissance.” (Wilson 1933: 59-
60)  
The question, of course, is whether carnal passion for women and/or a marriage 
geared towards procreation and the furthering of lineage could rightly be termed “love” 
among the more enlightened males in Platonic Renaissance circles. They would have 
been more likely to be viewed as filthy lechery or, at best, inferior liaisons existing solely 
for the relatively low purpose of creating progeny. Bach notes that only low-ranking 
characters in Shakespeare are shown to be slaves of sexual desire, while noble and truly 
masculine men instead opt for higher pursuits and male company. (Bach 2007: 5) 
Homosocial relationships, even amongst those who are married or otherwise entangled 
with women, are seen as decidedly superior. (Bach 2007: 8) 
Formerly Manichean Augustine believed that God should have created a male 
companion to Adam for the sake of friendship and intellectual conversation and Cicero 
argued that a man’s friend was his equal, while his wife was his subordinate, which made 
one’s friends exponentially more valuable and significant than one’s lowly wife. (Sinfield 
2006: 94)  Hamlet seems to take this kind of reasoning seriously and consequently, as 
Sinfield notes, 
 
repudiates Ophelia and excoriates Gertrude, while prizing Horatio for his rejection of 
feminine interference. Since Hamlet’s soul “was mistress of her choice,” she has 
preferred Horatio. (Sinfield 2006: 94-95) 
 
If marriage has any real worth in this value system, it is to connect the males 
involved. In Julius Caesar, Antony’s marriage to Octavia is intended to effect a male 
bond between Antony and Caesar: 
 
To hold you in perpetuall amitie  
To make you Brothers, and to knit your hearts  
With an vn-slipping knot. 
(Julius Caesar, II. ii. 835-837) 
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That Shakespeare took the theme of homosocial friendship vs. heterosexual marriage 
seriously is indicated by the wording he chooses to employ above, arguably much more 
emphatic than the possible original in the Countess of Pembroke’s translation of 
Garnier’s Marc Antoine: “for knitting a straiter bond of amitie betweene them.” (Muir 
1956: 208) Compared with Garnier’s, Shakespeare’s verses sound as if the marriage is 
being contracted between the men themselves. 
Some critics, notably Coppélia Kahn and Janet Adelman, have attempted to 
explain away the strong homosocial/homoerotic strand in Shakespeare in 
heteronormative, psychoanalytic terms, as an adolescent phase on the way towards the 
truly mature, adult ideal of a heterosexual marriage. Sinfield persuasively argues that 
various Renaissance texts show that male bonding of different sorts in the Renaissance 
cannot “so easily be accommodated.” He goes on to assert that  
 
the misogyny of early-modern society, so far from abating in recognition of the crucial 
role women must play in continuing the family line, was intensified by male resentment 
at such necessary enthrallment to the female and the married state. (Sinfield 2006: 94-95)  
 
This misogyny is arguably Platonically dualistic in its metaphysics and in ideology. 
 
5.2.1.5. UNEAR’D WOMB: WOMEN ARE FOR PROCREATION 
 
This necessary enthrallment to the female and the married state is the entire worth 
women are accorded in a large number of Renaissance texts. Ficino notably states – on 
the rare occasions when it crosses his mind that women might somehow be beautiful to 
some men – that the only function of this beauty is to impel men to procreate “handsome 
offspring.” Female beauty thus squarely belongs to the domain of “vulgar Venus,” while 
the more exalted spiritual love under the reign of “heavenly Venus” is, despite the 
goddess’ female identity, exclusively the province of men. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 185) 
This is the situation we encounter in Shakespeare’s Sonnets. The poetic subject’s 
initial project is to persuade the Boy to produce offspring. Sinfield observes that the 
“Poet’s commendations of procreation involve hardly any reference to the pleasures of 
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marriage and cross-gender intercourse.” He can only envisage “an instrumental and rather 
coarse” role that the imagined woman is to play:  
 
For where is she so fair whose unear’d womb 
Disdains the tillage of thy husbandry? 
(Sonnet 3) 
 
She is further spoken of as “some vial” for the Boy’s “treasure,” and in Sonnet 16 the 
Poet muses on the “maiden gardens, yet unset,” which would gladly “bear your living 
flowers.” The metaphors used are hardly flattering. In the last line, significantly, the Poet 
warns that women are allowed to have sexual intercourse and progeny with the Boy and 
are welcome to his sperm. The Poet, however, is keeping his “love.” (Sinfield 2006: 167-
168) 
 
5.2.2. HETEROEROTIC DUALISTIC LOVE 
 
5.2.2.1. THE DISEMBODIED FEMALE 
 
It is at some point during the Renaissance that Platonic love forever changed its 
meaning. From Plato’s and Ficino’s homoerotic idealized infatuation, it was transformed 
into a decidedly heteroerotic passion but significantly retained its exalted and idealized 
purely spiritual status. Three texts in particular played a critical role in this 
transformation. 
The most influential was, arguably, Cardinal Pietro Bembo’s Gli Asolani (1505), 
thought of as the prototype of the courtly Neoplatonic treatise, which presents Ficino’s 
theories in resolutely heteroerotic terms with recognizable influences of Dante and 
Petrarch. Leone Ebreo published his exceedingly popular Dialoghi d’Amore, also firmly 
founded on Ficino but centered on female beauty, around the same time. A third central 
text, the Cortegiano of Baldassare Castiglione, written about a decade later, exalts the 
pure love of spiritually inclined men for beautiful women, in a fashion that makes it a 
model case of the new and improved “Platonic love,” all its old and new stereotypes 
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included. These ideas, widely disseminated and poetically interpreted, eventually resulted 
in a genuine cult of the divine beauty of woman. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 195-196) 
In apparent contrast both to Ficino’s firmly homoerotic De amore and his many 
successors’ exaltations of women, whose bodily and spiritual beauty was worshipped as a 
reflection of the divine, Bruno’s De gli eroici furori, as Hanegraaff notes, is “clearly 
heterosexual but also shockingly misogynist.” (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 197) A small 
sampling of the text suffices to illustrate this: 
 
It is truly […] the work of a low, animal, filthy nature to have made oneself the 
constant admirer, and to have fixed a solicitous attachment upon or around the beauty of 
a woman’s body. Good God! What more vile and ignoble sight […] than a man, 
brooding, afflicted, tormented, sorry, melancholy; who waxes now cold, now hot, now 
boiling, now trembling, now pale, now blushing, now in a pose of perplexity, now in the 
act of decisiveness […] What tragicomedy, what act, I say, more deserving of pity and 
laughter […] than these subjugated men rendered pensive, contemplative, constant, 
steadfast, faithful, lovers, devotees, adorers and slaves of a thing without faith, bereft of 
all constancy, destitute of all intelligence, empty of all merit, void of any 
acknowledgement or gratitude, where no more sense, intellect or goodness are to be 
obtained than might be found in a statue or an image painted on a wall? (From the 
Introduction, cited in Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 198) 
 
He goes on to deride both women in general as disgusting “things” and “monsters” and 
their male admirers as pathetic fools and idiots. In Bruno’s paraphrasing of the Gospel 
injunction, “what belongs to Caesar should be rendered unto Caesar, and what belongs to 
God should be rendered unto God.” What he means is that one might appreciate the 
minor qualities that women have – without which they would be “more useless than a 
poisonous toadstool” – but one should certainly not admire them for themselves, let alone 
worship them. The true lover is really tormented by a “heroic” passion for the divine, not 
by a foolish passion for an actual – disgusting and monstrous – woman. 
(Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 198-199)  
Bruno is here only explicitly stating the misogyny already implicit in the tradition 
of the idealized female beloved. As has been noted, the worship of an ideal and spiritual, 
disembodied and disembodying, female beloved, was not only not incompatible with 
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misogyny, but in fact fully consistent with it. Rackin sees this misogyny as an integral 
part of the Petrarchan tradition. Both Petrarch’s Laura and the ladies celebrated in 
subsequent sonnet sequences modeled upon her were, in her view, idealized, but also 
“objectified and dehumanized”:  
 
Because the Petrarchan lady was fair, her beauty could be compared to the light of 
heavenly bodies or at the very least to precious earthly objects such as gold and pearls. 
Because she was unattainable, she could represent a Neoplatonic ideal and the lover’s 
passion could be sublimated into self-transcendence. Some of the ladies may have truly 
had those attributes; some of the poets (along with their readers) may have sought out 
ladies who had them; many of the poets undoubtedly constructed their ladies out of whole 
cloth. None of this really matters: what was important was the attributes, not the ladies. 
(Rackin 2005: 96)  
 
For Rackin, the misogyny inherent in worshipping the heavenly Petrarchan lady, 
while simultaneously – as Petrarch himself did in his misogynist satires – rebuking actual 
human women who naturally fell short, is virtually indistinguishable from the misogyny 
of Shakespeare’s later sonnets, in which the Dark Lady is introduced and also exposed as 
being the exact opposite of the Petrarchan ideal: “Dark rather than fair, she is also lustful 
rather than chaste; and instead of inspiring the poet to spiritual elevation, she degrades 
him in shameful lust.” Shakespeare contrasts his portraits of “a beautiful, unattainable 
young man and a dark, promiscuous woman” and depicts her in firmly corporeal terms, 
defying the Neoplatonic conventions of favoring sight over the other senses, and instead 
focusing on her “reeking” breath. (Rackin 2005: 100) As Nordlund sharply notices, 
Shakespeare “satirized Petrarch and yet shared a good deal of his ambivalence.” 
(Nordlund 2007: 48) 
 
5.2.2.2. THE MIRRORING FEMALE 
 
The ideal female beloved, sharply contrasted with actual human women, thus had 
to be fully disembodied and stripped of all remnants of her femininity and humanity – as 
they were defined in the dualistic traditions which produced the figure. As Berry 
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observes, “when supernatural or spiritual powers began to be attributed to a female object 
of desire, there was an attempt to erase all traces of active sexuality from this figure.” 
This seems to have been primarily motivated by  
 
the desire to make the sign of woman better capable of mirroring a transcendent 
dimension which, once contacted, could enable the male lover to forge a new and 
idealized identity. (Berry 2003: 18) 
 
The figure of the female beloved thus has one important function to perform: mirroring a 
higher spiritual dimension to a male lover, which in effect equals mirroring the male 
lover’s true spiritual self back to himself. As Berry reads the ending of the Paradiso, the 
direction of Beatrice’s glance, towards the fountain of light which Dante describes as 
God,  
 
stresses her role as an intermediary rather than active agent, as a mere mirror of this light, 
which she has guided Dante towards through his love for her, and which now, in the 
closing stages of his epic narrative, he can see without her mediation. (Berry 2003: 20) 
 
At the end of the quest, when Bruno would say the lover is finally graced with 
beholding the beauty of the “eternal feminine” who “perfectly reflects the divine light,” 
(Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 204) the male lover in fact finally reaches the reflection of his 
own divine self. As Berry interprets it, the figure of the ideal female beloved  
 
was usually little more than an instrument in an elaborate game of masculine 
“speculation” and self-determination, for the philosophical enterprise common to both 
Petrarchism and Renaissance Neoplatonism used woman as a “speculum” or mirror of 
masculine narcissism.” (Berry 2003: 2) 
 
Shakespeare’s heroes of the firmly heterosexual persuasion can at times seem 
quite content to use their beloved women as mirrors in which they can behold 
themselves. As Bloom reads it, Othello’s summation of his love for Desdemona,  
 
She loved me for the dangers I had pass’d,  
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And I loved her that she did pity them  
(Othello, I. iii. 167-168) 
 
must “give the audience or readers pause.” The formulation Othello employs reveals the 
fatality of his narcissistic love for her as little more than a mirroring object:  
 
He did not love her for herself alone but for the way he found himself nobly and 
heroically reflected in her. When he will not find the image of himself there that he seeks, 
that exists only because it is reflected in her, “chaos is come again.” (Bloom Othello 
2008: 7)  
 
Charney similarly notices that, in his imagination of sexual pleasure, Troilus 
“speaks only of himself and not at all about Cressida, and his speeches have a naïve and 
narcissistic quality like those of Angelo to Isabella.” (Charney 2000: 70-71)  
This narcissistic quality rightly belongs to the narcissistic mystical Eros of 
dualism. Neoplatonic Narcissus, let us remember, ideally realizes it is his own divine face 
he sees reflected in the murky waters of matter and accordingly eventually ascends away 
from the muddy puddle altogether, having used it for speculative reflection. 
 
5.2.3. THE INEVITABLE MISOGYNY OF DUALISTIC LOVE 
 
The subject of Eros in dualistic systems is almost invariably the masculine spirit – 
the same as its beloved object and the same as the One – and the body, gendered as 
female, is always its Other. This puts the goddess Venus herself in a classical double bind 
that women seem to have always faced, at least in Platonically influenced cultures: if she 
is cast in the role of the ideal beloved, then she is purely spiritual and thus masculine; if 
she is feminine, then she is material and carnal, and thus the lower, vulgar version of 
herself.  
Matter itself is always inescapably feminine. In some metaphysical frameworks, 
at the far pro-cosmic end of the spectrum of Neoplatonic dualism, it can be seen as open 
to male control, and sufficiently passive and receptive. It is only in this case that matter 
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itself can serve as a beloved other – but only to the daring theurgically inclined 
Neoplatonic Magus, as will be seen later. This, however, occurs rather infrequently. 
Whether the sentiment informing the Eros of dualism is homoerotic or 
heteroerotic is virtually irrelevant for women, as men of both predilections could find in 
Neoplatonism an ideological framework to justify their particular attraction. Those male 
lovers of the Neoplatonic persuasion who did not share Ficino’s homoerotic tastes could 
either exalt male friendship over vulgar coitus with women – which they could perceive 
as serving only the purposes of procreation – or, conversely, pretend their feelings for 
women came from heavenly Venus and had nothing to do with sex and reproduction. The 
woman thus becomes either anagogic, asexual and incorporeal, or little better than an 
animal.  
The dualistic narcissistic Eros of both veins in this tradition leads to one 
significant consequence: a distaste for actual women. Platonic dualism, in short, is 
invariably inimical to women. 
Let us compare the Eros of dualism to the idea of agape, as expounded in 
mainstream Christianity. God is, in all orthodoxies, always insurmountably Other to His 
creatures, and those creatures, in turn, are fundamentally always Other to each other and 
to God. The abyss in monotheisms exists between the Creator and the created. Agape, the 
love attempting to bridge this abyss, forms the basis of all human relationships in 
Christianity, including the relationship of marriage. As Brundage points out, 
 
Jesus and his early followers anticipated that Christian married couples would live within 
the context of traditional Jewish culture, but encouraged them to pattern their personal 
relationship upon the mutual self-giving that lay at the heart of the notion of agape 
among his early followers. Sexual relations in marriage formed part, but only part, of the 
sharing and loving relationship that seems to have been the marriage ideal of Jesus and 
the earliest Christians. (Brundage 2987: 58)  
 
Christian agape is always love for the Other, which is, in marriage, potentially inclusive 
of sexual acts. The narcissistic Eros of dualism, conversely, whether homoerotic or 
heteroerotic, is fundamentally a love of the same for the same, of the male spirit for what 
is in effect itself reflected, and, significantly – originally at least – resolutely exclusive of 
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filthy copulation. The abyss in dualisms exists between the intelligible and the sensible – 
parts of human beings and parts of creation. The abyss is within each human being, and is 
to be widened until the spiritual part is reunited with the One, which is essentially the 
same as the human spirit. The Eros of dualism strives to effect this mystical unification.  
Its misogyny in a metaphysical system that genders matter as female and opposes 
it to male spirit seems guaranteed. 
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… nothing brings me all things. 
(Timon of Athens, V. i. 186-188) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.0. HENOSIS 
 
The ultimate end of dualistic erotic desire is henosis – becoming essentially and 
entirely one with the One. The object of the male lover’s desire is, in accordance with the 
narcissistic Eros of dualism, always fundamentally the same as the subject, and his spirit 
strives to achieve unification with its source with which it is already essentially identical, 
though it is temporarily separated from it by the imprisoning body. All he needs to do 
when he reaches the end of his desire is to take that final plunge and accomplish erotic 
dissolution in the divine One. If the Neoplatonic Narcissus must ascend away from what 
he realizes is the mere reflection of his beautiful figure in the murky waters of matter in 
order to escape drowning in them, then paradoxically, his ultimate goal is to instead 
drown himself in the heavens above, wherein the divine form of his face originated.  
 Henosis has been the final goal in most dualistic mystical systems, and flatly – if 
sometimes wistfully – rejected by mainstream monotheisms. Orthodox theologians, 
whether Jewish, Christian, or Muslim, in Pagels’ phrase, all tend to “emphasize the 
distinction between the infinite God and his finite creatures,” consistent with the Jewish 
theologian Martin Buber’s pertinent description of God as “wholly other” in any 
orthodox monotheistic religious system. Even the mystics of Jewish, Christian, and 
Islamic traditions, Pagels reminds, who seek to experientially approach their infinite 
Creator, often very carefully first “acknowledge the abyss that separates them from their 
divine Source.” When the Dominican monk Meister Eckhart, for example, failed to do so 
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and claimed instead that our ultimate goal is attaining the “Cause that has no cause,” God 
Himself who “lies hidden in the soul’s core,” the archbishop of Cologne simply obtained 
a papal bull point-blank condemning his writings as heresy. (Pagels 1988: 65) 
Martin Buber expressed very well this crucial distinction between mainstream 
monotheisms and dualistic mysticisms: the orthodox monotheist describes the 
relationship he has with God in terms of “I and Thou,” while no orthodox Jew, any more 
than any orthodox Christian or Muslim, could say, with the Hindu devotee – or any other 
essentially dualistic mystic – “I am Thou.” (Pagels 1988: 65) 
 The stark contrast between the dualistic goal of henosis and a possible orthodox 
version of the highest point of one’s journey towards God can also be illustrated by 
comparing two individual expressions of such ideas, one from each metaphysical system, 
whose imagery is superficially seemingly similar, but fundamentally radically opposed. 
One is the concept of theurgically achieved henosis, conceived by the Neoplatonist 
Iamblichus, and the other is the Christian notion of theosis, propounded by Maximus the 
Confessor in the East and Duns Scotus Eriugena in the West. Both have significantly 
been painted in images involving fire. 
 Iamblichus, allegedly the least easily disgusted of all the Neoplatonists, shocked 
those of his peers more inclined towards ascetic contemplation by allowing the practice 
of theurgy, which involved ritual dealings with filthy matter. What the ultimate goal of 
theurgy is, however, is clearly stated in an exposition in his De mysteriis entitled “On 
theurgic release from the bonds of matter.” In it, he mentions that fire is used in 
sacrificial rituals involving burnt offerings, and reminds his readers that  
 
the fire of our realm, imitating the activity of the divine fire, destroys all that is material 
in the sacrifices, purifies the offerings with fire and frees them from the bonds of matter, 
and renders them suitable, through the purification of their nature, for consorting with the 
gods, and by the same procedures liberates us from the bonds of generation and makes us 
like to the gods, and renders us worthy to enjoy their friendship, and turns round our 
material nature towards the immaterial. (Iamblichus 2003: 247)  
 
The most pro-cosmic thinker among the Neoplatonists apparently only allowed dealings 
with matter if their final goal was to liberate the theurgist from it. Divine fire, like the 
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earthly fire used in sacrificial rites, burns away all that is material and purges the spirit, 
liberating it for unification with the divine. The true fire of spirit which is within us 
becomes one with the divine fire.  
 This is radically different from even the most daring concept orthodox 
Christianity can offer – that of theosis, a solution proposed by Maximus in the East and 
accepted by Eriugena in the West. The resurrected body of each human being is imagined 
as participating, along with the soul from which it is fundamentally inseparable, in the 
gradual process of becoming ever more God-like. For Maximus this emphatically does 
not mean a loss of identity or an absorption into the divine, and he uses the famous simile 
of iron in the fire to illustrate this process of unification, a simile which is repeated by 
Eriugena in the first book of the Periphyseon. (Elkaisy-Friemuth 2009: 91) 
 The iron which finds itself tempered in the fire is each resurrected human being, 
body and soul, becoming perpetually more Godly, but never reaching the point of 
becoming one with God. The iron of humanity becomes bright, hot, and pliable in the 
divine fire, growing ever more fire-like, but it never becomes fire itself, and it is never 
annihilated. It always remains itself, though it might appear virtually indistinguishable 
from the embracing flames. 
We can here see clearly the stark difference between orthodox Christianity and 
dualism, even that of the mildest, most pro-cosmic kind. In orthodox theosis, Maximus’ 
iron – both body and soul as the beloved Other to God – in the divine fire becomes ever 
more similar to the divine, whereas in dualistic henosis Iamblichus’ imprisoning matter – 
Other to the divine spirit – is annihilated in the divine fire, while its beloved – essentially 
identical – spirit is assimilated to it. In orthodoxy, the soul is Other to God, just like the 
body, and both are beloved, while the body is not necessarily Other to the soul. In 
dualism, the soul is the same as God, while the body is Other to the soul. 
 The notion of theosis is as mystical as Christianity can get without becoming 
something else. Henosis can only be a valid goal for the dualistic mystic. 
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6.1. INTO THE ONE: EROTIC HENOSIS IN RENAISSANCE 
NEOPLATONISM 
 
 In Renaissance Neoplatonism, although this was clearly verging on heretical 
ground, the ultimate point of ascent of either the still calm of ascetic contemplation or the 
fiery frenzies of erotic passion was henosis with the One. Ficino, though a Catholic 
priest, opted to interpret some orthodox doctrines – such as the Incarnation, Crucifixion, 
and Resurrection – metaphorically, while taking his Hermetic and Neoplatonic sources 
very literally. 
 Consequently, Ficino adopts from Plato and his successors a very clearly and 
explicitly dualistic version of the ultimate point of erotic ascent: according to his theory 
of erotic love, we are currently imprisoned in our bodies and can only catch a glimpse of 
“the one truth, which is the single ray of the one God,” but we can return to the source of 
our being and become fully unified with God, called by that ray of love. The return 
journey is also through love, being the act of creation in reverse. The lover is first 
attracted by the outward beauty of the physical world, then that of virtue, soul and mind. 
Finally, the soul is seized by the brilliance of divine beauty itself and, “drawn upwards, 
itself becomes God.” (Line 2004: 5)  
 The beloved represents the divine and leads towards annihilation in it. The Eros of 
dualism demands that one become one with the beloved, a process which Ficino 
famously illustrated with his simile of the separate but amorous drops of water, yearning 
for each other, flowing towards each other, and finally completely dissolving into one.  
This merging into one with the One is what is finally accomplished in the soul via 
the ray of divine love operating in it. Divine love first incites erotic love in the soul and 
purges it through suffering, and then, by a gradual movement towards purity from matter, 
finally assimilates it to its divine goal, itself. (Allen 2002: 62) 
It is indeed possible, both Ficino and Bruno promise, for erotic desire to attain its 
final goal, but only at the very limits of this world and beyond this earthly life. Love can 
never be consummated within the material world and in the material body. Only after he 
has first passed through suffering and death and completely transcended matter, “at the 
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end of desire,” is the lover finally united with divine beauty itself. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 
2008: 204) 
Ficino explicitly – very daringly for a Catholic priest – defines erotic henosis: 
 
 Finally, when the soul has become one, I mean the one which is inherent in the 
very essence of the soul, it remains for it to be changed thereby into the One which is 
above essence. This is what heavenly Venus herself accomplishes through love, that is, 
through the desire for divine beauty and the yearning for the good. (Ficino 2006: 54) 
 
Heavenly Venus draws the lover upwards, not only to the divine realm of spirit, but to 
being finally “changed” into “the One which is above essence.” Henosis is here shown as 
the logical end of the narcissistic Eros of the Neoplatonic dualistic tradition. 
 
6.2. AS WATER IS IN WATER: EROTIC HENOSIS IN SHAKESPEARE 
 
 Antony envisions being dissolved into a shapeless nothingness and speaks about it 
to his beloved servant, perhaps overdeterminedly named Eros. The differently shaped 
clouds, as Antony notes, are mere temporary illusions that will be dissolved eventually 
“As water is in water.” Antony declares, with what seems to be a mixture of anxiety and 
desire: 
 
My good knave Eros, now thy captain is 
Even such a body. Here I am Antony, 
Yet cannot hold this visible shape, my knave. 
(Antony and Cleopatra, IV. xiv. 13-15) 
   
The matter of each individual body will dissolve in surrounding matter, but also, 
in Renaissance Neoplatonism, the spirit of each human being striving towards the divine 
will dissolve in the oceanic One, as, in Ficino’s simile, water merges with water. 
Margaret W. Ferguson observes in her “Hamlet: letters and spirits” that “Antony’s 
marvelous dialogue with Eros envisions death as a dissolving of boundaries that is more 
erotic than terrible.” (Parker/Hartman 2005: 303)  
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Antony’s dialog with Eros illustrates several aspects of the tradition of dualistic 
erotic henosis: the erotic dissolving of boundaries between the lover and the beloved, the 
otherworldly nature of true love, the strong and persistent association of sex and death, 
the ultimate non-existence of identity, and the nothingness of death as the end of all 
desire – whatever and whomever human beings might (think they) desire. 
 
6.2.1. A CONSUMMATION DEVOUTLY TO BE WISH’D: EROS AS 
THANATOS 
 
A central theme of Bruno’s De gli eroici furori is his interpretation of the myth of 
Actaeon, the hunter who stumbles upon the naked goddess Dian while she is bathing. 
Mesmerized by her beauty, he does not even notice when his own dogs turn against him 
and devour him. As Bruno interprets it, the myth is an allegory for the “love-death” of the 
heroic lover: the passionate frenzies he suffers kill him, but this erotic death transforms 
him into the ideal object of his desire. Dian is for Bruno a figure of the purely spiritual 
One: she is “the world, the universe, the nature which is in things, the light shining 
through the obscurity of matter.” Thus Actaeon, the prototype of the heroic lover, is 
through his erotic death transformed into the inscrutable yet mysteriously immanent One: 
 
From the vulgar, ordinary, civil, and common man he was, he becomes as free 
as a deer, and an inhabitant of the wilderness; he lives like a god beneath the towering 
forest, in the natural rooms of the cavernous mountains, where he contemplates the 
sources of the great rivers, vigorous as a plant, intact and pure, free of ordinary lusts, and 
converses most freely with the divinity, to which so many men have aspired, who in their 
desire to taste the celestial life on earth have cried with one voice: “Lo, I have gone far 
off flying away; and I remained in the wilderness.” (Hanegraaff/Kripal 201-203) 
 
Actaeon, significantly, never gets to carnally know the beautiful female he sees. He 
achieves far more than that. What seemingly starts as physical desire for a female shape 
is through Bruno’s dualistic conjunction of Eros and Thanatos transformed into a 
successfully completed erotic henosis. 
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This conjunction of Eros and Thanatos is a commonplace in dualistically 
informed theories of erotic love and makes a regular appearance in Shakespeare’s work – 
especially the tragedies.  
Grady perceives a complex synergy of Eros and Thanatos at work in the final 
scene of Hamlet. As he reads it, “the anointing with poison of Laertes’s sword – the 
emblem of his masculine honor – and then an envenoming of a chalice of wine – an 
emblem of pleasure, reward, and female sexuality now made a vehicle of death” strongly 
hints at the fatality of sex or the eroticism of death, but this is not the first hint that is 
offered in the play.  
The very pretext for the fencing match is provided by Claudius’ mention of the 
praise of Laertes’s swordsmanship by Lamord, the apparently gratuitously mentioned 
gentleman from Normandy, whose name, significantly, “simultaneously evokes the 
French la mort (death) and the Latin amor (love).” (Grady 2009: 176) Death and love 
will have become indistinguishable by the end of the tragedy. 
The next emblem of love-death appears after Gertrude has mistakenly drunk from 
the poisoned cup containing a precious pearl, otherwise named a “union,” and Hamlet, 
having learned of this, shoves it down Claudius’ throat, yelling  
 
Is thy union here? 
Follow my mother.  
(Hamlet, V. ii. 331-332)  
 
For Hamlet, as Margaret W. Ferguson notes in her “Hamlet: letters and spirits,” 
“all unions are tainted with poison,” like the literal “union” in the cup that Claudius has 
prepared for Hamlet. (Parker/Hartman 2005: 302-303) Unions with the female Other 
certainly are tainted for Hamlet, and he has at that point already ascetically pronounced 
“we will have no moe marriage.” (Hamlet, III. i. 148) However, death in erotic union can 
also be seen in positive terms, as both Claudius and Gertrude die by this union almost 
simultaneously, which seems more orgasmic than terrible. Grady explains that this death 
by “union” is an illustration of  
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the concept of Liebestod (love-death), the ancient idea that death is in fact the true object 
of erotic desire – a theme hauntingly evoked in Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde and in the 
medieval romances behind it – and one that has been connected to Romeo and Juliet 
several times. (Grady 2009: 202) 
 
Hamlet and Ophelia’s own frustrated erotic union can also be seen as ultimately 
realized in death. As Jardine establishes, ritual “sexual banter, including lewd mocking 
rhymes and fairly explicit romping at weddings, was an acceptable part of social 
practice.” (Jardine 2005: 25) Mad Ophelia’s incoherent rhymes sound, more than 
anything, like sexually explicit wedding songs – those she would have heard at her own 
fervently desired wedding with Hamlet. It is during this “wedding” that she performs, as 
Showalter notes, that Ophelia first metaphorically “deflowers” herself – by divesting 
herself of all the flowers she has. (Parker/Hartman 2005: 80)  
Berry notices another metaphorical defloration of Ophelia. She means to hang her 
garland of weeds on the willow tree, a symbol both of sexuality and disappointment in 
love, which, according to Berry, here also assumes the symbolic role of male genitals. 
However, Ophelia loses this circular wreath of flowers:  
 
In slipping into the river, Ophelia’s loss of her “crownet” of flowers functions as 
a metaphorical defloration; indeed, she appears to fall into the brook backwards, as the 
Nurse’s husband told the infant Juliet that she would do, when “thou comest to age.” 
(Berry 2002: 27) 
 
She falls into the water much like a Neoplatonic Narcissus, but in a strange 
conjunction of Eros and Thanatos she goes to her death still happily singing her wedding 
songs, ultimately ecstatically becoming one with the fluid element. Her drowning can be 
seen as both a sexual and a mystical experience.  
Hamlet seems to seek his own erotic annihilation when he leaps into her grave, 
insinuating their impending union in death. As he has already said of death, ‘tis a 
consummation devoutly to be wished – and this is how his and Ophelia’s union is really 
to be consummated. His dive into Ophelia’s open grave can be seen as courting death in 
the best courtly fashion, much like Romeo does before Juliet’s tomb. 
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Both Hamlet and Romeo, but other fatally frustrated lovers in Shakespeare’s 
tragedies as well, court death in this way, realizing that love cannot be realized in this 
world. This is no accident. Apparently, when her beloved Adonis died, Venus cursed – or 
blessed – those that “love best” with inevitable death:  
 
Sith in his prime, Death doth my love destroy,  
They that love best, their love shall not enjoy.  
(Venus and Adonis, 1063-1064) 
 
One possible dimension of interpretation of the consistent association of love and 
death in Shakespeare’s tragedies is that pure lovers, those that “love best,” must ascend 
away from this cruel world in which true love is incompatible with life, so they can 
finally become one in death. De Rougemont has identified this as a central notion 
stemming from the consistent dualistic current at the core of the Western tradition of 
romantic love. (De Rougemont 1983) These unifying and liberating deaths are in 
Shakespeare usually erotically charged nearly simultaneous suicides – as is the case with 
Romeo and Juliet – or murder-suicides – as is the case with Othello and Desdemona. This 
tradition of fatal love is to blame for the fact that, even today, the media at times cover 
murder-suicides perpetrated by the male as “tragic” but “romantic,” investing them with 
an intriguing aura of almost otherworldly grandeur and mystique.  
Knowles has observed in his interesting treatment of Romeo and Juliet from a 
carnivalesque perspective that, inconsistently with the conventions of carnival, “only 
death came from their love, not the renewal and thus reaffirmation of life.” (Knowles 
1998: 58) Romeo and Juliet does not seem to fully belong to the medieval carnivalesque 
tradition with its medley of macabre and bawdy imagery which is ultimately monistic and 
life-affirming. It belongs, instead, to the dualistic tradition of erotic love which can only 
lead away from this dull and cruel world and straight into death. Quite possibly, it was 
the Neoplatonic view of love as Eros leading away from earthly life that made possible 
this novelty of treating love as fit subject matter for tragedy in the Renaissance.   
De Rougemont has even flatly called Romeo and Juliet a “courtly tragedy,” and 
observed that, significantly, Verona was a major center of Catharism in Italy, and the 
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scene of violent struggles between Patarenes and the orthodox, which likely became the 
stuff of legends that spread throughout Europe. (De Rougemont 1983: 190) Accordingly, 
with a touch of pathos and in consciously Cathar terms, De Rougemont explains that, as 
Romeo and Juliet die together in the graveyard, “Death’s consolamentum has sealed the 
one kind of marriage that Eros was ever able to wish for.” (De Rougement 1983: 91)  
Juliet anticipates the love-death resolution of her ultimately dualistic erotic 
infatuation for Romeo:  
 
If he be married,  
My grave is like to be my wedding-bed.  
(Romeo and Juliet, I. v. 134-135)  
 
He becomes married to her, and still her grave has served as a wedding-bed to her, with 
Death referred to, in erotically charged terms, as her lover. In a very similar combination 
of imagery, Desdemona asks for her wedding sheets to be placed upon the bed when she 
appears to anticipate her death, which will only precede Othello’s by a short while: 
 
If I do die before [thee], prithee shroud me 
In one of those same sheets. 
(Othello, IV. iii. 24-25) 
 
 Troilus is the only lover to die in the comedies – as he explicitly desired to. In his 
description of his exalted erotic state, he is a lost soul on the banks of the River Styx that 
leads into the underworld of Hades, and appeals to Pandarus to ferry him across: 
 
O, be thou my Charon, 
And give me swift transportance to those fields 
Where I may wallow in the lily beds 
Proposed for the deserver.  
(Troilus and Cressida, III. ii. 9-12) 
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Charney sees the erotic imagery used here as odd and disturbing. (Charney 2000: 70-71) 
Death, however, is the normal consummation of the kind of Eros that informs Troilus’ 
reverie. The lily beds of Elysium, of course, denote flowerbeds, but using the word “bed” 
here automatically conjures the image of a bed – along with the carnal consummation of 
love that is usually associated with it. Eros and Thanatos are once more firmly linked. 
Even though lovers in the comedies do not necessarily actually die, sex and death 
are consistently linked in imagery. Isabella’s imagined martyrdom is, as has often been 
noticed, described in erotically charged images:  
 
Th’ impression of keen whips I’ld wear as rubies, 
And strip myself to death, as to a bed 
That longing have been sick for, ere I’ld yield 
My body up to shame. 
(Measure for Measure, II. iv. 101-104) 
 
Stripping herself to death as to a bed is an interesting image: it reflects the idea that the 
body will be stripped off her spirit before she becomes one with the One in erotic 
henosis. This is reminiscent of Ambrose’s notion that the body is but a filthy robe to be 
discarded upon death – a strange notion indeed for a person that was to become a 
Catholic saint, but somewhat understandable given his Platonic philosophical education. 
Isabella’s keenness for martyrdom is also comparable to the dualistic heresiarch 
Origen’s effusion from his Dialogue:  
 
Bring wild beasts, bring crosses, bring fire, bring tortures. I know that as soon as 
I die, I come forth from the body. I rest in Christ. Therefore let us struggle, let us wrestle, 
let us groan, being in the body, not as if we shall again be in the tomb in the body because 
we shall be free from it. (Armstrong 1996: 181)  
 
Armstrong offers a fascinating history of female martyrdom in her Gospel 
According to Woman. Martyrdom was first associated with sexual asceticism and hatred 
of the body when dualistic metaphysics began to seep into Christianity. In the Middle 
Ages, the martyr was already nearly always also a virgin, which signified a renunciation 
  191 
of the bodily. (Armstrong 1996: 182) An interesting addition to the tradition appeared at 
some point before the 13th century: the virgin’s martyrdom commenced to be depicted 
almost invariably in terms suggesting a sexual assault. (Armstrong 1996: 183) That 
Isabella’s guarded virginity and distaste for all things fleshly should appear to be 
inseparable from her morbid sexual fascination with martyrdom seems a little less strange 
in light of this.  
Claudio echoes his sister’s sexually charged imagery of death: 
 
If I must die, 
I will encounter darkness as a bride, 
And hug it in mine arms. 
(Measure for Measure, III. i. 82-84) 
 
After Claudio’s promise to “encounter darkness as a bride,” Isabel admiringly 
declares: 
 
There spake my brother; there my father’s grave 
Did utter forth a voice. 
(Measure for Measure, III. i. 85-86) 
 
The image is a strange one indeed. The hollow darkness of a masculine (“father’s”) grave 
is imagined to speak in erotic terms about the feminine (“bride”) darkness of death: a 
deathly darkness is ultimately erotically desiring a deathly darkness. The same will be 
dissolved in the same, which is ultimately the erotically desired nothingness of death. 
The image of an erotic encounter with death is a common one in Shakespeare, 
frequently inspired by the early modern usage of the verb “to die” to refer to a sexual 
orgasm, which was itself perceived as a kind of death. (Deats 2005: 245) Lear declares “I 
will die bravely, like a smug bridegroom,” (King Lear, IV. vi. 198) and Antony sees 
himself as “A bridegroom in […] death,” who will “run into” Eros’ sword “As to a 
lover’s bed.” (Antony and Cleopatra, IV. xv. 100-101)  
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Miodrag Pavlović has noted in his “Antonije i Kleopatra” (Antony and Cleopatra) 
that Antony’s suicide is placed in a consciously symbolic framework, as the servant 
Antony desires should kill him is named Eros; when he refuses and commits suicide 
himself, Eros, in Pavlović’s phrase, transforms into Thanatos. (Pavlović 1990: 50-51) 
Antony’s desired erotic henosis is, interestingly, both homoerotic and heteroerotic, 
rendering Antony somehow androgynous, and both the penetrator (of Cleopatra) and the 
penetrated (by Eros’ sword). 
Shakespeare offers in Antony and Cleopatra a more clearly and consciously 
ambiguous approach to love-death than in any other tragedy of his in which his lovers 
die. Antony and Cleopatra both seem to ascend to lofty dimensions in the imagery 
surrounding their demise and death, and yet are throughout openly and luxuriously 
carnal, in contrast with other lovers in Shakespeare’s world, who are almost ethereal by 
comparison. Unlike Antony and Cleopatra, Zamir notices, for instance, Romeo and Juliet 
never eat, which is consistent with “the noncorporeal passion that possesses them.” 
(Zamir 2007: 131) Lisa Starks notes in her ““Immortal Longings”: The Erotics of Death 
in Antony and Cleopatra” that Shakespeare, who frequently explores the theme of love 
and death, takes the exploration further in this late tragedy, allowing the theme to become 
more potentially disruptive of cultural norms. Shakespeare’s equation of desire and death 
usually serves, in her words,  
 
not to valorize the fusion of death and sexuality but, rather, to reveal the abject loathing 
of the flesh and disgust of human mortality that ultimately results in the death of desire. 
In Antony and Cleopatra, however, Shakespeare transforms the death of desire into the 
ecstatic desire of death, a longing beyond the pleasure principle, a fusion of the 
destructive and the regenerative forces of Thanatos and Eros. (Deats 2005: 245) 
 
The entire tragedy sometimes reads as an extensive treatment on the fusion of 
Eros and Thanatos, viewed from all sides. Enobarbus humorously puns on the double 
meaning of “to die” extensively: 
 
Under a compelling occasion, let women die. It were pity to cast them away for 
nothing, though between them and a great cause, they should be esteem’d nothing. 
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Cleopatra, catching but the least noise of this, dies instantly; I have seen her die twenty 
times upon far poorer moment. I do think there is mettle in death, which commits some 
loving act upon her, she hath such a celerity in dying. (Antony and Cleopatra, I. ii. 136-
143) 
 
The clown also persistently quibbles on both “to die” and the phallic “worm,” allowing 
sex and death to be even comically intertwined in this tragedy. 
 Cleopatra approaches her own death with a bit more gravity, but still persistently 
linking sex and death: 
 
The stroke of death is like a lover’s pinch, 
Which hurts, and is desir’d. 
(Antony and Cleopatra, V. ii. 295-296) 
 
As she dies, she declares with pathos: 
 
I am again for Cydnus 
To meet Mark Antony. 
(Antony and Cleopatra, V. ii. 228-229) 
 
She is referring here to their first encounter on the river Cydnus. Their deaths are thus 
depicted as a mystical union entailing the dissolution of both into the watery element, 
much like Ophelia was dissolved in her erotic drowning. 
Through this ambiguity of the association of Eros and Thanatos, as either the 
negative terrible fatality of sex or the positive orgasmic eroticism of death, most 
accentuated in his Antony and Cleopatra, but present throughout his opus, Shakespeare 
seems to be deconstructing the usual Neoplatonic dichotomy of pure spirit and prime 
matter. Both the erotic ascent to henosis and the carnal descent to prime matter lead, 
ultimately, to nothingness and death. Death is inescapably the end of all desire in both 
meanings of the word: either as the inevitable end of all carnal desire or the desired end 
itself. 
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6.2.2. NOTHING BRINGS ME ALL THINGS: DEATH AS THE END OF 
DESIRE 
 
Whether through ascetic contemplation, or through erotic ascent in chase of a 
chaste lady (or divine boy), the ultimate goal of dualistic ascent is henosis. The three 
caskets Portia’s suitors choose from offer a clue as to what options are given to a 
pursuing subject in Renaissance Neoplatonism, whether he be a contemplative 
philosopher or a heroic lover: 
 
1. The gold casket with its image of death, 
2. The silver casket, containing the picture of a fool, and 
3. The lead casket, holding Portia’s “counterfeit.”  
 
Except for the silver one, which relatively straightforwardly represents breeding 
(knock a girl up by mistake and get foolishly trapped and burdened with a “fool” – that 
endearing Elizabethan term for an infant), they are both ambiguous. Love-death, Eros as 
Thanatos, dying in both its terrifying and its orgasmic meanings, could be seen as a gold 
death, while ascetic ascent towards still and contemplative henosis with the One is more 
in keeping with choosing the somber Saturnian lead. They both potentially lead to 
nothingnesses and they could both lead to perfect henosis. 
An example of pure henosis is given in Prospero’s successfully completed 
theurgical rites, after which he is finally to become God. As Corfield reads the play, 
Prospero’s “rough magic” is rough simply because it is “unsubtle by comparison with the 
next degree of the mage’s enlightenment.” Having completed this degree, Prospero 
simply “sheds his magic as a snake sheds its outworn skin, and proceeds to higher 
things.” These higher things are in effect henosis. Corfield cites Curry’s conclusion, 
which he mentions has been drawn with the aid of studying Neoplatonic philosophy, that 
Prospero’s “theurgical operations have accomplished their purpose. He wishes now to 
take the final step and to consummate the assimilation of his soul to the gods.” (Corfield 
1985: 33) As Line explains, 
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It would have been a heresy for Shakespeare to write this at the time but, in the 
Christian-Platonic tradition, the goal was not to become a lesser deity but God Himself. 
(Line 2004: 145)  
 
Leaving the imprisoning island and returning home triumphantly can easily be interpreted 
as Prospero’s henosis following his liberating death. The island can be read as his body, 
and the other characters as lower parts of himself that he must first theurgically put into 
order before he moves upwards still. Prospero finally leaves behind all but the divine 
spark, Prospero himself, which returns home to rule.  
Prospero can thus be read as having chosen the somber lead casket leading to pure 
ascent and, finally, henosis. Freud’s peculiar reading of the three caskets as three women 
to choose from can be interesting in this context. Freud notices that the lead casket 
bearing Portia’s image is all “paleness” and that Cordelia, the good one among the three 
sisters, is “silent.” These qualities are associated with dumbness, and Freud observes that 
“psycho-analysis will tell us that in dreams dumbness is a common representation of 
death.” As Harris paraphrases Freud, “the choice of the pale or silent woman represents 
the choice of a dead woman, and more specifically of death itself.” (Harris 2010: 80) In 
Neoplatonic terms, this is not surprising, as erotic henosis, chosen through the lead 
casket, is only achieved after death. Strangely enough, though, Freud does not pay much 
heed to the fact that another, much more ominous casket – the gold one – explicitly 
contains the image of Death. Thus two of the three caskets can be seen as ultimately 
leading to death. 
In the unconscious, as Harris notes,  
 
opposites such as death and love often represent one and the same content. For Freud, 
then, as for structuralists and deconstructionists, opposites are connected and contain the 
trace of each other. (Harris 2010: 81)  
 
In Renaissance Neoplatonism, as has been seen, these need not really be opposites to 
begin with – love and death can both firmly stand for henosis. The lead casket and the 
gold casket can be two sides of the same coin. 
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The gold casket of death officially leads to what is usually negatively painted as 
carnally induced annihilation in the depths of matter, but erotic, orgasmic death can often 
be at least quite ambiguous in Shakespeare. Erotic death can, as has been seen, often be 
interpreted as a representation of a mystical union and the ideal consummation of heroic 
love – a consummation devoutly to be wish’d – at times explicitly expressed as a lover’s 
death wish, as is the case with Othello: 
 
If it were now to die, 
‘Twere now to be most happy; for I fear 
My soul hath her content so absolute 
That not another comfort like to this 
Succeeds in unknown fate. 
(Othello, II. i. 189-193) 
 
Othello eerily (fore)sees in death the prefect consummation of his union with Desdemona 
– and devoutly wishes for it. His wish is fulfilled in their explicitly eroticized nearly 
simultaneous and uniting deaths. As he poetizes, 
 
I kiss’d thee ere I kill’d thee. No way but this, 
Killing myself, to die upon a kiss. 
(Othello, V. ii. 358-359) 
 
Whether pure and contemplative, as is the case with Prospero’s proper theurgical 
ascent, or impassioned and destructive, as is the case with Othello’s fiery frenzy, the 
annihilation of personhood into eventual nothingness is the ultimate goal of all dualistic 
desire. 
As Clifford Leech has discovered in “The “Meaning” of Measure for Measure,” 
the “meaning” of the play is what can rightly only be termed henosis. As Leech 
perplexedly observes, “the Duke offers no hint of Christian consolation: Claudio must 
welcome death because there is no real joy to be found in life: he denies even personality 
itself.” (Stead 1971: 157) For this he cites the Duke’s words  
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Thou art not thyself  
For thou exists on many a thousand grains  
That issue out of dust.  
(Measure for Measure, III. i. 5-43) 
  
The trapped divine sparks are in dualistic systems ideally to be reunited with their 
source and thus annihilated in henosis with the originating One. Personality and identity 
are mere illusions that should – like Prospero’s “rough magic” – finally be discarded like 
outgrown snake skins.  
Juliet also proves that identity is ultimately an illusion:  
 
Hath Romeo slain himself? Say thou but ay, 
And that bare vowel I shall poison more 
Than the death-[darting] eye of cockatrice. 
I am not I, if there be such an ay. 
(Romeo and Juliet, III. ii. 45-48) 
 
I am not I, as there is no “I”: “I” is fundamentally merely “a bare vowel” that 
poisons. She is not she, as finally, in their erotic annihilating union of death, she is him, 
as he is her. They have become one and their identities have evaporated as the mere 
illusions that they have always truly been.  
Something similar happens in imagery when, in Julius Caesar, Brutus runs on his 
sword, much like Antony does, and his servant answers Messala’s question of where he is 
with 
 
Free from the bondage you are in, Messala; 
The conquerors can but make a fire of him; 
For Brutus only overcame himself, 
And no man else hath honor by his death. 
(Julius Caesar, V. v. 54-57) 
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That the only thing the conquerors can do is give him a ritually proper funeral – “make a 
fire of him” – creates an interesting image wherein Brutus, because he “overcame 
himself” and, in one possible reading of these words, thus annihilated his identity, can 
now become the pure fire of spirit.  
After the Duke’s speech, even Claudio’s thoughts temporarily take a 
philosophical turn, and he muses:  
 
To sue to live, I find I seek to die, 
And seeking death, find life. 
(Measure for Measure, III. i. 42-43) 
 
A desire for erotic henosis, as has been seen, can at times hardly be distinguished 
from a world-weary death wish. As Victor Hugo has commented on Hamlet, in the best 
dualistic Platonic tradition of Romanticism:  
 
Hamlet expresses a permanent condition of man. He represents the discomfort of 
the soul in a life which is not sufficiently adapted to it. He represents the shoe that 
pinches and stops our walking; the shoe is the body. Shakespeare frees him from it, and 
he is right. (Bloom Hamlet 2008: 180) 
 
Hamlet has to beg Horatio to absent himself from “felicity,” (Hamlet, V. ii. 347) 
at least for a while, when he intends to commit suicide, and Constance amorously 
exclaims, as if to a lover: “Death, death. O amiable lovely death.” (King John, III. iv. 25) 
The object of erotic desire – and the true object of any strong desire – is in Shakespeare 
often explicitly shown to be death itself. 
Richard II stumbles upon a significant philosophical discovery in the course of his 
vaguely suicidal musings:  
 
Nor I, nor any man that but man is, 
With nothing shall be pleas’d, till he be eas’d 
With being nothing. 
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(Richard II, V. v. 1-66) 
 
Timon similarly notices, while merrily writing his epitaph:  
 
My long sickness  
Of health and living now begins to mend, 
And nothing brings me all things. 
(Timon of Athens, V. i. 186-188) 
 
“Nothing” is here explicitly shown to be the true goal of dualistic ascent. Whether 
this final step of death is an orgasmic leap into henosis with the One, or a plunge into the 
nothingness of feminine prime matter, can at times be indistinguishable, as both these 
nothingnesses irresistibly draw parts of each human being towards them. 
 
6.3. BEING NOTHING: THE PARADOX OF DUALISTIC DESIRE 
 
Suspended between the body, which is constantly threatened by dissolution into 
formless prime matter, and the spirit, which is irresistibly drawn towards annihilation into 
the inscrutable One, the Neoplatonic human is but a fleeting and ultimately false image. 
Identity, based on the temporarily formed matter of the body and the temporarily 
imprisoned forming spirit is less than a fiction – it is the shadow of a shadow, an 
afterthought of the lowly imprisoning body, precariously existing, as a frail bark thrown 
about on the waves between the sea and the sky, floundering between two powerful and 
eternal nothingnesses that offer annihilation to it.  
Both prime matter and pure spirit can be seen as nothingnesses in this paradoxical 
and self-deconstructing dichotomy. For, if prime matter is in Neoplatonism an amorphous 
nothingness because it is as yet unformed and below form, then the One towards which 
all spirit strives is also a limitless nothingness because it is the origin of all forms and 
above any particular form. These twin nothingnesses both claim the split human being, 
the one threateningly, the other alluringly. 
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Annihilation in the nothingness of the One is the ultimate goal of the erotic ascent 
of dualistic Renaissance Neoplatonism – the final rung of the Platonic ladder of 
perfection, the last step on an arduous journey of suffering, purification, and, finally, 
death. It is achieved if the lover has avoided the lures of the shadowy and illusory world 
of matter and ascended upwards towards the pristine light of the spirit. If the lover, 
however, mistakes this erotic call of divine beauty for carnal stirrings and he will instead 
be drawn downwards and ultimately annihilated in the nothingness of prime matter. 
Paradoxically, annihilating erotic deaths in Shakespeare, at least as often as not, 
appear to be impenetrably ambiguous on this very point. Shakespeare at times seems to 
be enjoying deconstructing the Platonic pure spirit/prime matter dichotomy in the theory 
of erotic love, while at other times he appears to be genuinely troubled and oppressed by 
it, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
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All this the world well knows, yet none knows well 
To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell. 
(Sonnet 129) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7.0. DESCENT 
 
 We have so far seen what Narcissus, standing on the brink of the muddy waters of 
matter, mesmerized by his beautiful reflection in them, ultimately ought to do. According 
to the vast majority of Neoplatonic thinkers, the purest option available to Narcissus is to 
look disgustedly away from the deceptive reflection of his beautiful divine face, and 
begin instead a purifying ascent towards the heavenly One, from which this divine form 
originated. The end of every desire is annihilating henosis – the soul’s dissolution into the 
One – and this is the drowning that Narcissus truly yearns for as he gazes into the 
reflecting waters longingly. 
Of course, what Narcissus ought to do is not what Narcissus actually does. 
Plotinus, in his allegorical reading of the myth, bemoans the fate of Narcissus, who 
drowns in the reflecting waters, and relates it to the inevitable deadly downfall of any 
man who falls in love with a beautiful body of a mere mortal, forgetting that it is solely 
an image of divine beauty. He warns that   
 
this man who clings to beautiful bodies and will not let them go, will, like the man in the 
story, but in soul, not in body, sink down into the dark depths where intellect has no 
delight, and stay blind in Hades, consorting with shadows there and here. (Allen 2002: 
290) 
 
Ficino likewise laments, in his interpretation of the myth, that Narcissus  
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 abandons his own beauty, but he never reaches the reflection. That is, the soul, in 
pursuing the body, neglects itself but finds no gratification in its use of the body. For it 
does not really desire the body itself; rather, seduced, like Narcissus, by corporeal beauty, 
which is an image of its own beauty, it desires its own beauty. And since it never notices 
the fact that, while it is desiring one thing, it is pursuing another, it never satisfies its 
desire […] it is racked by terrible passions and, stained by the filths of the body, it dies, 
as it were, since it now seems to be a body rather than a soul. (Allen 2002: 289) 
 
Ficino’s Neoplatonic hierarchy of the cosmic spheres kept changing throughout 
his lifetime, but it usually comprised four distinct levels: God (the One), Angel (the 
Mind), Soul (sometimes divided into its Intelligible and Sensible parts), and Matter (or 
the Body, depending on how ordered he felt the lowest part of the created universe to be 
at any given moment). Each sphere – on this his doctrine was unchanging – reflects, 
albeit imperfectly, the harmonious beauty of the one immediately above it. God is thus 
mirrored in the Angelic Mind, which is in turn mirrored in the Soul, which then reflects 
its form on the matter below it. Each cosmic sphere is thus a mere shadow of the one 
above it, and the higher spheres, being exalted and wise, are well aware of this:  
 
God is certainly never so deceived as to love the shadow of His own beauty in 
the Angel and neglect His own true Beauty. Nor is the Angel so taken by the beauty of 
the Soul, which is its shadow, that it becomes preoccupied with its shadow and forsakes 
its own beauty. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 183) 
 
Our soul, however, being so close to matter and thus itself volatile and unfixed, can be 
deceived by its reflection in the lower sphere:  
 
Only our soul, I say, is so captivated by the charms of corporeal beauty that it neglects its 
own beauty, and forgetting itself, runs after the beauty of the body, which is a mere 
shadow of its own beauty. […] This is greatly to be lamented, for this is the origin of all 
our woe. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 183) 
 
Dualistic Eros, as has been seen, is informed by this theory of magic mirrors, 
which can accommodate itself to both pro-cosmic and anti-cosmic worldviews. This 
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paradox – that the beauty of creation is a reflection of divine beauty, and thus both 
legitimately desirable and alluringly deceptive – is at the core of the intense ambiguity 
and consequently quite disparate attitudes towards desire, sexuality, love, procreation, 
creation, and even existence, that were present in Renaissance Neoplatonism, and very 
often even all held by the same person simultaneously. 
Ficino was certainly one of those persons. His constantly changing interpretation 
of the second of the two Platonic Venuses is an exquisite example of this paradoxical 
ambiguity. Heavenly Venus, masculine, divine, and purely spiritual, leading one 
unmistakably away from matter and towards the One, was for Ficino an 
unproblematically positive figure. Vulgar Venus, feminine, earthly, and focused on the 
material world, however, does not escape calumny.  
On the one hand, she is responsible for the procreation of beautiful forms in 
nature, not least of which are human bodies, whose generation is duly lauded by Ficino as 
“virtuous and praiseworthy,” which is in keeping with the official teachings of both the 
Catholic Church and Plato. On the other hand, it is vulgar Venus that traps sparks of the 
divine in this basest of all possible worlds, thus bringing them all the evils and all the 
suffering that they experience, which is in keeping with the dark dualistic undercurrent of 
Western metaphysical and religious thought. It is true that in De amore, Ficino repeatedly 
stresses that the second Venus is called “vulgar,” or a kakodaemon (evil daemon) not 
because it is inherently evil, but because  
 
on account of our abuse, it often disturbs us and powerfully diverts the soul from its chief 
good, which consists in the contemplation of truth, and twists it to baser purposes. […] it 
leads us to prefer the beauty of the body to the beauty of the soul and thus leads us 
downwards instead of upwards. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 181) 
 
However, his putative defense of her and himself is not entirely convincing, as the 
downward descent she leads one on due to “our abuse” can at times be virtually 
indistinguishable from her normal function in his system. There seems to be a 
discrepancy in Ficino’s thought between his theoretical acceptance of procreation and an 
abhorrence of what he refers to as “touching” – a term that can be taken as practically 
synonymous with “sexual activity,” even in the confines of marriage. The pleasures of 
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touch themselves, in Ficino’s words, “remove the intellect from its proper state and 
perturb the man.”  
His revulsion at “touching” seems to have grown steadily more intense as he 
himself grew older: while in De amore the second Venus is at times described as 
“virtuous and praiseworthy,” in De vita she is represented as a deceptive enemy stealing 
our vital energy in the interest of procreation and as a prostitute seducing the young by 
promising (but never actually giving) them the “lethal” pleasures of touch. 
(Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 183)  
“Touching” itself is never truly pleasurable, as it is always the end of a 
deceptively alluring fall into the material and away from the spiritual. It is difficult to 
ignore his explicit warning that 
 
the desire for coitus and love are shown to be not only not the same motions, but opposite 
[...] No name which is suitable for God is common with sinful things. Therefore anyone 
who is of sound mind ought to be careful lest he heedlessly apply the term love, a divine 
name, to foolish perturbations. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 186) 
 
When one desires another human being sexually, it is clear that the impulse has little to 
do with love, which is divine and purely spiritual. This is echoed in Adonis’ retort to 
vulgar Venus’ sexual pursuit of him, which could have been Ficino’s: 
  
 Call it not love, for Love to heaven is fled, 
Since sweating Lust on earth usurp’d his name. 
(Venus and Adonis, 793-794) 
   
Bruno’s treatise likewise preserves a clear Neoplatonic dichotomy between 
heavenly and vulgar erotic passions, sometimes rendering his attitude towards erotic 
desire extremely ambiguous. On the one hand, ascent from the earthly to the divine seems 
to be possible in his system only via contemplating the earthly beauty of the female body. 
On the other hand, sexual frustration is a necessary prerequisite of this mystical 
technique, as the desire of the “heroic lover” can only be satisfied by attaining the one 
“object,” “beauty,” or “fire” of the divinity itself.  
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A central figure in this mystical process is the “cruel and beautiful” goddess 
Diana, analogous to Ficino’s heavenly Venus. She causes the “sweet pain” of the heroic 
lover, who is then inspired to ascent by the burning passion – both in the sense of 
“desire” and in the sense of “suffering” – of his love, which can never be attained in this 
world, and which finally consumes him whole. Bruno believes this eternal frustration is 
the only praiseworthy option for the heroic lover, as “although the soul does not attain the 
end desired and is consumed by so much zeal, it is enough that it burns in so noble a 
fire.” (Hanegraaff/Krpial 2008: 198-201)  
Bruno, conversely, pours scorn on those who allow something as insignificant as 
an actual woman to get them into such a condition. In a long accusatory litany, he 
bemoans all the things men do  
 
for those eyes, for those cheeks, for that bosom, for that white, for that crimson, for that 
tongue, for that tooth, for that lip, that hair, that dress, that mantle, that glove, that little 
shoe, that slipper, that avarice, that giggle, that scorn, that empty window, that eclipsed 
sun, that torment, that disgust, that stench, that sepulcher, that cesspit, that menstruation, 
that carrion, that quartan fever, that uttermost insult and lapse of nature, which, with a 
surface, a shadow, a phantasm, a dream, a Circean enchantment plied in the service of 
reproduction, deceives under the guise of beauty; which simultaneously comes and goes, 
is born and dies, flourishes and rots, and may be somewhat beautiful on the outside, but 
truly and constantly contains within a shipload, a workshop, a customs-house, a 
marketplace of every foulness, toxin and poison that our stepmother nature has managed 
to produce: and once the seed she requires has been paid out, she often repays it with a 
stench, a remorse, a sadness, a weakness, a headache, a lassitude, and many more 
distempers known to all the world, so that it sorely aches where it itched so sweetly 
before. (From the Introduction; cited in Hanegraaff/Krpial 2008: 198) 
 
The expression “sorely aches where it itched so sweetly before” refers to what 
happens when a lover fails to worship the true goddess Dian properly and purely, and 
instead attempts to improperly, as it were, “hunt” Dian down, pursuing her – or, rather, 
the woman in whom she is reflected – sexually. Instead of Dian, then, one catches 
something completely different – judging from his choice of phrase, possibly even a 
venereal disease. 
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Shakespeare, much like the other poets and dramatists of the time, was 
demonstrably very intimately acquainted with the idea of the two forms of love. The 
editors of the First Folio did not arbitrarily and by accident ensure that the two Cupids – 
divine Cupid, the oldest of the gods, as the representation of heavenly love, and young 
Cupid, born of Venus, as the representation of its earthly counterpart – be depicted on 
several headpieces in it. (Line 2004: 14) Distinguishing love from lust certainly has 
throughout been a topic of great interest to Shakespeare.  
As Adonis claims, 
 
Love is a spirit all compact of fire, 
Not gross to sink, but light, and will aspire. 
(Venus and Adonis, 149-150) 
 
This is a clear demarcation of the two Venuses and the two kinds of love – earthly and 
heavenly. It is “gross” earthly “love” – which Adonis insists is but “sweating Lust” – that 
causes one to “sink” downwards into the cesspit of matter, while only true, heavenly love 
allows the spirit to “aspire” towards the One. 
 
7.1. HUNTING DIAN 
  
The Renaissance theory of erotic love, heavily saturated with the distinctive brand 
of Neoplatonic spirit/matter dualism, as we have seen, simultaneously legitimized 
romantic love and split its object into, on the one hand, an idealized representation of the 
divine, and, on the other, the despicable body of the actual human being in question. Both 
Ficino and Bruno warn the lover never to confuse this heroic passion for the One with 
carnal lust for a mere woman’s body and to keep heroically burning with the ever-
unquenchable desire to ascend to the divine. 
The mistake, it should be clear, is not in desiring Dian erotically, but in hunting 
Dian and attempting to have an actual sexual relationship with her. Dian can be 
worshiped and pursued chastely, according to all the rules of Neoplatonic ascent. 
Shakespeare’s comedies and romances tend to end in weddings which can easily be 
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interpreted as symbolic of spiritual ascent and successful henosis. Bassanio’s successful 
quest for Portia is a pertinent example. These marriages, though, it should be pointed out, 
are certainly never sexually consummated within the world of the play. There are no 
happily consummated and enduring marriages between Shakespeare’s heroes – only 
between his most troubling villains. (Greenblatt 2006: 137) 
In the darker comedies and the tragedies, the heroes also pursue Dian, as they all 
fall deeply and almost mystically in love with a chaste lady, whom they cast in the role of 
an exalted anagogic figure, and certainly not a potential prosaic spouse and mother to 
their future children. However, then they make the grievous error – more terrible than 
Actaeon’s – of pursuing her sexually. All the fallen heroes – would-be heroic lovers – of 
the problem plays and tragedies can be caught in the act of hunting Dian at some point. 
 
 
             Death of Actaeon (1562) by Vecelli 
 
Troilus is seen desiring Dian in “stubborn-chaste” Cressida, whom he calls “a 
pearl,” an appellation significantly also used to describe Desdemona. As Krims notes – 
and psychoanalytic readings are useful, if somewhat tautological, in this context – Troilus 
invokes the nymph Daphne in his appeal to Apollo. Daphne is the chaste nymph who at 
one point frustrates Apollo’s desire by metamorphosing into a bay tree. Krims interprets 
Troilus’s allusion to the virginal Daphne as representing “his difficulty imagining 
Cressida as sexual”: 
 
Perhaps then he thinks of her as chaste-stubborn not only because she resists him now but 
also because he has difficulty imagining her otherwise. Shakespeare thus presents us with 
a Troilus who not only idealizes Cressida but who also thinks of her as untainted by 
carnal desire. (Krims 2006: 96) 
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Bertram’s first desire is for freedom. He flees from the very idea of marriage, 
escaping to the wars, where the young men’s heroic courting of death sometimes seems 
indistinguishable from the erotic pursuit of love, as has been noticed by Helen Wilcox in 
her “Drums and Roses? The Tragicomedy of War in All’s Well That Ends Well.” 
(King/Franssen 2008: 90)  
Then he pursues a literal Dian, who is explicitly opposed even to marriage – let 
alone fornication – and declares in no uncertain terms: “Marry that will, I live and die a 
maid.” (All’s Well That Ends Well, IV. ii. 74) She is, unsurprisingly, then, not overly 
amenable to his desire: 
 
I’ll lie with him 
When I am buried.  
(All’s Well That Ends Well, IV. ii. 71-72)  
 
Angelo’s obsession with a “stubborn-chaste” virgin takes an even more extreme 
turn, as this apparently asexual puritan begins to pursue the epitome of inaccessibility, a 
young, fervent novice in a monastery. Isabel is tellingly first shown in the play 
 
wishing a more strict restraint 
Upon the sisterhood, the votarists of Saint Clare. 
(Measure for Measure, I. iv. 4-5) 
 
It is, again, hardly surprising that her mind gladly conjures up all manner of gruesome 
torture and a martyr-like death that she would happily endure ere she’d yield her “body 
up to shame.” (Measure for Measure, II. iv. 103-104) 
Romeo’s first love Rosaline – also depicted as having distinctly monastic 
aspirations – is explicitly likened to Dian, as 
 
she’ll not be hit 
With Cupid’s bow, she hath Dian’s wit; 
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And in strong proof of chastity well arm’d, 
From Love’s weak childish bow she lives uncharm’d. 
(Romeo and Juliet, I. i. 208-211) 
 
His passion for Rosaline shows Romeo as a courtly or aspiring heroic lover. As Muir 
shrewdly perceives, “Romeo’s passion for Rosalind becomes the typical romantic love of 
the sonneteers for a merciless instead of the sexual pursuit of a virtuous maid.” (Muir 
1956: 25-26) This might be said for the vast majority of Shakespeare’s idealistic tragic 
lovers. Interestingly enough, Romeo moves on to Juliet without skipping a beat – much to 
Mercutio’s amusement – with a similar frame of mind, but with different results, as Juliet 
is not a merciless maid. This will thus transpire to be another case of hunting Dian, at 
which the goddess will unleash her rage. 
Othello at first sees a literal Dian in Desdemona, and later wistfully bemoans  
 
[Her] name, that was as fresh  
As Dian’s visage.  
(Othello, III. iii. 386-387)   
 
He swears his love for her is not physical when he pleads to be allowed to take her with 
him to Cyprus: 
 
Vouch with me, heaven, I therefore beg it not 
To please the palate of my appetite, 
Nor to comply with heat (the young affects 
In [me] defunct). 
(Othello, I. iii. 261-264) 
 
It should be noted that Desdemona, similarly, “saw Othello’s visage in his mind.” 
(Othello, I. iii. 252) They both appear to have been idealistic and idealizing lovers at the 
outset of their relationship.   
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Even the cynical, dark, ascetic prince Hamlet is caught red-handed – before his 
bitter disappointment in the entire female sex – writing poetry to the “celestial Ophelia,” 
whom he describes as “his soul’s idol.”10 
Hunting Dian – pursuing the spiritually anagogic goddess of Neoplatonism 
sexually – does not bode well for the madly audacious lover, and will surely be 
penalized.  
One way in which the goddess herself punishes a lover who pursues her 
improperly in Shakespeare’s darker plays is through what has usually been referred to as 
“the bed-trick.” 
 
7.2. THE BED-TRICK: FROM DIAN TO HELEN IN ONE EASY STEP 
 
Shakespeare’s bed-trick – the plot device whereby a sexually available woman is 
supplied for a lustful male character’s bed instead of the desired virgin, notably used in 
All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure – has at times been derided as an 
overly tidy and convenient resolution of a complex situation. I will attempt to 
demonstrate that, far from being a cheap ploy resorted to by the dramatist, the bed-trick 
represents a serious investigation into an issue not only of great personal significance to 
Shakespeare, permeating many of his works, but also one of great wider cultural import. 
Shakespeare probably learned how to “perform” the bed-trick from the sources he 
used for All’s Well That Ends Well. In the ninth story of the third day in Boccaccio’s 
Decameron, Giletta di Narbona supplies the place of the desired nameless virgin in her 
husband Beltramo’s bed and consequently becomes pregnant with his twin sons, which 
finally wins over her reluctant husband. Shakespeare most probably read the story in 
William Painter’s 1575 book The Palace of Pleasure, where it appears with few 
alterations.  
It is Shakespeare who introduces changes into the narrative. Instead of Beltramo’s 
unnamed virgin whose only barrier on the road to marriage is her poverty and consequent 
lack of a dowry, Betrtram is shown sexually pursuing an actual Dian who expresses a 
                                               
10 The expression itself, it should be noted, can have a variety of meanings, as will be seen; one of them, 
however, certainly is in keeping with the idolizing and idealizing inherent in pursuing heavenly Venus. 
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strong desire to remain unmarried. As another important emendation, while Beltramo is 
clearly deeply moved by Giletta’s, again, clearly beneficent persistence and the doting 
care she bestows upon their twin sons, Bertram is not as persuasively enthusiastic when 
he realizes he has indeed unwittingly consummated his marriage with the now obviously 
pregnant Helen.  
Having attempted to evade consummating his marriage, he has instead made the 
fatal mistake of sexually pursuing the chaste Dian. Helen immediately schemes to take 
Dian’s place: 
 
Let us assay our plot, which if it speed, 
Is wicked meaning in a lawful deed, 
And lawful meaning in a lawful act, 
Where both not sin, and yet a sinful fact 
(All’s Well That Ends Well, III. vii. 43-47) 
 
The plot will indeed “speed,” and Bertram will be successfully bed-tricked by the 
combined efforts of Dian and Helen. 
Perhaps the most symbolically significant of the changes that Shakespeare 
introduced is the naming of the two female characters. It would be difficult to find two 
names that are more explicitly indicative of what is at work in the bed-trick. Sexually 
pursuing an unattainable virgin explicitly named after the goddess Dian, Shakespeare’s 
Bertram will thus unwittingly bed an eager Helen, whose name – associated in the play 
with Helen of Troy – is likewise no accident. She has, tellingly, explicitly renounced 
Dian and her protection:  
 
Now, Dian, from thy altar do I fly,  
And to imperial Love, that god most high,  
Do my sighs stream.  
(All’s Well That Ends Well, II. iii. 74-76) 
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Bertram only has himself to blame, as a lover can only be bed-tricked because he 
has failed to heed the advice repeated ad nauseam by all the Renaissance love theorists, 
Ficino and Bruno in particular. A lover, they insist, must take great pains not to mistake 
vulgar Venus for heavenly Venus. If he sexually pursues the body of a female he believes 
he is in love with, then he has already succumbed to the snare of vulgar Venus. (Line 
2004: 16) The Dian he believes he has attained will transpire to be a Helen instead, as is 
the case literally with Bertram. Sexually pursuing virginal Dian, he finds himself firmly 
trapped in a marriage with pregnant Helen. 
Shakespeare uses the bed-trick explicitly in another dark comedy, written 
immediately after All’s Well That Ends Well. In Measure for Measure, although nothing 
exists in the sources that would inspire it, we again encounter the plot to substitute vulgar 
for heavenly Venus, an eager Helen for a chaste Dian. Although the names are not as 
explicitly evocative, the contrast between the two female characters is more extreme in 
the later play – instead of a virgin and a virgin wife, we are introduced there to a novice 
and a fiancée, who may or may not be entitled to consummate her betrothal lawfully.  
Angelo, carnally desiring the young aspiring nun Isabel, asks himself:  
 
Dost thou desire her foully for those things  
That make her good?  
(Measure for Measure, 173-174) 
 
That is precisely the snare of vulgar Venus that a lover is caught in if he is found 
to be hunting Dian: he desires her “foully” – that is, sexually – precisely for those things 
that “make her good” – that is, her utter “merciless” unavailability. Bed-tricked, Angelo 
will instead bed Mariana: 
 
With Angelo to-night shall lie 
His old betrothed (but despised); 
So disguise shall by th’ disguised 
Pay with falsehood false exacting, 
And perform an old contracting. 
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(Measure for Measure, III. ii. 278-282) 
  
Not only will a hunter of Dian never attain her, but he will be hunted down by Helen and 
trapped in the lowly world of matter.   
Bertram and Angelo are explicitly bed-tricked and there are two actual women 
that switch places in order to deceive them. All it takes for them to fall prey to vulgar 
Venus, falling into the trap of materiality, is one night, as it is the very fact of satisfying 
carnal desire that really tricks the heroic lover. There are, however, other Shakespeare’s 
heroes who are also, in a manner of speaking, bed-tricked – during the course of their 
own one night of sexual consummation – although two separate women do not make an 
actual appearance. 
When one starts examining the sex lives of Shakespeare’s heroes – always an 
amusing pastime – one cannot avoid a striking discovery: they are typically accorded 
only a single night of carnal pleasure, which is then inevitably closely followed by a 
catastrophe. Shakespeare seems to be consistently making a point of ignoring the sources 
in this respect. 
Chaucer’s lovers, for instance, have three years together, while Shakespeare’s 
Troilus and Cressida only get one night. (Martin 1976: 19) Giletta only stops visiting 
Beltramo’s bed when she is certain she is pregnant, whereas Bertram is trapped after a 
single night with Helen. In Arthur Brooke’s poem, which served as a chief source for 
Romeo and Juliet, the fatal fight occurs a month or two into the regularly – if 
clandestinely – consummated marriage, while in Shakespeare, the consummation of the 
marriage is explicitly and significantly the couple’s first and last night together. (Muir 
1956: 25) In the story from Giraldi’s Hecatommithi (III.7) which Shakespeare used as a 
source for Othello, Disdemona and the Moor live together in married harmony for years 
and even have a child together before the first sign of any trouble. (Muir 1956: 123) In 
Shakespeare’s tragedy, Iago begins his accusation on the morning after Othello’s 
marriage has been consummated – and is, unbelievably, believed. (Muir 1956: 136)  
Although it has been much attacked by critics, this is not at all accidental. 
Shakespeare in fact takes great pains to reinforce the fact that Othello’s marriage is 
consummated during their first night together on Cyprus and that it is only after this – but 
  214 
immediately after this – that troubles ensue. He first has Othello invite Desdemona to 
their chambers: 
 
Come, my dear love, 
The purchase made, the fruits are to ensue; 
That profit’s yet to come ‘tween me and you. 
(Othello, II. iii. 8-10) 
 
To make sure that we have understood it well and that he has thoroughly driven this point 
home, he also has Iago confirm that “He hath not yet made wanton the night with her.” 
(Othello, II. iii. 16-17) 
All these lovers – whether they are married to their Dians or not – will be bed-
tricked and suffer various calamities immediately after their one night of sex. The 
different complications that ensue seem to serve only as symptoms of the real problem – 
the fall into sexual pleasure. What is constant about the bed-trick is that all manner of 
disasters immediately follow this single night of carnal pleasure, and that the much 
desired woman undergoes profound changes, at least in the male lover’s mind.  
Hunting Dian and expecting to have a relationship with her always spells trouble. 
Dian can never be attained, and if a hero believes he is sexually pursuing her, he is 
certainly in for a rude awakening. This is the true significance of the bed-trick – vulgar 
Venus will trick any lover who succumbs to the lure of the carnal. One way or another, 
when hunted down, Dian will become Helen.  
There are different ways in which Dian becomes Helen, as there are different 
versions of lower Venus and different Helens. The very name “Helen” carried in the 
Renaissance several disparate negative connotations. Maguire records that Renaissance 
pamphlets counseled against christening one’s daughter Helen, as it was a name 
associated with sexuality, adultery, and the downfall of ancient civilization. The false 
etymology of the ancient Greeks that saw in Helen the root “hele” (“destroyer”) prevailed 
in Renaissance England, leading to regular punning on Helen/hell/heaven. In Peele’s 
Edward I Mortimer, for instance, plays on the name of his beloved: “Hell in thy name, 
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but heaven is in thy looks.” Helen could thus imply merely wanton sexuality, death and 
destruction, or even hell. (Maguire 2007: 77) 
 
 
            The Love of Helen and Paris (1788) by Jacques-Louis David 
 
Dian or heavenly Venus, pursued chastely, will simply lead the pure lover 
upwards towards the One. Helen or vulgar Venus, however – if she is able to lure a 
careless lover downwards into her snare of sexuality – will do any one of a whole range 
of horrible things to him. She will trap him in a fertile marriage, or deceive him 
whorishly, or kill him, depending on whether she appears in the guise of a mother, a 
whore, or a fatal witch. Witchcraft is associated with all the faces of vulgar Venus and, 
apparently, all the things that actual women might do. 
 
7.3.1. VULGAR VENUS 
 
The bed-trick, as I have attempted to show, can be read as an allegorical 
representation of what happens when the lover does not heed Ficino’s and Bruno’s 
warnings. Since it is impossible to bed Bruno’s Dian, she will instantly transform into 
Helen; Ficino’s heavenly Venus will promptly become vulgar Venus. The lover, lusting 
after a virgin in a misguided attempt at ascent and liberty, falls and instead finds himself 
encumbered with an all-too-earthly woman, trapped in the material world of marriage and 
procreation, as transpires in the so-called “problem plays” – provided he is lucky. If he is 
unlucky, as is usually the case in the tragedies, his fall will lead him straight into the dark 
chaos of unformed prime matter.  
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It is in her most munificent form, then, that vulgar Venus “merely” tricks the 
unfortunate lover and traps sparks of divine beauty that issue from him, transfers them 
into lower Nature, and uses them to invest matter with beautiful new human forms. This 
is what happens to the questing lover who, desiring heavenly Portia, mistakenly chooses 
the silver casket with its picture of a fool – he has been, in Polonius’ phrase, tendered a 
fool, as he is now encumbered with a “fool,” a contemporary term for an infant. Desiring 
Dian, the lover has been bed-tricked by Helen, vulgar Venus, who, in her form of Mother 
Nature, imprisons men in a world of sexuality and fertility, which any heroic lover would 
have naturally preferred to avoid. 
In Shakespeare’s sources, Beltramo is depicted as merely unhappy with Giletta’s 
social status, preferring to marry a more suitable lady, whereas Bertram seems reluctant 
to marry altogether. He tellingly complains when he finds himself married to Helen and 
decides to go into the wars instead: 
 
Wars is no strife 
To the dark house and the detested wife. 
(All’s Well That Ends Well, II. iii. 291-292) 
 
The “dark house,” interestingly enough, is the name of the hell Malvolio finds 
himself trapped in, as well, when he unworthily pursues the exalted Olivia. The 
expression also recalls Othello’s nostalgia for his “unhoused free condition” which he has 
sacrificed for his love of “the gentle Desdemona.” (Bloom 1991: 65) Marriage itself can 
here be read as a kind of a hell and a kind of a fall – the dreaded snare of vulgar Venus. 
It is understandable how this theory of love wherein vulgar Venus is so easily able 
to trap one after a single night of pleasure could have gained ground in a time when 
contraception was at best dubious, and at worst unheard of, and a casual encounter could 
lead straight to forced marriage. Premarital sex, Greaves records, does not seem to have 
been the ordinary practice in Elizabethan society, but neither was it rare. Many weddings 
performed in Elizabethan and Jacobean England appear to have been the direct result of a 
pregnancy. (Greaves 1981: 204-205)  
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A wedding was sometimes not even required for a betrothed couple to be trapped 
in marriage if it transpired that their relationship had already been sexually consummated 
– which usually transpired because it was made obvious by the fiancée’s pregnancy. The 
folk custom of the time which recognized an official act of betrothal before witnesses as 
constituting marriage, a so-called “pre-contract,” was acknowledged by canon. (Wilson 
1933: 43) It does not seem likely that this custom was devised to confer rights or grant 
permission or give license to the affianced couple. Otherwise, Prospero’s strong 
insistence on awaiting a proper wedding would be uncalled for, and Claudio and Juliet 
would not have reason to be as contrite as they at least appear to be. The “pre-contract” 
would rather seem to prescribe consequences: the engaged male who has consummated 
his relationship with his fiancée is now in effect married, no longer free to marry another 
person, and responsible for any child that might be on its way. It in practice most 
probably made a significant portion of shotgun weddings redundant, trapping men 
forever without even necessitating a church ritual.  
Shakespeare himself, of course, quite probably ended up married in a way that 
resembled the bed-trick. The timing of his first daughter’s birth notoriously belied 
prenuptial sexual activities that trapped the young Adonis-like boy in a marriage with his 
own earthly Venus – or else the baby was born so extremely prematurely that her survival 
was a miracle. (Burgess 1970). It is quite conceivable (pun intended) that he would take a 
keen interest in ways to avoid falling into the snare of vulgar Venus, even is it was too 
late for him. 
Bertram’s Helen is likewise pregnant – which means he will not be escaping the 
dark house and the detested wife after all – and her body, an icon of vulgar Venus, has 
trapped a divine spark from Bertram in it. It is now busy working on imprisoning it in a 
material body of its own. 
Angelo is similarly bed-tricked and trapped, after a single night of carnality, in a 
valid marriage with Mariana, his “old betrothed (but despised).” He seems to bear this 
imprisoning punishment by marriage with only slightly more grace than Lucio, who 
complains that “Marrying a punk, my lord, is pressing to death, whipping, and hanging.” 
(All’s Well That Ends Well, V. i. 522-523) Other couples are also forcibly married after 
their sexual escapades: from the promiscuous pair with a child growing in a brothel, 
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through the expecting couple we certainly believe “have embrac’d” more than once, to 
the pair whose fate is sealed after one night. Even the announced marriage of the pure 
virginal couple seems forced – perhaps precisely because they have both expressed 
freedom from erotic passions as one of their chief aspirations. Gay sees at the end of the 
play  
 
a glum procession of the forced marriages of Angelo and Mariana, Lucio and his punk; 
even Claudio and his Juliet, parents of a new child, are, one assumes, marked for life by 
the traumatic events of the play. And, famously, Isabella makes no reply to the Duke’s 
repeated offer of marriage. (Gay 2002: 121)  
 
Nobody seems to be allowed to escape marriage in the worlds of All’s Well That Ends 
Well and Measure for Measure. Their rulers like to play matchmakers, and even their 
dedicated virgins will end up married.  
 Vulgar Venus can in her indomitable persistence on trapping in marriage even 
make a comic appearance, as she seems to do in The Merchant of Venice, where it is 
enough to simply give rings to pretty, clever boys, and even they will as a result 
transform into nagging, scolding wives. 
Cleopatra, in her “infinite variety,” is certainly also cast in the role of imprisoning 
vulgar Venus, even if she is simultaneously her heavenly counterpart as well – along with 
all the other versions of the goddess. Antony realizes:  
 
These strong Egyptian fetters I must break,  
Or lose myself in dotage. […] 
I must from this enchanting queen break off. 
(Antony and Cleopatra, I. ii. 116-117; 128)  
 
Trapped in her snare of sexuality and fertility, Antony is not even imprisoned in a 
lawful marriage by his vulgar Venus, but somewhere even lower than that: in the 
“fetters” of mere “lust.” Cleopatra is disturbingly presented as a witch, who is able to 
“enchant” Antony and trap him by way of her craft.  
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She also traps him by way of her fertility. The couple is depicted as sitting on the 
throne with Caesarion, Cleopatra’s son by Caesar, at their side,  
 
And all the unlawful issue that their lust  
Since then hath made between them.  
(Antony and Cleopatra, III. vi. 7-8) 
 
Antony and Cleopatra, significantly, have a multitude of children, which makes them 
unique as an amorous couple in Shakespeare’s entire opus. As Northrop Frye notes in his 
“Antony and Cleopatra,” Cleopatra is represented as a fertile goddess of the overflowing 
Nile ruling an Egypt that is partly the Biblical Egypt, whose Pharaoh was referred to as 
“the great dragon that lieth in the midst of his rivers,” and whose ruler here is “the serpent 
of old Nile whom we last see nursing a baby serpent at her breast.” (Bloom Antony 2008: 
243) This fertility shared by the Nile, Egypt, and Cleopatra is serpentine, disturbing, and 
imprisoning.  
Procreation is quite precarious both in Shakespeare and Renaissance 
Neoplatonism, as it requires a harmonious balance between spirit and matter. This is, of 
course, difficult to achieve in systems where clear extremes – spirit and matter, purity and 
filth, divine love and carnal lust – are so much insisted upon and mentioned with such 
frequency. Both heroic lovers and lusty lechers, Dians and Helens, virgins and whores, 
are more likely to be depicted without progeny.  
 
7.3.2.1. DIAN’S VISAGE NOW BEGRIM’D AND BLACK: VULGAR 
VENUS AS A WHORE, OR CONSTRUCTING THE VIRGIN/WHORE 
DICHOTOMY 
 
The Helen that the carnally desired Dian will often transform into during the bed-
trick is Helen of Troy, the archetypal whore. Lucrece, looking at the painting of Troy, 
bemoans the fall of “cloud-kissing Ilion,” and draws a parallel between the previously tall 
and heavenly city and a previously spiritual and rational man who is ruined by beastly 
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lust – like Paris was. Helen is to blame for the tragic fate of both: she is introduced and 
the city is then besieged by chaos and passion until it collapses, and her lover dies.  
Wells sees in the image of the besieged city an “ancient and familiar symbol of 
reason threatened by the treacherous passions” and explains that  
 
the Troy story haunted the imaginations of Renaissance writers as a symbol of our fallen 
human condition. Here was an archetypal tale about a city that fell, not as a result of the 
military superiority of the enemy, but because of an act of treachery within. (Wells 2005: 
23)  
 
Lucrece squarely blames all this lust which degenerates and disintegrates both 
man and city from within on Helen, and her imagination takes a particularly violent turn: 
 
Show me the strumpet that began this stir, 
That with my nails her beauty I may tear. 
(Rape of Lucrece, 1471-1472) 
 
The Helen of All’s Well that Ends Well is deliberately linked with her Trojan 
namesake. The clown at one point sings a song about Helen of Troy which, as Muir 
believes, “may be meant to suggest that the Helena of the play is extremely beautiful,” 
(Muir 1956: 98) or, as I believe, may be meant to suggest all the other slightly less 
appealing attributes usually ascribed to Helen of Troy – such as whorishly luring Paris 
and other men downwards into a realm of war and lechery. 
Shakespeare’s Helen also explicitly associates herself with Helen of Troy when 
she explains to the Countess: 
 
My lord your son made me to think of this;  
Else Paris and the medicine and the king  
Had from the conversation of my thoughts 
Haply been absent then. 
(All’s Well That Ends Well, I. lalala) 
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In Jardine’s apt, if euphemistic phrase, the pun on Paris – both the city and the lustful 
lover of the other Helen – “does not help.” Impelled to notice that Helen, as she is 
depicted in the play, “appears as a schemer,” which seems to her is a deliberate allusion 
to all other Helens who whorishly govern male action, Jardine also sees Shakespeare’s 
heroine – a match for Parolles in his quibbling on virginity – as too “knowing” for the 
innocent virgin she is supposed to be. The “knowing” woman, in any sense of the word, 
Jardine claims, can only precariously be a positive force in the Renaissance, despite the 
existence of writers who were enthusiastically propagating the education of women. 
Helen is a knowing woman in more than one way: significantly, she is intimately familiar 
with medicine and the dark secrets of the human body. (Jardine 2005: 53-57) 
Allison P. Coudert reminds that female curiosity in general was a consuming 
topic for early modern males, who saw women as “so many Pandoras, Psyches, Lot’s 
wives, and Eves, whose snooping, particularly into sexual matters, was categorically 
condemned.” (Hanegraaf/Kripal 2008: 252) The “knowing” woman, which 
Shakespeare’s Helen betrays herself to be, bore in Shakespeare’s time the suggestion of 
being sexually loose.   
The Helen or vulgar Venus who sometimes seems to take pure Dian’s place in a 
lustful lover’s bed, and especially his mind, can drag him down into the material prison 
of marriage and procreation, if she appears in her most benevolent, wifely and motherly 
guise. But, if she drags him even farther downwards, towards mere lust, where not even 
beautiful human forms are being created, she can transpire to be a whore. 
This is the fate that Troilus feels he has suffered. Having managed – or so he 
believes – to bed his Dian, the “stubborn-chaste” Cressida, he now feels bed-tricked, 
acting as if he were waking up next to a Helen instead. Girard notices that, as Troilus and 
Cressida are getting up after their first and only night together, he “no longer speaks like 
a man in love.” (Parker/Hartman 2005: 187) Krims conjectures that this is because “when 
Cressida reveals her desire, she shatters his childish idealization of her; now he fears she 
is a whore.” (Krims 2006: 101)  
This childish idealization appears to have been shattered in Shakespeare’s mind as 
well after the lovers have had their one night, as it is also “objectively” – in the world of 
the play, not just Troilus’ mind – that Cressida is instantly transformed after it. It may be 
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good to remember here that Chaucer’s Cressida was a young widow, who acted timidly 
and coyly among the Greeks for a long time until, because of her loneliness and fear, she 
finally succumbed to Diomedes’ advances. Shakespeare’s Cressida, by contrast, acts 
from the moment of her arrival to the Greek camp like a shameless flirt, and her 
unbridled lust apparently makes her go for the first male who shows any interest 
whatsoever. (Muir 1956: 79-81) Troilus’ Dian has turned into a Helen following their one 
night of sexual pleasure and accordingly comports herself much as does the actual Helen 
of the play. 
This is, in effect, what happens to Desdemona in Othello’s mind, as well. The 
moment their marriage is consummated Desdemona miraculously transforms from a 
virgin straight into a whore: 
 
[Her] name, that was as fresh 
As Dian’s visage, is now begrim’d and black 
As mine own face. 
(Othello, III. iii. 386-388) 
 
It is only after their single night together – but immediately after it – that it is 
possible for Othello to see his Dian as a Helen. The paradox of the timeframe (what is 
usually referred to as “double-time” in Othello criticism) enables Iago to begin his 
accusation on the very morning after the night in which Othello’s marriage has been 
consummated, a fact, Muir reports, much attacked by critics. (Muir 1956: 136)  
However, it is precisely this exaggerated absurdity that reveals what is actually 
taking place in Othello’s mind. His revulsion is really caused by his Dian – the 
unattainable heavenly Venus – agreeing to have sex with him and thus proving to be a 
Helen, a vulgar Venus, a sexual woman made of flesh and blood. Thus she goes in his 
mind from virgin to whore, without stopping at wife. The morning after she loses her 
virginity to him he is absurdly able to ask himself “What sense had I in her stol’n hours 
of lust?” (Othello, III. iii. 338) Othello’s jealousy is caused by the subconscious 
conclusion, heavily reinforced by the dualistic misogynist Iago, that “wife” already 
equals “whore,” which allows his imagination to run wild: 
  223 
 
I had been happy, if the general camp, 
Pioners and all, had tasted her sweet body, 
So I had nothing known. 
(Othello, III. iii. 345-347) 
 
Holderness explains more lucidly this sudden leap in Othello’s mind from 
imagining Desdemona as a heavenly Venus to seeing her as the whorish version 
of vulgar Venus the moment he realizes she is not Dian in person: 
 
This is what Othello took Desdemona to be, in herself: not a type or image of 
the ideal, but the form itself. Desdemona’s failure to measure up to the ideal is for 
Othello an unforgivable sin: he must kill her to preserve his own honour and the absolute 
perfection of his vision. If Desdemona is not the heavenly virgin of Cassio’s annunciation 
– “Hail to thee, lady!” – then she can only be her contrary, the woman clothed in scarlet. 
(Holderness 2010: 98)  
 
This is the root of the enormous significance that the “lost” handkerchief carries 
in the tragedy. Lynda Boose has famously argued in her seminal “Othello’s 
Handkerchief: The Recognizance and Pledge of Love” that the handkerchief represents 
the consummated marriage of the newlywed couple and their wedding sheets stained with 
blood, which she reads as proof that Desdemona has entered her marriage as a virgo 
intacta. For this conclusion she cites the folk custom of displaying the spotted wedding 
sheets as proof of the bride’s virginity. (Boose 1975) Emma Smith asserts that it is 
precisely in the handkerchief that the double vision which Othello has of Desdemona can 
best be perceived, as, “when the handkerchief is first given” – which is, significantly, 
before their first night together in Cyprus – “it represents her virtue and their chaste love, 
but it later becomes a sign, indeed a proof, of her unfaithfulness.” (Smith 2004: 233) 
The word “spotted” connects the handkerchief with both roles that Desdemona is 
cast in: virtuous wife (in the objective reality of the play) and shameless whore (which 
she is forced to play in Othello’s mind). The handkerchief spotted with strawberries is in 
imagery first implicitly associated with the newlyweds’ wedding sheets spotted with her 
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maiden blood, and then explicitly by Othello when he decides that her “bed, lust-stain’d, 
shall with lust’s blood be spotted.” (Othello, V. i. 36)11 As mere hours have passed since 
the consummation of their marriage on those very sheets, we can only surmise that 
Othello equates in his mind “lust’s blood” with Desdemona’s maiden blood. As Sinfield 
reminds, citing Snowden, to Othello’s injunction, “Think on thy sins,” Desdemona 
replies, “They are loves I bear to you,” to which Othello laconically comments: “And for 
that thou diest.” (Othello, V. ii. 40-41) What transpires here is that “Othello finds himself 
acknowledging that Desdemona’s offense resides in her legitimately expressed 
sexuality.” (Sinfield 1992: 76) 
It should be stressed that Desdemona does not lose the handkerchief, which she 
personally values greatly. Othello himself discards it, throwing it on the floor and 
complaining that it is “too small.” Apparently, this signifier that she is a virtuous wife 
who has lost her virginity to him is just not good enough. She is no longer Dian, which 
makes her a whore.  
Desdemona, Dympna Callaghan surmises based on her studies into Elizabethan 
and Jacobean performance, was most probably depicted in “whiteface,” as women’s 
characters were customarily represented by “excessive whiteness,” while the deliberately 
named Bianca must have been even more heavily made up to connote what she terms 
“the transgressive ultra-white femininity.” Cosmetics for women, which consisted 
primarily of whitening their faces, were in themselves a whorish enterprise, linking 
women with deceiving devils and enchanting witches. Depicting Desdemona on stage in 
whiteface already, to a degree, comprises calumny.  
Interestingly enough, Othello was also depicted on stage using the despicable art 
of “face-painting,” as the actor playing his role would have been a white male wearing 
“blackface.” (Callaghan 2000: 81-88) Thus both Othello and Desdemona were 
represented by white males, one painted black, the other white, to denote the different 
ways in which these two characters are othered. As Karen Newman observes in her 
““And Wash the Ethiop White”: Femininity and the Monstrous in Othello,” the other “is 
constituted discursively in the play as both woman and black.” (Smith 2004: 227)  
                                               
11 Emphasis mine. 
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Both these otherings are based on the explicit Neoplatonic conception of matter as 
the “dark other” and would have been impossible without it. Both women and black 
“barbarians” were believed to be by nature more material and more carnal than Western 
white males. Both, however educated and civilized, were expected to be able to easily 
revert to this beastly fundament of their natures: the Black, however civilized, will thus 
become a savage barbarian, and the woman, however virginal, will become a whore.   
Another signifier of the fact that both Desdemona and Othello are othered in the 
world of the play is noted by Peter Stallybrass in his “Transvestism and the “body 
beneath”: speculating on the boy actor,” in which he discusses at length the use of the 
name “Barbary” by both characters. In her willow song, Desdemona takes on the voice of 
“poor Barbary,” a maidservant by that name who was abandoned by her lover. 
(Zimmerman 2005: 56) The name “Barbary” was in Shakespeare’s time used for both the 
Berber-Arab people of the part of North Africa and the region they inhabited. They were, 
significantly, also referred to as “Moors.” (Holderness 2010: 47)  
Iago uses the toponymical designation “Barbary” in his attack on Othello before 
Brabantio, when he warns Desdemona’s father that he will have his daughter “cover’d 
with a Barbary horse.” Barbary, Stallybrass concludes, is thus both “the name for bestial 
male sexuality” and “the name for a maid betrayed in love”:  
 
A single signifier slides between male and female, animal and human, betrayer and 
betrayed, and at the same time between opposed notions of the “barbarian” as oppressor 
and as victim. (Zimmerman 2005: 57)  
 
Othello is in Iago’s imagination thus a beastly barbarian, unfit for the gentle-born 
Desdemona. He later tellingly describes the precarious married couple as “an erring 
barbarian and [a] super-subtle Venetian.” (Othello, I. iii. 356) “Super-subtle,” of course, 
has a double meaning: Desdemona can be interpreted as being overly refined, delicate, 
and dainty, and thus not a good match for the barbaric Othello. It can, however, also 
imply her deceptive whorishness, and thus the way in which she herself is othered as a 
woman. This doubleness is both the doubleness of Venus and the doubleness of Venice, 
which was in Shakespeare’s time known for its superior culture and civilization, but also 
had a “distinct and controversial reputation as a city of pleasure,” one aspect of which 
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was “the legendary beauty of Venetian women.” (Holderness 2010: 28) Desdemona, the 
Dian and heavenly Venus of the play, has implicitly and explicitly been attacked in the 
course of it as a deceptive whore.   
She is not the only one against whom this crime has, perhaps at times 
surprisingly, been perpetrated. The young, innocent Juliet is also under attack. After 
pursuing Rosaline, according to the eerie words of the Chorus,  
 
Now Romeo is belov’d and loves again,  
Alike bewitched by the charm of looks.  
(Romeo and Juliet, II. Ch. 5-6)  
 
If the Chorus is to be heeded, then young Juliet, much like Cleopatra, is a witch 
enchanting poor males with her bodily charms.  
Perhaps she has learned only too well how to fall on her back once she is grown, 
in the bawdy phrase of the Nurse’s husband. It is tempting to read these words as a comic 
retort to the already comic praise that Agrippa bestows on women’s superior modesty: 
“when they fall they fall on their backs and not on their faces.” (Agrippa 1993: 15) 
Falling on one’s back might be indicative of more “modesty,” but it can even more easily 
be indicative of sexual availability, which appears to be Shakespeare’s snarky meaning 
here. Juliet has fallen on her back, apparently, and it somehow causes the fall in the play 
from the exalted balcony scene to the tomb – if it is a fall. 
Antony and Cleopatra are also depicted as an intentionally ambiguous couple – 
much more so than Romeo and Juliet – potentially both divinely exalted and bestially 
depraved. Antony’s fall, however, again, if it is a fall, undeniably transpires owing to lust. 
Philo, significantly, has the opening words, and they are ruthless: 
 
Nay, but this dotage of our general’s 
O’erflows the measure. Those his goodly eyes, 
That o’er the files and musters of the war 
Have glow’d like plated Mars, now turn  
The office and devotion of their view 
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Upon a tawny front; his captain’s heart, 
Which in the scuffles of great fights hath burst 
The buckles on his breast, reneges all temper, 
And is become the bellows and the fan 
To cool a gipsy’s lust. 
Look where they come! 
Take but good note, and you shall see in him 
The triple pillar of the world transform’d 
Into a strumpet’s fool. 
(Antony and Cleopatra, I. i. 1-13) 
 
There are two important Philos in the history of Neoplatonism who would have 
said something quite like this. One of them is Philo of Alexandria, who repeatedly and 
disgustedly refers to Egypt as the country of the body and carnal passions. (Philo 1995: 
245-248) The other is Philo (Leone) Ebreo, a Renaissance Neoplatonist, who taught the 
familiar Neoplatonic doctrine of the two discrete kinds of love, of which the lower one 
was a child of lust, blind and careless, which would inevitably turn into violence and 
jealousy. (Garen 1988: 150) Whichever Shakespeare was referring to – and he could well 
have been referring to both – we are not meant to simply disregard as immaterial the 
venerable Philo’s words, according to which Cleopatra is a lustful “gypsy” and a 
bewitching “strumpet.” 
Caesar does not seem to think much better of Cleopatra when he plans to win her 
over:  
 
Women are not  
In their best fortunes strong, but want will perjure  
The ne’er touched vestal.  
(Antony and Cleopatra, III. xii. 29-31)  
 
Virgins can easily becomes whores, as is always the case in dualistic systems of thought, 
but Cleopatra is no vestal to begin with. Predictably, she does betray Antony in battle 
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repeatedly, at which he rages: “Triple-turn’d whore.” (Antony and Cleopatra, IV. xii. 13) 
There seems to be a gratuitous elision of non-sexual betrayal with sexually connoted 
“whoredom” – at least when women are spoken of. 
Thus, when Ophelia acquiesces to being used by her father to discover the reason 
behind the young prince’s “antic disposition,” Hamlet rages at her in explicitly sexual 
terms, accusing her of whorishly deceiving men with her face-painting and implying she 
will cuckold her as yet non-existent future husband. Both women in the tragedy, the 
remarried widow and the young virgin, are tellingly used as “bait” at some point, which 
reduces them to pieces of flesh in imagery and thus frames them as sexually loose.  
Hamlet has already read Gertrude as a whore for remarrying with such haste, and 
transposed this designation onto all womanhood – including Ophelia – in his pathetic 
“Frailty, thy name is woman!” Apparently bed-tricked by his mother’s sexual “frailty,” 
Hamlet instantly transforms “celestial” Ophelia into a whore in his mind. 
Male minds make the Dian-to-vulgar-Venus, virgin-to-whore leap with 
astounding speed and ease even in the comedies and romances. Claudio, for instance, 
rants about his beloved Hero in Much Ado about Nothing after hearing one 
unsubstantiated rumor:  
 
You seem to me as Dian in her orb, 
As chaste as is the bud ere it be blown, 
But you are more intemperate in your blood 
Than Venus, or those pamp’red animals 
That rage in savage sensuality. 
(Much Ado about Nothing, IV. i. 57-61) 
 
Posthumus similarly rages in Cymbeline, for similarly silly reasons: 
 
We are all bastards, 
And that most venerable man which I 
Did call my father, was I know not where 
When I was stamp’d. Some coiner with his tools 
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Made me a countefeit; yet my mother seem’d 
The Dian of that time. 
(Cymbeline, II. v. 2-7) 
 
The Neoplatonic dualistic theory of erotic love, according to which any desirable 
female form is either heavenly Venus leading the heroic lover upwards to the pristine 
purity of masculine spirit or vulgar Venus dragging him downwards to the filth of 
feminine matter, had a pivotal role in constructing the virgin/whore dichotomy in much 
the same form as it still exists in the Western world today. Shakespeare, in turn, had a 
pivotal role in imprinting it in the minds of those throughout the following centuries who 
consumed his work – but he also seems to have provided the antidote.  
 
7.3.2.2. GET THEE TO A NUNNERY: DECONSTRUCTING THE 
VIRGIN/WHORE DICHOTOMY 
 
When Hamlet advises Ophelia to refrain from becoming a wife and mother, he 
significantly tells her: “Get thee to a nunnery. Why wouldst thou be a breeder of 
sinners?” (Hamlet, III. i. 123) As Williams asserts in his fascinating Glossary of 
Shakespeare’s Sexual Language, he is almost certainly, at least implicitly, alluding here 
to a brothel. One significant common denominator of both these female abodes was the 
supposed childlessness they entailed, he notes, as nuns were debarred from breeding, and 
whores were “allegedly incapable.” (Williams 1997) Hamlet’s “get thee to a nunnery” is 
a cry aimed at all women in dualistic systems of erotic love: you can legitimately be 
either virgins or whores, but not wives or mothers. A woman’s place is in a nunnery, 
whether it is to be understood as a monastery or a brothel. 
Measure for Measure offers an abundance of material for a case study of this 
phenomenon. Isabel’s actual literal nunnery has a telling rule about speaking with men: 
 
Then if you speak, you must not show your face, 
Or if you show your face, you must not speak 
(Measure for Measure, I. iv. 12-13) 
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Michael D. Friedman explains that because “these limitations apply only when a sister 
speaks with men, we may assume that they are designed to prevent the arousal of male 
sexual desire, which presumably occurs when women speak and display their beauty at 
the same time.” (Friedman 1996: 4) The regulations signify more than this, however. 
They diminish the threat of women by obviously and artificially splitting them into mind 
and body, spirit and flesh, nuns and whores, and forbidding them to be both at once. It 
should be noted that Isabel is advised by the Duke to demand “all shadow and silence” 
(Measure for Measure, III. i. 247) for her purported encounter with Angelo; a woman 
cannot be both spirit and flesh, but she is allowed, apparently, to be neither. (Igrutinović 
2009: 114) 
 The entire play itself splits womanhood in such an obviously artificial way that 
makes it difficult to resist imagining Shakespeare deliberately providing ammunition for 
deconstructing this split all along the way. In all other versions of the story, it is the 
felon’s wife who is asked to sleep with the judge, in all other versions of the story she 
does in fact yield to save her husband’s life, and in no version of the story is she judged 
for it. According to the description on the title-page of Whetstone’s play – one of the 
sources that Shakespeare used – it concerns itself with the “venturous behaviours of a 
chaste Ladye.” (Stead 1971: 11) 
It is only in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure that the dilemma posed before 
the heroine – a young novice, and not a wife – creates such an absolute chasm between 
charity and chastity, and only in the world of this play that chastity seems to be in effect 
incompatible with charity. Shakespeare artificially separates chastity from charity as he 
splits the chaste but yielding wife, and thus womanhood as well, into the mercilessly 
virginal Isabel and the gently yielding Mariana. The image of Mariana and Isabel – 
champions of charity and chastity – meeting at the moated grange with the Duke, is 
juxtaposed to that of the offenders against charity and chastity – Barnardine the murderer 
and Claudio the fornicator – rotting in Angelo’s prison together, awaiting their 
executions. 
A woman in this world can either be a whore or a nun – inevitably an inhabitant 
of a “nunnery” – and there are no wives in the entire play. Charity and chastity, fertility 
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and sterility, love and legalism, the carnal and the spiritual are all radically opposed and 
always present only in their extremes. As Harriett Hawkins rightly observes, “the 
borderline between angelic and demonic extremes of virtue and vice” is “a very narrow 
one, and all too easy to cross” (Hawkins 1978: 109) in the dualistic world of Measure for 
Measure. Thus far almost incorporeal, the Puritan Angelo is, at the very first stirrings of 
sexual desire, driven “to embrace the basest of urges […], since he believes that his 
prurient interest in Isabella indicates a complete depravity.” (Holloway 1998: 3) Or, in 
Ted Hughes’ terms, “behind Angelo’s face, Adonis has become Tarquin,” (Hughes 1992: 
171) going from one extreme to the other in a matter of seconds. (Igrutinović 2009: 113) 
Shakespeare, apparently conscious of this radical split that occurs in dualistic systems, by 
taking it to the extreme, actually helps expose it.  
Ernest Jones has famously attempted to explain, in his seminal “Hamlet and 
Oedipus,” the extreme virgin/whore dichotomy he has discovered in Hamlet in 
psychoanalytic terms as a result of 
 
the splitting of the mother image which the infantile unconscious effects into two 
opposite pictures: one of a virginal Madonna, an inaccessible saint towards whom all 
sensual approaches are unthinkable, and the other of a sensual creature accessible to 
everyone. […] When sexual repression is highly pronounced, as with Hamlet, then both 
types of women are felt to be hostile: the pure one out of resentment at her repulses, the 
sensual one out of the temptation she offers to plunge into guiltiness. Misogyny, as in the 
play, is the inevitable result. (Jump 1968: 57-58)  
 
Misogyny is, of course, already inherent in the dualism of the Neoplatonic love theory 
which is the real metaphysical source of the highly pronounced sexual repression that the 
more idealistic amongst Shakespeare’s heroes – Hamlet being a case in point here – seem 
to suffer from. If we have any problem with the concept of the “splitting of the mother 
image” in the “infantile unconscious,” it is not necessarily crucial as a prerequisite for the 
analogous splitting of any female figure into the virgin/whore extremes which has existed 
in Platonic and Neoplatonic thought at least since the Symposium. Shakespeare offers in 
his extreme splittings of the feminine ample material for deconstructing the dichotomy. 
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The female characters involved in bed-tricks yield examples of womanhood split 
into extremes now miraculously united and conspiring against the males who insist on 
splitting them. Bloom has noted that there have been numerous critical theories of 
“interconnection between Diana and Helena, examining how they come together in the 
bed-trick to form one “super-woman,” comprised of otherwise incompatible paradoxes 
such as action and submissiveness, sexuality and chastity.” (Bloom All’s Well 2010: 14) 
As has been noticed, the woman in Measure for Measure is split into Isabella and 
Mariana, who then likewise form this “super-woman” when they too collude in the bed-
trick. It can appear that the reason they are brought together is partly to accentuate that 
there has been, prior to the whole shenanigans and probably causing them, a split into 
these impossible extremes, and that it needs to be healed, if at least for a short while. 
In the inexorably split world of Measure for Measure, Marian and Juliet, who 
belong to the loving, charitable, and fertile paradigm, fall squarely under what Sinfield 
calls the “whorish alternative to female sexuality,” along with the prostitutes. When 
opposed to the virginal Isabella, they constitute what Callaghan refers to as a “dynamic of 
the polarized feminine.” This dynamic can be found again and again in Shakespeare: the 
evidently still virginal young wife Lavinia is accorded the whorish Tamora as her 
counterpart, and Octavia – whose marriage is likewise apparently yet to be consummated 
in Shakespeare’s play – is given Cleopatra. In Othello, this role is taken by Bianca, while 
the divine Desdemona, Sinfield notes, “is the madonna in the customary madonna/whore 
binary,” quickly adding that “the two elements in such binaries are always collapsing into 
each other.” (Sinfield 1992: 75) 
Another way in which Shakespeare sometimes helps deconstruct the virgin/whore 
dichotomy is by allowing it to collapse. Desdemona, whose name contains a “demon,” 
and Bianca, the white innocent one, are inextricably connected through Cassio. The 
designated Adonis of the play, Cassio duly worships heavenly Venus in the “divine” 
Desdemona, but consorts with vulgar Venus in (“white” or “white-painted”) Bianca, a 
prostitute whom he despises, abuses (calling her “a customer” [prostitute], “the monkey,” 
“the bauble” [toy], a “fitchew [polecat, thought to be lecherous and smelly] – marry, a 
perfum’d one!”), and has no intention of marrying. 
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Another link between the designated virgin and the designated whore is 
Desdemona’s handkerchief which Bianca copies. (Klajn 1991: 338) Significantly, when 
Desdemona formerly known as the virgin loses it, it is Emilia the wife who snatches it 
and it ends up with Bianca the prostitute. This is one of the relatively rare straightforward 
appearances that the Triple Goddess deigns to make in Shakespeare. 
The mythologies of both ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonism had the notion of 
the Triple Goddess, consisting of three goddesses associated with three separate phases of 
the moon. The Triple Goddess typically comprises the pure virgin in the heavens (Dian, 
the new moon), the fertile wife and mother on earth (Demeter, the full moon), and the 
deathly crone in the underworld (Persephone, the dark of the moon). These were usually 
seen, relatively unproblematically, as phases of a woman’s life or the changing seasons in 
nature. The Triple Goddess, predictably, becomes in Shakespeare very problematic 
indeed, as his fertile wife – and there is a precious dearth of wives in his world – is 
already an imprisoning vulgar Venus, and his pure virgins do not escape calumny either. 
The deathly crones are abundant, though, and are forced to carry fertility, whorishness, 
and fatality. This causes the other guises of the goddess to collapse into the most 
disturbing one. 
In Othello, we can see the Triple Goddess collapsing into a virgin/whore 
dichotomy which will then, of course, further collapse, as dichotomies are wont to. 
Desdemona, now a wife and no longer a heavenly virgin, has her handkerchief taken by 
the wife of the play, Emilia, only for it to be almost immediately conferred to Bianca, the 
prostitute of the play. The wives are already whores – as only virgins are not whores – 
and there are no more virgins. The conclusion practically imposes itself: there is no 
Triple Goddess, and there is no virgin/whore dichotomy either. All the women in the play 
are squarely whores. 
On the other hand, Bianca the prostitute is obviously right to call herself honest, 
as she is certainly the least deceitful and the most loyal character in the play. All the 
women in the play can easily also be read as honest – at least more honest than the men 
they find themselves attached to. The female characters seem to resist the virgin/whore 
dichotomy imposed on them by the male ones. 
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Ophelia, who apparently, more than anything, wished to be Hamlet’s wife – a 
wish wholeheartedly supported by her would-be mother-in-law – solves the virgin/whore 
riddle imposed on her in Hamlet’s “nunnery” rant by being both and neither. In her mad 
frenzy she is shown both as a sexually repressed virgin desiring marriage and as a 
luxuriantly sensual woman capable of distinctly bawdy allusions. Showalter asserts in her 
“Representing Ophelia: women, madness, and the responsibilities of feminist criticism” 
that Ophelia is in this scene certainly meant to represent both innocence and whoredom, 
and simultaneously: 
 
Her flowers suggest the discordant double images of female sexuality as both innocent 
blossoming and whorish contamination; she is the “green girl” of pastoral, the virginal 
“Rose of May” and the sexually explicit madwoman who, in giving away her wild 
flowers and herbs, is symbolically deflowering herself. The “weedy trophies” and phallic 
“long purples” which she wears to her death intimate an improper and discordant 
sexuality that Gertrude’s lovely elegy cannot quite obscure. In Elizabethan and Jacobean 
drama, the stage direction that a woman enters with dishevelled hair indicates that she 
might either be mad or the victim of a rape; the disordered hair, her offense against 
decorum, suggests sensuality in each case. The mad Ophelia’s bawdy songs and verbal 
license, while they give her access to “an entirely different range of experience” from 
what she is allowed as the dutiful daughter, seem to be her one sanctioned form of self-
assertion as a woman, quickly followed, as if in retribution, by her death. 
(Parker/Hartman 2005: 80)  
 
Ophelia’s death can thus also be read as a form of punishment for daring to disturb the 
virgin/whore dichotomy and attempting to stand for both.  
This is, interestingly enough, what Helen herself subversively does as a figure in 
the Gnostic tradition, managing to carry the double meaning of the name Helen, as 
representing both heaven and hell simultaneously, in a disturbingly paradoxical 
coincidentia oppositorum. Helen herself is an emanation of Sophia, feminine Wisdom 
who harks from the purely luminescent spiritual Pleroma and can lead lost sparks of spirit 
back to it, but simultaneously represents a tainting of the pleromatic divinity, as she is the 
cause of the fall into matter. Appropriately, she has found herself incarnated both as the 
beautiful Helen of Troy, whose face launched a thousand ships, and Helen of Tyre, the 
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prostitute that Simon Magus found in a brothel and took around as his companion. 
(Mitchell 2006: 22-25) Nuttall finds all these Gnostic elements quite explicitly reflected 
in Marlowe’s Dr Faustus, which would in the very least indicate that they were not 
unknown in the dramatic circles of the English Renaissance. (Nuttall 2007: 41-42)  
Helen is, significantly, associated in the Gnostic tradition with Selene (Luna), the 
moon, and given the seemingly paradoxical appellation “the sacred whore.” (Mitchell 
2006: 26) The “sacred whore” is simultaneously the whore and the moon goddess, who 
both firmly fuse into one in the Gnostic Helen. Bertram’s Dian and Helen can thus 
transpire to be one and the same (as can Isabel and Marian or any other pairing of split 
womanhood). In this framework it is possible to offer the interpretation of All’s Well that 
Ends Well that Tillyard does, according to which Helena stands for heavenly grace, 
without which Bertram is merely unredeemed man in all his glory or lack thereof. 
(Tillyard 1985: 108) Deconstructing the dichotomy of the bed-trick she stages, appearing 
in both the roles accorded to the polarized feminine figure, Helen can also be Dian, and 
lead both to ascent and descent, heaven and hell. 
As has been seen, Dian, when hunted down sexually, can dramatically transform 
straight into the whorish version of vulgar Venus in the bed-trick, but the two female 
figures can also prove to be parts of a single female entity by seeming so extremely 
polarized as to invite deconstruction or by simply readily collapsing one into the other.  
The virgin/whore dichotomy is thus both underscored and problematized in the 
bed-trick, and Shakespeare himself both seems to construct and deconstruct it.  
 
7.3.2.3. MUCH MORE MONSTROUS MATTER: MOTHER, MONSTER, 
WITCH, OR (DE)CONSTRUCTING THE FERTILE/STERILE DICHOTOMY 
 
Another dichotomy that imposes itself when one begins the Neoplatonic 
downward journey into the secret depths of matter, which will be briefly treated here to 
the extent that it relates to the virgin/whore dichotomy, is similarly only applicable to 
females and feminine matter. The fertile/sterile dichotomy is based on two pressing 
Neoplatonic questions: whether procreation is laudable and to what extent; and whether 
women and feminine matter can themselves be called fertile and to what extent.  
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These two questions and the different answers to them in Neoplatonic thought are 
already discordant and contradictory: on the one hand, procreation is officially praised as 
impressing beautiful spiritual forms on chaotic prime matter; on the other hand, it is the 
dirty work of vulgar Venus, impossible without the fall of forming masculine spirit into 
feminine matter.  
As to the second question, the degree of agency accorded to the woman, the 
womb, and menstrual matter in procreation varied in Neoplatonism from those thinkers 
who thought of prime matter as utterly dead and dark to those who saw it as almost 
always infused with vital spirits and indomitable life. Women, ever – for some strange 
reason – the carriers of humanity’s symbolic connection with matter and procreation, 
could thus be seen as either passive receptacles of men’s forming spiritual seed, without 
which there would be no new life, or as innately teeming with new life, but also 
dangerously chaotic and in need of male spiritual control. It should be noted that more 
agency also inevitably entailed more fear and disgust in male minds. 
Procreation is thus far lower in the Neoplatonic hierarchy than ascending away 
from filthy matter altogether, but formed matter is still far higher than that feminine 
matter which refuses to even be formed. Mothers are thus already fully immersed in the 
fallen material world, even if they are officially seen as somewhat better than prostitutes. 
Childless women, conversely, are either too unnaturally spiritual for their sex, or else too 
unnaturally recalcitrant and depraved to even be able to conceive by allowing male spirit 
to form the dark menstrual matter of their dark watery wombs.  
The fertile/sterile dichotomy in Neoplatonic thought thus self-deconstructs even 
before it is properly constructed. This is apparent in the act of sending women to the 
“nunnery,” where both virgins in the monastery and whores in the brothel are imagined 
as childless. Shakespeare does give one of his episodic whores a child, but there is 
generally a stunning absence of mothers in his opus and there are certainly no “good” 
mothers anywhere to be found.  
Shakespeare’s mothers are either pathetically weak (Constance, Lady Macduff, 
Valeria), sexually inappropriate (Helen, Juliet, Kate Keepdown), pathetically weak and 
sexually inappropriate (Gertrude), monstrously domineering (Volumnia), or sexually 
inappropriate and monstrously domineering (Tamora, Joan of Arc). This short list fully 
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exhausts all of Shakespeare’s female characters appearing before the romances who have 
at some point at least conceived a child (almost half of these children do not get born 
during the course of their respective play), and not all of these mothers even appear on 
stage.  
The mother, when she appears as a figure, is usually already a disgusting, 
disturbing whore – if she is not a mere figure – but virgins can be at least as disturbing. 
Virgins are often seen in Shakespeare’s world as disruptive figures that need to be 
coerced into marriage, as Kathryn R. Finin notices in her “Ethical Questions and 
Questionable Morals in Measure for Measure and The Merchant of Venice.” (Bristol 
2010: 105) Bertram calls Dian “cold and stern” and Parolles maintains that a virgin is “a 
desperate offendress against nature.” Romeo’s Rosaline’s  
 
beauty starv’d with her severity  
Cuts beauty off from all posterity  
(Romeo and Juliet, I. i. 219-220)  
 
Womanhood is, it appears, somehow naturally inextricably associated with 
sexuality and carnality, and a deliberate virgin is thus unnatural. Angelo, persuading 
Isabel to sleep with him, urges her to 
 
Be that you are, 
That is a woman; if you be more, you’re none. 
(Measure for Measure, II. iv. 134-135) 
 
This suggests that sexual prurience is merely normal female nature, which is firmly in 
keeping with early modern notions of female reproductive physiology and of what 
constituted socially acceptable female sexual behavior. These notions, for instance, often 
precluded the recognition of rape as a crime, as the very fact that a woman had admitted 
to having been involved in a sexual act, however unwillingly, could signify her 
unchastity, because the normal expression of female sexuality was generally understood 
as a yielding response to male desire. If she became pregnant as a result of the rape, her 
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complaint became immaterial, as it was widely believed that a woman could only 
conceive if she had experienced an orgasm. (Ward 2008: 46) 
 It is in Measure for Measure that the simultaneous deconstruction of the 
virgin/whore and the fertile/sterile dichotomies is perhaps at its most obvious. In the 
world of the play, on the one hand, a Puritanical, Manichean hatred towards flesh as 
innately evil is displayed by several characters and masqueraded as true Christian 
religiosity; on the other hand, a subversive undercurrent makes certain our sympathies 
will side with fertility and motherhood, pitted against and starkly contrasted with sexual 
purity. Filial, motherly, and “conjugal” love, kindness, fertility, and extramarital sex all 
belong to the same paradigm. The prostitute Kate Keepdown’s illegitimate child is in the 
motherly care of the prostitute Mrs. Overdone – “a bawd of eleven years’ continuance.” 
(Measure for Measure, III. ii. 196). Juliet’s premarital pregnancy is announced to Isabel 
by the satanically subversive Lucio in positive images of love and fertility: 
  
 Your brother and his lover have embrac’d. 
As those that feed grow full, as blossoming time 
That from the seedness the bare fallow brings 
To teeming foison, even so her plenteous womb 
Expresseth his full tilth and husbandry. 
(Measure for Measure, I. iv. 40-44) 
    
As charity and chastity are radically opposed and fully exclude one another in the 
play, it is to be expected that we will gladly choose the lechers and the whores – and 
rightly so. Chaste Isabel is capable of uttering “More than our brother is our chastity” 
(Measure for Measure, II. iv. 185) and “I had rather my brother die by the law than my 
son should be unlawfully born.” (Measure for Measure, III. i. 189-190) This is the other 
paradigm, consisting of “precise,” cold, sterile legalism, apparently opposed to love and 
life itself. It is interesting to note that Claudio is sentenced to death not for fornication, 
but “for getting Madam Julietta with child,” (Measure for Measure, I. ii. 72-73) and 
Lucio rightly observes of Angelo that “This ungenitur’d agent will unpeople the province 
with continency.” (Measure for Measure, III. ii. 174) Angelo would have probably 
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agreed with the “Precisians” condemned by the Anglican Church for condemning “the 
white veil accustomably used by women in their giving of thanks [after childbirth] as a 
whorish attire.” (Fissell 2006: 125) 
This readily rouses our sympathies, as we will both agree with Claudio that 
creating new life is a positive act and with Claudio himself that he is being judged over a 
mere technicality. Claudio could have, however, probably married Juliet in a similarly 
clandestine but actual church ceremony that Romeo organized with his own Juliet, and 
this would have been even less perilous and public than the exchange of vows they did 
have. This would fail, however, to make the necessary point of their being the loving, 
fertile, but fornicating couple, and as such, destructive to the cold, restrictive, puritanical 
world of Angelo. (Igrutinović 2009: 114)  
Sarah C. Velz, interpreting the play in terms of the Gospel parable of the seeds, 
finds that the “good ground,” those bearing spiritual fruit, relates precisely to Mariana’s 
love and Juliet’s pregnancy. The “good ground” is thus equated in the play with physical 
love and physical fertility and not only are we today far more likely to side with it, but 
even the puritanically inclined theatergoers of the time would have been expected to at 
least question their strict worldview. 
This might have been slightly more difficult with Cleopatra, but a similar 
mechanism is certainly at work in Antony and Cleopatra. Apparently misreading 
Charmian’s palm, Iras announces “There’s a palm presages chastity, if nothing else,” to 
which Charmian wittily retorts “E’en as the o’erflowing Nilus presageth famine.” 
(Antony and Cleopatra, I. ii. 47-48) Chastity is in two brief comments firmly associated 
with the barrenness of the drought and starkly opposed to fertility. A culture whose very 
survival is dependent on the overflowing of the slimy, serpentine Nile, is highly unlikely 
to value dry adherence to puritanical norms. Cleopatra’s Egyptian, serpentine fertility is 
thus juxtaposed to Octavia’s Roman, cold and virginal childlessness, which is another of 
Shakespeare’s inventions apparently meant to force his audience to pick the side they 
would have otherwise been unlikely to.  
Truly monstrous – both murderous and inordinately lustful, and thus opposed to 
both charity and chastity – characters in Shakespeare are somewhat more likely than not 
to be sterile. In the sources that Shakespeare used for King Lear, Cordelia’s evil sisters 
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have children. (Muir 1956: 143) Not so in Shakespeare’s tragedy, where all three of 
Lear’s daughters are depicted as childless. Apparently, Cordelia is too purely spiritual to 
be tainted by childbearing, and her sisters, conversely, too carnal and sunken into the hell 
of unformed matter, where sterility lies. Lear himself curses his lustful and cruel daughter 
to barrenness: 
 
Hear, Nature, hear, dear goddess, hear! 
Suspend thy purpose, if thou didst intend 
To make this creature fruitful. 
Into her womb convey sterility, 
Dry up in her the organs of increase, 
And from her derogate body never spring 
A babe to honor her! If she must teem, 
Create her child of spleen, that it may live 
And be a thwart disnatur’d torment to her. 
(King Lear, I. iv. 275-283) 
 
Shakespeare appears to generally take a more passive view of female fertility, 
according to which dark feminine matter itself is dead and sterile unless and until it is 
infused with life from the forming masculine spirit. Thus cruel virgins and depraved 
monsters are barren, while a slightly slutty fiancée and a wife, as well as a gentler kind of 
whore, can be allowed to conceive – but not escape calumny, of course. 
Lady Macbeth is, apparently, somewhere in between. Having self-admittedly 
breastfed, she is also apparently sterile. Peter Stallybrass suggests that we are “asked to 
accept a logical contradiction for the sake of a symbolic unity: Lady Macbeth is both an 
unnatural mother and sterile.” (Sinfield 1992: 77) Instead of trying to explain away this 
paradox by imagining her employed as a wetnurse or in a prior marriage, we can instead 
see her as fully embodying the paradox of the anti-Madonna. Like the Madonna is 
paradoxically both a virgin and a mother, so Lady Macbeth, her opposite, is both 
motherly in a cruel, unnatural way, and childless. Lady Macbeth, representing the 
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inversion of proper – passively nurturing – womanhood and motherhood, becomes 
analogous to the figure of the witch. 
Mary Elizabeth Fissell finds, studying in her Vernacular Bodies: The Politics of 
Reproduction in Early Modern England a number of Renaissance pamphlets against 
witches and murdering mothers, a firm link between these two unnatural kinds of women. 
The link is in the monstrously and distinctly materially maternal, as witches  
 
can be understood as excessively maternal towards their familiars, the small magical 
animals that supposedly did their bidding, while murdering mothers were insufficiently 
maternal towards their offspring. In both kinds of pamphlets, motherhood in all its 
depraved varieties is described in intensely bodily terms, with a near obsession with 
blood and milk. Murdering mothers and witches intersected in the harm they caused to 
children. They also resembled each other in their links to the supernatural. (Fissel 2006: 
75) 
 
Heidi Breuer notes in her Crafting the Witch: Gendering Magic in Medieval and 
Early Modern England that, as witches suckled their familiars, but were most commonly 
accused of harming their neighbors’ children, they were in themselves framed in maternal 
terms. In her words, maternity structures  
 
1) the way the witch gets her power (through her sexual liaison with the devil, she obtains 
a child-substitute in the form of the suckling familiar) and 2) the way she exerts it (the 
domestic nature of the conflicts themselves). Witches are maternal, but their maternity is 
inverted – they suckle demons and harass human children. Witches are anti-mothers, 
notmothers, women who have rejected traditional motherhood in favor of a demonic 
alternative. Stigmatizing women who are not mothers works to reaffirm the primacy of 
motherhood as the essential female role. Not a mother? Must be a witch. At the same 
time, these writers abject actual maternal figures, erasing any space for a positive notion 
of motherhood, for a good mother (Breuer 2009: 110) 
 
She finds in the culture of early modern England a variety of representations of maternity 
gone wrong. This image was, in her words, so powerful that “the invocation of the 
murderous mother in Lady Macbeth’s speech allows Shakespeare to conjure an entire 
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legacy of monstrous maternity and to tap into the popular interest of his audience in just a 
few lines.” (Breuer 2009: 128) 
The witch is thus somehow between the fertile and the sterile, between the horror 
of the mother and the “notmother” – and both seem to produce a horror in dualistically 
inclined male minds. Lady Macbeth is both mother and anti-mother and thus a witch. 
Unlike the cross-dressed virgin, or the boy dressed as a boy on Shakespeare’s stage, the 
manly, “unsexed” virago – deprived only of her “feminine” gentle and feeble passivity, 
but not her sexuality and womanly body – is a lethal witch, both disgustingly fertile and 
deathly sterile. 
Shakespeare’s Joan of Arc fully embodies the virgin/whore, masculine/feminine, 
and sterile/fertile paradoxical self-deconstructing dichotomies inherent in the figure of the 
witch. She begins as an unyielding virgin, declining marital offers:  
 
I must not yield to any rites of love, 
For my profession’s sacred from above. 
(Henry VI 1, I. ii. 113-114) 
 
That trouble is ahead is apparent already in the adoring words of Charles the Dolphin:  
 
Bright star of Venus, fall’n down on the earth, 
How may I reverently worship thee enough? 
(Henry VI 1, I. ii. 142-143) 
 
The image of the bright star of Venus “fall’n down on the earth” does not bode well. 
Lucifer, of course, is one of the names given to planet Venus, and his fall did not go too 
well for him. Additionally, the image implies the fall of heavenly Venus down to earth 
and her instant transformation into earthly Venus. 
Joan claims she has been “a virgin from her tender infancy” only to exclaim, 
seconds later, that she is pregnant, and that, in her words, “the fruit within my womb” 
should at least be spared. Warwick asks “Is all your strict preciseness come to this?” and 
concludes that “she hath been liberal and free.” York yells with a righteous zeal: 
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“Strumpet, thy words condemn thy brat and thee.” (Henry VI 1, V. iv. 36-91) She remains 
suspended between the whorishly fertile and the lethally sterile, as her womb instantly 
becomes, in her death, her unborn child’s tomb. 
The representation of Joan of Arc already reveals all the themes associated with 
the dread of the abject carnal feminine that Shakespeare was to develop later: the virgin 
turned whore, heavenly Venus become earthly Venus in an instant, the unnatural virgin 
juxtaposed with the fertile whore, and the “manly” – but in effect merely “unsexed” from 
her passivity, not her carnal femininity – virago who is discovered to be a whore, a 
murderess, and a witch. 
Both images of monstrous sterility and of monstrous fertility are in Renaissance 
Neoplatonism associated with feminine prime matter and its refusal to yield to masculine 
spirit. Monstrous sterility, as in the case of Goneril and Regan, occurs when dead and 
dark feminine matter opposes the life-infusing masculine spirit without which conception 
is impossible. Monstrous fertility, on the other hand, happens when chaotic and watery 
feminine matter is not properly controlled by the forming masculine spirit, resulting in 
the rank overgrowth of slimy, deformed, irrational life. Either way, the dark feminine is 
always to blame for not cooperating properly with the divine masculine. 
A fascinating, if disturbing example of monstrous fertility can be found in the first 
Canto of The Faerie Queene. Spenser, who appears to have had more fear and loathing 
towards carnality and materiality constructed as feminine than most Elizabethan 
Neoplatonists, has his purely virginal knight Redcross encounter the female monster 
Errour, who, though meant to represent religious heresy, is invested with a seemingly 
gratuitous monstrous fertility: 
 
This is the wandring wood, this Errours den,  
A monster vile, whom God and man does hate [...]  
Halfe like a serpent horribly displaide,  
But th’ other halfe did womans shape retaine [...]  
Of her there bred  
A thousand yong ones, which she dayly fed,  
Sucking upon her poisonous dugs, each one  
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Of sundry shapes, yet all ill favored:  
Soone as that uncouth light upon them shone,  
Into her mouth they crept, and suddain all were gone [...]  
She poured forth out of her hellish sinke  
Her fruitfull cursed spawne of serpents small,  
Deformed monsters, fowle, and blacke as inke,  
Which swarming all about his legs did crall,  
And him encombred sore, but could not hurt at all.   
(Spenser, The Faerie Queene, Book I, Canto I, xiii-xxii)12 
 
Errour’s monstrous uber-fertility has her spawning amorphous serpentine monsters that 
are, deprived of the light of forming masculine spirit, little more than deformed chunks of 
slimy prime matter. 
Even though Shakespeare appears to generally take a more passive view of matter 
and female fertility, he has his share of images of monstrous feminine fertility associated 
with uncontrolled formless prime matter very reminiscent of Spenser’s Errour, if not 
quite as aggressive and extreme. There is, for instance, the figure of the “cestern” 
teeming with slimy, half-formed life. Cleopatra invokes it in her anger, as if it were 
actually in her power to fluidize her domain thus: 
 
So half my Egypt were submerg’d and made 
A cestern for for scal’d snakes! 
(Antony and Cleopatra, II. v. 94-95) 
 
Othello, conversely, recoils from it in fear and disgust at the watery hyper-fertile and 
hyper-carnal female sexuality, which is for him, in Holderness’ words, “a sticky cloacal 
swamp heaving with amphibious life,” or, in Othello’s words,  
 
a cestern for foul toads 
                                               
12 Heidi Breuer offers in her Crafting the Witch a fascinating reading of the Errour scene based on Lacan 
and Kristeva. The above citation is taken from her book. (Breuer 2009: 124-126) 
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To knot and gender in! 
(Othello, IV. ii. 61-62) 
 
Holderness explains that in Iago’s mind – and later Othello’s as well – an “honest 
man” is “one who has a horror of mud, and associates it with vice and shame,” 
consequently denying “any relationship with the stench and slime of ordinary human 
functions.” (Holderness 2010: 99) The object of disgust here sounds increasingly, as we 
descend further downwards towards it, like the common Neoplatonic descriptions of 
slimy and formless prime matter. 
Shakespeare’s single instance of the simultaneously monstrously sexual and 
monstrously fertile woman is Tamora. As Coppélia Kahn notices, the fecundity of the 
monstrously fertile Roman mother of the twenty-six Andronici – a fertile Roman is 
apparently an oxymoron – is displaced onto her, the Gothic outsider, and “demonized 
with a ferocious linguistic and theatrical inventiveness”:  
 
With every reference to Tamora’s maternity, we are also reminded of her lasciviousness. 
She flaunts sacralized chastity and also the Roman ethnic purity it protects, her bastard 
child being by blood half-Goth, half-Moor. This nameless infant embodies the anxieties 
about the unconstrained maternal womb represented by the pit in act two. 
 
The ultimate source of all the crimes in the tragedy is, in Kahn’s reading, the othered, 
“offended, alienated mother.” (Kahn 2002: 53-69) 
Many references are made in Titus Andronicus to Tamora as a beastly mother, 
and she is finally likened to the panther in Aaron’s symbolically economical lie told to 
two Titus’ sons:  
 
Straight will I bring you to the loathsome pit  
Where I espied the panther fast asleep.  
(Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 193-194)  
 
The pit – which, among other things, represents the monstrously fertile womb – is 
associated with Tamora as the panther – the “all-beast.” 
  246 
 
7.3.2.3.1. A BEAST THAT WANTS DISCOURSE OF REASON OR WHAT 
REMAINS IS BEASTLY: THE HUMAN ANIMAL OR HUMANS DESCENDING 
TO THE ANIMALISTIC 
 
Many Shakespeare’s more lowly characters are explicitly compared to animals. 
Prospero calls the bodily one of his two slaves “the beast Caliban,” (The Tempest, IV. i. 
140) and, in Cymbeline, Guiderius concludes that Cloten’s name could be Toad, or 
Adder, or Spider, and that he is “an arrogant piece of flesh.” Coriolanus finds himself 
exiled by “the beast with many heads,” while Menenius refers to the representatives of 
the people as “the herdsmen of the beastly plebeians.” (Coriolanus, II. i. 95)  
Women are naturally more beastly owing to their inextricable association with 
matter and sexuality. Lear notoriously compares the “simpering dame” with beasts on 
account of their shared lust: 
 
The fitchew nor the soiled horse goes to’t 
With a more riotous appetite. 
Down from the waist they are Centaurs, 
Though women all above. 
(King Lear, IV. vi. 115-118) 
 
Hamlet disparagingly compares his mother with an animal and even then finds her 
wanting, as  
 
a beast that wants discourse of reason 
Would have mourn’d longer. 
(Hamlet, I. ii. 157-158) 
 
It can appear that some despicable human specimens just naturally find themselves 
occupying the level of the beast. The Ghost, however, for instance, reveals to Hamlet his 
mother’s fall to this animal state: 
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O Hamlet, what [a] falling-off was there 
From me, whose love was of that dignity 
That it went hand in hand even with the vow 
I made to her in marriage, and to decline 
Upon a wretch whose natural gifts were poor 
To those of mine! 
But virtue, as it never will be moved, 
Though lewdness court it in the shape of heaven, 
So [lust], though to a radiant angel link'd, 
Will [sate] itself in a celestian bed 
And prey on garbage. 
(Hamlet, I. v. 47-57) 
 
Renaissance Neoplatonism saw humans as very easily sliding down the scale of 
perfection from the exalted spiritual to the depraved material – from the angelic to the 
beastly – and lust was very often the culprit. In his Oration on the Dignity of Man, Pico 
della Mirandola has God tell man as He created him: “Thou shalt have the power to 
degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out 
of thy soul’s judgement, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine.” Giordano 
Bruno, reiterating this point in De gli eroici furori, published in London in 1585, warns 
that “there are not two contrary essences, but only one essence subject to two extremes of 
contrariety.” The human soul is capable of ascending to the divine – but also of 
descending to the beastly. (Wells 2005: 13) The same view of man’s essentially double 
nature continued to be restated, according to Wells, well into the eighteenth century. 
(Wells 2005: 14) 
It seems to have been at its most pronounced around Shakespeare’s time, when 
the anxieties surrounding it were at their strongest. Medieval man was not expected to be 
as removed from his body as Renaissance man, who had recently discovered, via the 
strong infusion of Neoplatonism into the culture, that in spirit he was truly divine, and 
would fully ascend to the divine – if he could only rid himself of the beastly body. Erica 
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Fudge investigates this cultural faultline in ““The dog is himself”: Humans, Animals, and 
Self-Control in The Two Gentlemen of Verona.” The presence of an actual dog on stage 
in this comedy is in her reading “a representation of nature as the uncivilized that stands 
against the rational civility that is understood to be truly human.” (Maguire 2008: 194) 
Fudge cites Greenblatt’s research into the behavior manuals of the fifteenth through 
eighteenth centuries and finds that they are positively obsessed with the management of 
urine, feces, mucus, saliva, and wind. Proper control of each of these bodily products 
distinguishes the child from the adult, the cultured from the vulgar, the civilized from the 
barbaric, the upper classes from the lower – the truly human from the beastly. Crab 
urinating under the table, Fudge asserts, “begs to be added to this list of dichotomies,” 
signaling “in the most explicit way possible the very real danger of incivility that hangs 
over the play.” (Maguire 2008: 197-199) 
The danger of falling into the animalistic seems to hang over every play and the 
more exalted characters seem to notice this more. Cassio expresses a great deal of anxiety 
over it in Othello:  
 
To be now a  
sensible man, by and by a fool, and presently a beast!  
O, strange!  
(Othello, II. iii. 298–300) 
 
He sees this fall in Othello, but also in himself when he laments: “Reputation, reputation, 
reputation! O, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself, and what 
remains is bestial.” (Othello, II. iii. 262-264) It may sound trite and narcissistic to modern 
ears, but seeking soldierly fame is in Plato’s Symposium actually one of the lower modes 
of pursuing immortality. “What remains” in any dualistic system after the immortal part 
is lost is the mere body, which is “bestial.” 
Lear discovers in his descent from kingly pomp towards the bare base of 
humanity that the “thing itself” (Edgar in his guise of Poor Tom) is but “a poor, bare, 
fork’d animal.” (King Lear, III. iv. 102-109) Edgar explains – and there is some question, 
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of course, as to whether we should be taking his moralistic warnings seriously, as they 
are based entirely on a fabricated identity – that he was a “servingman,” 
 
proud in heart and mind; that curl’d my hair; wore gloves in my cap; serv’d the lust of my 
mistress’ heart, and did the act of darkness with her [...] one that slept in the contriving of 
lust, and wak’d to do it [...] out-paramour’d the Turk [...] hog in sloth, fox in stealth, wolf 
in greediness, dog in madness, lion in prey. Let not the creaking of shoes nor the rustling 
of silks betray thy poor heart to woman. Keep thy foot out of brothels, thy hand out of 
plackets, thy pen from lenders’ books, and defy the foul fiend. (King Lear, III. iv. 85-98) 
 
It is, apparently, vulgar Venus in the guise of lustful mistresses that drags men down to 
the level of the animalistic. 
The sometimes disturbingly puritanical Duke orders the “bawd” – or pimp – 
Pompey in Measure to Measure to say to himself: 
 
From their abominable and beastly touches 
I drink, I eat, [array] myself, and live. 
Canst thou believe thy living is a life, 
So stinkingly depending? 
 
The Duke then orders: 
 
Take him to prison, officer, 
Correction and instruction must both work 
Ere this rude beast will profit. 
(Measure for Measure, III. ii. 19-33) 
 
Lust is seen by the ostensibly good ruler of the play as firmly beastly and being 
linked to it makes a man no more than an animal. Othello likewise has a violent disgust at 
the idea of sexual promiscuity and firmly associates it with the beastly: 
 
I had rather be a toad 
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And live upon the vapour of a dungeon 
Than keep a corner in the thing I love 
For others’ uses.  
(Othello, III. iii. 272–5) 
 
Iago’s puritanical but filthy mind easily conjures up animalistic images of “lust in action” 
in his description of Desdemona and Cassio to Othello, picturing them  
 
as prime as goats, as hot as monkeys, 
As salt as wolves in pride, and fools as gross  
As ignorance made drunk. 
(Othello, III. iii. 403-405) 
 
The lovers are imagined both as beastly and as sunken into the oblivion of the 
material (“ignorance made drunk” recalls Barnardine’s state in the depths of Angelo’s 
prison). These images of animalistic lust ironically also recall Iago’s warnings to 
Brabantio, with images of “an old black ram tupping” his “white ewe,” (Othello, I. i. 90-
91) his daughter “cover’d with a Barbary horse,” (Othello, I. i. 111-112) and his daughter 
and the Moor “making the beast with two backs” (Othello, I. i. 116-117) 
Othello’s suicide is significantly announced by way of his reminiscing about his 
martial feat: 
 
in Aleppo once, 
Where a malignant and a turban’d Turk 
Beat a Venetian and traduc’d the state, 
I took by th’ throat the circumcised dog, 
And smote him - thus. 
(Othello, V. ii. 352-356) 
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Othello has now himself become the “circumcised dog” to be smitten by no one other 
than himself. He has also, evidently even to himself, fallen to the level of the animal. The 
beastly Tamora also apparently deserves a beastly death:  
 
And for that ravenous tiger Tamora […] 
throw her forth to beasts and birds to prey: 
Her life was beastly. 
(Titus Andronicus, V. iii. 179-200) 
 
It should be noted that voluntary stripping to the level of the animalistic – just like 
the voluntary descent of Gnostic Christ figures into the depths of the carnal to save the 
lost sparks of spirit – can be couched in distinctly positive terms, as it is when Edgar 
becomes poor Tom: 
 
I will preserve myself, and am bethought 
To take the basest and most poorest shape 
That ever penury, in contempt of man, 
Brought near to beast. My face I’ll grime with filth,  
Blanket my loins, elf my hair in knots, 
And with presented nakedness outface 
The winds and persecutions of the sky. 
(King Lear, II. iii. 6-12) 
 
Lear eventually mirrors this descent. Though the king, he finds himself, in the stormy 
wilderness, worse off than any animal, and, it appears, defiantly and willingly so:  
 
This night, wherein the cub-drawn bear would couch, 
The lion and the belly-pinched wolf 
Keep their fur dry, unbonneted he runs, 
And bids what will take all. 
(King Lear, III. i. 3-14)  
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This kenotic humiliation of the king sunken below the level of the animal is Christ-like 
and in fact directly recalls Christ’s observation that “The foxes have holes, and the birds 
of the air have nests; but the son of man hath not where to lay his head.” (Matthew 8: 20, 
KJV) This is, however, a rare occurrence in Shakespeare. The animalistic is far more 
frequently associated with a moral fall into carnal, beastly passions. 
The entire island of Cyprus appears to fall into carnal passions in the night when 
Othello and Desdemona physically consummate their love. While it was purely spiritual, 
apparently, it could order the elements. Now, while they have their one night of “lust,” a 
sort of a drunken orgy takes place on “this warlike isle” in the middle of the sea, and it 
brings them all apart and down into the watery depths of the material. “What is the 
matter?” is asked three times during the course of this festival. Cassio is again the one to 
realize what has happened, and laments “that we should, with joy, pleasance, revel, and 
applause, transform ourselves into beasts!” (Othello, II. iii. 291-293) Without love, and 
instead sunken into the carnal depths of lust, men have become beasts, and chaos is come 
again. 
 
7.3.2.3.2. CHAOS IS COME AGAIN 
 
Shakespeare found in chaos itself, Goddard claims, “a subject that continued to 
enthrall him to the end of his days.” All the significant characters in his opus, he finds – 
Brutus, Hamlet, Othello, Macbeth, King Lear, Antony, Cleopatra, Coriolanus – confront 
chaos in some way. (Goddard I 1960: 28-29) J. Dover Wilson explains that this was not 
an idiosyncratic fascination, but a hot topic of the time, as the “apprehension that the 
whole order might suddenly revert to Chaos haunted men’s imagination.” (Wilson 1933: 
16) He explains where this sudden fear of chaos originated in turn-of-the-century 
England: 
 
the beheading of Robert, Earl of Essex, on February 25, 1601 […] and not the death of 
the Queen in 1603, was the end of the true Elizabethan age, those halcyon days of happy 
ease, illimitable hope and untarnished honour […]. The brilliant but erratic young earl, 
the principal star in the Elizabethan firmament for the last ten years of the century, 
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suddenly fell like Lucifer from heaven […] the harmony was broken; the Elizabethan 
balance overthrown. England awoke with a start to the grim realities of life, and the 
accession of James I ushered in a period of cynicism and gloom, self-indulgence and 
crime. (Wilson 1933: 36) 
 
Other authors explain this fascinated fear of chaos in other ways, all solidly 
political. That the notion of chaos looming just beneath the surface of the seemingly 
ordered cosmos coincided in time with the strong anxieties surrounding the demise of 
Essex, the uncertain succession of Elizabeth, or even the burning of Giordano Bruno at 
the stake is, of course, no coincidence. The political is, apparently, always associated 
with the metaphysical. However, attempting to determine which came first – the political 
or the metaphysical – resembles the chicken-and-the-egg debate. Shakespeare and other 
Englishmen at the turn of the century were faced with an objectively chaotic political 
situation and those metaphysical tools available for interpreting it that existed in 
Renaissance Neoplatonism heavily reinforced the fear of “chaos come again” – 
whichever came first. 
This fear of “chaos come again” and the consequent obsession with it – that much 
is clear – is dualistic in its metaphysics. None of the truly monistic orthodoxies – in 
which the divine Maker fully creates and controls the world He has created out of nothing 
– had the notion of primeval chaos which might return, apparently, at any point. 
Dualisms, conversely, all held to some degree the view that the basis of the created 
universe was somehow something fundamentally dark and chaotic, on which divine order 
had to be imposed from the outside, more or less unsuccessfully. Neoplatonism, in 
Plotinus’ time as much as Ficino’s, maintained that the cosmos was created out of chaotic 
and recalcitrant feminine prime matter.  
This feminine prime matter was inherently and eternally chaotic and thus the 
culprit for any disorder in the created universe. In Troilus and Cressida, which Una Ellis-
Fermor called “an implacable assertion of chaos as the ultimate fact of being,” (Martin 
1976: 91) the chaos is unproblematically to be blamed on Helen.  
Hamlet’s unweeded garden that grows to seed in which the time is out of joint can 
likewise be seen as simply feminine matter refusing to be controlled. Philippa Berry 
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notices in “Hamlet’s ear” that Hamlet’s misogyny attributes the “degenerative trend in 
nature to the female body and female sexuality in particular.” (Alexander 2004: 204) 
 Some heroes and anti-heroes, having descended to the point where chaos has 
overtaken them, express a desire for all form to vanish and for the chaos of prime matter 
to return. Macbeth has dragged his world down to primeval chaos and now wishes to see 
it fully divested of all light and order: 
 
I gin to be a-weary of the sun, 
And wish th’ estate o’ th’ world were now undone. 
(Macbeth, V. v. 48-49) 
 
On being told Antony is now married – after first hitting the messenger and 
drawing a knife at him – Cleopatra invokes chaos: 
 
Melt Egypt into Nile! and kindly creatures 
Turn all to serpents! 
(Antony and Cleopatra, II. v. 78-79) 
 
Antony has an almost identical response to the slightest intimation that he is to be taken 
away from Cleopatra: 
 
Let Rome in Tiber melt, and the wide arch 
Of the rang’d empire fall!  
(Antony and Cleopatra, I. i. 33-40) 
 
They both want the cosmos to dissolve into the watery chaos of matter. Rome melting in 
Tiber is arguably a strange image, while Egypt melting in Nile is a familiar one, with 
intimations of fertility, however disturbing and disgusting they might be. 
Timon spouts an elaborate inventory of evils he wishes should befall Athens, and 
every one is essentially a desire for order to cease its rule, and chaos to reign supreme 
instead: 
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O thou wall 
That girdles in those wolves, dive in the earth. 
And fence not Athens! Matrons, turn incontinent! 
Obedience, fail in children! Slaves and fools, 
Pluck the grave wrinkled Senate from the bench, 
And minister in their steads! To general filths 
Convert o’ th’ instant, green virginity! 
Do’t in your parents’ eyes! [...] Maid, to thy master’s bed, 
Thy mistress is o’ th’ brothel! [...] Piety, and fear, 
Religion to the gods, peace, justice, truth, 
Domestic awe, night-rest, and neighborhood, 
Instruction, manners, mysteries, and trades, 
Degrees, observances, customs, and laws, 
Decline to your confounding contraries; 
[... ] Lust, and liberty, 
Creep in the minds and marrows of our youth, 
That ‘gainst the stream of virtue they may strive, 
And drown themselves in riot! 
(Timon of Athens, IV. i. 1-36) 
 
Lear similarly dissolves into a mad rage and immediately a chaotic tempest, 
overtaking the entire world of the play, follows: 
 
you unnatural hags, 
I will have such revenges on you both 
That all the world shall – I will do such things –  
What they are yet I know not, but they shall be 
The terrors of the earth! You think I’ll weep: 
No, I’ll not weep. 
I have full cause of weeping, but this heart 
  256 
[Storm and tempest] 
Shall break into a hundred thousand flaws 
Or ere I’ll weep. O Fool, I shall go mad! 
(King Lear, II. iv. 278-286) 
 
Having descended to a chaotic state, for which females are, of course, to blame, the king 
faces chaotic prime matter in the form of the stormy wilderness he finds himself exiled 
in, and wishes to drag his entire kingdom down with him, right to the destruction of all 
order and form:  
 
Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! rage, blow! 
You cataracts and hurricanoes, spout 
Till you have drench’d our steeples, [drown’d] the cocks! 
You sulph’rous and thought-executing fires, 
Vaunt-couriers of oak-cleaving thunderbolts, 
Singe my white head! And thou, all-shaking thunder, 
Strike flat the thick rotundity o’ th’ world! 
Crack nature’s moulds, all germains spill at once 
That makes ungrateful man! 
(King Lear, III. ii. 1-9) 
 
“Moulds” refer here to the forms Plato saw as existent in the creator’s mind, which 
served to shape everything that is – as indicated in the Timaeus and the Phoedrus. George 
Williams believes it is likely that Shakespeare’s allusion to the Platonic moulds in King 
Lear stems from the commentaries made on Plato’s writing by Plotinus and the 
Neoplatonists and reported in the writings of Ficino and his Florentine Academy, which 
would have still been far more available at the time than Plato himself. It is, whatever its 
source in Shakespeare, certainly an ancient Platonic and Neoplatonic notion that the 
moulds of nature will crack and the world will at some point revert to primeval chaos – 
even if it is only to begin a new cycle of creation once more. (Williams George 1951: 67-
68) 
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It appears that the desire for this world-destructive reversion to chaos only 
materializes in those heroes – and villains – who have already sunk to the level so low on 
the Platonic scale of perfection that their souls cannot endure the chaotic nature of the 
surrounding matter any longer. It is again vulgar Venus – notably in the guise of Goneril, 
Regan, Gertrude, Cressida and Helen of Troy – that is caught in the act of dragging 
Shakespeare’s male heroes down to the level of chaotic prime matter where they seem to 
have little option but to wish for the destruction of the cosmos. She has come a long way: 
from merely trapping in marriage and procreation, through being whorish, beastly, and a 
witch, and – usually by lust – to dragging men right down to prime matter, where there 
are no more beautiful forms to breed, but instead only dark, deadly chaos. 
 
7.3.3. MORTAL VENUS 
 
As has been seen, Bruno’s Dian and Ficino’s heavenly Venus can never be 
attained, and will, if a lover pursues them sexually, transform in the bed-trick into a 
version of Helen or vulgar Venus. In the tragedies, the version of the lower Venus the 
hero is likely to encounter is the most lethal of her incarnations, who can bring only death 
and destruction, and not form new life. 
 The lover cannot say he has not been properly warned. Ficino explicitly stresses 
in his De vita the importance of distinguishing pure Dian from perilous lower Venus:  
 
For those flavors you perceive in things which are pleasing because of their moderate 
temperedness, those Diana gave you by the gift of Apollo and of Jupiter. But those 
wonderful allurements of taste by which daily you, secretly miserable, lose your life like 
people caught on a hook – these are the ones that insidious Venus fashions. (Ficino 1998: 
211)  
 
Cleopatra’s fishing scene, which has already been mentioned, is much more eerie in this 
context: 
 
as I draw them up,  
I’ll think them every one an Antony,  
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And say: “Ah, ha! y’ are caught.”  
(Antony and Cleopatra, II. v. 13-15)  
 
We may want to remember here also Ficino’s image of the soul, which, captivated 
by the beauty of the pure beloved, “is drawn upward as by a hook,” (Line 2004: 95) and 
that one way of interpreting this scene is to see Cleopatra as heavenly Venus drawing 
Antony’s soul upwards. In her infinite variety, of course, Cleopatra is also “insidious 
Venus,” who causes Antony to lose his life “like people caught on a hook.” Ficino spares 
no effort in cautioning the young would-be lover against this deathly lower Venus:  
 
Against her multiple deceptions equip yourselves with the eyes of Argus; fortify 
yourselves with the shield of Pallas; and stop your ears to her flattering promises as to the 
lethal songs of the Sirens; finally, accept from me this flower of prudence with which you 
may avoid the sorcery of this Circe. (Ficino 1998: 211)  
 
Cleopatra is, like a Siren or a Circe, a lethal, deceptive witch – something Antony himself 
appears to recognize when he realizes that he “must from this enchanting queen break 
off.” (Antony and Cleopatra, I. ii. 128) It is precisely because he fails to do this that he 
eventually dies. 
Catherine Belsey sees a similar mechanism at work in other Shakespeare’s plays 
in her “Desire’s excess and the English Renaissance theatre: Edward II, Troilus and 
Cressida, Othello,” and explains that, according to Renaissance medical theory, sexual 
desire itself is an effect of an excess of blood, resulting in lovesickness or erotomania, 
which can have lethal consequences. Troilus and Cressida, in her view, shows a world 
where “desire is everywhere,” and this sick condition “commonly exceeds its outward 
motive, its object” – which somehow inevitably leads to fatal consequences. Helen’s 
worth, in Belsey’s phrase, “is a topic for debate” as the “mortal Venus” (Troilus and 
Cressida, III. i. 31) is also a whore. (Troilus and Cressida, IV. i. 67) (Zimmerman 2005: 
72) 
Helen of Troy is indeed at one point called by a servant “the mortal Venus, the 
heart-blood of beauty, love’s invisible soul.” (Troilus and Cressida, III. i. 31-33) And 
while this is certainly meant to serve as a panegyric which is later to be contrasted with 
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“whore,” it is in itself more than a little disturbing. The mortal Venus is not only a 
beautiful mortal woman generously compared with the immortal goddess Venus. The 
mortal Venus is also the deadly lower Venus. 
Pandarus, significantly for Troilus, asks at this very moment “Who? my cousin 
Cressida?” Cressida proves to have been his own mortal Venus, lethal to him, which is 
apparent to Pandarus himself when he says to Cressida: “I knew thou wouldest be his 
death.” (Troilus and Cressida, IV. ii. 86) 
Lust is what causes Troilus’ personal death, and the death of many in the war 
caused by lust itself. When Helen sentimentally and somewhat frivolously hums: “Let thy 
song be love. This love will undo us all. O Cupid, Cupid, Cupid!” (Troilus and Cressida, 
III. i. 110-111) any Neoplatonist worth his salt will instantly know that this “love” she 
speaks of is in fact lust, lethal to those that pursue it. 
Troilus is aware that he has succumbed to mortal, destructive lust before his final 
battle. Though it is clear that the battle itself will be the apparent cause of his death, the 
real cause is his fall into the devastating snare of lust that has first damaged and 
disintegrated him from within, as Helen had done to Paris, and as the Trojan horse will 
analogously do to the entire city:  
 
Why should I war without the walls of Troy, 
That find such cruel battle here within? 
Each Troyan that is master of his heart, 
Let him to field, Troilus, alas, hath none. 
(Troilus and Cressida, I. i. 2-5) 
 
Mortal Venus doing away with her unfortunate lover is the dark underbelly of the 
persistent association of sex and death, or Eros and Thanatos, noted in the chapter dealing 
with henosis. The lead and golden caskets, available to the would-be heroic lover hunting 
Dian, can, as has been seen, both signify death.  
The golden casket explicitly connotes erotic death or death by lust. Morocco is the 
one to choose it – the ostentatiously solar candidate, whose black “complexion” is, in his 
words, the  
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shadowed livery of the burnish’d sun, 
To whom I am neighbor and near bred. 
(The Merchant of Venice, II. i. 1-3) 
 
This association of the black “complexion” with the solar, of course, recalls Cleopatra’s 
boast that she is “with Phoebus’ amorous pinches black.” (Antony and Cleopatra, I. v. 
28-29) Both these African characters appear to be associated with lust and, consequently, 
death by lust, as Morocco’s prize, found within the golden casket, is 
 
A carrion Death, within whose empty eye 
There is a written scroll […] 
“All that glisters is not gold, 
Often have you heard this told; 
Many a man his life hath sold 
But my outside to behold. 
Gilded [tombs] do worms infold.” 
(The Merchant of Venice, II. vii. 63-69) 
 
Bassanio knows to avoid it because he knows how mortal Venus tricks lovers by 
deadly dead matter straight to death: 
 
Look on beauty,  
And you shall see ‘tis purchased by the weight, 
Which therein works a miracle in nature, 
Making them lightest that wear most of it. 
So are those crisped snaky golden locks, 
Which [make] such wanton gambols with the wind 
Upon supposed fairness, often known 
To be the dowry of a second head, 
The skull that bred them in the sepulchre. 
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(The Merchant of Venice, III. ii. 88-96) 
 
Golden locks of hair are in Neoplatonic astrology a sign of solar influences, and 
we see them here directly associated with death. The sun and cadavers in conjunction 
with lust are very frequently connected in Shakespeare’s imagery, whether it is the solar 
snaky golden locks that would usually incite to lust but that actually derive from 
entombed skulls of long dead women, or, in Hamlet’s unforgettable speech, the sun 
“kissing” carrion:  
 
the sun breed maggots in a dead dog, 
being a good kissing carrion. 
(Hamlet, II. ii. 181-186) 
 
The female body is in fact dead female carrion matter, only temporarily infused with the 
“kissing” male sun of the spirit, which gives it life, even if this life is maggot-like.   
Because matter is mere carrion, then lust, being the hungry desire for it, becomes 
associated with the vulture. Venus’ thought of lust is described as her “vultur thought” in 
Venus and Adonis (551) and Tarquin’s is a “vulture folly” in Lucrece (556). The 
conclusion is clear: lust is vulture-like as what it preys on is nothing but dead matter. 
Lust, as a desire for the body, which in itself is dead matter, can also bring death 
to those that pursue it. One implication of the persistent link between Eros and Thanatos 
that can be found in Shakespeare’s work is that death somehow always seems to follow 
sex and blood is always spilled – even, sometimes, innocent blood – as some sort of 
catastrophe inevitably closely follows the single night of carnal pleasure that 
Shakespeare’s lovers are invariably accorded. 
Romeo significantly kills Tybalt on the very day he consummates his marriage 
with Juliet. Both acts are, in Leggatt’s reading, “a shedding of Capulet blood, and a loss 
of innocence: the lovers’ first sexual encounter, and Romeo’s first killing.” (Leggatt 
2005: 3) Leggatt notices a similar pattern in Othello. Preparing to murder Desdemona, 
Othello threatens that her “lust-stain’d” wedding sheets will be “spotted” with blood. 
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(Othello, V. i. 36) These are the same wedding sheets that are already spotted with her 
maiden blood, as “her murder is also her wedding night.” (Leggatt 2005: 3) 
Interestingly enough, Cassio the Venus-worshipping Florentine is wounded in the 
thigh, just like the mythical Adonis he resembles so much, in the same night when 
Desdemona loses her virginity. Shakespeare’s own Adonis significantly dies right after 
he succumbs to Venus. Being sexually seduced by lower Venus, he is no longer a 
capable, manly, dexterous hunter.  
 
He ran upon the boar with his sharp spear, 
Who did not whet his teeth at him again, 
But by a kiss thought to persuade him there; 
And nousling in his flank, the loving swine 
Sheath’d unaware the tusk in his soft groin. 
Had I been tooth’d like him, I must confess, 
With kissing him I should have kill’d him first. 
(Venus and Adonis, 1011-1018) 
 
The conclusion imposes itself: mortal Venus incites to deadly animalistic lust and kills 
after, or during, or even instead of sex, destroying the guilty and the innocent. 
In one of her guises, Tamora is mortal Venus, implicating all around her in her 
lethal lust. One clear conjunction of blood, violence, sex, and death that she brings about 
begins in her order that her sons should rape Lavinia: “let my spleenful sons this trull 
deflow’r.” (Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 191) When Martius falls into the pit, Quintus says: 
 
What, art thou fallen? What subtile hole is this, 
Whose mouth is covered with rude-growing briars, 
Upon whose leaves are drops of new-shed blood 
As fresh as morning dew distill’d on flowers? 
A vey fatal place it seems to me. 
(Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 198-202) 
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The freshly murdered Bassanio’s blood – covering the vaginally overdetermined pit and 
described as “dew” on “flowers” – is clearly related to the violent deflowering of the thus 
far apparently virginal Lavinia. Sex, death, violence, and blood all follow in mortal 
Venus’ wake.  
In Measure for Measure, death is officially and legally the punishment for sex, as 
was the case in Puritan Geneva. The medieval church and the Bible, Shuger notes, show 
no precedent for the Puritan insistence on harshly punishing premarital sex (the combined 
response of the medieval church and the Bible would simply boil down to Isabella’s “O, 
let him marry her!”). Plato’s Laws, significantly, do. (Shuger 2001: 2-12) The 
conjunction of sex and death is a distinctly dualistic concept. 
Troilus, as has been seen, dies in war because he has already been defeated from 
within by the lethal lust of mortal Venus in a play where all is, finally, but “wars and 
lechery.” Mars and Venus are not conflicted in this lowly and chaotic world – both 
squarely lead to fall and death, as they do in the very similar universe of All’s Well That 
Ends Well. Here, as Wilcox notes, “the parallels between love and war are so extensive 
that we begin to wonder if the one is not an allegory of the other” – and both are similarly 
lethal. We are left uncertain, she observes, whether the “patch of velvet” on Bertram’s 
cheek is covering up a scar gained in battle or one caused by syphilis. (King/Franssen 
2008: 90-92) Syphilis itself – a relatively recent occurrence in Shakespeare’s time – 
connected, in a very graphic way, sex with disintegration, rotting matter, and death, 
putting a damper on the comparatively bawdy medieval attitudes towards the body and 
physical expressions of love. 
Whether the setting is tragic or comic, the lust of lower Venus consistently 
disintegrates and destroys Shakespeare’s male heroes and anti-heroes, dragging them – in 
soul, body, or both – downwards towards the hell of formless prime matter. 
 
7.4. HELLEN 
 
Venus is, as has been seen, radically divided in Renaissance Neoplatonism and in 
Shakespeare’s dramatic and poetic worlds into heavenly and vulgar, pure spirit and base 
matter, the one leading up to Heaven and the one dragging down to Hell. In the bed-trick, 
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heavenly Venus turns into vulgar Venus, chaste Dian into whorish Helen, who, in her 
most pernicious version, could more rightly be named “Hellen,” though the names given 
to this figure are already many. The infernal aspect of the triple goddess is Persephone, 
who shares in Hades this dark aspect with Hecate. (Line 2004: 28) In Ted Hughes’ 
mythological reading of Shakespeare, she is termed the Queen of Hell. (Hughes 1992) 
Whatever they call her, most critics who have dealt with Shakespeare from a religious or 
mythological perspective will agree that there is in his work a persistently recurring 
figure representing the infernal feminine.  
The original Dark Lady, whoever she may have been, may well have been the 
initiatory inspiration for exploring and developing this figure. In Sonnet 147, the bed-
tricked poetic subject’s seeming heavenly Dian transpires to be an infernal Hellen 
instead:  
 
I have sworn thee fair, and thought thee bright,  
Who art as black as hell, as dark as night.  
(Sonnet 147, 13-14) 
 
“Lust in action” is what finally causes the male spirit, bed-tricked by the promise 
of heaven, to fall into the feminine hell of matter, as is apparent in Sonnet 129: 
 
Th’ expense of spirit in a waste of shame 
Is lust in action, and till action, lust 
Is perjur’d, murd’rous, bloody, full of blame, 
Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust, 
Enjoy’d no sooner but despised straight, 
Past reason hunted, and no sooner had, 
Past reason hated as a swallowed bait 
On purpose laid to make the taker mad: 
[Mad] in pursuit and in possession so, 
Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme, 
A bliss in proof, and prov’d, [a] very woe, 
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Before, a joy propos’d, behind, a dream. 
All this the world well knows, yet none knows well 
To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell. 
(Sonnet 129) 
 
“Hell,” is, of course, slang for “vagina” – a fact which allowed Shakespeare much 
humorous punning, especially in the Sonnets. This is not without its metaphysical basis. 
Semen is, both in Plato’s and Aristotle’s reproductive theories – which were still extant in 
the Renaissance and continued to be rehearsed well into the eighteenth century – a 
product of the male mind/spirit. When this spirit is “wasted” in the “waste/waist” parts of 
a woman’s body, where unformed menstrual matter lurks, it has in fact fallen from the 
highest to the lowest point possible in one easy step, self-injurious to the male. Sex is in 
the thought systems of the time thus both metaphysically and physiologically the tragic 
fall of spirit into the very hell of matter, and infernal women are to blame. 
This can sometimes be very discreetly indicated. Hamlet, before renouncing 
Ophelia, seemingly romantically calls her “my soul’s idol.” The soul’s idol or eidolon 
can have a very specific meaning in Neoplatonism, pertaining to the question of 
Heracles’ presence in the Hades, as mentioned in Homer’s Odyssey. Ficino follows 
Plotinus in elucidating that it is not Heracles that Odysseus finds in Hades, but only his 
eidolon – the soul’s infernal reflection. Since the heroic Heracles lived the life of action, 
Plotinus explains, “something of him remained below,” whereas if he had been a 
contemplative philosopher, his whole soul would have remained in the intelligible world, 
where it rightly belongs. (Allen 2002: 169-171) The “soul’s idol” is thus the infernal 
reflection of the soul which has not renounced the life of action. This makes “my soul’s 
idol” about as flattering an appellation as “good kissing carrion.” Hamlet accordingly 
leaves Ophelia along with all “baser matter.” 
Sometimes the fall of light into the darkness of hell is explicit, as in Antony’s 
lament:  
 
my good stars, that were my former guides,  
Have empty left their orbs, and shot their fires  
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Into th’ abysm of hell.  
(Antony and Cleopatra, III. xiii. 144-146) 
 
If the Promethean fire of divine love is snatched by an undeserving, lecherous 
lover, Line observes, a fall into the hell of lust is the consequence. Malvolio, in her 
words, pursues Olivia, the heavenly Venus, as if she were the earthly Venus. She quotes 
Ficino as noting that “Plato says that this kind of love is born of human sickness” and 
“does not look up to the heavens, for in its black prison it is shuttered by night.” Line 
explains that Malvolio is punished by being bound and imprisoned in a dark house, which 
is “Plato’s black prison shuttered by night, the dark recesses of the earthly cave.” (Line 
2004: 130) Claudio is similarly shut in Angelo’s dark dungeon for his sexual escapade 
with Juliet, and Caliban is bound is his cell for attempting to rape Miranda. 
The fall into the hell of matter is at times perceptible in Neoplatonic stages of 
emanation or cosmic spheres. Plotinus terms these stages the One, Mind, Soul, and 
Matter, and Ficino usually names them God, Angel, Soul and Matter. (Allen 2002: 48) In 
Measure for Measure, the fall to the prison is depicted in ever-darkening degrees, which 
correspond to the Neoplatonic ones: the celestial Duke’s Palace, Angelo’s house where 
legalistic justice is dealt, the nunnery and the monastery, and finally the dark hell of the 
prison.  
Othello finds his celestial love in Venice, but takes her on a tempestuous sea 
voyage that will transport them to Cyprus, where chaos breaks loose in the single night of 
physical love that Othello and Desdemona share. In Venice, before the marriage is 
consummated, there was pure love between Othello and Desdemona, and a friendly bond 
between Othello and Cassio. Both bonds dissolve when “lust” takes over and the 
downward fall continues. Venetians appear, deputing Cassio in Othello’s place, and 
ordering him to go to Mauritania. Being the next stage of this punitive descent, we can 
safely assume that, had Othello lived to see it, Mauritania would have been a truly hellish 
place. 
There is a distinct downward movement in the settings of King Lear as well. The 
tragedy begins in Lear’s court where the king hands government to evil “deputies,” just 
like the Duke does in Measure for Measure. Absconding the increasingly hostile houses 
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of Goneril and Regan, the king finally finds himself in a dark, tempestuous wilderness, 
while Gloucester simultaneously takes a plunge into the watery abyss from the cliff of 
Dover.  
It appears that, as the hero or villain descends towards the hell of unformed 
matter, his entire realm is dragged along with him. Saturninus’ lust for Tamora 
transforms the once happy Rome into hell. Paris and Troilus both allow their respective 
domains – the collective and the individual – to fall into the chaos of “wars and lechery,” 
and the cruel demigod Angelo’s entire world is dragged into the dark prison as he himself 
falls prey to lust. Claudius, the devilish usurper, has transformed the apparently once 
garden-like Denmark into a dark, infernal place, as Macbeth has done to Scotland. Both 
usurping tyrants continue to drag their domains downwards, into the apparently 
bottomless abyss of hell.  
This, paradoxically, carries a pro-cosmic message: this world is not in itself 
already as bad as it can be. It can always be worse, and we can always fall downwards 
still, which can apparently transpire to be good news, as we can then also rise and 
improve our worlds. This is not the only good news that the hero can find in the dark hell 
of unformed prime matter when he finally comes face to face with it – as will be seen in 
the next chapter.  
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Here never shines the sun, here nothing breeds 
(Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 96) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.0. NOTHING 
 
In the Neoplatonic interpretation of the myth, Narcissus finally tragically drowns 
in the watery realm of unformed chaotic matter towards which the insidious beauty of his 
reflection has lured him. Masculine spirit can thus descend to the very bottom of 
feminine prime matter and find in it nothing other than hell. That hell is no more – or less 
– than being banished into the realm of the unformed elements was a common tenet of 
Renaissance Neoplatonism, and advocated most famously by Paracelsus. (Wain 1968: 
284)  
This is, quite possibly, the hell that Macbeth in set in. The answer to J. Dover 
Wilson’s question “Where does Macbeth open, on earth or in hell?” (Wilson 1933: 32) 
can thus also be “neither.” Neoplatonic hell is not a place one visits after death, but a 
state one may find oneself in at any point in the life of one’s eternal soul – the dreadful 
state of the spirit sunken to the very dregs of the universe. As W. A. Murray argues in his 
“Why was Duncan’s Blood Golden?” Lady Macbeth belongs to this “darkness of hell, to 
the sightless world of the elements” that the witches inhabit, and their combined efforts 
finally drag Macbeth and his entire domain down there as well. (Wain 1968: 284)  
As has been seen, the tyrant’s domain is very commonly represented as a hell in 
Shakespeare, simply inviting anti-cosmic interpretations invoking the figure of the 
“prince of this world.” If we look closely at the usual usurper’s career, however, he is 
typically revealed as a fallen potential hero (rather than the archetypically evil ruler of the 
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world) and his domain has fallen along with him (not originally being hellish at all). As 
Anne says to Richard III, “thou hast made the happy earth thy hell.” (Richard III, I. ii. 51)  
Macbeth only usurps and falls because of the joint temptations of the four witches 
(his wife included). The real villain of the tragedy – and the real ruler of the infernal 
domain – is thus none other than Hecate. 
 
8.1. BUT TO THE MATTER: MY MOTHER. HECATE AS QUEEN OF 
THE WORLD 
 
To mangle the notorious benignly sexist dictum, behind every usurping tyrant 
there is a Hecate, a “manly” witch, representing indomitable dark matter, from whom his 
power is truly derived. Lady Macbeth and the three witches, led by Hecate, govern 
Macbeth, and Lear’s evil daughters rule over their husbands and the entire hellish 
domain. 
Hamlet’s “O most pernicious woman!” precedes his “O villain, villain, smiling, 
damned villain!” (Hamlet, I. v. 105-106) and he is far quicker to judge his mother than 
his “uncle-father.” Claudius derives his power from Gertrude even in practical legal 
terms – according to the law extant in Shakespeare’s England, the marriage of a widow to 
her late husband’s brother sufficed to threaten the son’s inheritance claim (Jardine 2005: 
39) – and we can safely surmise that Claudius’ power originates in Gertrude. He himself 
freely confesses that the queen 
 
is so [conjunctive] to my life and soul, 
That, as the star moves not but in his sphere, 
I could not but by her. 
(Hamlet, IV. viii. 14-16) 
 
Saturninus is similarly entranced by the infernal Tamora to the degree that it 
becomes apparent it is her will that rules Rome. When she says “Where is my lord the 
King?” (Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 259) she only stresses that she is the real mistress of this 
hellish world. 
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Hecate also makes an appearance in The Tempest – if only in the reminiscences of 
its characters. The “foul witch” Sycorax, decidedly carnal and material in imagery, is 
brought pregnant to the island, where she reigns supreme over the entire realm, except 
Ariel,  
 
a spirit too delicate  
To act her earthy and abhorr’d commands.  
(The Tempest, I. ii. 272-273) 
 
Her son, Caliban – “Thou earth” as called by Prospero – claims the island is his 
“by Sycorax my mother,” and he may well be right. The material, “earthy” domain to 
which Prospero has been exiled rightfully belongs to Sycorax the witch, and the magus 
can only with great difficulty tame it and bring it under his rational and spiritual control.  
The male heroes and anti-heroes of the tragedies have no such luck, as they are 
unable or unwilling to resist the allure of Hecate. The Queen of Hell is revealed as the 
real tyrant of Shakespeare’s tyrannical regimes, and the usurping “prince of this world” is 
merely her consort, governed by her. We empathize with Saturninus, Macbeth, and 
Claudius, and easily condemn Tamora, Lady Macbeth, and even poor old Gertrude. 
Hecate, queen of the daimons and first among the witches, personifying all the 
powers of lower nature, is, interestingly enough, in Neoplatonic thought firmly identified 
with matter itself. Shaw explicitly elucidates that, for Neoplatonists, Hecate does not 
merely preside over matter or have a symbolic association with matter – she is matter. 
(Shaw 1995: 41) 
The infernal feminine of Neoplatonism thus does not only lead to and govern this 
dark realm, she is identified with it. Unlike the female anagogic figures that merely 
mirror or reflect the pristine purity of spirit they lead their male adorers towards, the 
seductress causing a male hero’s fall is also the place to which he falls. She is the thing 
itself, and the thing itself is a nothing – a void. 
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                   Hecate: Procession to a Witches' Sabbath (17th century) by de Ribera 
 
8.2. O: FACING THE “OOMB”  
 
Several critics have noticed the significance of what Berry, perhaps most 
illuminatingly, terms “Shakespeare’s tragic ‘O’s.” Shakespeare’s O’s, she notes, 
frequently appearing in conjunction with his lethal and whorish queens/queans, elide 
these infernal female figures with “bodily openings or dilations that are similarly 
amoral,” connecting the “gynaphobic” with the “reginaphobic” strand in his tragedies. 
(Berry 2002: 50) The O with which heroes defeated by the infernal feminine figures die 
on their lips is simultaneously the O of the vaginal orifice, but it is also the womb/tomb – 
Joyce’s brilliantly coined “oomb” – of Mother Earth, the O of dark feminine prime matter 
to which every descent ultimately leads. 
The first – and also the most elaborate and explicit – appearance of an actual O on 
Shakespeare’s stage is Tamora’s infernal pit, with which the dark queen of Rome is 
identified in multiple ways. She is the first to mention it, and does a fair job of describing 
both its surroundings and the hole itself: 
 
A barren detested vale you see it is, 
The trees, though summer, yet forlorn and lean, 
Overcome with moss and baleful mistletoe; 
  272 
Here never shines the sun, here nothing breeds, 
Unless the nighty owl or fatal raven; 
And when they show’d me this abhorred pit, 
They told me, here, at dead time of the night, 
A thousand fiends, a thousand hissing snakes, 
Ten thousand swelling toads, as many urchins, 
Would make such fearful and confused cries, 
As any mortal body hearing it 
Should straight fall mad, or else die suddenly. 
(Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 93-104) 
 
The pit is a fascinating amalgam of the monstrously sterile (barren vale) and the 
monstrously fertile (hissing snakes and swelling toads) and thus clearly represents matter 
itself. The delicious ambiguity of “here nothing breeds” must be especially emphasized, 
as it can denote both the utter sterility and the uber-fertility of the nothingness of 
misshapen dark prime matter, untouched by the forming, life-infusing sun.  
Attributes are added to the image of the pit when Martius falls into it, and Quintus 
eloquently muses on it before attempting to aid his brother: 
 
What, art thou fallen? What subtile hole is this, 
Whose mouth is covered with rude-growing briars, 
Upon whose leaves are drops of new-shed blood 
As fresh as morning dew distill’d on flowers? 
A vey fatal place it seems to me. 
(Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 198-202) 
 
Gordon Williams classifies the circular hole of Tamora’s pit under “O” in his 
Glossary of Shakespeare’s sexual language and explains both as meaning “vagina,” 
elucidating that “briars” were a common appellation for pubic hair. (Williams G. 1997) O 
as the vagina is also “the swallowing womb” of “this deep pit, poor Bassianus’ grave.” 
(Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 239-240) The womb is, of course, simultaneously the tomb. 
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This tomb is also a mouth that devours all: the “detested, dark, blood-drinking 
pit” (Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 224) and “this fell devouring receptacle” which is as 
“hateful as [Cocytus’] misty mouth.” (Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 235-236) Hades 
represented as a “hell-mouth,” equipped to emit smoke, it should be noted here, was a 
standard stage-property of Renaissance theater. The devouring “receptacle” – a word 
reminiscent of Plato’s term for the matrix of the world – is also hell, another term for 
vagina; and thus the circle of O closes. 
Kahn explains that Tamora’s explicit  
 
self-association with hell is more than conventional, given the imagery of the pit that 
connects hell not only with female sexuality (a connection ubiquitous in the 
Shakespearean canon as well) but more specifically […] with the malign fecundity of the 
maternal womb. (Kahn 2002: 69) 
 
The O of the vagina, womb, and tomb is finally, Berry notes, “the O of Tamora’s gaping 
mouth, when she devours her own children.” (Berry 2002: 139) 
Romeo’s own descent into the O of Juliet’s grave shows a similar over-elaborate 
elision of the gaping devouring mouth with the womb and the tomb of earth: 
 
Thou detestable maw, thou womb of death, 
Gorg’d with the dearest morsel of the earth, 
Thus I enforce thy rotten jaws to open, 
And in despite I’ll cram thee with more food. 
(Romeo and Juliet, V. iii. 45-48) 
 
In Macbeth, the witches significantly prepare their “hell-broth” in an O-shaped 
cauldron, and its ingredients should make it clear that we have now descended to the very 
bottom of the universe. Being bits and body parts of mostly formless, slimy animals like 
toads, lizards, and snakes, they plainly indicate primordial matter – chaotic, disordered, 
and disgusting. An especially intriguing addition to the mix is a  
 
Finger of birth-strangled babe  
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Ditch-deliver’d by a drab.  
(Macbeth, IV. i. 30-31)  
 
This links women as whores and mothers with witches as women suspended between the 
two, proliferating nothing but dead misshapen matter. Hecate is understandably pleased. 
Othello descends in his mind into the O he believes Desdemona to be: a “subtile 
whore” and a “closet lock and key of villainous secrets.” (Othello, IV. ii. 21-22) A 
woman’s closet, as her most intimate chamber where she is likely to entertain lovers, 
(Jardine 2005: 148) is linked in imagery with every facet of what Shakespeare’s O 
represents, an association reinforced in Othello’s accusation aimed at Emilia of having 
“the office opposite to Saint Peter” and keeping “the gate of hell.” (Othello, IV. ii. 91-92) 
Presumably, as she has allowed lovers into Desdemona’s closet – and thus into her 
vagina as well – Emilia is cast in the role of the hell porter. 
Lear similarly descends in his mind into this vaginal hell or feminine prime 
matter: 
 
But to the girdle do the gods inherit, 
Beneath is all the fiends’: there’s hell, there’s darkness, 
There is the suphurous pit, burning, scalding, 
Stench, consumption. Fie, fie, fie! pah, pah! 
(King Lear, IV. vi. 126-129) 
  
Muir warns against interpreting this disgust as “Shakespeare’s own revulsion against 
sexuality” as it may have been suggested by Harsnett’s account of the exorcists’ pretence 
that Sara Williams was, during menstruation, possessed with a devil “in a peculiar part of 
the body,” “in the inferior parts,” and “in the most secret part of my body.” It must be 
noted, however, that the vocabulary used here is quite rational and mild. Harsnett, as 
Muir has argued, does indeed mention evocative phrases such as “filthy fumes,” “the 
bottomlesse pit of hell,” “scalded,” “thicke smoake & vapour of hell,” “brimstone,” “vgly 
blackness, smoake, scorching, boyling and heate,” (Muir 1956: 160) but in a completely 
separate context, fully unconnected with women’s sexual organs. This would in fact 
  275 
prove that it is Shakespeare (or, at any rate, Lear) who makes the connection between the 
dark, sulphurous pit of hell and women’s genitals, and not Harsnett, or Jesuit exorcists, or 
poor misguided Sara. 
Timon suffers a parallel plunge into a feminine gynecological hell: 
 
Common mother, thou 
Whose womb unmeasurable and infinite breast 
Teems and feeds all; whose self-same mettle 
Whereof thy proud child (arrogant man) is puff’d, 
Engenders the black toad and adder blue, 
The gilded newt and eyeless venom’d worm, 
With all th’ abhorred births below crisp heaven 
Whereon Hyperion’s quick’ning fire doth shine: 
[...] 
Ensear thy fertile and conceptious womb, 
Let it no more bring out ingrateful man! 
Go great with tigers, dragons, wolves, and bears, 
Teems with new monsters, whom thy upward face 
Hath to the marbled mansion all above 
Never presented! 
(Timon of Athens, IV. iii.177-192) 
 
Burgess notices that King Lear and Timon of Athens were written roughly at the 
same time and have in common a strong, seemingly unwarranted revulsion at 
womanhood and sexuality. Timon, in his apt phrase, has a “gratuitous venereal 
obsession,” and Lear “finds in sex a symbol of the hell he wishes on the whole world.” 
Burgess argues that both Lear and Timon “go beyond simple dramatic necessity in 
invoking woman as the source of degradation and disease” and surmises that if 
“Shakespeare was ill with something other than overwork, that something was venereal 
disease.” (Burgess 1970: 197-199) 
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Although personal experience with venereal disease can certainly cause one to 
become more puritanical, invoking woman – or, rather, infernal feminine prime matter 
located in and identified with female sexual organs – as the source of degradation and 
disease hardly necessitates contracting syphilis. Neoplatonism will suffice. Lear and 
Timon rage at female sexuality because they have descended into the bottom of their 
universes’ O’s, and are there faced with this prime matter, which they rightly (according 
to Neoplatonists of all persuasions) see as the root of all that is rotten. 
The O of infernal prime matter was often quite literal, tangible, and visible on 
Shakespeare’s stage. Its role was played by the trap on the stage, a standard theatrical 
property. As Kinney explains:  
 
The trap in the middle of the stage, in the platea, serves the gravediggers in 
Hamlet as they dig in unsacred ground and find Yorick’s skull […]. It is the pit in Titus 
Andronicus into which Bassianus’ body is thrown and where Quintus and Martius fall, 
smearing themselves in his blood and thus appearing guilty of his death (2.3). It is also, 
most commonly, infernal. Joan de Pucell’s familiar spirits are “culled Out of the powerful 
regions under earth” (1 Henry VI, 5.3.10-11); it is where the spirit rising for Mother 
Jordan the witch is commanded by Bolingbroke to “Descend to darkness and the burning 
lake!” (1 Henry VI, 1.4.39). This may be why the trap seems so fitting a place for 
Malvolio and why Feste thinks of exorcism as the way of bringing him back onstage. But 
ghosts may issue from the trap, too […] Hamlet’s father seems doomed to remain in the 
trap as one who “cries under the stage” (1.5). […] But it is used most frequently by the 
weird sisters in Macbeth, who enter and exit by it. (Kinney 2003: 22)  
 
From it emerge the deceiving liars, demons, witches, and, interestingly enough, 
Old Hamlet. Iamblichus’ warning that “from the hollows of the earth leap chthonian dogs 
(i.e., daimons), who never show a true sign to a mortal” (Shaw 1995: 41) is strangely 
appropriate here. 
A hero can also actively descend into an O as part of a daring exploratory feat. 
Part of Hamlet’s timeless allure may stem from the fact that his adventurous dealings 
with matter appear voluntary and that his descent seems to leave him relatively unsullied. 
He does not fall into the abyss of matter owing to, say, inordinate lust – he plunges in 
because he feels it his duty to investigate what is rotten in the state of Denmark.  
  277 
Hamlet in fact undergoes not one, but three separate descents into three separate 
O’s analogous with the three faces of the Triple Goddess: the virgin, the mother, and the 
queen of the underworld.  
His first encounter is with the virgin. When he intrudes in Ophelia’s closet, her 
private chambers, “all unbrac’d,” he has entered his first O. He renounces her along with 
all “baser matter,” but has still to solve the riddle. Ophelia, though she belongs to the 
female sex, is not the source of all corruption in Denmark, and ridding himself of her 
resolves little. As Showalter notes, Hamlet’s “fixation with “matter” […] increasingly 
takes on the moralised burden of the maternal body.” Shakespeare swiftly moves from 
the “country matters” of Hamlet’s banter with Ophelia to a  
 
more intricate pun on mother/matter, mater (Latin for “mother”) still providing the root 
of the word maternity: “My wit’s diseased … as you say, my mother. Therefore no more, 
but to the matter. My mother, you say … / O wonderful son, that can so astonish a 
mother!” (III. ii. 303-310) Weighted with the hierarchical sexual biology of Aristotelian 
embryological theory, which defined the female contribution to conception and gestation 
as gross “matter” acted upon by the masculine motive principle of generation, Hamlet’s 
imaginative penetration into the anatomical reaches of the womb turns it into the origin of 
the “corruption” which plagues the state. (Laoutaris 2008: 65)  
 
Hamlet’s second plunge is into the O of his mother’s closet – the place Berry 
refers to, in Lacanian terms, as the “hollow phallus of the mother.” (Berry 2003: 79) Line 
lucidly observes that Hamlet asks “Now, mother, what’s the matter?” (Hamlet, III. iv. 7) 
on “entering the womb-like cavern of her closet to look into the face of his own 
substance.” (Line 2004: 129) For in Gertrude’s private chamber, Hamlet is faced with his 
material origins. The presence of dead Polonius in Gertrude’s closet, much like that of 
dead Bassanius in Tamora’s pit, is no accident. What Hamlet discovers in the O of the 
mother is dead, bloody, maternal, menstrual matter that is at the basis of his mortal body. 
Screaming insults at her, however, does not solve his quandary, as the originating source 
of all rottenness lies elsewhere. 
The O that Hamlet faces last is the gaping hole of Ophelia’s grave. Dug in 
unhallowed ground and spewing forth a medley of skulls and bones, it is eerily 
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reminiscent of the witches’ hell-broth, and similarly comprises chaotic, disgusting dead 
matter. Hamlet has discovered the womb/tomb of Mother Earth, the very bottom of the 
universe where the hell of prime matter lies, and the real culprit for all chaos, rottenness, 
and death. He muses on human mortality and the volatility of the earthy matter that even 
great kings were made of: 
 
Alexander died, Alexander was buried, Alexander returneth to dust, the dust is 
earth, of earth we make loam, and why of that loam whereto he was converted might they 
not stop a beer-barrel? 
 
Imperious Caesar, dead and turn’d to clay, 
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away. 
O that that earth which kept the world in awe 
Should patch a wall t’expel the [winter’s] flaw! 
(Hamlet, V. i. 208-216) 
 
Ophelia’s grave, significantly, spits forth the skull of Hamlet’s beloved jester 
Yorick, who, in Rutter’s interpretation, comes to speak for her one last time:   
 
Bizarrely, proleptically, Yorick is Ophelia’s double, for “to this favour she must 
come.” The skull makes the audience face up to death’s horrors in a materially specific 
way that Hamlet’s philosophizing has managed to avoid. Death, the prince learns from 
Yorick, stinks. The jester is a substitute who grounds ghastliness, displacing it from 
Ophelia now, for, newly-dead, her corpse still registers her sweetness, while casting 
imagination forward to Ophelia then, in the grave, “instant old,” no longer even a body 
but rotten flesh and jumbled bones. The words Hamlet puts into Yorick’s mouth let 
Ophelia, strangely, speak for the last time – “to this favour she must come.” (Rutter 2001: 
41) 
 
However, when Hamlet instructs Yorick’s skull “Now get you to my lady’s 
[chamber], and tell her, let her paint an inch thick, to this favor she must come; make her 
laugh at that,” (Hamlet, V. i. 192-195) we are not necessarily certain which lady Hamlet 
has in mind. He has been to both his ladies’ chambers and ascertained that both Gertrude 
and Ophelia are feminine dead matter that is mere bait and not to be trusted. “My lady” 
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can, in fact, be any lady: a woman luring her lover towards carnality; a mother trapping 
her child in a mortal body; or Mother Earth, the dead matter from which it is made 
merely being painted over with a pleasing shape. Hamlet seems to be echoing Plotinus’ 
sentiment that the material world (and any beautiful body in it) remains forever but a 
“corpse adorned.” (Enn., II.4.5.18, cited in Allen 2002: 79) 
Yorick also serves as a surrogate for Hamlet’s deceased father – and certainly 
appears in his memories as more of a true father figure than the late king ever does. Old 
Hamlet’s still fresh grave is, interestingly enough, never visited in the course of Act V, 
but he is briefly remembered by the gravedigger, who significantly began his career on 
the day of the late king’s victory over Old Norway. Even more significantly, the 
gravedigger started digging on the very day when Hamlet was born. A more chilling 
memento mori specifically meant for Hamlet would be hard to devise. The two events are 
actually linked in the graveyard scene as Hamlet contemplates the death of his father, his 
own impending death, and the end of his line. There is no grandson following Old 
Hamlet’s death that would be heir to his conquest – just like there was, sadly, no 
grandson following John Shakespeare’s death – either recent or impending at the time 
Hamlet was written. (Welsh 2001: 36-37) 
Ophelia, who might have been Hamlet’s true earthly Venus, his unear’d womb to 
produce his sons and his bodily immortality, is discarded as “baser matter” and “good 
kissing carrion,” and fittingly thrown into the gaping O in the middle of the stage – and 
Hamlet leaps in after her, daring the pit to devour him, much as does Romeo. The pit 
finally does devour all. The Ghost proves to have been her consort, doing her bidding and 
at last bringing death upon everyone. She wins, as does every O that opens in the 
tragedies, and there is no escaping this Charybdis. 
 
8.2.1. MOTHER, WHAT’S THE MATTER? MOTHER (EN)MATTERS 
 
Jacqueline Rose, replying in her “Sexuality in the reading of Shakespeare: Hamlet 
and Measure for Measure” to Eliot’s notorious judgment that Hamlet’s “mother is not an 
adequate equivalent” for his disgust, which “envelops and exceeds her,” (Eliot 1920) 
issues a bold statement. Reversing Eliot’s argument, she suggests that, rather than 
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attacking the very existence of something “inscrutable, unmanageable or even horrible,” 
one should instead question “an aesthetic theory which will only allow into its definition 
what can be controlled or managed by art” – such as was Eliot’s (although in practice he 
certainly had his share of excessively disgusted and horrified moments). Rose finds that 
the true object of horror and disgust in Hamlet is “nothing other than femininity itself.” 
(Drakakis 2002: 103) Given that femininity is in the entire tradition of Western dualistic 
thought identified with maternity and materiality, and matter is seen as the root of all evil, 
Hamlet’s disgust seems only natural. 
The view that the mother provides only base menstrual matter in procreation 
while the father provides the spiritual form was expounded by Plato, elaborated by 
Aristotle, and even propounded by the likes of Aquinas. All-pervasive before the 
discovery of the ovum, (Allen, Prudence 1997) it was demonstrably held by Shakespeare. 
Helen herself warns a potential husband: 
 
You are too young, too happy, and too good, 
To make yourself a son out of my blood. 
(All’s Well That Ends Well, II. iii. 96-97) 
 
Sebastian likewise explicates this distinctly dualistic view in Twelfth Night: 
 
A spirit I am indeed,  
But am in that dimension grossly clad  
Which from the womb I did participate. 
(Twelfth Night, V. i. 236-238)  
 
The mother does not merely make us material; she also makes us mortal, as 
without embodiment, we could have happily remained pure eternal spirits. As Janet 
Adelman explains: 
 
The mother’s body brings death into the world because her body itself is death: in the 
traditional alignment of spirit and matter, the mother gives us the stuff – the female 
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matter – of our bodies and thus our mortality. (Adelman 1992: 27, cited in Armstrong P. 
2006: 185)  
 
This “traditional alignment” which harks from Plato and Neoplatonism necessitates 
Hamlet’s and other tragic heroes’ realization that maternal matter makes us mortal and 
that vulgar/mortal Venus creates us only to destroy us. 
This is at the root of the persistent and sinister association between motherhood 
and mortality, between mothering and murdering, between womb and tomb. It appears in 
Cleopatra’s disturbing oath made to Antony:  
 
The next Caesarion [smite],  
Till by degrees the memory of my womb [...]  
Lie graveless.  
(Antony and Cleopatra, III. xiii. 162-166) 
 
It varies from Romeo’s “womb of death” aimed at Juliet’s tomb through Friar 
Lawrence’s jovial and casual “The earth that’s nature’s mother is her tomb” to Rosse’s 
lament that Scotland can no longer be “call’d our mother, but our grave” (Macbeth, IV. 
iii. 166) which seems on the surface to have little to do with metaphysical issues. That the 
enmattering mother is also a murderess plainly follows from the dualistic logic of 
Neoplatonism, and finds many expressions in Shakespeare’s work.   
Cases in point are the disturbing images of breastfeeding portraying a helpless 
male child in danger of bloody violence perpetrated by the mother. Lady Macbeth 
notoriously threatens her perhaps imaginary infant: 
 
I have given suck, and know 
How tender ‘tis to love the babe that milks me; 
I would, while it was smiling in my face, 
Have pluck’d my nipple from his boneless gums, 
And dash’d the brains out. 
(Macbeth, I. vii. 54-58)  
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Volumnia’s threat to her own son is perhaps less direct but no less disturbing: 
 
The breasts of Hecuba, 
When she did suckle Hector, look’d not lovelier 
Than Hector’s forehead when it spit forth blood 
At Grecian sword. 
(Coriolanus, I. iii. 40-43) 
 
She finally manages to effect Coriolanus’ death by equating her womb with Rome 
as his native land: 
 
thou shalt no sooner 
March to assault thy country that to tread 
[...] on thy mother’s womb 
That brought thee to this world. 
(Coriolanus, V. iii. 122-125) 
 
For Coriolanus, Rome is the monstrous multitude which desires his bloody wounds – 
much like his mother does. The multitude, elsewhere associated with chaotic lower 
matter, is here explicitly linked with the mother’s womb. The many-headed monster that 
finally overwhelms Coriolanus certainly also comprises his mother, as well as the two 
mutually indistinguishable multitudes – the Roman and the Volscian – that offer to 
destroy him at differing points in time. Defeating her son, this monstrous maternal O will 
devour him: 
 
O mother, mother! 
[...] O my mother, mother! O! 
You have won a happy victory to Rome; 
But, for your son 
[...] most mortal to him. 
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(Coriolanus, V. iii. 185-189) 
 
Rome and Volumnia are thus one – the mother that here metaphorically eats her 
young. Timon is even more explicitly being eaten by the multitude of Athens. As 
Apemantus notices, “what a number of men eats Timon, and he sees ‘em not!” (Timon of 
Athens, I. ii. 39-40) Tamora is literally a mother that eats her young, as Titus uses 
deception to force her to “like to the earth swallow her own increase.” (Titus Andronicus, 
V. ii. 191)  
The womb tomb that eats her own young is not Shakespeare’s invention nor is it 
without precedent. In Spenser’s Faerie Queene, Errour’s misshapen offspring crawl 
around her in the darkness, but 
 
Soone as that uncouth light upon them shone,  
Into her mouth they crept, and suddain all were gone. 
(Spenser, Faerie Queene) 
 
This is simply what the O of maternal prime matter does in Neoplatonic dualism. 
 
8.2.2. NOTHING OF WOMAN: MOTHERFREE 
 
It is understandable – given the usual attributes coupled with maternal materiality 
in Renaissance Neoplatonism – that so many Shakespeare’s heroes attempt to evade any 
association with the feminine. Before her death, as Cleopatra grows determined and 
“marble-constant,” she feels impelled to claim:   
 
I have nothing  
Of woman in me.  
(Antony and Cleopatra, V. ii. 238-239)  
 
Renouncing her femininity apparently allows Cleopatra to assume a masculine fixity of 
spirit. The statement can also be read as a humorous aside of the boy actor playing 
  284 
Cleopatra’s role, who truly would have been granted the liberty to claim to have nothing 
of woman in him.   
“Nothing of woman” can, however, also be linked with the desire that some 
heroes have to break free from the maternal body in which they were tragically 
enmattered and thus to not have anything of woman in them. I would like to term this an 
aspiration to be “motherfree” – adding the suffix which is used to denote a “lack” that is 
seen as positive and advantageous.13 If we remember, Ficino’s “heavenly Venus” is said 
to have been born without a mother, which makes her a stranger to matter, and thus 
exalted and free.  
To be of woman born is a heavy burden to bear and makes one vulnerable to all 
that flesh is heir to: pain, illness, death, and worst of all – lust. When the puritanical boy 
rejects her advances, Vulgar Venus asks Adonis:  
 
Art thou a woman’s son and canst not feel  
What ‘tis to love, how want of love tormenteth?  
(Venus and Adonis, 201-202)  
 
She scolds him that he is a “Thing like a man, but of no woman bred!” (Venus and 
Adonis, 214) A similar sentiment is found in Sonnet 41:  
 
And when a woman woos, what woman’s son  
Will sourly leave her till [she] have prevailed?  
(Sonnet 41, 7-8) 
 
Freedom from being born to a mother is freedom from lust and entanglements with 
women – which does not seem like a bad thing at all in the Neoplatonic value system. 
Being motherfree carries other privileges as well. In a vision provided by the 
witches, a bloody child tells Macbeth that  
 
                                               
13 Note the use of the suffix “-free” in the name for the Childfree movement – the movement of happily and 
intentionally “childless” individuals and couples. 
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none of woman born  
Shall harm Macbeth.  
(Macbeth, IV. i. 80-81)  
 
What Macbeth does not immediately realize is that he will indeed be harmed – only by 
someone not “of woman born.” The bloody child anticipates Macduff, who, “untimely 
ripp’d” from his mother’s womb, and thus free from the maternal body, can slay Macbeth 
and carry a victory over Hecate. To be motherfree is to be virtuous, valiant, truly 
masculine, and impervious to the evil effects of matter. Posthumus (also “ripp’d” from 
his mother) asserts that 
 
There’s no motion 
That tends to vice in man, but I affirm 
It is the woman’s part. 
(Cymbeline, II. v. 20-22)  
 
Minimizing “the woman’s part” in a child maximizes the chances that the child 
will be a decent and virtuous human being. Leontes is glad that Hermione did not nurse 
the boy, as she already has “too much blood in him.” Mother’s milk, as the contemporary 
physician John Sadler insists, it should be noted here, “is nothing but the monstrous bloud 
made whitte in the breasts.” (Laoutaris 2008: 171)  
 
8.2.3. MORTAL VENUS IS IMMORTAL (THE LADIES HAVE 
PREVAIL’D) 
 
Would-be motherfree heroes may sometimes attempt to sever their associations 
with maternal matter in somewhat violent ways. Coriolanus faces this chaotic substance 
in “the mutable, rank-scented meiny” which, according to him, is a Hydra and a monster 
– the beast with many heads. (Coriolanus, III. i. 66-71) He “banishes” the maternal 
material multitude: 
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You common cry of curs, whose breath I hate 
As reek a’ th’ rotten fens, whose loves I prize 
As the dead carcasses of unburied men 
That do corrupt my air – I banish you! 
(Coriolanus, III. iii. 120-123) 
 
It is this maternal material monster that he attempts to escape when he “elopes” into 
Aufidius’ open arms – much like Othello does with Iago. 
However, there is really no banishing or escaping one’s feminine basis and 
origins. The triple goddess, who reigns over matter, will usually win in Shakespeare’s 
darker plays. It might be useful to remember here that the triple goddess – part of the 
Neoplatonic tradition – was comprised of three goddesses: infernal Persephone/Hecate, 
benevolent maternal nature represented by Demeter/Ceres, and Artemis/Diana, the virgin 
goddess of the new moon. (Line 2004: 28)  
It is precisely this trio of goddesses that appears before Coriolanus and assures 
him that resistance is futile and that he cannot destroy or escape the maternal womb and 
the monstrous multitude of his native Rome: Volumnia, “the most noble mother in the 
world” – and the sinister manly witch who is fooling no one, Virgilia, the benign young 
wife and mother, and the utterly gratuitous virgin Valeria – clearly there only to complete 
the triple goddess in the most clichéd way imaginable –    
 
The moon of Rome, chaste as the icicle  
That’s curdied by the frost from purest snow  
And hangs on Dian’s temple. 
(Coriolanus, V. iii. 65-67).  
 
“The ladies have prevail’d,” (Coriolanus, V. iv. 40) the news goes, and when the 
three ladies enter Rome triumphantly, a Senator exclaims “Behold our patroness, the life 
of Rome!” (Coriolanus, V. v. 1) For all the talk of virtue and virility, Rome in effect 
worships – and is apparently ruled by – the triple goddess, and Coriolanus does not stand 
a chance against her. He belongs to her. 
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For Coriolanus is “a thing of blood.” Frequently covered in blood, he may 
superficially resemble in imagery the “bloody man”/“bloody child” of Macbeth. The 
“bloody child” in Macbeth – bloody because he has been “ripp’d” from his mother’s 
womb – indicates, however, a radical cut from the mother, being motherfree and thus free 
from matter as well: Macduff, free from the materiality of the maternal body, can slay 
Hecate’s consort Macbeth. Coriolanus, on the other hand, who “from face to foot” is “a 
thing of blood,” (Coriolanus, II. ii. 108-109) is entirely his mother’s, a part of her body, 
constantly returning to it, struggling to be born and separated, and will be reabsorbed by 
her when he is devoured by the multitude.  
The ladies have similarly prevail’d against Bertram in All’s Well That Ends Well. 
The triple goddess tricks him after he has attempted to renounce women, and he is finally 
faced with a trio of women: the pure virgin Dian, the pregnant mother Helen, and the old 
Widow, who demonstrate to him that he cannot flee materiality and that he is indeed 
already trapped in it. 
 
8.2.4. NOTHING OF WOMAN: O = 0 
  
There is yet another way in which to interpret Cleopatra’s assertion that she has 
“nothing of woman” in her. In most Neoplatonic thought, prime matter is viewed as 
privation – and thus literally nothing. (Allen 2002: 75-76) Therefore, whoever is meant to 
be saying this – however “constant” Cleopatra is and however male-bodied the boy actor 
is – neither can escape the fact that they were enmattered in their mothers’ wombs and 
that they consequently have in them the nothing of prime matter that is at the basis of 
every living human being. We all have, according to Neoplatonists, the nothing of 
woman in us, the nothing of maternal mortal matter we inherited from our mothers. This 
enables Hamlet to play with his eerie rhymes and claim that  
 
The King is a thing - 
Guildenstern: A thing, my lord? 
Hamlet: Of nothing, bring me to him. 
(Hamlet, IV. i. 27-30) 
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It is irrelevant here which king Hamlet has in mind, as the (still) living king is, just as 
much as the dead one, a thing of nothing, made of the nothingness of matter. 
The fact that Neoplatonism so often equated prime matter with privation, the void, 
nothingness itself, solidifies the meanings associated with “Shakespeare’s tragic O’s” and 
adds to them. “O,” “nothing,” and “hell” are all things an Elizabethan might use to refer 
to female genitals; they can also, significantly, denote feminine maternal matter. The void 
of O is the womb we are enmattered in and the tomb we will be devoured by in death. 
Showalter declares in her “Representing Ophelia: women, madness, and the 
responsibilities of feminist criticism” that Ophelia, consistently with the customary 
representations of femininity, is “certainly a creature of lack.” “I think nothing, my lord,” 
she says in the Mousetrap scene, to which he retorts: 
 
Hamlet: That’s a fair thought to lie between maids’ legs. 
Ophelia: What is, my lord? 
Hamlet: Nothing. 
(Hamlet, III. ii. 117–19) 
 
Showalter notes that in Elizabethan slang “nothing” was a term for the vagina, but that its 
meanings are further proliferated in a distinctly feminine paradigm. To Hamlet, she 
explains, 
 
“nothing” is what lies between maids’ legs, for, in the male visual system of 
representation and desire, women’s sexual organs, in the words of the French 
psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray, “represent the horror of having nothing to see.” When 
Ophelia is mad, Gertrude says that “Her speech is nothing,” mere “unshaped use.” 
Ophelia’s speech thus represents the horror of having nothing to say in the public terms 
defined by the court. Deprived of thought, sexuality, language, Ophelia’s story becomes 
the Story of O—the zero, the empty circle or mystery of feminine difference, the cipher 
of female sexuality. (Parker/Hartman 2005: 78-79) 
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The nothing of the vagina and the nothing of the chaotic, irrational incoherence of 
feminine madness are both ultimately the nothing of unformed prime matter.  
“Nothing” is thus deservedly the crucial key word of the tragedies – the original 
problem, the posed question, the stumbling block, but also the usually unsatisfactory 
solution. All the “ocular proof” and “auricular evidence” that the tragedies ultimately 
give in response to the probing questions of the neurotic male heroes can boil down to 
“nothing” – the nothing of dark, unformed prime matter.  
 The apparently widespread contemporary notion that “prime matter” could fully 
be equated with “nothing” is attributable to one of the bolder moves in the history of 
ideas, occurring right around Shakespeare’s time as part of an effort to reconcile 
traditional monotheistic religions with the increasingly popular dualistic ideas spreading 
as part of the package of Renaissance Neoplatonism.  
The entire subject of the origin of the cosmos was rife with controversy in 
Shakespeare’s time and there was an ongoing debate between the so-called pagan prima-
materialists and the Christian ex-nihilists. Plato and Aristotle unproblematically claimed 
that the cosmos was created from chaotic prime matter in a culture whose creation myths 
shared the same narrative. However, adherents of the Judeo-Christian tradition had to see 
the very notion of prime matter as heretical because it directly contradicted the Biblical 
doctrine of creation from nothing (ex nihilo). This notion was, nonetheless, being heartily 
espoused by learned people who read Plato and Aristotle, and with increasing frequency. 
William R. Elton cites in his informative “Deus Absconditus: Lear” some of the 
arguments that Christian authors used to denounce the pagan notion of prime matter. 
Some of these belie a great deal of anxiety, as the arguments of pagan philosophers 
seemed to make quite a bit of logical sense. Mutian categorically announces: “We leave 
behind the entelechy of Aristotle and the ideas of Plato. God created all things from 
nothing.” Montaigne sees the reasoning that “Because nothing is made of nothing: God 
was not able to frame the world without matter” as proof of the vanity of feeble human 
understanding, and Robert Parsons similarly exalts the doctrine of ex-nihilism as “high 
and hidden doctrine,” beyond the merely human capacity of comprehension. A 
contemporary of Shakespeare’s, R. B., Esquire, prays to God in The Difference betwene 
the Auncient Phisicke and the Latter Phisicke (1585) to “teach, ayd, & assist thy servants 
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against the heathnish and false Philosophie of Aristotle, which teacheth” that “of 
nothyng, nothyng can be made.” (Bloom Lear 2008: 252) Apparently, this was a hot and 
anxiety-inducing issue.  
A potential solution was long before offered by the early Neoplatonists – who, not 
being bound by the Torah, needed no such solution. According to Plotinus, as 
paraphrased by Allen, “matter, even when informed, retains its ontological status as anti-
substantial, evil privation.” (Allen 2002: 79) This solution was then embraced by some of 
the dualists who wished to hold on to at least part of the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Gnostics saw the cosmos as formed from dark prime matter by the blundering Demiurge 
– very differently than the Jews and the Christians. This matter, however, resulted from 
the shadow cast by the curtain separating the realm of light from Sophia’s prideful 
creation. The substance of matter is, thus, nothing but shadow, which is nothing other 
than the absence of light – which is nothing. Cabalists – notably Maimonides – similarly 
took the doctrine of creation ex nihilo very seriously, but saw this “nothing” as the abyss 
of prime matter that was within En Sof and has since been continuously being overcome 
in creation. (Armstrong 2007: 149) 
Christian Neoplatonists in the Renaissance, faced with a similar problem, adopted 
a similar solution. The brilliant, if audacious turn in contemporary thought connecting 
and reconciling the debating parties – the traditionally and “naïvely” monotheistic with 
the popularly and “scientifically” dualistic – appears to have originated in the mind of the 
mathematician Thomas Harriot, Raleigh’s protégé, member of the mythical School of 
Night, and probably an acquaintance of Shakespeare’s. According to Aubrey, at one 
point, Harriot did not value “the old storie of the Creation of the World. He could not 
beleeve the old position; he would say ex nihilo nihil fit.” (Bloom Lear 2008: 254) 
However, in his writings there is also a marginal note that states: “Ex nihilo nihil fit; sed 
omnia fint ex nihilo” – out of nothing nothing is made; yet everything is made out of 
nothing. (Turner 1999: 35) This seemingly paradoxical addendum to Aristotle’s 
insufficiently imaginative dictum in effect reconciles the “pagan prima-materialists” with 
the “Christian ex-nihilists” in the Christian Neoplatonic vision of the cosmos fashioned 
from the “nothing” – the void, the O/0 – that is prime matter. 
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For the womblike and vaginally suggestive “nothing” – the O – of feminine 
matter is simultaneously the absolute nothing – the 0 – that prime matter is. As Frederick 
Turner reveals in his brilliant Shakespeare’s Twenty-First-Century Economics: The 
Morality of Love and Money, despite centuries of previous contact between the Arab 
world and Europe, the zero only made its way into Christendom in the fourteenth century, 
and “it was only in Shakespeare’s time that its full power as a concept and as a source of 
mathematical ideas began to be realized.” Lear’s Fool is obviously fascinated by its 
ramifications: 
 
When Lear’s Fool wants to find the ultimate description of the nonexistence to 
which Lear has reduced himself by giving away his kingdom, he says to his master: 
“Now thou art an O without a figure” (King Lear, I. iv. 193). What he means is that if 
Lear had a figure or digit, say 8 or 2 or 5, followed by a zero (an “O”), then he would 
have eighty or twenty or fifty; but as it is, he has only the zero, he has nothing. Or rather, 
is nothing. There is something utterly chilling about this image; the Fool is insisting on a 
meaning for zero that is not simply as a conventional placeholding sign to signify tens or 
hundreds or thousands, but the mysterious void itself. (Turner 1999: 36) 
 
This is what Lear encounters in the stormy wilderness: the void of prime matter as 
the basis of the cosmos and his own frail body – and this is what he has been reduced to. 
Gloucester lucidly observes, on seeing Lear mad: 
 
O ruin’d piece of nature! This great world 
Shall so wear out to nought. 
(King Lear, IV. vi. 134-135) 
 
Lear is here compared to the cosmos, and both will, without the forming spirit, eventually 
revert to the “nought” – the zero – of chaotic, unformed matter. The abdicated king is 
being schooled in the paradoxical cosmogony and cosmology of Christian Neoplatonism, 
which is at variance both with the naïve-sounding traditional monism of creatio ex nihilo 
and with the popular scientific-seeming but unimaginative materialism of Aristotle’s ex 
nihilo nihil fit which Hobbes dryly explicates “because nothing, however it be multiplied, 
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will for ever be nothing.” (Bloom Lear 2008: 254) Apparently, Lear is initially a staunch 
follower of Aristotle and Hobbes, as can be seen in his opening dispute with Cordelia, 
who has “nothing” to offer him: 
 
Lear: what can you say to draw a third more opulent than your sisters? Speak. 
Cordelia: Nothing, my lord. 
Lear: Nothing? 
Cordelia: Nothing. 
Lear: Nothing will come of nothing, speak again. 
(King Lear, I. i. 85-89) 
 
Conversely, Lear is able to say to Goneril when Regan only allows him to keep twenty-
five retainers:  
 
Your fifty yet doth double five and twenty, 
And thou art twice her love. 
(King Lear, II. iv. 268-269) 
 
Both their “loves” will eventually “wear out to nought” – deflate to zero – as 
neither daughter will ultimately allow him a single servant. An O/0 without a figure, 
however it be multiplied, remains nothing. The characters heavily associated with lower 
matter – Edmund, Goneril, and Regan – will, attempting to multiply their material 
possessions (which are in themselves nothing, as matter is nothing) predictably end up 
with nothing.  
In contrast, the less materialistic characters – Cordelia, Edgar, Kent, Gloucester, 
and Lear – are all more or less voluntarily reduced to nothing/0 in the course of the play. 
Cordelia has “nothing” to offer both to her father and her new husband. Edgar becomes 
poor Tom, a “poor, bare, fork’d animal,” “the thing itself,” realizing that “Edgar I nothing 
am.” (King Lear, II. iii. 21) Kent is put in the stocks for serving the King, and Gloucester 
is blinded and leaps into the abyss. Lear is reduced to an O/0 without a figure, and he has 
apparently still not learned his lesson:  
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Fool: Can you make no use of nothing, nuncle? 
Lear: Why, no, boy, nothing can be made out of nothing. 
(King Lear, I. iv. 132-133) 
 
What he needs to realize is that everything is made out of nothing – something 
even young Romeo seems to understand when he exclaims “O any thing, of nothing first 
[create]!” (Romeo and Juliet, I. i. 177) The universe is created out of the nothingness of 
feminine prime matter, the “Nothing, the middle, the female genitals, procreation” (Berry 
2002: 152) that Lear has attempted to banish with Cordelia, the spurned, despised zero 
which turns out to be “the womb of all.” (Turner 1999: 43) Apparently, the appropriate 
mathematical operation is putting a figure before the 0, and not multiplying it. The 
chaotic dark feminine nothing of matter, led, guided, and lovingly formed by masculine 
numerical spirit, makes the universe. The way the universe is created on the cosmic level 
is analogous to the way a child is made by the male spirit forming the nothingness of 
menstrual matter.  
But the male must be willing to descend into this feminine hell and “spend 
himself upon her” – Elizabethan slang for ejaculating inside a woman – investing his 
most precious life-giving spirit in this nothingness, this zero. He is indeed a hero if he 
dares do it: in Turner’s words, “like a merchant adventurer he risks himself in that dark 
and oceanic passage, that the profit of a child may emerge from the trade.” (Turner 1999: 
59-60) 
This is how the nothingness of dead matter can be seen as “good kissing carrion” 
in which the sun will breed life. Analogously to the fertilizing male, the sun amorously 
and generously infuses life into dead earth, just like the spirit of God graciously animates 
dark feminine matter. The darkest, blackest matter is paradoxically closest to what is, in 
Timon’s phrase, “Hyperion’s quick’ning fire”: Morocco’s dark “complexion,” we might 
recall, is the “shadowed livery of the burnish’d sun,” (The Merchant of Venice, II. i. 1-2) 
and Cleopatra is “with Phoebus’ amorous pinches black.” (Antony and Cleopatra, I. v. 
28-29) Black matter is “good kissing carrion” because it lures towards it the sun’s 
creative, forming, life-infusing gaze. 
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The idea of “good” feminine matter, fully animated by the loving masculine spirit, 
appears in the so-called animist or vitalist brand of Neoplatonic dualism, expounded in 
diverse works of late Renaissance literature by authors such as Pierre de Ronsard, 
François Rabelais, Michel de Montaigne, and, in England, Samuel Daniel, Christopher 
Marlowe, Ben Jonson and John Milton, as well as philosophers and natural philosophers 
such as Bernardino Telesio, Francesco Patrizi, Girolamo Cardano, and Giordano Bruno. 
It has as its central philosophical motif the conception of matter utterly infused with spirit 
and therefore the living mother of all. (Berry 2002: 12-13) This is as pro-cosmic as 
Neoplatonism can get without becoming something else. 
 
8.3. THIS THING OF DARKNESS 
 
 The descent that leads heroes to the very bottom of their universes’ O’s ultimately 
forces them to acknowledge the nothingness of dark feminine matter as the basis of the 
cosmos and the basis of their own mortal bodies. This is not an easy feat, and all but few 
fail at it. Prospero’s is a rare and exemplary success story. He was exiled with his 
daughter in  
  
A rotten carcass of a butt, not rigg’d, 
Nor tackle, sail, nor mast, the very rats 
Instinctively have quit it. There they hoist us, 
To cry to th’ sea, that roar’d to us; to sigh 
To th’ winds, whose pity, sighing back again, 
Did us but loving wrong. 
(The Tempest, I. ii. 146-151) 
 
This is very reminiscent of the allegorical exegesis of the book of Jonah from the Cabalist 
book of Zohar as a gripping representation of the soul’s fall into the body: Jonah 
descends into the sail – the soul into the body – and there endures the tempest of 
materiality, wherein he is ultimately devoured by a whale. (Scholem 1999: 101-103) In 
The Tempest, the mind (Prospero) and soul (Miranda) descend into the storm-toss’d body 
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and are exiled onto the earth. When they arrive, only the “hag-born whelp” and the 
imprisoned spirit exist on the island, forming an unresolved duality of base matter 
derived from a monstrous witch and pure spirit of air, suffering in his prison. 
Caliban is the material part, as can clearly be read from the salacious insults 
leveled at him by Prospero: “Thou earth,” “Thou poisonous slave, got by the devil 
himself,” (The Tempest, I. ii. 319-320) and many more, and his fully unenlightened 
desire, reminiscent of Barnardine’s, to remain asleep. First coddled and stroked by the 
inexperienced Prospero, he tries, apparently according to his unalterable nature, to rape 
Miranda. The material part has rebelled in lust. What follows is the other extreme: a 
misguided asceticism wherein Caliban is imprisoned and abused, repressed and forgotten. 
This will apparently not do, either, and Prospero’s wedding ceremonies performed for his 
daughter come to an abrupt end when a graceful dance of Nymphs and Reapers vanishes, 
and the magus remembers: 
 
I had forgot that foul conspiracy 
Of the beast Caliban and his confederates 
Against my life. 
(The Tempest, IV. i. 139-141) 
 
Perhaps the Reapers reminded him of his mortality, which his body conspires to effect. 
Not long after this, Prospero is capable of uttering, in reference to Caliban, this 
revolutionary statement: 
  
this thing of darkness I 
Acknowledge mine. 
(The Tempest, V. i. 275-276) 
 
Prospero has faced and acknowledged his dark, bestial, material basis, and can now 
proceed to be truly liberated from it.  
The alchemists would say that in order for prime matter to be transfigured, it must 
first be acknowledged and integrated, and the Neoplatonic Hecate, Shaw explains, was 
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not merely evil matter incarnate. She was, in fact, also “a mirror of the embodied soul, 
reflecting the soul’s experience of matter.” In this sense, he elucidates, “matter (Hecate) 
functioned as an index of the soul’s spiritual condition and was evil only in proportion to 
the soul’s attachment to its material existence.” (Shaw 1995: 41-42) A journeying hero 
must look into the mirror of Hecate in order to ascertain to what extent he is in her thrall 
and proceed with this knowledge. We might want to remember that the virtuous Banquo, 
for instance, is entirely unimpressed by the witches. 
The ultimate goal is to be liberated from matter entirely, but this appears to be an 
impossible feat without first being truly faced with it. Descent into the bottom of the 
material world can thus bring enlightenment and actually appear to be the sine qua non of 
one’s final salvation from it.  
 
 8.4. LOOK HERE COMES A WALKING FIRE: THE SPARK OF SPIRIT 
IN THE “O” 
 
 Ficino waxes poetic on the seemingly paradoxical blessings of the soul’s descent 
into the dark world of matter:  
 
For whoever is dull in his wits and strong in body will not know how to value his good 
health. One must be sick from time to time so that by way of comparison at least one may 
recognize the value of health, and with renewed pleasure enjoy one’s renewed health. 
Man’s soul, being more obtuse than all minds, needs this comparison in order to make the 
most comprehensive judgment about the weightiest matters. Thus, shaken by the storms 
of this world, it will prophesy more accurately here, and discern more keenly there, how 
calm and pleasant is the refuge in God; it will cling to it with greater intensity and enjoy 
it with greater pleasure. Plotinus seems to approve highly of this proof; and Porphyry 
especially when he says that the soul which has experienced these ills too often 
eventually will cling completely to its parent and no longer ever return to them. (Ficino 
2005: 261)  
 
Only when it descends to the darkest uttermost bottom of the universe can the “obtuse” 
human soul learn to value the light of divine love that remains high above. 
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When Shakespeare’s tragic heroes are “drawn through the material world to the 
grossest level of existence,” Line observes, this “light dwindles to barely a glimmer in the 
darkness of original chaos.” (Line 2004: 122) But it is only here, paradoxically, that this 
glimmer will be appreciated, and it can, apparently, never be fully extinguished: 
 
Those who penetrate deep into the darkness of matter and manage to keep their reason 
[…] may still come face to face with chaos, the formless darkness from which we are 
created. But they are never completely lost, for the spark of love that drew the unformed 
mind to the love of God, although buried in the darkness, still faintly flickers. The highest 
light is reflected in the deepest dark. (Line 2004: 124) 
 
King Lear loses sight of the light of divine love and “his mind dissolves into 
madness as he descends through the material world into the chaos of unformed matter” 
through “a storm in which all nature appears to be disintegrating and the very body of the 
world is flattened into primary chaos.” Lear can now see nothing of the world “except its 
gross matter.” (Line 2004: 126) However, it is precisely in this O of prime matter that a 
spark of light first appears: 
 
Fool: Prithee, nuncle, be contended, ‘tis a naughty night to swim in. Now a little 
fire in a wild field were like an old lecher’s heart, a small spark, all the rest on’s body 
cold. Enter Gloucester with a torch. Look, here comes a walking fire. (King Lear, III. iv. 
110-114) 
 
The walking fire, Line observes, is Gloucester with a torch, “arriving to lead them 
to better lodgings, one step at least out of the underworld.” (Line 2004: 129) Figures that 
make a salvific appearance in this underworld of darkness include Feste in Malvolio’s 
dark house, the disguised Duke in Angelo’s prison, and Marina in the brothel – to name 
but a few. It is this hell that Neoplatonic Christ comes to harrow and it is here that 
Shakespeare’s Christ figures, who come to enlighten and teach, can be encountered. It is 
in the chaotic, watery darkness of prime matter – “a naughty night to swim in” – that a 
spark of spirit appears, bringing enlightenment and beginning the hero’s resurrection. 
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8.5. SEA-CHANGE 
  
Disintegration in the fluid element can bring about a transfiguration. This is how 
Ariel describes sea-change in his song: 
 
Full fadom five thy father lies, 
Of his bones are corals made: 
Those are pearls that were his eyes: 
Nothing of him that doth fade, 
But doth suffer a sea-change 
Into something rich and strange. 
(The Tempest, I. ii. 397-402) 
 
The song is usually read as saying that everything of his body that is disintegrated is also 
transformed, and this is certainly the more obvious meaning. There is, however, another 
reading that works syntactically and adds a further layer of meaning to this most explicit 
elucidation of the motif of sea-change extant in Shakespeare. “Nothing of him” that “doth 
suffer a sea-change” can be read alchemically as the nothing of prime matter which forms 
him being transformed into something purer, more precious, and more permanent. Corals 
and pearls replace rotting flesh when putrified in the depths of water. 
Water is, of course, one of the most picturesque and widely used representations 
of prime matter, both in myth and philosophy. One need only remember Plotinus’ usage 
of Plato’s “bottomless sea of unlikeness” (Pol. 273d6–e1) to express the experience of 
the soul fallen into matter – or the “mud of Hades.” (Turner/Majercik 2000: 39) 
Shakespeare’s work readily yields examples of a persistent association between 
tempestuous water and chaotic matter. In Macbeth, it is the witches, Hecate’s underlings, 
who cause tempests. Othello is separated by the tempestuous sea of materiality and carnal 
passions from his beloved Cassio and Desdemona. Examples of the fluid element being 
directly linked to matter are too numerous to count. 
The tempestuous watery chaos of prime matter has to be endured so this 
womb/tomb would deign one the opportunity for rebirth. The notion has helpfully been 
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termed by Jung nekyia and defined as “the night sea journey” in exploration of the 
chaotic material basis that leads one towards enlightenment and transformation. (Jung 
1984: 57-60) Nekyia is closely associated with a Neoplatonic interpretation of Christ’s 
death, in which he bravely descends into the hell of prime matter and is then resurrected. 
This rebirth through water is quite tentative and problematic in the tragedies and the dark 
comedies, where the womb/tomb of prime matter is more likely to simply devour 
everyone and everything. 
Hamlet, however, arguably experiences some sort of transformation when he is 
returned by the sea in one piece after his tempestuous adventure: 
 
High and mighty, You shall know I am set naked on your kingdom. To-morrow 
shall I beg leave to see your kingly eyes, when I shall, first asking your pardon thereunto, 
recount the occasion of my sudden [and more strange] return. 
(Hamlet, IV. vii. 43-47) 
 
“Naked,” as Hamlet himself explains it in his footnote, means “alone,” but babies 
are born naked, and he is, as it were, reborn. Having sailed literally to his death, grappled 
with pirates, and become their sole prisoner, he miraculously returns a changed man: at 
ease with his mortality and trusting “Providence” to aid him in his dilemmas. 
C. J. Cisson notices in “Justice in King Lear” that, in “the great storm of events,” 
the king also “suffers a sea-change, purged by suffering.” (Kermode 1969: 236) The 
choice of words is significant, as Lear clearly suffers in the watery element, and imagery 
of water is omnipresent throughout his ordeal. Gloucester explicitly associates Lear’s 
purging storm with a violent sea tempest: 
 
The sea, with such a storm as his bare head 
In hell-black night endur’d, would have buoy’d up 
And quench’d the stelled fires. 
(King Lear, III. vii. 59-61) 
 
With the associated images of the sea and hell, Lear has obviously suffered a potentially 
transfiguring descent into primeval chaos – a sea-change. As Ficino asserts, “the soul, 
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even as it is tossed about in the mighty tempest of this sea [of life], always gazes up at 
heavenly things, and in gazing up at them it is daily seized by a yet more vehement love 
of them.” He goes on to elucidate, quoting from Plato’s Republic:  
 
Whoever glimpses the sea[-god] Glaucus worn and disfigured from his long sojourn in 
the waves, all covered moreover with pebbles, sea-weed, and oyster shells, will think of 
him as not a sea but a wood creature. Likewise, when we witness the soul distracted and 
overwhelmed by earthly desires and habits, we regard ourselves as an earthly rather than 
a heavenly being. Were we to uncover the soul, however, and consider it in its purity 
when it has already emerged from this sea through a love of things divine, we would 
surely know that the soul, because it is akin to things divine and eternal, yearns for such; 
and that, as soon as it has emerged in its purity, it attains them and dwells with them in 
the light serene, and in this company becomes altogether divine. (Ficino 2005: 307) 
 
This description is strangely reminiscent of Lear’s appearance after the wearing but 
transforming storm, as described by Cordelia: 
  
As mad as the vex’d sea, singing aloud, 
Crown’d with rank [femiter] and furrow-weeds, 
With hardocks, hemlock, nettles, cuckoo-flow’rs, 
Darnel, and the idle weeds that grow 
In our sustaining corn. 
(King Lear, IV. iii. 2-6) 
 
Gloucester undergoes a similar sea-change in his frustrated suicide attempt. As he 
explains to his disguised son: 
 
There is a cliff, whose high and bending head 
Looks fearfully in the confined deep. 
Bring me but to the very brim of it. 
(King Lear, IV. i. 73-75) 
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Leaping into this imaginary but symbolically significant watery abyss allows Gloucester 
to finally accept that his life is a miracle. 
Water, though a powerful and prevalent metaphor for it, is but one way to 
represent prime matter, and adventures in any sort of wilderness are similar to this sea 
change. As Berry explains, for instance, “the setting of a forest (silva in Latin) 
allegorically evokes the disorderliness of primal matter (as silva, hyle or chora)” (Berry 
2002: 51) and there are arguably many forest settings in Shakespeare’s comedies and 
romances where miraculous enlightenments, transformations, and rebirths occur. 
Elisabeth Bronfen also notes in “Shakespeare’s nocturnal world” that night in 
Shakespeare’s work signifies both “chaos” and “the possibility of transformation.” 
(Drakakis/Townshend 2008: 21) Darkness, the opposite of the forming spiritual light of 
the sun, is the hallmark of prime matter.  
Dark and confined spaces, such as pits, cells, and hovels, as has been noted, can 
also represent the bottom of the material world, the womb/tomb of prime matter where 
Shakespeare’s rebirths can – but by no means necessarily do – take place. The notion that 
the experience of these cavernous spaces, symbolizing prime matter and reminiscent, of 
course, of Plato’s cave, can bring one closer to enlightenment, was reflected in a 
contemporary architectural trend noticeable in the more affluently built Renaissance 
houses – a garden path leading the walker through a dark underground grotto into a sunlit 
and intricately designed grove. A symbolic movement from darkness into light, “from a 
recognition of the elemental basis of creation, realised in the darkened space of the 
artificial cave or grotto, to a garden of light,” represents, in Laoutaris’ view, a striking 
dramatization of this commonly held “neo-Platonic world-view.” (Laoutaris 2008: 104-
106) 
In Cymbeline, Guiderius and Arviragus, “sparks of nature,” true heirs of their 
kingly father, are trapped in a literal cave which is visited by their sister Imogen, a Christ 
figure. In Line’s reading, divine light enters the dark cave, symbolically dies and is then 
reborn. (Line 2004: 133-134) All the sparks can then, liberated, return to their father, who 
is now free of his own Hecate, the evil queen.  
Rebirths through water more closely resembling the story of nekyia tend to appear 
in the romances with some regularity: The various tempests of The Tempest bring 
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transformation to virtually all involved; in The Winter’s Tale, the violent storm that 
drowns many also brings a newborn to the shore of Bohemia; and all the characters in 
Pericles who die by water return resurrected. When Marina is taken by the sea, Pericles is 
told that she is dead, to which  
 
He [puts] on sackcloth, and to sea. He bears 
A tempest, which his mortal vessel tears, 
And yet he rides it out. 
(Pericles, IV. iv. 29-31) 
 
Each of the principal characters endures a nekyia: a sea-change involving riding out a 
tempest, symbolic death and rebirth. Thaisa significantly asks Pericles: 
 
Did you not name a tempest, 
A birth, and death? 
(Pericles, V. iii. 33-34) 
 
Perhaps unwittingly, she has recounted the essence of the entire play – and many other 
plays centering on sea-change that Shakespeare wrote toward the end of his career.  
It is mostly in Shakespeare’s romances that resurrecting returns which “offer the 
opportunity for transformation, but a transformation that will take up and redeem the 
past” are allowed to take place. (Perry/Watkins 2009: 48) However, the potential for a 
transfiguring encounter with the watery chaos of prime matter is already indicated in 
Hamlet and developed, but left ambiguous in King Lear. Coming face to face with the 
material basis of all creation, the nothing that everything is made of, is revealed in the 
tragedies to be, if not necessarily enlightening and revitalizing, then at least inescapable 
and unavoidable. 
As has been noted, this descent into the void can also at times, especially when 
appearing in conjunction with erotic themes, be indistinguishable from henosis, and the 
two nothingnesses of pure spirit and prime matter can be quite difficult to tell apart. Far 
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from being limiting, this ambiguity adds to the possibilities of interpreting Shakespeare’s 
work, and potentially shows him as personally deconstructing spirit/matter dualism itself. 
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… they cannot touch me for [coining,] I am the King himself. 
(King Lear, IV. vi. 83) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9.0. THEURGY 
 
Plotinus firmly believed that Narcissus, fatally betrayed by the lovely reflection of 
his spiritual being in the shadowy material waters, suffered the worst fate that could 
befall a soul: lethal immersion in the depths of matter. The story of primordial, purely 
spiritual Man, as it is told in the Corpus Hermeticum, however, paints an entirely 
different picture of what entanglement with matter might entail:  
 
Man […] leant across the armature of the spheres, having broken through their 
envelopes, and showed to the Nature below the beautiful form of God. […] Nature smiled 
with love, for she had seen the features of that marvelously beautiful form of Man 
reflected in the water and his shadow on the earth. And he, having seen this form like to 
himself in Nature, reflected in the water, he loved her and wished to dwell with her. The 
moment he wished this he accomplished it and came to inhabit the irrational form. Then 
Nature having received her loved one, embraced him, and they were united, for they 
burned with love. (Yates 1964: 23-25) 
 
This version of Narcissus is not tricked by his reflection in the material waters of Nature: 
he consciously and graciously chooses to lend her his form, becoming united with her. 
She, in turn, does not deceive him or wish to imprison him: instead, she lovingly yields to 
his forming embrace.  
Along with Iamblichus’ theory of the fully and productively descended soul, this 
creation narrative from the Corpus Hermeticum seems to have played a pivotal role in 
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informing Ficino’s cosmology as it concerns the interactions of male spirit with female 
matter. He, however, never forgot Plotinus, either. Kodera explains that  
 
the erotic, potentially uncontrollable involvement of soul with matter deeply worried 
Ficino, yet, paradoxically he developed a cosmology that put particular emphasis on the 
domination of matter by soul by transferring the model of the Narcissistic and creative 
gaze to the story of divine Creation. (Allen 2002: 294) 
 
In a central passage in his Theologia Platonica, Ficino explains that, apart from a 
limitless and limiting God, there is also a “shadow,” which he openly identifies with 
“most common matter.” God looks at this shadowy matter and it is, by virtue of His 
creative gaze, converted into a mirror, reflecting the image of the creator. This matter is a 
nothingness and has no definite characteristics: it is malleable, pliable, and yielding. 
Ficino’s Philebus commentary once more describes the act of creation as a Narcissistic 
process in which “God is mirrored in a shadow, matter or otherness.” (Allen 2002: 296) 
This creative Narcissistic mirroring can and does, according to some 
Neoplatonists, recur on every level of the cosmos on which ordering masculine spirit 
abides, including the level of our own earthy existence. Aiding the demiurgic process of 
forming feminine matter and persuading her to faithfully mirror the divine is what was 
known in both ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonic circles as theurgy. In contrast to 
“theologia” (talking about the gods), the term “theourgia” refers to “doing divine works,” 
as John P. Anton clarifies in his “Theourgia – Demiourgia: A Controversial Issue in 
Hellenistic Thought and Religion.” (Wallis/Bregman 1992: 16) Birger A. Pearson 
explains in his “Theurgic Tendencies in Gnosticism and Iamblichus’s Conception of 
Theurgy” that the concept of theurgy afforded one the possibility to – instead of seeing it 
as a catastrophe of imprisonment – view one’s embodied existence as an opportunity to 
courageously cooperate in the divine work of creatively ordering matter. 
(Wallis/Bregman 1992: 256)  
This is the other, decidedly pro-cosmic side of the coin of post-Platonic thought, 
inviting one to active involvement with the material world (vita activa) instead of a 
passive withdrawal from it (vita contemplativa). It was Iamblichus that most 
wholeheartedly embraced theurgy, not merely allowing the rites that involved dealings 
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with filthy matter, but instead viewing them as a prerequisite for salvation, thus virtually 
reversing Plotinus’ view on the urgency of the soul’s ascent as a sine qua non of its 
redemption. Certainly a new development in the Platonic tradition, this leaning towards 
theurgy is not entirely without basis in the dialogues. In Plato’s doctrine of recollection, 
the soul was reawakened by its contacts with objects in the material world which 
functioned as mnemonic prods that helped remind the soul of the Platonic Forms. 
Theurgy, Shaw explains, accordingly exemplified “a ritual praxis where the prods of 
sensate experience were carefully controlled in rites designed to awaken the soul to the 
Forms.” (Shaw 1995: 24) 
It is clear that this proactive, enthusiastic pro-cosmic Neoplatonism is still fully 
dualistic in its metaphysics. The spirit, instead of fleeing from it in disgust, deigns to 
instead engage matter bravely and lovingly form it. The ultimate goal is still ascent 
towards henosis, now viewed as impossible without a corresponding theurgical descent in 
which the material base is acknowledged, transformed, and then finally left behind. 
We have seen that the comedies and romances offer instances of successful 
ascents, whereas the tragedies yield mostly examples of how a misguided attempt at 
ascent can instead cause a hero to be dragged downwards to the bottommost dregs of the 
material universe. Similarly, successful attempts at theurgy can most readily be found in 
the romances, while in the tragedies we can see the cosmos reduced to chaotic prime 
matter, and its potential theurgical agents banished, maimed, and/or killed. As much as it 
is possible, the discussion of theurgical moments in Shakespeare’s work will be focused 
on the tragedies and “problem” plays, but when mentioning instances from other plays 
seems necessary in order to illuminate a significant point, this will not be avoided at all 
cost.  
 
9.1. GOD KISSING CARRION (HIS FULL TILTH AND HUSBANDRY) 
 
Mentioned in Virgil’s Aeneid, Berry relates, the notion that both individual souls 
and the anima mundi were of a fiery substance that animated individual bodies and the 
body of the world was then restated by many a classical commentator, and Cicero notably 
cited the Stoic view that a “creative fire” pervaded the world. Marsilio Ficino wrote:  
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The sun of the world, the substance of natural life, completely possesses and 
bears that which the rest of the world has parts of. Therefore some have placed the soul of 
the world in it, on account of its rays being everywhere diffused. (Berry 2002: 30)  
 
Berry interprets this notion of vitalism/animism as being pro-cosmic to the extent of 
according some form of independent source of life to matter itself. However, there is very 
little in the contemporary sources that would substantiate that view – even the “seeds” 
and “vital spirits” abiding in Nature according to the most enthusiastic vitalists were 
explicitly seen not as attributes of matter per se, but instead as benevolent infusions of 
life-giving and forming spirit into it. The feminine nothing that everything came from 
was apparently only good – and living – to the extent that it was passively yielding to the 
animating and forming influence of the infinitely superior masculine spirit that was the 
sole originator and proprietor of life. Ficino even emphasizes: 
 
Heaven, the husband of earth, does not touch the earth, as is the common opinion. It does 
not have intercourse with its wife; but by the rays of its stars alone as if with the rays of its eyes, it 
illuminates her on all sides; it fertilizes her by its illumination and procreates living things. (Ficino 
1998: 401)  
 
It is the rays of the heavenly light of spirit that fertilize – safely from afar and 
without touching – earthly matter, thus giving it any life that might issue from her. 
Shakespeare frequently employs the image of the divine solar animating dead matter, but 
he apparently allows some “touching” (so abhorrent to Ficino) to take place in the 
process. The other possible wording of the famous “carrion” crux in Hamlet enables a 
somewhat different reading of it: 
 
For if the sun breed maggots in a dead dog, 
being a god kissing carrion – Have you a daughter? 
Polonius: I have, my lord. 
Let her not walk i’ th’ sun. Conception is a blessing, but as your daughter may conceive, 
friend, look to’t. 
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(Hamlet, II. ii. 181-186)14 
 
The divine male solar spirit deigns to lovingly animate dead female matter, much 
as some male might impregnate Ophelia if she walks too much in the sun. Female carrion 
matter in itself is not necessarily “good” in any way, as is implied by the other wording; 
instead, it is graciously kissed and thus given life by the divine spirit, the sun “god.” 
Conception is a blessing, Hamlet says, and we can infer that fertility in nature can be 
precariously positive if matter is sufficiently passive and tame and yields to the god 
kissing it. However, the imagery surrounding solar fertilization of matter is always 
ambiguous and at least somewhat disturbing. Lepidus, for instance, explains this 
animating process: “Your serpent of Egypt is bred now of your mud by the operation of 
your sun. So is your crocodile.” (Antony and Cleopatra, II. vii. 26-27) The image of 
serpents and crocodiles emerging from the primordial mud of the Nile would not 
necessarily regale the hearts and souls of squeamish Neoplatonists such as Ficino. 
The spirit animates and forms, but also transforms matter. As King Philip of 
France explains to Constance: 
 
To solemnize this day the glorious sun 
Stays in his course and plays the alchymist, 
Turning with splendor of his precious eye 
The meagre cloddy earth to glittering gold. 
(King John, III. i. 77-80) 
 
The sun performs alchemy on prime matter, transforming it into pure gold, a 
transformation which is itself in alchemy a symbol for the transfiguring – but also 
animating and ordering – action of spirit upon matter.  
As Rebecca Lemon argues in her “Sovereignty and treason in Macbeth,” Duncan 
similarly performs multiple functions in Macbeth, each associated with the distinctive 
solar imagery surrounding him. As the sun, Lemon notes, Duncan shines forth light on all 
his noblemen who as a result appear “like stars.” (Macbeth, I. iv. 41) He graciously 
                                               
14 Emphasis mine.  
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declares he will “plant” Macbeth and make him “full of growing,” (Macbeth, I. iv. 28-29) 
which will unfortunately not come to fruition, in contrast with Banquo’s willing 
“harvest” (Macbeth, I. iv. 33) which he intends to present himself as to his sovereign. 
(Moschovakis 2008: 74)  
A man can thus be a representation of the divine spirit forming and fertilizing 
matter, just like the sun is. Duncan is the Neoplatonic sun shining forth life and order into 
his domain. This solar figure of the king is a mirror image of God – and this mirroring is 
repeated on all hierarchical levels of the universe. 
 
9.2. I AM THE KING HIMSELF: THE THEURGIST 
 
The hierarchical notion of a higher, more spiritual sphere forming a lower, more 
material one in its own lofty image is frequently represented in the figure of coining. The 
Duke significantly asks Escalus “What figure of us do you think he will bear?” (Measure 
for Measure, I. i. 16) when he confers his royal authority on Angelo, and the unhappy 
deputy himself asks: 
 
Let there be some more test made of my mettle 
Before so noble and so great a figure 
Be stamp’d upon it. 
(Measure for Measure, I. i. 47-49) 
 
The figure of the king is stamped on a coin like the figure of kingly and/or divine 
authority is stamped on Angelo, whether he is meant to represent Ficino’s Angel (the 
sphere immediately reflecting God), or secular authority, or both.  
The figure of the father is likewise imprinted on the child, as his divine spirit 
forms the menstrual matter provided by the mother. Shakespeare has some fun with the 
image, allowing Angelo to judge “felons” procreating outside of marriage as those  
 
that do coin heaven’s image 
In stamps that are forbid. 
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(Measure for Measure, II. iv. 45-46) 
 
“Heaven’s image” is any human being created in the image of God – a fairly orthodox 
notion. Stamping this spiritual image on pre-existent matter in order to create a child, 
however, is not. Posthumus rages at all womanhood in words that are, similarly to 
Angelo’s, difficult to take too seriously: 
 
We are all bastards, 
And that most venerable man which I 
Did call my father, was I know not where 
When I was stamp’d. Some coiner with his tools 
Made me a counterfeit. 
(Cymbeline, II. v. 2-6) 
 
The figure of coining ultimately refers to stamping onto lower matter the image of 
God as the ultimate Father and the ultimate King. Like the husband has the right to 
imprint his form on his wife’s menstrual matter, so the king has the authority to coin – to 
rightfully stamp his image on base metal and thus give it value and significance. God as 
the Father and King of all stamps His image on the metal (or “mettle,” or matter – all 
virtually interchangeable words in Elizabethan English) that all is made of and thus forms 
and creates everything.  
When Lear claims “they cannot touch me for [coining,] I am the King himself,” 
(King Lear, IV. vi. 83) he is speaking as the king – or, at any rate, the abdicated king – of 
his domain, but also, significantly, as its Everyman. For, unorthodoxly, audaciously, 
subversively, the proponents of theurgy in Renaissance Neoplatonism hold it that each 
man, being in spirit essentially identical to God, has the “right – indeed, the responsibility 
– to reshape the world” in his own divine image. (Mebane 1989: 7) “With his super 
celestial mind,” Ficino writes in his Theologia Platonica, man, who “transcends heaven” 
and “provides generally for all things both living and lifeless, is a kind of God.” 
Possessing virtually the same genius as the author of the heavens, he could also make the 
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heavens had he the materials. (Dollimore 2004: 162-163) Elsewhere he simply asserts 
that man “Est utique deus in terris.” (Allen 2002: 51) 
This view is not unprecedented in the history of Neoplatonism. Iamblichus first 
interpreted Plato’s notion that the Demiurge gave to each soul a spark of himself (Tim. 
41c) as implying that each soul had the responsibility to perform its own demiurgy, i.e. its 
own theurgy, creating a cosmos out of the chaos of its embodiment. (Shaw 1995: 15) 
Hermetic and Paracelsian magicians followed suit, acting on the belief that humanity is 
“in part divine and therefore capable of controlling at least the lower spheres of the 
cosmos.” (Mebane 1989: 6-7) This predictably resulted in the view the humanists held, 
that in order to, as Mebane paraphrases, 
 
realize our divine potential, we must, like God, exercise our powers in creative acts 
through which we reproduce in the external world the perfection we have come to see 
within our own minds. (Mebane 1989: 11)  
 
The proto-atheistic humanist focus on man as the god of his own domain thus stems from 
an old and venerable tradition which is actually religious and metaphysical in origin. It is 
the subsequent sanitization of early modern science and mystification of the early modern 
occult that has obscured this connection between the rationally active humanist and the 
magus – it is, for instance, still bad form to issue a reminder that Newton spent more time 
and effort on alchemical experiments than on “legitimately” scientific ones. 
The homo faber of the humanists is, understandably if we take this into 
consideration, at times difficult to distinguish from the occult Renaissance figure of the 
magus: for Giordano Bruno, the “magus signifies a wise man with the power of acting,” 
while Paracelsus describes the figure in slightly more religious terms. (Nuttall 2007: 5) 
Pico’s description of Zoroaster as a magus is an amalgam of the two:  
 
the son of Oromasius, in practicing magic, took that to be the cult of God and the study of 
divinity; while engaged in this in Persia he most successfully investigated every virtue 
and power of nature, in order to know those sacred and sublime secrets of the divine 
intellect; which subject many people called theurgy, others Cabala or magic. (Allen 2002: 
143) 
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Ficino with his priestly medicine and cautious astrology, merely mentioning 
talismans and statues without necessarily advocating their use, and Pico with his pious 
and gentle Cabala, stand on the benign and more rational-seeming extreme of 
Renaissance magic. On the other extreme is Agrippa, with his complex, demon-invoking, 
and otherwise quite intimidating practices. (Yates 1964: 141) Somewhere in the middle is 
the mathematician-magus John Dee – revered in the golden age of Elizabethan magic, 
and feared after the age had passed for ever; accused of unspeakable rites, but also at one 
point “a very clear example of how the will to operate, stimulated by Renaissance magic, 
could pass into, and stimulate, the will to operate in genuine applied science.” (Yates 
1964: 150) Dee is but one example of this. Nutall notes that the branches of occult 
knowledge that grew in popularity after Ficino’s apology for magic (alchemy, astrology, 
chiromancy, physiognomy, the art of memory, numerology and word-magic) at times 
actually resulted in objective and systematized knowledge, and thus spurred on the 
advent of modern science, but warns that to “see them only as precursors of the science 
we know” would be “to misunderstand them by completely removing their spiritual 
dimension.” (Nuttall 2007: 28-29)  
Thus the theory and practice of Renaissance magic appear to have diverged into 
two roads – one that would eventually result in a “rational” and “scientific” will to 
manipulate the world, and one that would prove to be, more or less, a dead end. As 
Mitchell sees this issue, the Renaissance Magus at one point becomes split into two 
figures: the “engineer” (and empire-builder), and the “eccentric” (the poet and visionary). 
(Mitchell 2006: 105) Shakespeare’s Prospero is apparently meant to be both.  
Jonson, according to Mitchell, shows a thorough knowledge of alchemical terms 
in The Alchemist, and there is absolutely no reason to suppose that Shakespeare would 
have been any less acquainted with the currents of Gnostic/Hermetic thought. (Mitchell 
2006: 83) Bloom notes that Prospero’s name is the Italian word for “the favored one,” a 
direct translation of “Faustus.” (Bloom Tempest 2008: xii) In Prospero, Shakespeare 
certainly appears to be portraying a magus. 
This magus at first takes the eccentric, contemplative road, neglecting practical 
affairs of the state. In this, as many critics have noticed, he greatly resembles Rudolf II, 
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the Emperor of Bohemia, who dedicated himself solely to scientific and occult study, 
eschewing his practical duties to the point that, in 1606, the archdukes reassigned his 
authority to a deputy, commenting that “[h]is majesty is interested only in wizards, 
alkymists, Kabbalists,” and noting his “whole library of magic books.” The parallels with 
another ruler “rapt in secret studies” (The Tempest, I. ii. 77) who would be deposed by his 
brother for “neglecting worldly ends” (The Tempest, I. ii. 89) are clear. (Kastan 2005: 
177) 
Prospero, however, eventually proves his true theurgical prowess when he 
exercises full control over the watery element in the tempest of his own making. The 
Boatswain scathingly asks the King of Naples and the usurping Duke of Milan, referring 
to the waves, “What care these roarers for the name of king?” and challenges them: “if 
you can command these elements to silence […] Use your authority.” (The Tempest, I. i. 
16-17; 21-23) Redmond is right in noting that the Boatswain’s words point to the fact that 
these “great leaders are powerless against the tempest because their titular authority does 
not coincide with any practical ability to govern the vessel.” (Redmond 2009: 123) There 
are, however, additional multiple meanings of this exchange, most of them Neoplatonic 
in origin. 
The metaphor of the ship of state harks back to Plato’s Republic and is 
complemented by the myth in the Statesman depicting the demiurge as ideally at the helm 
of the ship that is the cosmos. (Plato 1997: 206-207) Plotinus compares the individual 
soul to a sailor, while Numenius likens his “Second God” to a helmsman sailing over the 
sea of Matter and controlling it, all the while fixing his gaze on the “First God” above. 
(Wallis/Bregman 1992: 469) Iamblichus explains that sailing in a ship “represents the 
sovereignty that governs the world,” (Iamblichus 2003: 293) and Ficino clarifies Plato’s 
ship metaphors as asserting that “the king should also be called the helmsman of human 
life, as though it were a ship,” for “human governance is identical to divine governance, 
and the one God is ruler of the whole world.” (Ficino 2006: 60) Plato, according to 
Ficino,  
 
undoubtedly teaches us, in an allegory, that we do not have a true and lawful king, unless 
it be He whom the King of heaven Himself has placed as a shepherd over us in heaven 
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and on earth, a shepherd who fully represents the King of heaven Himself, not in name 
alone, but also in pattern of life. (Ficino 2006: 63)  
 
Sailing a ship over tempestuous seas thus represents theurgical governance over 
matter on all levels: individual (the soul ruling over the body), state (the rightful ruler 
governing the state), and cosmic (the demiurge ordering primordial chaos into a cosmos). 
Prospero is the clearest example of an ultimately successful theurgist and ruler, but there 
are other rulers who, achieving personal equilibrium, govern the state justly and assume 
divine proportions. As Redmond notices, there are, for instance, distinct “similarities 
between how Prospero secretly controls the action on the island and the dominating, 
manipulative presence of the disguised Duke of Vienna in the earlier Measure for 
Measure.” (Redmond 2009: 124) Though not necessarily universally appreciated by the 
critics, the figure of the theurgist manipulating the cosmos into order clearly recalls the 
real Platonic divine ruler, though he may not currently be the one with the title. As Angus 
says of Macbeth: 
  
Now does he feel his title 
Hang loose about him, like a giant’s robe 
Upon a dwarfish thief. 
(Macbeth, V. i. 19-22) 
 
The title does not help the usurpers contain the chaos in Hamlet and King Lear either, and 
the theurgical message is clear: the real ruler is not the one with the title, but the one who 
can command the elements to silence – like Prospero does, like Duke Vincentio does, like 
Old Hamlet apparently could, and like divine Duncan demonstrably did. 
This figure of the divine ruler commanding the tempestuous elements conjures, of 
course, another well-known image – that of Christ calming the storm on the Lake of 
Gennesaret and walking on water towards His stunned disciples. He, apparently, was the 
one who had the authority to command the elements to silence – an ability lacked by the 
tempest-tossed titularies of The Tempest.  
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Christ as a powerful, ordering theurgical figure, as opposed to the docetic Christ 
of anti-cosmism we encountered earlier, makes a regular appearance in Shakespeare’s 
work, usually arriving at the very end to set right the time that was out of joint. These 
returns of the rightful kings who come to order their universes are usually endowed with 
the common trappings of the Second Coming of Christ.  
One of the most striking paraphernalia of Doomsday as described in the Bible is 
the sound of trumpets beckoning all to their reckoning. When the Duke returns publicly 
in Measure for Measure – as Christ is also expected to, in direct contrast with His first 
incognito sojourn on the earth – the citizens know to gather at the gates because the 
trumpets tell them to: 
 
Twice have the trumpets sounded; 
The generous and gravest citizens 
Have hent the gates. 
(Measure for Measure, IV. vi. 11-12) 
 
When the king arrives in All’s Well That Ends Well to bring justice and order and 
thus end it all well, Lafew portentously utters: “The King’s coming, I know by his 
trumpets.” (All’s Well That Ends Well, V. ii. 51-52) Lafew knows, as we know, by the 
King’s trumpets, that Judgment Day is coming. Trumpets also, significantly, sound as 
Macduff and Malcolm charge to set the time free of Macbeth, and when the Venetians 
appear to depose Othello – both arrivals signaling the end of chaos and the advent of a 
new order. 
Some of the divine rulers arriving to overthrow tyrants and bring order are dukes 
and kings; some are imprudently absconding or unjustly overthrown rightful rulers; and 
some are, disturbingly, themselves “usurpers” with no inherently justifiable right to rule. 
In these examples we can clearly see how the right to rule is decentered in pro-cosmic 
dualism: each man, as a spark of the divine demiurge and thus invested with both the 
right and the responsibility to participate in theurgically ordering the universe, is indeed 
born to set right the time that is out of joint. This makes pro-cosmic dualism arguably 
even more politically subversive than anti-cosmic dualism, which might well be more 
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inclined to see all current rulers as agents of the devil, but is also less inclined to inspire 
its adherents to strive to do anything about it.  
This pro-active tendency of pro-cosmic dualism to encourage one to, magus-like, 
rule over lower matter and order it inspired more than just the inception of modern 
applied science and insufficient meekness in royal subjects: it made possible the 
widespread enthusiasm and support for the onset of colonization. The Tempest is, among 
other things, as Kastan would have it, “a telling document of the first phase of English 
imperialism,” (Kastan 2005: 170) and the figure of the magus as colonizer makes a potent 
appearance in Prospero as the subduer and would-be civilizer of Caliban. As we have 
seen when discussing Othello and Desdemona, the othering of non-whites follows a 
metaphysical pattern similar to that of the othering of women in dualistic systems of 
thought: dark, chaotic matter needs to be ordered and controlled by divine spirit; 
analogously, as some human beings (white males) are thought to be more spiritual, and 
others (females, non-whites, and especially non-white females) more material, it follows 
that the divine magus has both the right and the responsibility to rule over those who are 
lower on the Platonic ladder of perfection in a benevolent attempt to civilize them and 
bring order into their savage, brutish lives. It should not be surprising, then, that Dee, the 
theurgical mascot of the Elizabethan age and its most notorious magus, far from being 
“rapt in secret studies” and unconcerned with matters of state, was instead an active 
supporter of Britain’s first maritime exploits. He is even traditionally credited with 
coining the very term “British Empire,” and was one of its “earliest, boldest, and most 
ingenious advocates.” (Sherman 1995: 148) The theurgical goal of conquering and 
ordering the watery chaos of matter offered a natural impetus to one possible justification 
of the imperialist project of conquering – for the purported purpose of ordering – the 
more carnal and animalistic chaos of the “barbarians.”  
 
9.3. THE MAGUS vs. THE WITCH: THE THEURGIST AND HIS OBJECT 
 
Conquering and ordering watery chaos is firmly a manly, magus-like theurgical 
exploit. Antony thus quite understandably berates himself:  
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I, that with my sword 
Quarter’d the world, and o’er green Neptune’s back 
With ships made cities, condemn myself to lack 
The courage of a woman. 
(Antony and Cleopatra, IV. xiv. 57-60) 
 
From being able to control earth and water with straight lines and craftsmanship, 
Antony and his soldiers are reduced to being “women’s men” – out of their element, 
fighting at sea, and being predictably conquered by the watery chaos that is ultimately 
Cleopatra’s doing.  
Unmanning Antony, Cleopatra is a witch, who enchants him with her artifice – 
which ominously outdoes nature. (Armstrong 1996: 101-103) For women who attempt to 
change nature are witches and whores, whereas men who do the same are magi and 
theurgists. Prospero paints a frightening picture of Sycorax, who 
 
was a witch, and one so strong 
That could control the moon, make flows and ebbs, 
And deal in her command without her power. 
(The Tempest, V. i. 269-271) 
 
It is easy to forget that Prospero in fact performs quite similar feats, but that these are 
somehow laudable in his case. A man operating on nature is a divine theurgist; but should 
a woman dare attempt agency, she is doomed to be seen as an unnatural, manly witch, 
who needs to be put in her place. 
Kate gives a full theological explanation for this seeming paradox in the Quarto 
version of the ending of The Taming of the Shrew: 
 
The first world was, a forme, without a forme, 
A heape confusd a mixture all deformd, 
A gulfe of gulfes, a body bodiles, 
Where all the elements were orderless, 
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Before the great commander of the world, 
The King of Kings the glorious God of heauen, 
Who in six daies did frame the heauenly worke, 
And made all things to stand in perfit course. 
Then to his image he did make a man. 
Old Adam and from his side a sleepe, 
A rib was taken, of which the Lord did make, 
The woe of man so termed by Adam then, 
Woman for that, by her came sinne to vs, 
And for her sin was Adam doomd to die. 
(The Taming of the Shrew, Quarto version, V. ii. 136-149) 
 
Only superficially orthodox, this misogynist tirade is in fact largely dualistic. God 
operates on pre-existent prime matter, orders it and forms it, finally creating man in his 
image. Woman, on the other hand, is explicitly not made in God’s image, but, implicitly, 
in the disturbing image of the very matter that God has conquered. As prime matter was 
ordered by God, so woman-as-matter must be controlled by divine man – and not the 
other way around. Luciana develops this theme in The Comedy of Errors: 
 
The beasts, the fishes, and the winged fowls 
Are their males’ subjects and at their controls: 
Man, more divine, the master of all these, 
Lord of the wide world and wild wat’ry seas, 
Indu’d with intellectual sense and souls, 
Of more pre-eminence than fish and fowls, 
Are masters to their females, and their lords. 
(The Comedy of Errors, II. i. 18-25) 
 
Divine man rules over both animals and women. Women are generously put in the same 
category as beasts, fishes and winged fowls – the category of the material which male 
spirit naturally subjects to his control. If she cannot be transcended and escaped, then 
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woman as matter should at least ideally be but a malleable object, sufficiently pliable and 
amenable to the forming gaze of the male spirit. Using Ficino’s mirror imagery, Isabel 
accedes to Angelo’s accusatory “Nay, women are frail too” and expands upon it: 
 
Ay, as the glasses where they view themselves, 
Which are as easy broke as they make forms. 
Women? Help heaven! men their creation mar 
In profiting by them. Nay, call us ten times frail, 
For we are soft as our complexions are, 
And credulous to false prints. 
(Measure for Measure, II. iv. 124-130) 
 
Isabel subverts Angelo’s allegation by pointing out that “good” women, behaving like 
“good” Neoplatonic matter should, cannot be blamed for being “frail”: if they are to be 
controlled and formed by men, then they must indeed be frail – soft, credulous, and easily 
broken. Lucrece does the same in her speech to Tarquin:  
 
For men have marble, women waxen minds, 
And therefore are they form’d as marble will; 
The weak oppress’d, th’ impression of strange kinds 
Is form’d in them by force, by fraud, or skill. 
Then call them not the authors of their ill, 
No more than wax shall be accounted evil, 
Wherein is stamp’d the semblance of a devil. 
(The Rape of Lucrece, 1240-1246) 
 
It is not difficult to conceive how this pro-cosmic extreme on the dualistic 
spectrum – where female matter can and must be controlled – could produce even more 
anxiety in the male mind than the anti-cosmic kind. If feminine matter is “good” 
(obedient and easily formed) then women are not to blame for their actions, as it is solely 
up to men to direct and control them. If, on the other hand, matter is “bad” (recalcitrant 
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and disobedient), the responsibility is still firmly on male spirit – but his task is 
significantly more challenging. As Kodera explains, one effect of this seemingly 
benevolent notion of forming female matter lovingly by way of a creative male gaze in 
Renaissance Neoplatonism is that 
 
disobedient matter poses an alarming threat to divine omnipotence. The idea that matter 
could become such an obstacle to the divine is, I think, a direct result of the Narcissism 
involved in the process of creation, which always conveys a solipsistic fantasy of 
absolute power that does not tolerate any opposition. (Allen 2002: 296) 
 
Rebellious matter is frequently figured in Shakespeare by rebellious women – 
wives or daughters – who, by not properly submitting to husbands and/or fathers 
personify the terrifying mutiny of matter against the ordering spirit. Shylock notably cries 
in dismay, upon hearing that his daughter has abandoned him: “My own flesh and blood 
to rebel!” to which Solanio wryly retorts: “Out upon it, old carrion, rebels it at these 
years?” (The Merchant of Venice, III. i. 35-36) The allusion is clearly sexual: rebellious 
daughters are elided with rebellious and lustful flesh. In King Lear it is similarly said:  
 
Our flesh and blood, my lord, is grown so vild  
That it doth hate what gets it.  
(King Lear, III. iv. 145-146) 
 
What “gets” – begets or conceives – any human being is spirit that animates and 
forms prime matter. One meaning of this can be that our bodies lustfully rebel against the 
spirit and we become mere animals. The first meaning, of course, is that children – 
especially (but not exclusively) daughters – rebel against their fathers. The two notions 
are at times difficult to separate, as the two themes are multiply intertwined.  
 
9.4. ACCORDING TO MY BOND: LOVE AS THEURGY 
 
Juan Luis Vives tells in his 16th century manual Education of a Christian Woman 
the gripping tale of Justina, a noble Roman virgin, given in marriage to a rich but 
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irascible man, who instantly became suspicious of her extraordinary beauty. On their 
wedding night, just after the marriage was consummated, spotting her white neck as she 
was bending down to untie her shoes, and overpowered by a jealous rage, he brutally 
murdered her, as is described in the epigram that Vives quotes: 
 
My cruel husband cut off my head 
As I stooped down to loose the fastenings 
Around my snow-white foot, 
Pitilessly, and beside that very bed 
Where I had lain with him not long before, 
And where I lost the honor of my maidenhood. 
And yet I did not merit this cruel death, 
I call upon the gods to be my witnesses. 
But here I lie, the victim of harsh fate. 
Learn, fathers, from the example of Justina 
Not to marry your daughter to a senseless man. 
(Vives 2000: 163)  
 
Othello, it will easily be noted, in fact does exactly the same, killing his beautiful 
young wife for the sin of having loved him. What is striking is the moral that Vives 
offers. To our modern eyes, it looks quite bizarre, yet it is one that some of Shakespeare’s 
heroes will actually agree with:  
 
It will be evident that a girl must not give even a sign of her desire for marriage 
or that she loves a young man in order to marry him. If you love him before he is your 
husband, what will he suspect but that you will easily fall in love with someone else other 
than him, to whom you should not yet have shown your love. Naturally, he will think that 
he is not the only one loved, since there is no reason to think that you will not love others; 
and after you have been legitimately joined to him, you will fall in love with others, since 
you have such a strong inclination toward love. 
Others may gloss over this fact with whatever pretexts they wish: A woman who 
loves a man who is not her husband is a prostitute in her body if she has carnal relations 
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with him, and in her mind if she does not. It does not matter who the man is, if she does 
not yet love her husband. (Vives 2000: 170)  
 
One of the striking emergent changes in the Renaissance – what Sinfield has 
repeatedly referred to as “faultlines” – is an increased agency enjoyed by a woman in her 
choice of a spouse. The new-and-improved “choice” model of marriage, Jardine asserts, 
far from being an unproblematically positive development for the female sex, powerfully 
stirs male anxieties by transforming a woman’s love from “a simple reflection of duty” to 
an expression of her own will. Here Jardine sees the origin of “the potential unruliness 
not only of Cordelia […], but of Desdemona.” (Jardine 2005: 117) The “familiar comic 
pattern, in which daughters routinely leave blocking fathers in order to marry,” (Adelman 
2008: 39) does not even always work in Shakespeare’s comedies, except when the 
blocking father is a Jew and his daughter is converted by leaving him, as is the case in 
The Merchant of Venice. In Shakespeare’s tragedies, rebellion against the father, however 
justified, will frequently eventually cost a girl her life, as Juliet, Desdemona, and 
Cordelia can testify. Having the opportunity to choose her own spouse, apparently, a 
young woman is forced to choose between love and duty, and the two common virtues 
are thus divided and juxtaposed, forming a new dichotomy. 
This dichotomy is especially potent if “love” is equated with “lust.” From young 
and innocent Adonis’ claim that “Love to heaven is fled” since “sweating Lust on earth 
usurp’d his name” (Venus and Adonis, 793-794) to the cynical, paradoxically puritanical 
lecher Iago’s view of love as “merely a lust of the blood and permission of the will,” 
(Othello, I. iii. 335) Shakespeare’s characters are notoriously prone to making this 
equation. Seeing all love as carnal lust, Iago acknowledges only vulgar Venus, and 
manages to impart this view onto Othello, who consequently begins to view Desdemona 
from Brabantio’s point of view: if she has neglected her duty towards her father for the 
sake of “love,” then she might do it again, this time to her husband.  
This is how a fatal error is made, an error diametrically opposed to that made by 
the bed-tricked heroes: wary of mistaking lust for love, some Shakespeare’s heroes 
instead mistake love for lust. Cordelia and Desdemona are ultimately rejected by Lear 
and Othello because they are mistakenly believed to put love, which is mere lust, above 
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duty. Because they freely choose and love their husbands, they are discarded as lecherous 
– and chaos ensues. 
Why chaos would ensue when love is banished from a cosmos is explained at 
length in Neoplatonic literature. The Neoplatonic “golden chain” – the divine ray of light 
permeating and binding all – is the ordering backbone of the universe and was commonly 
known as such in Shakespeare’s time. Ben Jonson refers to this bond in his Hymenei as a 
“golden chain let down from Heaven,” citing Homer and Macrobius, the fourth-century 
Neoplatonist, as his sources in a marginal note: “from the Supreme God to the 
bottommost dregs of the universe there is one tie, binding at every link and never 
broken.” This, Jonson explains, is “the golden chain of Homer which, he tells us, God 
ordered to hang down from the sky to the earth.” (Line 2004: 117) 
This golden chain that binds all is, in fact, indistinguishable from love itself. 
Iamblichus explicitly states in his De mysteriis that this principle that binds the cosmos 
together is its universal love “which contains all things and produces this unifying bond 
by means of an ineffable communion.” (Shaw 1995: 123) In the beginning, it was Eros 
himself who coordinated the Ideas in the intelligible world and “knitted the cosmos 
together in a unified bond.” The creator “sowed the bond of love, heavy with fire, into all 
things” so that “the All might continue to love for an infinite time and that the things 
woven by the intellectual light of the Father might not collapse.” It is only through this 
“Love that the elements of the world remain on course.” (Shaw 1995: 123-124)  
Love is thus the divinely infused bond of the universe. “Why is Love called a 
Magus?” asks Ficino in De amore and immediately answers: 
 
Because all the force of Magic consists in Love. The work of Magic is a certain drawing 
of one thing to another by natural similitude. The parts of this world, like members of one 
animal, depend all on one Love, and are connected together by natural communion. 
(Yates 1964: 126)  
 
Using a different metaphor to illustrate the same point, Ficino asserts:  
 
Since they are the work of a single artificer, all the components of the world, as parts of 
the same machine, similar to one another in essence and life, are bound together by a 
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certain reciprocal affection. Hence rightly may love be called the everlasting knot and 
bond of the world, the immovable support of its parts and the firm foundation of the 
whole machine. (Ferruolo 1955: 17)15  
 
In light of this, let us revisit Cordelia’s “inadequate” reply to her father’s demand 
for a public display of affection: 
 
I love your Majesty 
According to my bond, no more nor less. 
(King Lear, I. i. 92-93) 
 
Cordelia’s reply, which failed to satisfy Lear, Johnson, Bradley, and several critics 
following in their wake, offers her father nothing less than love as the divine ordering 
bond of the universe. When this love is banished, the entire cosmos dissolves into chaos. 
Ficino explains how this may be possible in De Amore, where he relates how “the matter 
of this world,” which in the beginning “lay a formless chaos,” received, by submitting to 
divine love, “the ornament of all the forms.” And so, through love, “out of chaos it 
became a world.” (Devereux 1969: 163) Conversely, without love, the universe collapses 
once more into primordial chaos. Othello obviously knows his “Platonicks” when he 
portentously claims:  
 
and when I love thee not,  
Chaos is come again.  
(Othello, III. iii. 91-92) 
 
Divine love being indistinguishable from divine beauty, Venus in effect says as much 
upon the death of Adonis:  
 
For he being dead, with him is beauty slain,  
And beauty dead, black chaos comes again.  
                                               
15 Emphasis mine. 
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(Venus and Adonis, 1019-1020) 
 
When the ordering bond of love is banished, primordial chaos returns. Othello 
knows it but murders Desdemona anyway, Lear learns it after he banishes Cordelia, and 
Leontes is faced with a long, dark, barren winter which begins when he has Hermione 
and all her women thrown together in the dungeon, symbolically exiling the entire female 
sex into the underworld. If we remember that “Hermione” was in the seventeenth century 
identified with Harmonia, (Bloom 2004: 509) the mythical daughter of Mars and Venus 
and the harbinger of harmony and balance, we can understand why banishing and killing 
her love brings a dark, chaotic winter to Leontes’ court.  
Deconstructing the love/duty dichotomy in these instances of banished 
representatives of love who are simultaneously found to be the bearers of harmony and 
order, Shakespeare proves that love is duty, order, and the bond of the universe, and that 
the two cannot be separated. Sonnet 26 is thus dedicated to  
 
Lord of my love, to whom in vassalage 
Thy merit hath my duty strongly knit. 
(Sonnet 26: 1-2)16 
 
Horatio promises to Hamlet his loyalty in the same vein: “As needful in our loves, fitting 
our duty”; and Kent rages at Oswald: 
 
Such smiling rogues as these, 
Like rats, oft bite the holy cords a-twain 
Which are t’ intrinse t’ unloose. 
(King Lear, II. ii. 273-275) 
 
The holy cords are the bonds of love and duty, which Kent both amply demonstrates 
towards his king. The word “cord,” significantly, puns on the name Cordelia, which can 
in French, among other things, mean “the tier of cords.”  
                                               
16 Emphases mine. 
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If female figures cannot be allowed to display any real theurgical agency with 
impunity, they certainly can represent a passive, easily lost and easily destroyed harmony 
of the universe. The deception surrounding the female sex revealed in the bed-trick can 
thus work in the opposite direction as well. Heavenly love can be mistaken for vulgar 
lust, and the ordering bond of the universe thus carelessly discarded, like Othello’s 
handkerchief. Whichever direction is taken, one thing is certain for male heroes: one way 
or another, female figures are potentially deceptive and can easily transpire to be the 
exact opposite of what they seem. Anxiety surrounding women and love (damned if you 
do, damned if you don’t; can’t live with them, can’t live without them) is a natural 
consequence of the doubleness of Neoplatonic Venus. 
 
9.5. MIRROR UP TO NATURE: NATURE(S) IN NEOPLATONISM. 
HIGHER NATURE AS THEURGY 
 
Another natural consequence of the doubleness of Neoplatonic Venus is the 
doubleness of Neoplatonic nature. As L. C. Knights finds in “Some Contemporary 
Trends in Shakespearean Criticism,”  
 
In Shakespeare’s poetic thought we find two apparently contradictory intuitions 
regarding man’s relation to the created world existing independently of human choice and 
will. Nature and human values are felt as intimately related, and at the same time as 
antagonistic. (Wain 1968: 229)  
 
This is because, as appears to be the case with many key concepts, there are, in 
fact, two separate and radically opposed natures in Renaissance Neoplatonism, 
corresponding to the two aspects of the goddess of nature, usually indistinguishable from 
aspects of Venus herself. As Line explains, one is a munificent, forming, spiritual figure, 
and the other a dark, chaotic, evil one. In her dark aspect, in Line’s words, the goddess of 
nature “is Hecate; hers is the uncreated nature of the body of the world, as yet 
unawakened by love,” and her attributes “darkness and lack of form.” (Line 2004: 27) 
She is as close to unformed matter as nature can get.  
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In her more elevated aspect, nature is the divine forming principle that orders her 
own material lower aspect, and Ficino identifies this higher nature with the forming, 
fruitful aspect of Venus, who must not be despised, as she was “born of heavenly origin” 
and “beloved above others by an ethereal god.” (Line 2004: 40) Ficino habitually praises 
this munificent Venus, who is “universal nature itself, that is to say, a seminal, life-giving 
[power], infused through the whole world,” whose roles include “presiding over matter 
and giving birth to things.” (Allen 2002: 263)  
These two separate aspects of nature are in Shakespeare’s opus most dramatically 
and elaborately juxtaposed in King Lear. Both aspects are so persuasively present in the 
tragedy that “nature” itself becomes a perplexing and anxiety-ridden word. Cordelia’s 
bond of love, discussed previously, certainly corresponds with higher nature. As John F. 
Danby interprets in “Cordelia as Nature,” for Cordelia “bond” means “natural tie,” a 
“duty willingly accepted and gladly carried out because it answers to right instinct.” 
When she says she loves Lear according to her bond, what she means to say, in Danby’s 
paraphrase, is “I love you as every normal girl loves her father – naturally!” (Bloom Lear 
2008: 204) 
According to the spiritual rules of higher nature, it is natural for elderly parents to 
be loved, obeyed, and honored. According to the material rules of lower nature, those 
with physical power naturally rule over those who are weaker – adult children over their 
enfeebled parents – as advocated in the falsified letter from Edgar. As per higher nature, 
the King is the King by divine right. As per lower nature, a dethroned Kind is but a poor, 
bare, fork’d animal. Under higher nature’s rule, the cosmos makes moral sense and 
thunder is an unproblematic signifier of divine justice. Under lower nature’s rule, the 
storm is hellish chaos let loose, the unleashed fury of the elements. 
In King Leir, Shakespeare’s source for the play, a single thunderclap dissuades the 
murderer sent by Ragan from killing the king, (Muir 1956: 147) which is in keeping with 
Kermode’s observation that “Elizabethan playwrights made conventional use of the 
inherited belief in thunder as the voice of the Divine Judge.” (Kermode 1969: 148) Lear 
also, at least initially, sees the thunder as an instrument of justice, which is apparent from 
his first reaction to it: 
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Tremble, thou wretch 
That hast within thee undivulged crimes 
Unwhipt of justice! 
(King Lear, III. ii. 51-53) 
 
However, the storm he endures transpires to be a much less benevolent and just 
affair. As a manifestation of primordial chaos, it corresponds to Edmund’s view of nature 
to a much greater degree than Lear’s or Cordelia’s: 
 
Thou, Nature, art my goddess, to thy law 
My services are bound. Wherefore should I 
Stand in the plague of custom, and permit 
The curiosity of nations to deprive me, 
For that I am some twelve or fourteen moonshines 
Lag of a brother? Why bastard? Wherefore base? 
When my dimensions are as well compact, 
My mind as generous, and my shape as true, 
As honest madam’s issue? Why brand they us 
With base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base? 
Who, in the lusty stealth of nature, take 
More composition, and fierce quality, 
Than doth within a dull, stale, tired bed 
Go to th’ creating a whole tribe of fops, 
Got ‘tween asleep and wake? Well then, 
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your land. 
Our father’s love is to the bastard Edmund 
As to the legitimate. 
(King Lear, I. ii. 1-18) 
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He is base, according to Neoplatonism, as he is only able to grasp lower, material 
nature, the nature of animals. Recognizing no bonds of love, duty or custom, he 
renounces higher nature and embraces lower nature.  
Significantly, Edmund despises astrology. He certainly has a point – “An 
admirable evasion of whoremaster man, to lay his goatish disposition on the charge of a 
star!” – but his disbelief in astrology would certainly make it clear, to any Neoplatonist at 
least, that, for Edmund, heaven has no relevance and only chaotic matter exists. For, from 
Philo to Ficino, the followers of Plato have insisted on the significance of stars as 
windows into divine light and powerful portents of providence. Understandably then, to 
Northrop Frye in his “King Lear: The Tragedy of Isolation,” Edmund’s contempt of 
astrology signals the fall of the entire universe of the play from being ruled by higher 
nature to being usurped by lower nature:  
 
The royalty of Lear held his society bound to that greater nature which is 
symbolized by the stars in their courses, the world of order and reason that is specifically 
the world of human nature. With the abdication we are now wholly confined to the lower 
physical nature of the elements, an amoral world where the strong prey on the weak. It is 
this lower nature, the Dionysian wheel of physical energy and fortune, to which Edmund 
attaches itself. He is Gloucester’s “natural” son, and on that level of nature he will act 
naturally. (Kermode 1969: 266) 
 
For Edmund, the goddess of nature is Hecate. Significantly, the murdering 
Lucianus in The Mousetrap sees nature as Hecate too: 
 
Thou mixture rank, of midnight weeds collected, 
With Hecat’s ban thrice blasted, thrice [infected], 
Thy natural magic and dire property 
On wholesome life usurp immediately. 
(Hamlet, III. ii. 257-260) 
 
What Hecate’s natural magic might entail is apparent in Macbeth’s speech to the witches: 
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Though you untie the winds, and let them fight 
Against the churches; though the yesty waves 
Confound and swallow navigation up; 
Though bladed corn be lodg’d, and trees blown down; 
Though castles topple on their warders’ heads; 
Though palaces and pyramids do slope 
Their heads to their foundations; though the treasure 
Of nature’s [germains] tumble all together, 
Even till destruction sicken; answer me 
To what I ask you. 
(Macbeth, IV. i. 51-61) 
 
Hecate’s wild lower nature (winds and waves) unleashed by her minions is seen as 
rebelling against and overturning the higher nature of humanity and civilization, as 
evident in the destruction of symbols of divine and regal power (churches, castles, 
palaces, and pyramids), but also of all formed and begotten life on earth (corn, trees, and 
even the very “germains” – spiritual seeds – of higher nature themselves). Regicide is 
clearly part of this paradigm. When Lennox describes the night in which the king was 
murdered as “unruly” and goes on to relate that “the earth was feverous, and did shake,” 
(Macbeth, II. iii. 54-61) we may easily get the impression that it was the unruly night 
itself, a personification of Hecate, that killed the divine king. 
Lower nature is apparently unleashed in that infernal night: darkness refuses to 
succumb to daylight, as nocturnal owls eat diurnal falcons and as Duncan’s horses, 
“[t]urn’d wild in nature,” break their stalls, rebel against “mankind,” and eat each other. 
However, in Rosse’s understanding, the events of the night show without a doubt that 
 
the heavens, as troubled with man’s act, 
Threatens his bloody stage. 
 (Macbeth, III. iv. 3-19) 
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Like Lear’s storm, these portents can simultaneously be interpreted as both higher nature 
lamenting for her ruler and lower nature rebelling against him. Having two different 
natures as available concepts bearing the same name renders some of the customary 
questions any culture asks itself (“what is nature?” and “how normative should whatever 
it is be?”) even more complex than usual. 
 
9.6. THE ART ITSELF IS NATURE: ART vs. NATURE. ART AS 
THEURGY 
 
The existence of two separate natures in Renaissance Neoplatonism also further 
complicates the perennial art-vs.-nature debate, which enjoyed a renaissance of its own in 
the Renaissance.  
Perdita and Polixenes famously stage one version of it in The Winter’s Tale. 
Perdita represents the primitivist position, usually espoused by the orthodoxly devout and 
the naïvely optimistic: nature, being divinely created, should not be adulterated with 
inferior, deceptive, and sacrilegious human artifice. (Wells 2005: 92) Polixenes retorts by 
pointing out that, being ultimately derived from nature, all that is must of necessity be 
natural:  
 
Nature is made better by no mean 
But Nature makes that mean; so over that art 
Which you say adds to Nature, is an art 
That Nature makes [...] 
 
In the continuation of his argument, citing the example of grafts, however, Polixenes 
seems to somewhat expand his point of reference: 
 
This is an art  
Which does mend Nature – change it rather; but 
The art itself is Nature. 
(The Winter’s Tale, IV. iv. 87-97) 
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There now appear to be two natures present in his final argument: the nature 
which needs to be mended and changed and the “artful” nature which does this mending 
and changing. The former is consistent with Neoplatonic lower nature, in need of 
additional forming; the latter with higher nature, which operates upon it and benevolently 
reorders it.  
Polixenes, as Wells notes, presents “a classic humanist view,” proposing that 
“nature’s deficiencies can be remedied by art.” (Wells 2005: 92) Polixenes’ view, as well 
as the humanist view itself, however, is largely derived from the classic Neoplatonic 
view, and would have been difficult without the resurgence of Platonic ideas. The 
defense of the arts in Neoplatonic thought included a reminder that all we can perceive in 
the sensible world is already a mere imitation of Plato’s Ideas, as can be seen in the 
following passage from Plotinus:  
 
If anyone despises the arts because they produce their works by imitating nature, 
we must tell him, first, that natural things are imitations too. Then he must know that the 
arts do not simply imitate what they see, but they run back up to the forming principles 
from which nature derives. (Line 2004: 31)  
 
Plotinus does not only defend the arts as no worse than nature; he also explicitly states 
that, by reaching the very molds in the intelligible realm that shape it, they are in fact 
better that sensible nature. Lower nature is a more material imitation of higher spiritual 
nature, and divine man can, as has been seen, transcend the earthly realm and theurgically 
order it from above.  
Ficino bases his own apotheosis of the arts on this theurgical premise. In his 
Platonic Theology, he insists that “man imitates all the works of the divine nature, and 
perfects, corrects and improves the works of the lower nature.” (Burroughs 1944: 233) In 
De vita, he makes the same point, this time significantly comparing a magus with a 
gardener: in his words, “a Magus seasonably introduces the celestial into the earthly by 
particular lures just as the farmer interested in grafting brings the fresh graft into the old 
stock.” (Ficino 1998: 387) The imagery of grafting would certainly please Polixenes, but 
also Hamlet, though he is much less optimistic about “our old stock” in the nunnery 
  333 
scene. Art in Neoplatonism hopefully is higher nature itself “gardening” lower nature:  
introducing order, weeding the chaos, and grafting the earthly with the celestial. This 
gardening image apparently applies for all meanings of the word “art” – which ranged 
from poetry and painting, through all practical and mechanical skills, to magic and 
alchemy (Turner 1999: 19) – as well as all that could be referenced by “higher nature” 
and “lower nature.”  
The image of the garden, wherein higher nature orders lower nature is, according 
to Caroline Spurgeon, the most frequent mode in which Shakespeare alludes to nature – 
not only nature represented by the vegetation, but also human nature, and the nature of 
the state. (Spurgeon 1971: 164) Notable is the use of this image in Richard II, where the 
royal gardeners rightly wonder: 
 
Why should we in the compass of a pale 
Keep law and form and due proportion, 
Showing as in a model our firm estate, 
When our sea-walled garden, the whole land, 
Is full of weeds, her fairest flowers chok’d up, 
Her fruit-trees all unprun’d, her hedges ruin’d, 
Her knots disordered, and her wholesome herbs 
Swarming with caterpillars? 
(Richard II, III. iv. 40-47) 
 
The state is, apparently, in great need of the art of gardening itself – as is Hamlet’s 
Denmark, an unweeded garden – and gardening the state is certainly a noble calling for 
an exalted theurgist. The highest arts, according to Ficino, are 
 
those arts which, imitating the divine rule, take care of human government. Individual 
animals are hardly capable of taking care of themselves or their young. Man alone 
abounds in such a perfection that he first rules himself, something that no animals do, and 
thereafter rules the family, administers the state, governs nations and rules the whole 
world. (Burroughs 1944: 234) 
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The Neoplatonic/humanist view espoused by Ficino, the gardeners, and Hamlet is 
starkly opposed to that of Gonzalo, whose utopian primitivist commonwealth will have 
no law, letters, authority, traffic, or work – and  
 
nature should bring forth,  
Of it own kind, all foison, all abundance,  
To feed my innocent people.  
(The Tempest, II. i. 163-165)  
 
Gonzalo’s ideal is, as has been noted, in keeping with Montaigne’s essay on “Cannibals,” 
in which he praises the society of “primitive” American Indians, deeming it to be 
superior to Plato’s republic:  
 
It is a nation, would I answer Plato, that hath no kind of traffic, no knowledge of 
letters, no intelligence of numbers, no name of magistrate, nor of politic superiority; no 
use of service, of riches, or of poverty; no contracts, no successions, no partitions, no 
occupation but idle; no respect of kindred but common, no apparel but natural, no 
manuring of lands, no use of wine, corn, or metal. (The Riverside Shakespeare, 
Introduction to The Tempest by Hallet Smith, vol. 2, p. 1657) 
 
It has been said that Caliban – pure and unadulterated lower nature in all its glory – is 
“Shakespeare’s refutation of Montaigne’s primitivism.” (The Riverside Shakespeare, 
Introduction to The Tempest by Hallet Smith, vol. 2, p. 1657) It is, moreover, a 
Neoplatonic refutation – Gonzalo’s concept of nature is similar to Edmund’s and it is 
demonstrably erroneous in the world of the play, as lower nature cannot be left to its own 
devices, but must instead be ruled by higher nature, just as matter must be formed and 
ordered by spirit, or chaos will ensue. 
Art as higher nature gardening lower nature can thus be taken to mean, among 
other things, colonization, proper government, civilization, but also artistic expression in 
its more narrow contemporary sense, operating upon human nature and improving it. 
(Wells 2005: 91) The Neoplatonic concept of art as higher nature persuading lower 
nature to mirror it with more fidelity overlaps almost in its totality with the concept of 
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theurgy. Prospero is an artist in all of these variations of the concept of art as theurgy: a 
civilizing colonist, a Magus, but also, significantly, a poet, musician, and theatrical 
performer. 
 
9.6.1. WELL TUN’D NOW: POETRY AND MUSIC AS THEURGY 
 
When Philip Sidney boldly stated in his Apology for Poetry that Nature’s “world 
is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden,” (Pollard 2004: 184) his argument in poetry’s 
defense was Platonic. The world was golden, Plato had insisted, when the demiurge’s 
hand was still firmly on the helm of the cosmos, ordering and directing it; having since 
deteriorated into a more chaotic brazen state, it can, presumably, be mended – not only in 
fancy, but, operating on the recipients’ human natures, in reality as well – via the 
theurgical prowess of the divinely inspired poets. For, according to Ficino’s interpretation 
of Plato, “poetry springs from divine frenzy,” (Line 2004: 62) and it is by divine frenzy 
that “man is lifted above the nature of man and passes into God.” (Ficino 2006: 53) 
Therefore the task of poetic frenzy is  
 
firstly, through musical tones, to arouse those parts which slumber; through harmonious 
sweetness, to soothe those which are disturbed; and finally, through the harmonising of 
diverse elements, to dispel dissonant discord and temper the various parts of the soul. 
[…] it recalls the soul from the sleep of the body to the wakefulness of the mind; from the 
darkness of ignorance to the light; from death to life; from the oblivion of Lethe to the 
memory of the divine. (Ficino 2006: 53-55) 
 
As can be seen, poetry was not necessarily easily separable from music, and both 
have multiple functions, deriving from Pythagoras’ theory of the music of the spheres. 
(Dunn 1969: 391) One of the functions is, as has been noted, to inspire ascent towards the 
purely spiritual realms where this heavenly harmony can be enjoyed without the 
encumbrance of base matter. Pericles, for instance, explicitly hears “the music of the 
spheres” when he finds his lost daughter Marina, and then the goddess Dian appears to 
him, summoning him to the elevated realm of Ephesus. Lorenzo and Jessica strive to hear 
it when they initiate their ascent of love, and Prospero, abjuring his rough magic, has one 
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last request from Ariel: “some heavenly music.” All these instances of music appearing in 
Shakespeare’s work indicate ascent. 
Music can be used theurgically to order and reorder the cosmos as well. As Pico 
della Mirandola claims, “nothing is more effective in natural magic than the hymns of 
Orpheus, if the right kind of music, intention of the mind, and other circumstances are 
applied which are only known to the wise.” (Allen 2002: 227-228) His teacher, colleague, 
and friend Ficino had taken this apparently matter-of-fact piece of advice quite seriously, 
as he spent some time attempting to discover this ideal combination of circumstances – in 
theory by combining Plato’s theory of correspondence between man and cosmos with 
Hermetic lore, and in practice by singing Orphic songs to what he believed to be an 
imitation of the music of the spheres. He was adamant that he had succeeded in drawing 
down the influence of the astral deities and absorbing a “certain celestial virtue” through 
this artistic/theurgic endeavor, a virtue he was then able to share with the surrounding 
cosmos – primarily his enchanted audience. (Wells 2005: 96)  
Certain characters in Shakespeare’s world are able to do as much – notably Ariel, 
at least according to Ferdinand’s rapt review of the spirit’s virtuosity: 
 
Sitting on a bank,  
Weeping again the King my father’s wrack, 
This music crept by me upon the waters, 
Allaying both their fury and my passion 
With its sweet air. 
(The Tempest, I. ii. 390-394) 
 
Music creates harmony both in lower nature, calming and ordering the tempestuous 
waters of matter, and in an individual, allaying his passions, thought to derive from his 
material basis. Properly applied, then, harmonious heavenly music can theurgically help 
order physical nature and human nature.  
Music can reorder wounded nature as well, infusing life-giving spirit into it. The 
Pythagoreans, Ficino notes, who “used to perform certain wonders by words, songs, and 
sounds in the Apollonian and Orphic manner,” apparently “knew how music healed, and 
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they knew that the more clearly the laws governing the cosmos could be reproduced in 
sound, the more effective the healing.” (Allen 2002: 239) Lord Cerimon reviving Thaisa 
and Paulina bringing Hermione to life both use music to help their ambitious theurgical 
performances. 
The romances, in Dunn’s apt phrase, “reveal a world which operates largely 
according to Neoplatonic principles. This world is like a gigantic instrument upon which 
the gods play.” (Dunn 1969: 394) This is in stark contrast with what happens in the 
tragedies, where most attempts at theurgy are frustrated, their would-be agents maimed 
and/or murdered. Lavinia has her harmony-creating faculties forcibly taken away from 
her – when her rapists cut off her hands and her tongue, they rob her not only of her 
ability to communicate the crime to others, but also of her music, which apparently had 
the capacity to order the cosmos: 
 
O, had the monster seen those lily hands 
Tremble like aspen leaves upon a lute, 
And make the silken strings delight to kiss them, 
He would not then have touch’d them for his life! 
Or had he heard the heavenly harmony 
Which thy sweet tongue hath made, 
He would have dropp’d his knife, and fell asleep, 
As Cerberus at the Thracian poet’s feet. 
(Titus Andronicus, II. iii. 44-51) 
 
Lavinia is here explicitly likened to Orpheus, the Thracian poet who famously quieted 
Cerberus with his lyre on his way to rescue Eurydice from Hades. Unlike Orpheus, 
Lavinia does not get her chance to use her music theurgically, and monstrous chaos 
finally devours all.  
Orpheus was not only revered as a tamer of mythical beasts, but of real ones as 
well – including, apparently, the beast in human nature. In the Arte of English Poesie, 
George Puttenham relates that Orpheus “assembled the wild beasts to come in herds to 
hearken to his music, and by that means made them tame,” which can be taken to imply 
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that via “harmony and with melodious instruments” he was able to bring “the rude and 
savage people to a more civil and orderly life.” Wells interprets this as one more piece of 
evidence that the Orpheus story was for Renaissance humanists “a fable about the origins 
of civilization.” (Wells 2005: 12) Music, when used theurgically, can order and elevate – 
tame and civilize.  
In light of this, it is both touching and eerie to hear Othello praise Desdemona as 
“an admirable musician! O, she will sing the savageness out of a bear.” (Othello, IV. i. 
187-188) We know that, like Lavinia, she will not be allowed to do so, and the 
savageness of brutish humans – her husband, most notably – will be the death of her and 
her harmony-creating faculties.  
Iago is a conscious destroyer of this musical harmony: “O, you are well tun’d 
now! But I’ll set down the pegs that make this music.” (Othello, II. i. 199-200) Cassio – 
the presumably Ficinian Florentine – attempts in the morning after the skirmish to restore 
it, apologizing to Othello by bringing musicians in front of his house. The plan does not 
come to fruition. The Clown ominously observes that “the general so likes your music, 
that he desires you for love’s sake to make no more noise with it,” further explaining that 
“to hear music the general does not greatly care.” (Othello, III. i. 11-17) Had the general 
cared more for the heavenly harmony of music, one feels forced to infer, he would have 
been far more reluctant to murder its source – and chaos would hopefully not have come 
again. 
 
9.6.2. THE PLAY’S THE THING: THE THEATER AS THEURGY 
 
Though there are fewer direct references to theatrical art as an instrument of 
theurgy in contemporary Neoplatonic and humanist sources – presumably as it had still 
not become one of those arts deemed to be respectable enough – it is not difficult to see 
how this complex and complete mode of artistic expression, including in Shakespeare’s 
time poetry, music, and visual representation, could have been embraced by dedicated 
would-be theurgists as a powerful means to reorder the cosmos and human nature.  
The stage was, after all, already widely accepted as an apt metaphor for the world: 
Plotinus, as only one example, famously claimed that we should regard public calamities 
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as “stage-plays,” (Inge 1900: 331) and the notion of the world being like a stage was 
expressed in the writings of Pythagoras, Plato, and Petronius, recurring in medieval 
writers such as John of Salisbury and Wycliffe. Shakespeare’s England appears to have 
merely introduced the practice of putting this notion into the mouths of dramatic 
characters, (Pollard 2004: 20) turning it from a world-weary meditation on the illusory 
quality of terrestrial life into a fascinated reflection on the power of theatrical illusion. 
“All the world is a stage” can be turned on its head and read as “a stage is all the 
world” – and more than that, an entire cosmos, at least in Yates’ ambitious interpretation 
of Fludd’s Hermetic memory system, which was allegedly based on the Shakespearean 
Globe Theatre. According to it, the Shakespearean stage had several distinct levels 
representing different cosmic spheres. The subcelestial world was depicted by the square 
stage on which ordinary men played their parts, the round celestial world which hung 
above it was meant to portray the “shadow of ideas,” the vestige of the divine, and above 
these “heavens” was the supercelestial world of ideas which shine down through the 
heavens onto the sensible world.  
Yates conjectures that “scenes of higher spiritual significance in which the 
shadows are less dense” would have been played high up – such as Juliet’s solar 
appearance to Romeo on her balcony, or Cleopatra’s death high in her monument. 
Prospero once, according to stage directions, emerges “on the top,” invisible to the actors 
on the stage below the “heavens,” but visible to the audience, and his appearance would 
have been “singularly impressive as the apotheosis of the benevolent Magus who had 
risen beyond the shadows of ideas to the supreme unifying vision.” (Yates 1964: 365) As 
has been suggested here previously, the trap in the middle of the stage, often a pit leading 
into the underworld, and a portal to the demonic and chthonic, would have been likely to 
represent the O of infernal prime matter. 
Apparently, then, the notion of the world as a stage – or the stage as the world – 
had at its core a stage which encompassed the entire Neoplatonic cosmos, including those 
parts of it which were normally outside of ordinary humans’ reach, as they were situated 
above the realm of the sensible world. In light of this, there can be two distinct 
interpretations of Hamlet’s famous exposition on  
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the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is, to hold as ’twere 
the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the 
very age and body of the time his form and pressure. (Hamlet, III. ii. 18–22) 
 
Theatrical performance can, on the one hand, be seen as simple mimesis – in 
which case Grady is right to refer to The Mousetrap as a “mimesis of mimesis.” (Grady 
2009: 172) On the other hand, if seen through the lens of theurgical Neoplatonism, this 
“mirror up to nature” that Hamlet speaks of acquires an entirely different meaning. In 
Kodera’s fascinating study on mirror imagery in Renaissance Neoplatonism, he 
demonstrates that the mirror, which is “a signifier for matter, shadow and otherness,” 
grows into the “omnipresent image of all transactions between “above” and “below,” 
between spiritual and corporeal substances, between form and matter,” and thus comes to 
represent “reproducing divine order on a lower level.” (Allen 2002: 299) Hamlet’s view 
of theatrical performance as “the mirror up to nature” becomes, in light of this, 
interpretable as an endorsement of a theatrical theurgist’s effort to manipulate and 
persuade lower nature – at least that portion of lower nature at his disposal – to faithfully 
reflect higher spiritual nature.  
A play is a shadow of a shadow only if it portrays life mimetically. However, if it 
instead shows the true face of the more spiritual and superior forming nature, it is in fact 
more real than “reality”; not a mimesis of mimesis, but an anti-mimesis, as it were: a 
return from the Other of matter to the originating “form and pressure” of Platonic and 
Hermetic higher nature. In this sense, Hamlet’s theater as the mirror up to nature is fully 
in keeping with Plotinus’ contention that “the arts do not simply imitate what they see, 
but they run back up to the forming principles from which nature derives.” (Line 2004: 
31)  
A theatrical theurgist does not merely imitate life in the subcelestial world, he 
attempts to do far more than that – offer a glimpse into the supercelestial world and 
persuade the former to mirror the latter – mending lower nature with the higher nature of 
art and ordering the base matter at his disposal. It is in this light that we can draw a 
further implication from Shakespeare’s pun on his theater as “the wooden O” in the 
Prologue to Henry V – not necessarily a merely sexual allusion to the “vaginal orifice,” 
which, as Gordon Williams cautions, should not always be resorted to whenever an “O” 
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is mentioned, (Williams 1997) but the Neoplatonic O, the nothing of matter that 
everything comes from and that the theurgist is invited to help animate and order. The 
“wooden O” is that little piece of matter available to this particular dramatist for 
theurgical manipulation. 
The idea that a dramatist wields awesome power over his audience, affecting their 
minds, bodies, and souls, (Pollard 2004: xi) as his plays are able to “reconstitute us in 
their own image,” was one which defenders of the theater actually shared with the 
antitheatricalists. (Pollard 2004: 22) This is the primary way in which the theurgical 
function of the theater may have been manifested in actuality: a Neoplatonically inclined 
dramatist would have been eager to garden the natures of his characters – and his 
audience – weeding the passions and pruning the excesses.  
He was able to do this by confronting them with their actions (as is done to 
Claudius in The Mousetrap) or by putting them through a purgatorial tempest of the 
chaos these actions naturally cause (as is done to Lear). Leontes undergoes both, but most 
notable is his remark on the effect that the “statue” has on him: 
 
No settled senses of the world can match 
The pleasure of that madness. 
(The Winter’s Tale, V. iii. 72-73) 
 
It seems like the artist (Paulina or Shakespeare or both) is also capable of transferring the 
divine frenzy received from the supercelestial world onto the subcelestial one and 
inducing it in the stupefied spectator in order to gently inspire him to change. 
The statue scene (along with its critical reception) is a good example of the 
ramifications of the theurgical aspect of the theater. Huston Diehl argues in ““Strike All 
that Look Upon With Marvel”: Theatrical and Theological Wonder in The Winter’s Tale” 
that naming Paulina after Paul is a deliberate act on Shakespeare’s part, through which he 
explicitly joins the art vs. nature debate, as “Paul fosters a wonder in the natural world, 
understood to be God’s creation, while arousing suspicion of all human creations.” 
(Reynolds/West 2005: 25) In the statue scene, according to Diehl, Shakespeare  
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locates the source of true wonder in God’s creations, not his own, and creates a theater 
that, in Perkins’ words, is “wholly within the powre and practice of nature.” In the 
process, Shakespeare differentiates his medium – the actor’s body – from the sculptor’s 
stone and naturalizes his own artifice by identifying his fictional characters with the 
actors who embody them. The statue scene succeeds in part because it focuses its 
spectators’ gaze on the material body of the living actor who plays Hermione, an actor 
who, however skillfully she imitates a stone statue, cannot help but breathe, have 
“motion” in her eye, and appear to the audience as if “the very life” were “warm upon 
her lip.”17 
 
Paulina, by apparently bringing a statue to life, orchestrates a “wondrous theatrical 
spectacle that culminates in the revelation that the statue is no work of art at all, but a 
living woman, wrinkled by time.” (Reynolds/West 2005: 26) In that, Diehl argues, 
Shakespeare refutes the accusations of primitivist antitheatricalists, in apparently 
claiming to only be presenting what God and Nature have wrought. (Reynolds/West 
2005: 27)  
The body Shakespeare presents on his stage, however, is not that of “a living 
woman, wrinkled by time.” It is that of a young boy. If Shakespeare is denying the 
charges of magic or witchcraft in his theater, he is doing it with his tongue firmly in his 
cheek. For Hermione herself is an illusory product of the witchcraft of his wit, which 
transforms the materials available to him – the bodies of his actors – into whatever his 
imagination requires, whether that be dead bodies, moving statues, or aged women. The 
artist as theurgist organizes and manipulates the materials at his disposal to perform a 
ritual, as it were, showing a truth that is above a merely mimetic one, and through it 
reform the hearts and souls of those observing it.  
In the character of Paulina, Shakespeare makes a Neoplatonic argument, 
resembling those made by the likes of Plotinus and Ficino, and reiterated in Polixenes’ 
claim that “the art itself is nature.” Significantly, Paulina is both a midwife and a 
theurgical artist. Her “art” therefore brings forth both nature in the primitivist sense – 
when she delivers Perdita – and art as higher nature in the Neoplatonic sense – when she 
                                               
17 Emphases mine. 
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animates a statue and resurrects Hermione, both of which were feats notoriously 
performed by the Magi.  
 
9.6.3. THE WITCHCRAFT OF HIS WIT: WORLDLY ILLUSION vs. 
THEATRICAL ILLUSION 
 
Iago at one point says to impatient Roderigo “Thou know’st we work by wit, and 
not by witchcraft,” (Othello, II. iii. 372) and the witches in Macbeth actually function in 
the same way. That is, apparently, the only witchcraft that exists. Evil is in Shakespeare’s 
world never effected through magic – only the deceptive power of words. 
“Good deception” – the transformative theurgy wrought by theatrical illusion – is 
likewise magical usually only as the witchcraft of wits. As Greenblatt explains in 
“Shakespeare and the exorcists,” Harsnett’s pamphlet, used subversively by Shakespeare 
in the creation of King Lear, implies that “exorcisms are stage plays fashioned by 
cunning clerical dramatists and performed by actors skilled in improvisation.” 
(Parker/Hartman 2005: 169)18 As Shakespeare always seems to maintain a 
problematicized, two-directional, close link between religious and theatrical expression, 
(Rozett 2003: 89) one could easily argue that Shakespeare turns the assertion on its head, 
suggesting that, instead, stage plays are exorcisms. As Marion Gibson notes in her 
Possession, puritanism and print, exorcism has long functioned as a strong metaphor for 
catharsis, both in the theatrical sense and “at a deep emotional level.” (Gibson 2006: 154)  
The exorcism whose portion Edgar fakes is in actuality being performed on Lear 
and Gloucester – and, hopefully, the audience as well – as they are being purged and 
transformed. As Jan Kott shrewdly observes in “King Lear, or Endgame,” the “precipice 
at Dover exists and does not exist” (a paradox possible only in theater, and a theater with 
modest scenery at that), as the audience is “taken in” as much as Gloucester is. (Kermode 
1969: 273-274) Edgar’s words – the witchcraft of his wits – create the theatrical illusion 
of the cliff at Dover for Gloucester and us. “Thy life’s a miracle,” Gloucester learns, as 
he could not have without the illusion of a close shave with death, and so do the 
spectators, similarly deluded into being afraid for his life.  
                                               
18 Italics mine. 
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Hamlet’s Mousetrap reveals another plane of reality in the cosmos of the play, 
forming a specific Platonic ladder within in. (Forker 1963: 215) The added rung on the 
ladder is arguably the highest of them all, as it is by way of theatrical illusion that more 
truth is revealed than is available in the rest of the play. Not only us Claudius’ crime 
clearly shown to him – and us – for the first time, but Hamlet is also allowed to see 
himself identified, in the character of Lucianus, “nephew to the King,” with his nemesis 
Claudius as a potential parricide, regicide and thus deicide. Theurgical agency being 
usually frustrated in the tragedies, Hamlet’s theatrical production fails to actually 
accomplish anything: Claudius may be somewhat contrite, but not sufficiently to change 
his course of action, and Hamlet himself is no less paralyzed with regard to his own.  
Prospero is ultimately the most complete figure of the magus-playwright who 
weaves an elaborate web of theatrical illusion around his literally captive audience. 
Ending his – and Shakespeare’s – theatrical production, Prospero concedes its illusory 
nature, but not without indicating that it is no more illusory than the globe (and the 
Globe) itself: 
 
Our revels now are ended. These our actors 
(As I foretold you) were all spirits, and 
Are melted into air, into thin air, 
And like the baseless fabric of this vision, 
The cloud-capp’d tow’rs, the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve, 
And like this insubstantial pageant faded 
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff  
As dreams are made on; and our little life 
Is rounded with a sleep. 
(The Tempest, IV. i. 148-158) 
 
The world itself being but a dreamlike illusion, the theurgical dramatist transpires 
to be an even more trustworthy figure than the demiurge. He does not even pretend to 
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offer “reality,” but, under the guise of apparent illusion, a dramatist-as-theurgist might 
approach what is even higher than this, merely subcelestial reality; he might reach the 
supercelestial world of originating ideas and infuse them into the world of his spectators, 
changing it and them for the better. Illusion in the Tempest – as elsewhere in 
Shakespeare’s opus when characters in need of correction are misled and manipulated – 
is benign and instructive, unlike the lies of those “most seeming virtuous” villains that 
deceive for selfish purposes.  
Prospero the magus and Prospero the playwright are thus not really separable as 
figures, and, in light of this, the Tempest “gains additional pathos as the theatrical 
magician’s farewell to his art.” (Mitchell 2006: 83) For, as Yates has remarked, although 
“Shakespeare never wielded a wand, nor thought of himself as a magus, he is a magician, 
master of the spell-binding use of words, of poetry as magic.” (Yates 2003: 190) 
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Man, more divine, the master of all these, 
Lord of the wide world and wild wat’ry seas, 
Indu’d with intellectual sense and souls, 
Of more pre-eminence than fish and fowls, 
Are masters to their females, and their lords. 
(The Comedy of Errors, II.i.15-25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10. THE LEGACY OF DUALISM: A CONCLUSION 
 
 10.1. SHAKESPEARE’S DUALISM: A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A 
NEOPLATONIST 
 
An analysis of dualistic concepts appearing in Shakespeare’s work demonstrates 
how the complex and inherently inconsistent dualism of Renaissance Neoplatonism 
offers a plethora of aesthetically pleasing paradoxes. Fair is foul, and foul is fair. An 
attempt at ascent towards the purely spiritual can through illusion lead to one’s fall, but, 
conversely, a descent into the depths of the material can bring regeneration and wisdom. 
Henosis – becoming one with the One – can be virtually indistinguishable from being 
dissolved in the nothingness of prime matter. Nothing can be made out of nothing, yet 
everything is made out of nothing. Although a dead nothingness, matter yields life when 
made fertile by the spirit, just like carrion kissed by the sun breeds maggots. What gives 
us life and substance is also what makes us mortal and thus kills us. The womb is a tomb 
and the tomb is a womb. Though best escaped, the cosmos is a masterpiece of divine 
harmony, which man has a duty to aid. Love can be a divine calling towards the purity of 
spirit, or it can be mere deceptive lust. One can, tragically, mistake it for mere deceptive 
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lust and banish it, only to realize that it was the bond of the universe, without which the 
world has reverted to primal chaos. 
 
10.1.1. THE ARTIFICE OF ETERNITY: THE IMPACT OF DUALISM ON 
SUBSEQUENT LITERATURE 
   
It is easy to see how Shakespeare’s works easily served as a conduit for 
Neoplatonic spirit/matter dualism and how these entertaining paradoxes stemming from 
this dualism would continue to be rehearsed for centuries to come even if – or, rather, 
especially if – they were not expressed in explicit philosophical terms.  
Allegory, arguably, does a better job at imprinting basic metaphysical concepts 
into human minds than dry philosophical systems. Ebreo, the author of the wildly popular 
dialog Philo and Sophia, notably agreed with Ficino that philosophical wisdom is best 
taught through the allegorical mode, not only because these lessons tend to stick better, 
but also because “allegory best corresponds to the metaphysical dualism of matter and 
form.” (Frank/Leaman 1997: 456-457) The snobbish division into the more spiritual and 
the more material castes of humans that dualistic systems are prone to can be seen 
manifested in their potentially different respective consumptions of the allegorical mode. 
The enlightened would, for instance, be able to see the highest meaning of Ebreo’s work 
– the union of Love and Wisdom – whereas the uninitiated would think they have read 
nothing more than a mere love story. We can similarly envisage the groundlings in the 
Globe only being able to grasp Shakespeare’s basic story, which might end in marriage or 
death, but those more elevated theatergoers – both intellectually and spatially – instead 
perceiving a union with the One, or a fall into the carnal, or possibly both, if they were 
watching a performance of one of his more ambiguous plays, such as Antony and 
Cleopatra.  
This potential for ambiguity and paradox combined with the dignity accorded to 
the poet as a theurgical agent of divine ordering spirit could be what endowed 
Neoplatonic metaphysics with its enduring influence and its magnetic appeal to artists of 
all hues. Bloom has famously argued that Gnosticism is the real religion of poetry, but 
Neoplatonism – or, at any rate, the complex and anxiety-ridden amalgam of deliciously 
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paradoxical inconsistencies that Renaissance Neoplatonism presented – seems better 
suited for the role. Its influence on literature has certainly been more pervasive and 
enduring than that of Gnosticism proper, though all brands of dualism have left their 
mark on literature following Shakespeare. Several instances will be mentioned here for 
the sake of illustration. 
Blake is generally allowed to have been a Gnostic, though many marvel at that 
apparent aberration, and his poetry is now frequently enough interpreted in this key. 
(Nuttall 2002) His so-called prophetic works show Gnostic sensibilities even more 
explicitly, and his Urizen is a figure which arguably resembles the Gnostic Demiurge or 
Lurianic Din more closely than any other in the history of English literature, ruling his 
material prison-like world through constricting laws.  
Caroline drama had already reverted to the adulation of virginity under strong 
Platonic influences, (Dusinberre 1975: 48) and it is in Romanticism that Neoplatonism 
flourishes once more, one of its manifestations being the reemergence of idealized 
romantic love, preferably towards a woman who is dead and thus conveniently 
disembodied. The beloved woman could, spirit-like, be idealized, or, matter-like, 
depicted as terrifying, dark, carnal, or serpentine.  
In his Rime of the Ancient Mariner, Coleridge faces his protagonist, after a 
descent away from civilization, reason, and religion, with prime matter itself in the 
disturbing guise of sea snakes:  
 
The very deep did rot: O Christ!  
That ever this should be!  
Yea, slimy things did crawl with legs  
Upon the slimy sea.  
About, about, in reel and rout  
The death-fires danced at night;  
The water, like a witch’s oils,  
Burnt green, and blue and white. 
 
After initial disgust, the Mariner learns to embrace the material basis of the cosmos: 
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O happy living things! no tongue  
Their beauty might declare:  
A spring of love gushed from my heart,  
And I blessed them unaware.   
(Coleridge 1961) 
 
He is finally forced to, much like Prospero, acknowledge this thing of darkness his, and 
this is what ultimately brings him salvation.  
Plato’s eternal and pre-existent soul makes an appearance in Wordsworth’s 
Intimations of Immortality: 
 
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:  
The Soul that rises with us, our life’s Star,  
Hath had elsewhere its setting,  
And cometh from afar:  
Not in entire forgetfulness,  
And not in utter nakedness,  
But trailing clouds of glory do we come  
From God, who is our home:  
Heaven lies about us in our infancy! 
Shades of the prison-house begin to close  
Upon the growing Boy  
But he beholds the light, and whence it flows,  
He sees it in his joy. 
(Wordsworth 1854) 
 
Coleridge and Wordsworth were clearly and openly Neoplatonists, and some 
poems of Shelley and Keats display Neoplatonic elements. Neoplatonic metaphysics and 
aesthetics most noticeably impacted the German Romantics, though these were not their 
only dualistic formative influences. Goethe confesses in his From My Life: Poetry and 
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Truth to the many unorthodox origins of his philosophy: “Neo-platonism was its basis; 
Hermeticism, mysticism, and cabalism also contributed something, and so I built myself 
a very strange-looking world.” (Ebeling 2007: 130) 
Modernism commenced with scientific discoveries which seemed to resonate with 
dualistic notions, as did the law of entropy (allowing an understanding of the world as 
having a chaotic fundament), as did Darwin’s theory of evolution (allowing the 
conception of an animalistic basis for man), and as did Freud’s psychoanalysis (allowing 
a primitive, chaotic, irrational Id to be envisaged at the core of the human psyche). Freud, 
significantly, extensively read both Plato and Shakespeare, (Deats 2005: 245-246; 
Finucci/Scwartz 1994: 3)19 while Jung was heavily into alchemy and the Hermetica, 
which helps explain his concept of the Shadow as the dark, carnal, animalistic side of 
human nature which, however odious, needs to be faced and integrated.  
The literature of the period reflects its spirit/matter dichotomy, mostly implicit 
and experienced and/or couched in different terms, but sometimes bluntly explicit, as is 
the case in Yeats’ work. His “Sailing to Byzantium” describes the yearning of the poetic 
subject to flee the carnal, sensible world of becoming for a world of purely spiritual 
being: 
 
That is no country for old men. The young 
In one another’s arms, birds in the trees –  
Those dying generations – at their song, 
The salmon-falls, the mackerel-crowded seas, 
Fish, flesh, or fowl, commend all summer long 
Whatever is begotten, born, and dies. 
                                               
19 As Armstrong points out, “Shakespeare has been in psychoanalysis for as long as psychoanalysis itself 
has been around, and in two senses: that is, Shakespeare has been both subject to psychoanalysis and a 
constitutive presence in psychoanalysis,” (Armstrong P. 2006: 5) both to such an extent that it can be said 
that “there is a Shakespearian myth at work in psychoanalysis,” (Rabaté 2001: 68) which is why, 
tautologically, “psychoanalysis ‘works’ in reading Shakespeare.” (Armstrong P. 2006: 225) Both 
discourses have in turn been heavily influenced by Platonic ideas, which is what enables a psychoanalytic 
critic such as Krims to assert that, Hamlet being disgusted with his mother’s sexuality, “Gertrude is but a 
seething mass of female Id for him now.” (Krims 2006: 67) The Id greatly resembles Neoplatonic matter, 
being the dark, chaotic, irrational, animalistic basis of a human that is somehow fluid and somehow 
feminine. 
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Caught in that sensual music all neglect 
Monuments of unageing intellect.  
Consume my heart away; sick with desire 
And fastened to a dying animal 
It knows not what it is; and gather me 
Into the artifice of eternity. 
[…] 
Once out of nature I shall never take 
My bodily form from any natural thing. 
(Yeats 1962: 101-102)  
 
Yeats’ Mythologies contain a fully explicit exposition of his Gnosticism. There 
are also implicitly dualistic modernists, notably those who intensively read Shakespeare 
and extensively quoted and paraphrased his words, such as Eliot, Joyce, and Woolf. Their 
spirit/matter dualism is mostly expressed in symbolic dichotomies such as the fixed/the 
fluid. All these dichotomies are implicitly or explicitly gendered. Young Stephen, for 
instance, is explicitly (and most probably at least somewhat scathingly) shown in A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man to be toying with a “novel” gendered spirit/matter 
cosmology.  
 
10.2. OTHERING MATTER, OTHERING MOTHERING: THE IMPACT 
OF DUALISM ON CONCEPTIONS OF GENDER 
  
The influence of gendered spirit/matter dualism has not been merely literary. 
Women have always been, in Iris Marion Young’s phrase, “asymmetrically associated 
with sex, birth, age, and flesh,” (Young 2005: 14) and Neoplatonic matter easily became 
another concept to link them with in popular imagination. As this matter was dark, 
irrational, and disturbingly chaotic, this is how women began to be perceived as well – 
and no longer as “merely” weaker and otherwise inferior.  
As Coudert notes, it is in the early modern period that this phenomenon became 
pronounced:  
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The connection of women with the body and matter and men with the soul or 
spirit goes back to Aristotle and appears as a constant theme in the literature of the 
Middle Ages, but in the early modern period this dichotomy was drawn in starker terms 
than ever before as the genders became increasingly polarized. (Hanegraaff/Kripal 2008: 
271) 
 
It is quite conceivable that the resurgence of post-Platonic dualistic concepts contributed 
to the growing polarization of the genders, with an intensifying expectation that males 
conform to the notion of active, fixed, forming and ordering rational spirit, and females to 
the notion of passive, pliable, but also disturbingly fluid and irrational matter.  
For many European countries, notably including England, the metaphysical shift 
towards a gendered spirit/matter dichotomy as a basis for determining proper gender 
identities and relations was partly introduced through strains of Protestantism. The 
notions of Calvin and Zwingli, who were themselves influenced by Renaissance 
Neoplatonism, and had some distinctly dualistic features, (Kristeller 1961: 63) made their 
way into the practical, everyday religiosity of women and men.  
Late medieval Christianity had been “interpreted and performed in very bodily 
ways,” and Catholic women, including Englishwomen, had long been taught to identify 
with the Virgin Mary while pregnant, in labor, or nursing their infants – all states and 
actions depicted in positive bodily images by medieval Catholicism. When some 
reformers went so far in their iconoclastic zeal as to begin resembling anti-cosmic 
heresies of old – denying Christ’s human body, denying the reality of the Eucharist, 
saying Mary was “an empty sack of saffron” – the bodies of ordinary men and especially 
women were demoted as a result. Pregnant and laboring women were forbidden to pray 
to the Virgin Mary and instructed instead to remember Eve’s sin and pray to Christ. 
Christ himself was masculinized as a figure, his medieval representation as a mother of 
all overflowing with milk being inconceivable in the Reformation. (Fissell 2006: 10-55) 
The womb, which had been considered wondrous and miraculous, was now 
represented as monstrous. Women were, like Coriolanus (but with a diametrically 
opposite meaning), having their “nothings monster’d.” Pamphlets about monstrous births 
resulting from lustful, uncontrolled wombs, went hand in hand with those about 
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murdering mothers and witches. (Fissell 2006: 10-55) Interestingly, midwives were often 
accused of practicing witchcraft at a time when control over the birthing process was 
increasingly being taken over by male doctors. (Laoutaris 2008: 269) 
Gendered spirit/matter dualism built into the incipient obstetrics of early modern 
times and manifested in treating the laboring woman as a material object to be managed 
(Young 2005: 55-61) – and a potentially recalcitrant and perilous object at that – 
continues to plague the Western world. In its benign form, the laboring woman is 
construed as being heroically defended against her body – chaotic, irrational, dangerous 
and inimical both to her child and to her own true “self” – via elective caesarians or 
“active birth management” which contains various, usually unnecessary, and almost 
invariably unpleasant interventions. In its less benevolent aspects, it is manifested in 
punishing the woman’s body for its demonstrated sexuality, which is sometimes even 
explicitly stated, as was the case with symphysiotomy in Ireland, openly practiced in 
order to discourage women from having further sexual relations.  
The man – and especially woman – of orthodoxy were humbled, but whole. The 
man – and even woman – of dualism could hope to achieve godlike status and become 
one with the deity, but only provided that said man – and especially woman – be willing 
to forfeit the gross material body. It is little wonder that many women feel impelled to 
construct their identities in stark opposition to their bodies, especially in contexts 
involving pregnancy, birth, and childrearing, which seem to designate them as animalistic 
and carnal. Opting for caesarians (“because I don’t want to risk it”), opting out of 
breastfeeding (“because I’m not a cow”), and delegating “menial” childcare to even 
lower beings, such as immigrant nannies (instead of, say, sharing it with the children’s 
father), are all perfectly understandable personal choices in post-Platonic cultures. 
Second-wave feminism attempted to solve the conundrum of association with procreation 
and its resulting demotion of women in a manner similar to what anti-cosmic dualisms 
offered their female adherents. Women were warned that having children will ruin their 
chances of amounting to anything in those spheres that really matter – which are a 
historical continuation of those spheres traditionally allotted to male spirit: spiritual, then 
intellectual, and finally professional pursuits.  
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The impact of dualistic metaphysics is perceptible in contemporary abortion 
debates, where one commonly used argument is othering the unborn human as “a cluster 
of cells” or “a blob of tissue,” which is unformed and lacks consciousness (Platonists 
might say “unensouled” or “devoid of spirit”), and opposed and inimical to the woman 
insomuch as she is a conscious, rational, productive subject, and not a primitive, 
animalistic “breeder.” Othering the child in dualistic discourses enters into childrearing 
ideologies as well, especially those belonging to those Protestant currents which are 
inimical to the body. In these ideologies, the importance of feeding and sleeping 
schedules, imposed in order to “civilize” the infant, is stressed, and we can see the crying 
infant labeled as being “carnal” (which is apparently a sin) for demanding food or the 
close presence of another human body. A somewhat similar mechanism is at work in 
ideologies surrounding artificial reproductive technologies which employ donor gametes 
(and sometimes even adoption): the new parents view themselves as having merely taken 
base matter from the inferior (less affluent) biological parents, which they have the right 
to fashion in their own image. Consequently, they feel free to disregard the resulting 
offspring’s genetic origins as insignificant, sometimes much to their chagrin. All these 
instances of adultism – othering small children as not fully human – are justified via an 
implicit spirit/matter dichotomy. 
Women allow the othering of their bodies and their children in an attempt to 
redeem at least their “true inner selves,” as they seem to have but one choice: the choice 
of how to respond to the invitation to be identified with the material and the carnal. 
Should they accept, then they might, conversely, feel driven to embrace eco-feminism, 
Neopaganism, or Wicca, and end up giving birth in a pool while chanting to various 
goddesses. Deconstructing these dichotomies, or at least becoming aware of them and 
their origins, might be a first step out of the various double binds that women find 
themselves in. 
Queen Elizabeth herself might have contributed to some double binds in an effort 
to legitimize her rule as the first female monarch of England. She famously elided the 
dualistic emergent early modern concept of interiority as essential and real with the 
distinctly non-dualistic medieval concept of the king’s “body politic” as opposed to his 
“body natural,” (Kantorowitz 1997: 144-145) with some strange and disturbing results, 
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noted by Stephen Cohen in his “(Post) modern Elizabeth: Gender, politics, and the 
emergence of modern subjectivity.” By divorcing identity from biology, Cohen claims, 
she invited uncertainty as to what her gender was – “an anxiety that produced a growing 
obsession with Elizabeth’s sexuality.” (Grady 2002: 24-29) Ben Jonson is quoted as 
saying that “She hath a membrana which rendereth her incapable of man,” whereas she is 
elsewhere accused of being given to an “unspeakable and incredible variety of lust.” 
(Burgess 1970: 69) The somehow essentially masculine, but distinctly female-bodied 
Virgin Queen – an “unnatural” figure either way – ended up occupying both extremes of 
the virgin/whore dichotomy. 
The virgin/whore dichotomy, itself a product of dualistic metaphysics, as has been 
noted, split womanhood into the idealized spiritual virgin and the carnal whore. On the 
one hand, it has caused women to be seen as more frail, irrational, and fleshly. On the 
other hand, it has also resulted in aberrations such as the Victorian concept of the woman 
as the “angel in the house” – asexual and childlike – and the accompanying barbarization 
of men, who were now seen as the lustful ones, unable to control themselves. This led, 
like all gender stereotypes are wont to, to different but equally unfortunate consequences, 
some of which can still be felt, such as the easy proliferation of rape culture. 
 Many notions derived from dualistic concepts (such as, for instance, the notion of 
ecstatic and all-consuming erotic love) are difficult or impossible to integrate into our 
cultural practices (such as the choice model of marriage), but are also difficult to 
eradicate, which is why it is important to at least raise awareness of their originating 
context (dualistic metaphysics inimical to procreation and marriage) and the implications 
stemming from that context (death and union with divinity is the true consummation of 
dualistic Eros, and not “happily ever after” with a spouse). Many fascinating implications 
of dualistic metaphysics can be found everywhere in our current ideologies, which could 
be explored in great detail, but will only be mentioned here: the ideology of pro-ana 
websites and forums (exhorting their adherents to control their gross carnal desires, get 
rid of loathsome fluid flesh, and reach the ideal – which is being reduced to “pure” solid 
bones); the ideologies of Trans* (positing an essential gendered identity inimical to the 
inconsequential body) as opposed to Queer (doing the exact opposite) activism; the 
disgusted misogyny of some male homosexual cultural discourses, and many more. 
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10.3. HEAVENLY ORDER OR ITS SUBVERSION? THE IMPACT OF 
DUALISM ON POLITICS 
 
As is the case with women, whenever any humans need to be othered in order to 
justify subduing them, they will almost inevitably be depicted in terms positioning them 
as “matter” in the hierarchical spirit/matter dichotomy. This was demonstrably the case 
with various “barbarians” that were being colonized by the burgeoning English Empire in 
Shakespeare’s time. The Renaissance Magus, dominating and ordering the world of 
chaotic matter, easily transformed into the colonist, ruling and civilizing the carnal, wild, 
irrational brutes. (Mitchell 2006: xvii; Laoutaris 2008: 96) 
This is not to claim that this civilized/brutish dichotomy, based on spirit/matter 
dualism, did not begin to collapse soon after it was constructed. In his Religo Medici, 
Thomas Browne already warns us that, being carnal, “we are what we all abhorre, 
Antropophagi and Cannibals, devourers not onely of men, but of our selves.” (Laoutaris 
2008: 121) In a way, Prospero deconstructs the dichotomy – while in the process of 
constructing it – the moment he is forced to utter of Caliban “This thing of darkness I 
acknowledge mine.” Laoutaris observes that as “the boundaries between the beast and the 
natural historian become blurred, the neo-Platonic scaffolding that had shored up the 
colonial project begins to seem very weak indeed.” (Laoutaris 2008: 129)  
The dichotomy will be further expounded and further destabilized during the next 
great English colonial expansion, ushering in the era of Modernity. Conrad’s Kurtz 
notoriously descends into an African heart of darkness on an exalted mission to civilize 
its dark, irrational, carnal barbarians, only to end up barbarically exclaiming 
“Exterminate all the brutes!” 
The notion of divine man being able and invited to replicate divine order onto 
baser matter was a staple of Renaissance Neoplatonism, and Neoplatonic concepts such 
as the great chain of being resonated well with royalist doctrines such as the divine right 
of kings, which has sometimes been presented as unproblematic. “It was a commonplace” 
in the Renaissance, Tillyard noted, “that order in the state duplicates the order of the 
macrocosm.” (Tillyard 1972: 96) However, dualistic metaphysical systems, though they 
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can hold notions of corresponding macrocosm/microcosm harmonies, also have a 
tendency to ask further subversive questions such as Is there order in the macrocosm? 
And if there is, is it being properly duplicated?  
The dualistic notion of a divine spark in each human decenters the right to rule. 
Anti-cosmic dualisms – whose one true God is unknown and unknowable and infinitely 
removed from this world, which is instead ruled by a usurper far beneath the divine 
sparks he is keeping imprisoned – are more overtly politically subversive. They are also, 
however, less inclined to inspire their adherents to be actively involved in changing this 
irredeemable world than pro-cosmisms, less squeamish and more optimistic about it. 
It is, arguably, the Neoplatonic notion of an interior, spiritual self that really 
matters, essentially identical to other divine sparks, which humanism adopted, that made 
democracy and equality as we now know them possible. The Neoplatonic brand of 
dualism quite possibly also inspired religious tolerance, as any differences in ritual 
practices began to be seen as relatively unimportant. It is within Renaissance 
Neoplatonism that Judaism came to be studied and respected after yet another dark period 
of pronounced anti-Semitism among Christians, and prominent Neoplatonists such as 
Nicolas of Cusa and Ficino were notably involved in ecumenical movements. 
 
10.4. A POST-PLATONIC WORLD 
 
It is frequently stated that we live in a post-Christian world, but it is becoming 
increasingly clear that, in many ways, this world is instead post-Platonic. Perhaps the 
reason we have lost sight of this is our tendency to mystify the occult on the one hand, 
and sanitize the origins of modern philosophy and science on the other. 
Platonism has admittedly long been disregarded as “the foundation of much of 
modern philosophical thought,” and the syllabi of many university courses in the history 
of philosophy generally start with Descartes, (Hutton/Hedley 2008: 2-3) not even taking 
into consideration that Descartes himself was heavily indebted to the Platonic tradition in 
his metaphysics. In this, he was not alone: Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant, to name a few, 
were all demonstrably influenced by it. (Kristeller 1961: 68) German Idealism was 
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perhaps the clearest continuation of such “pure” Neoplatonism as was expounded by 
Plotinus and Proclus – a conclusion, for instance, not resisted by Schelling and Hegel. 
Platonic notions were built into the foundations of modern science as well. 
“Neoplatonic metaphysics,” Clucas argues, “played a significant, albeit unrecognised, 
role in the development of modern science.” (Clucas 2006: 3) As Mitchell claims, “the 
new scientific age began not with a rejection of magic, but with a revival of interest in 
occult theory and practical magic.” (Mitchell 2006: 5) Dualistic metaphysics were also 
used to justify technology subduing nature, and the “occult traditions themselves were 
annexed to allow the development of technology. The Magus metamorphosed into the 
engineer,” once more conquering the world of matter, only by different means. (Mitchell 
2006: xvii) 
In this post-Platonic world, we no longer mention categories such as “spirit” and 
“matter,” just like we do not believe in Plato’s Ideas. Our new ideologies with their new 
dichotomies, however, still rehearse this split, only couched in different terms. The dark 
otherness of matter, though no longer explicitly stated, is still firmly built into the 
foundations of our civilization. 
 
10.5. THIS DUALISM WILL SELF-DECONSTRUCT 
 
 This thesis, which began with quoting Psalms and Plato, will have to be excused 
for ending with a cartoon reference. Attempting to chop a worm in half with an axe, 
Foghorn Leghorn places it on a tree stump on which he has drawn a line. Evading the 
axe, the worm wiggles now to the one side of the dividing line, now to the other, creating 
the illusion each time that one half of the worm is somehow gone. This leads Foghorn 
Leghorn to conclude:  
 
I know what you’re gonna say, son. When two halves is gone, there’s nothin’ 
left. And you’re right, it’s a little ole worm who wasn’t there. Two nothin’s is nothin’. 
That’s mathematics, son! You can argue with me, but you can’t argue with figures! Two 
half nothin’s is a whole nothin’!  
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Something similar ultimately happens with spirit/matter dualism. When either 
side of the dichotomy is seen in its final extreme, both are shown to be nothingnesses. 
Pure spirit, only able to be described in negative terms, can only be experienced after a 
final dissolution into the nothingness of henosis. Prime matter, on the other hand, is an 
absolute darkness, privation, and void. Any thing or being or cosmos composed of the 
two will also be a nothingness, as two half nothin’s is a whole nothin’ – and the 
dichotomy neatly collapses. 
We can keep attempting to arbitrarily slice the worm in half and hold on to its 
real, important, or valuable part. Or we can believe Foghorn Leghorn that two nothin’s is 
nothin’ – though it might be wise to remember that he is here trying to take the whole 
worm for himself – and give up. We can, conversely, refuse to be taken in, and insist that 
the worm, at any rate, is real – and whole.  
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